Game Theory with Applications to Economics

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 August 2023) | Viewed by 8415

Special Issue Editor


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Guest Editor
Departament d’Economia and ECO-SOS, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain
Interests: claims problems; game theory; social choice

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Game theory, which deals with strategic interactions among multiple decision makers in a context with predefined rules and outcomes, is a major research branch in economic theory. It is noteworthy that game theory is not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but is also an important tool to understand the real behavior of society (widely applied to avoid conflict situations, defense, operations against time-critical targets, competition models, contests, among others). Furthermore, there has also recently been an almost exponentially growing interest in the application of game theory concepts and tools to research on control, multiagent systems, and networks due to the irruption and attractiveness of artificial intelligence.

This Special Issue aims to further the state-of-the-art. We encourage the submission of papers underscoring recent advances in theory and application of game theory to economics. Building on established contributions as well as on the current momentum, we are interested in new cutting-edge applications of game theory, including behavioral and experimental economics applications. A few topic areas are highlighted below:

  • Industrial organization;
  • Bargaining;
  • Networks;
  • Mechanism design;
  • Auctions;
  • Voting theory;
  • Experimental economics;
  • Political economy;
  • Behavioral economics;
  • Experiments;
  • Artificial intelligence;
  • Computer science.

Dr. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • auctions
  • networks
  • computing
  • behavior
  • experiments
  • voting
  • artificial intelligence
  • economics
  • claims problems

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

27 pages, 353 KiB  
Article
Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage
by Armando Gomes
Games 2024, 15(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15010004 - 30 Jan 2024
Viewed by 1009
Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target’s shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost [...] Read more.
This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target’s shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show that trading allows for the entry of arbitrageurs with large blocks of shares who can hold out a freezeout—a threat that forces the bidder to offer a high preemptive bid. There is also a positive relationship between the takeover premium and arbitrageurs’ accumulation of shares before the takeover announcement, and the less liquid the target stock, the stronger this relationship is. Moreover, freezeouts eliminate the free-rider problem, but front-end loaded bids, such as two-tiered and partial offers, do not benefit bidders because arbitrageurs can undo any potential benefit and eliminate the coerciveness of these offers. Similarly, the takeover premium is also largely unrelated to the bidder’s ability to dilute the target’s shareholders after the acquisition, also due to potential arbitrage activity. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
16 pages, 5866 KiB  
Article
The Art of Sharing Resources: How to Distribute Water during a Drought Period
by Sebastian Cano-Berlanga, María-José Solís-Baltodano and Cori Vilella
Games 2023, 14(5), 59; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050059 - 25 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1134
Abstract
Water scarcity is a growing problem in many regions worldwide. According to the United Nations, around one-fifth of the world’s population lives in areas where water is scarce. Another one-quarter of the world’s population has to face water supply cuts, mainly because this [...] Read more.
Water scarcity is a growing problem in many regions worldwide. According to the United Nations, around one-fifth of the world’s population lives in areas where water is scarce. Another one-quarter of the world’s population has to face water supply cuts, mainly because this proportion of the population lacks the necessary infrastructure to acquire water from rivers and aquifers (UN, 2005). Water is a resource that is essential to human survival and is also present in all productive processes in the economy. Therefore, we are challenged to adequately manage water to ensure the population’s well-being and to achieve socioeconomic development. Specifically, this paper analyzes the situation present in the summer of 2022 at Riudecanyes (a village in Catalonia, Spain), where a drought problem exists. We propose applying the conflicting claims problem theory to give possible solutions to distribute the water. We propose to use this theory to describe the distribution of the available irrigation hours in 2022, considering the demand made by the farmers in the previous year, when there was regular irrigation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
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9 pages, 262 KiB  
Communication
Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets
by Harold Houba and Françeska Tomori
Games 2023, 14(4), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040054 - 11 Jul 2023
Viewed by 1177
Abstract
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream [...] Read more.
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
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11 pages, 276 KiB  
Article
The Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission in European Union through Applying the Claims Problems Approach
by Foroogh Salekpay
Games 2023, 14(1), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010009 - 20 Jan 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1313
Abstract
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris [...] Read more.
Due to the challenge of global warming, the European Union (EU) signed the Paris Agreement (2015) to diminish total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. This paper addresses the conflict that EU member states face when they want to follow the target of the Paris Agreement for the period 2021–2030 which is a 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 (compared with GHG emission in 1990). EU member states have to emit at a level that is lower than their emission needs. To solve this problem, we implement the claims problems approach as a method for distributing insufficient resources among parties with greater demands. We use several well-known division rules to divide the emission budget among EU member states. We define a set of principles that should be satisfied by division rules to select the most optimal allocation method. To diminish the effect of countries’ preferences on the allocation we use equity and stability criteria to examine the fairness of the rules. Moreover, we allocate the emission budget in two ways: First, we apply division rules to allocate the total emission budget for 2021–2030 among countries. Second, we allocate the emission budget annually from 2021 to 2030. We propose that Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) is an appropriate division rule to meet the target of 2030. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
18 pages, 948 KiB  
Article
Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching
by Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic
Games 2023, 14(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010002 - 27 Dec 2022
Viewed by 1449
Abstract
This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and [...] Read more.
This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and analyze the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. The cases of convergent expectations, divergent expectations and of social preferences are studied. The extension of earlier works lies in the consideration of a stochastic matching on a graph dependent on the weights of edges. The results show that, in all three cases, the dynamics converges rapidly to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, which is an equilibrium that combines notions of stability and fairness. In the first two scenarios, the numerical simulations reveal that the convergence toward a fixed point is speedily achieved at the value of the outside option. In the third scenario, the fixed point promptly converges to the value of the outside option supplemented by the surplus share. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
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8 pages, 285 KiB  
Article
The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting
by Marina Bánnikova and José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
Games 2022, 13(6), 77; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060077 - 17 Nov 2022
Viewed by 1442
Abstract
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a [...] Read more.
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory with Applications to Economics)
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