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Volume 14
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Games, Volume 14, Issue 1 (February 2023) – 18 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): A convenient model for the comparative analysis of different ways of organization of economic agents is Cournot oligopoly. We have analytically and numerically built and investigated a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We have conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agent behavior (a differential game in normal form), hierarchical organization (differential Stackelberg games), and cooperation (optimal control problem) using individual and collective indices of relative efficiency. The same analysis is made for models with a green effect when players choose both output volumes and environmental protection efforts. View this paper
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24 pages, 404 KiB  
Article
Global Innovation Contests
by Elias Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos and Theofanis Tsoulouhas
Games 2023, 14(1), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010018 - 20 Feb 2023
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1526
Abstract
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global [...] Read more.
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in the Theory and Applications of Contests and Tournaments)
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9 pages, 1031 KiB  
Article
Salivary Oxytocin Has Nonlinear Relationships with Trust and Reciprocity
by Sakura Arai, Motoki Watabe, Kei Kanari, Qiulu Shou, Frank Krueger and Haruto Takagishi
Games 2023, 14(1), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010017 - 20 Feb 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1849
Abstract
Oxytocin has been proposed to regulate human trust. Previous experiments supported this claim by demonstrating that exogenous and endogenous oxytocin is associated with trust (how much trust people place in strangers) and reciprocity (how much people reciprocate when trusted). However, recent replication attempts [...] Read more.
Oxytocin has been proposed to regulate human trust. Previous experiments supported this claim by demonstrating that exogenous and endogenous oxytocin is associated with trust (how much trust people place in strangers) and reciprocity (how much people reciprocate when trusted). However, recent replication attempts have been unsuccessful in demonstrating the trust-enhancing effect of oxytocin, and there is limited evidence on whether oxytocin is associated with reciprocity. This study aimed to replicate the previously found nonlinear relationships between the endogenous oxytocin concentration and both trust and reciprocity by utilizing a monetarily incentivized trust game. In a college sample, we found that salivary oxytocin levels showed (i) an inverted U-shaped relationship with trust in men and (ii) a U-shaped relationship with reciprocity in women. The current results confirm the previous finding that endogenous oxytocin levels have nonlinear relationships with trust and reciprocity. Further research on the role of oxytocin secretion in trust and reciprocity is warranted. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue A Yin and Yang Perspective on the Trust Game: Trust and Reciprocity)
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21 pages, 1743 KiB  
Article
Risk-Averse and Self-Interested Shifts in Groups in Both Median and Random Rules
by Yoshio Kamijo and Teruyuki Tamura
Games 2023, 14(1), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010016 - 13 Feb 2023
Viewed by 1331
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are [...] Read more.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a “black box” when individuals make decisions in a group. In this regard, the subjects in our experiment were only requested to show their faces to the other members, without further communication. Moreover, we adopted two collective decision rules, i.e., the median rule and the random rule, which provide the truth-telling mechanism. In the experiments of both anonymous investment and donation, we found that the subjects who made decisions in a group offered significantly lower amounts than those who made decisions alone, after controlling for individuals’ risk and altruistic preferences. The findings imply that people are more risk-averse and self-interested when they are in a group, regardless of which collective decision rules are adopted. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory with Mathematical Methods)
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15 pages, 317 KiB  
Review
Motivated Memory in Economics—A Review
by Andrea Amelio and Florian Zimmermann
Games 2023, 14(1), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010015 - 31 Jan 2023
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2331
Abstract
Motivated reasoning refers to the idea that people hold certain beliefs about themselves or the world due to their desire to do so, rather than striving for accuracy. This type of belief formation can lead to overconfidence and polarization, as well as facilitate [...] Read more.
Motivated reasoning refers to the idea that people hold certain beliefs about themselves or the world due to their desire to do so, rather than striving for accuracy. This type of belief formation can lead to overconfidence and polarization, as well as facilitate immoral behavior at both the individual and collective levels. One of the supply-side mechanisms for motivated reasoning is motivated memory, or the selective retrieval of past experiences or information based on self-serving criteria. In this article, we review the still young economics literature on motivated memory. Summarizing both theoretical and empirical work, we highlight the key results this literature has produced. We also discuss open questions and potentially exciting avenues for future research in this area. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Motivated Beliefs)
18 pages, 306 KiB  
Article
Differential Game-Theoretic Models of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of the Green Effect
by Guennady Ougolnitsky and Anatoly Usov
Games 2023, 14(1), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010014 - 30 Jan 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1304
Abstract
We built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agents’ behavior (a differential game in normal form), [...] Read more.
We built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agents’ behavior (a differential game in normal form), their hierarchical organization (differential Stackelberg games), and cooperation (optimal control problem) using individual and collective indices of relative efficiency. The same analysis wasperformed for the models with the green effect when players chose both output volumes and environmental protection efforts. We used the Pontryagin maximum principle for analytical investigation and the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling for numerical calculations. This method allows for reducing the number of computer simulations, providing sufficient precision. As a result of the comparative analysis, systems of collective and individual preferences were obtained. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory with Mathematical Methods)
13 pages, 2315 KiB  
Article
Robust Data Sampling in Machine Learning: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Training and Validation Data Selection
by Zhaobin Mo, Xuan Di and Rongye Shi
Games 2023, 14(1), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010013 - 30 Jan 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2308
Abstract
How to sample training/validation data is an important question for machine learning models, especially when the dataset is heterogeneous and skewed. In this paper, we propose a data sampling method that robustly selects training/validation data. We formulate the training/validation data sampling process as [...] Read more.
How to sample training/validation data is an important question for machine learning models, especially when the dataset is heterogeneous and skewed. In this paper, we propose a data sampling method that robustly selects training/validation data. We formulate the training/validation data sampling process as a two-player game: a trainer aims to sample training data so as to minimize the test error, while a validator adversarially samples validation data that can increase the test error. Robust sampling is achieved at the game equilibrium. To accelerate the searching process, we adopt reinforcement learning aided Monte Carlo trees search (MCTS). We apply our method to a car-following modeling problem, a complicated scenario with heterogeneous and random human driving behavior. Real-world data, the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM), is used to validate this method, and experiment results demonstrate the sampling robustness and thereby the model out-of-sample performance. Full article
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18 pages, 883 KiB  
Article
Information Design for Multiple Interdependent Defenders: Work Less, Pay Off More
by Chenghan Zhou, Andrew Spivey, Haifeng Xu and Thanh H. Nguyen
Games 2023, 14(1), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010012 - 30 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1482
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker. A principal, who can be one of the [...] Read more.
This paper studies the problem of information design in a general security game setting in which multiple self-interested defenders attempt to provide protection simultaneously for the same set of important targets against an unknown attacker. A principal, who can be one of the defenders, has access to certain private information (i.e., attacker type), whereas other defenders do not. We investigate the question of how that principal, with additional private information, can influence the decisions of the defenders by partially and strategically revealing her information. In particular, we develop a polynomial time ellipsoid algorithm to compute an optimal private signaling scheme. Our key finding is that the separation oracle in the ellipsoid approach can be carefully reduced to bipartite matching. Furthermore, we introduce a compact representation of any ex ante persuasive signaling schemes by exploiting intrinsic security resource allocation structures, enabling us to compute an optimal scheme significantly faster. Our experiment results show that by strategically revealing private information, the principal can significantly enhance the protection effectiveness for the targets. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game-Theoretic Analysis of Network Security and Privacy)
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3 pages, 165 KiB  
Editorial
Acknowledgment to the Reviewers of Games in 2022
by Games Editorial Office
Games 2023, 14(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010011 - 21 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1094
Abstract
High-quality academic publishing is built on a rigorous peer review process, and Games is no exception, upholding its high standards for published papers due to the outstanding efforts of our reviewers [...] Full article
11 pages, 276 KiB  
Article
The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission in European Union through Applying the Claims Problems Approach
by Foroogh Salekpay
Games 2023, 14(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010009 - 20 Jan 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1321
Abstract
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris [...] Read more.
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021–2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries’ preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021–2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
16 pages, 619 KiB  
Article
HEXACO Personality Dimensions Do Not Predict Individual Differences in Adolescent Trust Behavior
by Hester Sijtsma, Nikki C. Lee, Jacek Buczny, Miriam Hollarek, Reubs J. Walsh, Mariët Van Buuren and Lydia Krabbendam
Games 2023, 14(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010010 - 20 Jan 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1608
Abstract
Adolescence is an important developmental period for both trust behavior and personality maturation, and individual differences in trust decisions may be related to different personality traits. In the current study, a group of adolescents (n = 483, Mage = 13.5, SD [...] Read more.
Adolescence is an important developmental period for both trust behavior and personality maturation, and individual differences in trust decisions may be related to different personality traits. In the current study, a group of adolescents (n = 483, Mage = 13.5, SDage = 0.4) played two counterbalanced conditions of a multi-round trust game. In one condition, the partner displayed trustworthy behavior (the trustworthy condition), while the partner in the other condition played untrustworthy behavior (the untrustworthy condition). Three types of trust behavior were examined: initial trust behavior, the adaptation of trust behavior (trustworthy condition), and the adaptation of trust behavior (untrustworthy condition). Personality was measured using the Brief HEXACO Inventory. We expected the HEXACO personality dimensions of honesty–humility and agreeableness to be positively associated with initial trust behavior, but conscientiousness to be negatively related to initial trust behavior. The examination of the relationship between these dimensions and the adaptation of trust behavior were conducted on an exploratory basis. The investigation of the relationship between the remaining dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience) and the three types of trust behavior were also carried out on an exploratory basis. For each type of trust behavior, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was undertaken to examine whether the HEXACO personality dimensions were related to trust behavior. Using frequentist analyses, no evidence was found that supported the HEXACO dimensions as significant predictors of the three types of trust behavior. Moreover, additional Bayesian analyses showed evidence that the hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (honesty–humility, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) did not outperform the non-hypothesized HEXACO dimensions (emotionality, extraversion, and openness to experience). The association between personality traits and trust might be less pronounced during adolescence as personality maturates across an individual’s lifespan. Additionally, due to a heightened sensitivity to the environment, contextual cues may affect adolescent decision-making processes, leaving less room for personality-driven behaviors. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue A Yin and Yang Perspective on the Trust Game: Trust and Reciprocity)
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21 pages, 2494 KiB  
Article
Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity
by Yao Zhang, Yushu Zhang, Yan Wu and Frank Krueger
Games 2023, 14(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010008 - 13 Jan 2023
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1945
Abstract
Trust and reciprocity promote cooperation and are key elements of a successful social life. This study investigated the framing effects on trust and reciprocity behaviors. Using an iterated one-shot within-subjects design, this study explored how trust and reciprocity decisions changed when the game [...] Read more.
Trust and reciprocity promote cooperation and are key elements of a successful social life. This study investigated the framing effects on trust and reciprocity behaviors. Using an iterated one-shot within-subjects design, this study explored how trust and reciprocity decisions changed when the game was framed in terms of a give (i.e., using a standard trust game with a default of no trust) and a take (e.g., using a distrust game with a default of full trust) frame. Participants of both genders first completed the scenario version of the game (Session 1), and then played the roles of trustors (Session 2) and trustees (Session 3) with human and computer-mediated human partners either in the give or take frame. Our results showed increased trust in the give than in the take frame, but only pronounced in direct interaction with human (vs. indirect computer-mediated) partners. Participants also showed higher expectations of return in the give than in the take frame. The actual reciprocity was higher in the give than in the take frame when interacting both with human and computer-mediated human partners. The results contribute to our understanding of the factors that shape trust and reciprocity and emphasize the impact of framing the default. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue A Yin and Yang Perspective on the Trust Game: Trust and Reciprocity)
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19 pages, 1254 KiB  
Article
COVID-19 Activities: Publicness and Strategic Concerns
by Todd Sandler
Games 2023, 14(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010007 - 12 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1199
Abstract
This paper considers the diverse public good characteristics of COVID-19 activities along with their strategic implications. The underlying aggregator technologies, which relate individual contributions to the amount consumed, affect the prognosis for the supply of COVID-related activities. Weakest-link activities assume a particularly pivotal [...] Read more.
This paper considers the diverse public good characteristics of COVID-19 activities along with their strategic implications. The underlying aggregator technologies, which relate individual contributions to the amount consumed, affect the prognosis for the supply of COVID-related activities. Weakest-link activities assume a particularly pivotal role in curbing the spread of COVID-19. For instance, the propagation of COVID-19 through new strains is disproportionately influenced by those countries with the smallest vaccination rates or least isolation actions. Diverse income distribution among at-risk countries raises the need to “shore up” weakest-link countries’ provision to lift global supply. Generally, shoring-up actions result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with unfavorable collective action prospects. As the number of countries requiring shoring up increases, the less favorable is the prospect for addressing provision shortfalls. Also, as the number of capable countries to do the shoring up increases, the prospect for successful action diminishes. The paper also examines the strategic implications of other aggregators—e.g., best shot and better shot—associated with COVID-inhibiting actions. To address best-shot anti-COVID actions, countries must pool or coordinate actions to meet a threshold. A host of institutions—e.g., the World Health Organization or public-private partnerships—can facilitate shoring-up weakest-link activities or coordinating best-shot actions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics and Sustainability Research)
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14 pages, 1198 KiB  
Article
The Connection between Imported Inputs and Exports: The Importance of Strategic Interdependence
by Arijit Mukherjee and Yao Liu
Games 2023, 14(1), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010006 - 09 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1248
Abstract
Ignoring strategic interactions among final goods producers, the extant theoretical literature shows that lower costs of imported inputs increase the exports of the final goods using those inputs. Hence, it does not explain the empirically relevant positive relationship between the costs of imported [...] Read more.
Ignoring strategic interactions among final goods producers, the extant theoretical literature shows that lower costs of imported inputs increase the exports of the final goods using those inputs. Hence, it does not explain the empirically relevant positive relationship between the costs of imported inputs and the export of the final goods. We use a simple Cournot duopoly (i.e., duopoly quantity competition) with homogeneous products to show that if the exporters differ in input coefficients, lower costs of imported inputs may increase or decrease the exports of the final goods. Thus, we argue that strategic interdependence among the exporters can be an important factor for the positive relationship between lower costs of imported inputs and the export of the final goods. We further show that a lower cost of imported inputs may reduce the consumer surplus, total profits of the exporters, and world welfare. We also show the implications of a Bertrand duopoly (i.e., duopoly price competition) with horizontal product differentiation for our analysis. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)
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3 pages, 174 KiB  
Editorial
Pre-Registration in Experimental Economics: An Editorial Policy
by Heinrich H. Nax
Games 2023, 14(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010005 - 04 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1585
Abstract
First and foremost, pre-registration is not the all-in-one solution for experimental economics [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)
21 pages, 364 KiB  
Article
The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment
by Timothy Mathews, Soiliou Daw Namoro and James W. Boudreau
Games 2023, 14(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010004 - 03 Jan 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1757
Abstract
A multi-tournament environment is analyzed, focusing on the impact of organizer market structure on agent entry behavior. Two high ability agents first decide which tournament to enter (with fields then filled by low ability agents). If the marginal benefit of high ability agents [...] Read more.
A multi-tournament environment is analyzed, focusing on the impact of organizer market structure on agent entry behavior. Two high ability agents first decide which tournament to enter (with fields then filled by low ability agents). If the marginal benefit of high ability agents in an event is weakly increasing, a monopsonist organizer sets prizes so that the high ability agents enter the same event. If this marginal benefit is diminishing, a monopsonist organizer will either: always set prizes for which the high ability agents enter different events; or set prizes for which the high ability agents enter different events if and only if the difference in ability between the high ability and low ability agents is sufficiently small. Sequentially competing organizers set prizes for which both high ability agents enter the same event if and only if the marginal benefit of having two high ability agents in one event is relatively large. For competing organizers there may be either a first or second mover advantage. Finally, Social Welfare may be higher or lower with competing organizers, implying greater organizer competition does not necessarily increase Social Welfare. Parallels are noted throughout to the labor market for professional golfers both over years when the PGA TOUR was essentially a monopsonist and more recently when LIV Golf emerged as a competitor. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in the Theory and Applications of Contests and Tournaments)
16 pages, 334 KiB  
Article
Oligopoly Pricing: The Role of Firm Size and Number
by Iwan Bos and Marco A. Marini
Games 2023, 14(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010003 - 29 Dec 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2510
Abstract
This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases [...] Read more.
This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the largest seller and industry capacity is neither too big nor too small post-merger. Similarly, breaking up a firm only leads to lower prices when it concerns the biggest producer and aggregate capacity is within an intermediate range. Investment and entry (weakly) reduce prices, whereas divestment and exit yield (weakly) higher prices. Taken together, these findings suggest that size matters more than number in the determination of oligopoly prices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)
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18 pages, 948 KiB  
Article
Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching
by Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic
Games 2023, 14(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010002 - 27 Dec 2022
Viewed by 1454
Abstract
This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and [...] Read more.
This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and analyze the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. The cases of convergent expectations, divergent expectations and of social preferences are studied. The extension of earlier works lies in the consideration of a stochastic matching on a graph dependent on the weights of edges. The results show that, in all three cases, the dynamics converges rapidly to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, which is an equilibrium that combines notions of stability and fairness. In the first two scenarios, the numerical simulations reveal that the convergence toward a fixed point is speedily achieved at the value of the outside option. In the third scenario, the fixed point promptly converges to the value of the outside option supplemented by the surplus share. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
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20 pages, 2330 KiB  
Article
Defining Cyber Risk Scenarios to Evaluate IoT Systems
by Roberto Andrade, Iván Ortiz, María Cazares, Gustavo Navas and María Isabel Sánchez-Pazmiño
Games 2023, 14(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010001 - 20 Dec 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1875
Abstract
The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) has accelerated digital transformation processes in organizations and cities. However, it has also opened new security challenges due to the complexity and dynamism of these systems. The application of security risk analysis methodologies used to [...] Read more.
The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) has accelerated digital transformation processes in organizations and cities. However, it has also opened new security challenges due to the complexity and dynamism of these systems. The application of security risk analysis methodologies used to evaluate information technology (IT) systems have their limitations to qualitatively assess the security risks in IoT systems, due to the lack of historical data and the dynamic behavior of the solutions based on the IoT. The objective of this study is to propose a methodology for developing a security risk analysis using scenarios based on the risk factors of IoT devices. In order to manage the uncertainty due to the dynamics of IoT behaviors, we propose the use of Bayesian networks in conjunction with the Best Worst Method (BWM) for multi-criteria decision-making to obtain a quantitative security risk value. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory for Cybersecurity and Privacy)
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