Game Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics and Sustainability Research

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 November 2023) | Viewed by 8066

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
Interests: development economics; environmenral, resource and energy economics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

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Guest Editor
1. College of Business and Public Management, Wenzhou-Kean University, Wenzhou 325060, China
2. Natural Resources Institute, the University of Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, UK
Interests: development economics; environmental economics; energy policy; food policy; composite indicators; sustainability

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Co-Guest Editor
Department of Economic and Statistical Sciences, University of Salerno, I-84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
Interests: innovation economics; environmental economics; labor economics; econometrics; public policy; economics of innovation; patents; knowledge diffusion process; employment; green economy; applied microeconometrics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

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Co-Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
Interests: game theory; cooperative games (TU and NTU); public and global goods; private and public R&D investments and knowledge spillovers in pharmaceutical industry; environmental agreement; spatial competition; Voronoi diagram and its applications; optimization problems; experimental economics; experimental learning in game theory; economics and finance mathematics and economics education; general equilibrium model
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

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Co-Guest Editor
Department of Economic and Statistical Sciences, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, 84084 Fisciano, Italy
Interests: applied game theory; environmental economics; experimental economics; waste management; patent regulations

E-Mail Website
Co-Guest Editor
Department of Economic and Statistic Sciences, University of Fisciano, Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, 84084 Fisciano, Salerno, Italy
Interests: cooperative games; applied game theory; environmental economics; experimental game theory; game theory for mathematic education

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

We are currently experiencing several multi-layered global crises that call for enhanced cooperation. Severe multidimensional, complex phenomena such as the COVID-19 outbreak and global climate change have dramatically changed our lives and our relationship with our work, nature and interactions, affecting entire populations. Adverse events risk causing enormous ecological, societal, economic and governance impacts, endangering mankind.

Game theory offers an array of rigorous analytical tools to settle noteworthy issues and possibly offset the anthropogenic impact on society, environmental quality and sustainable use of natural resources, proposing resilience policy and solutions. There is a sizeable body of game theory applications for monopolistic and oligopolistic interaction patterns within the framework of the economics of natural resources. A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature offers strategic perspectives on environmental and development economics and sustainable development.

The relevance of game theory for the analysis and optimization of the interaction between sizeable groups of states arises, especially within international environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement or the European Green Deal. Against this backdrop, the theory of global common-pool resources governance plays a central role in the assessment and optimization of international and global climate action. This is even more pertinent for the exploration of fisheries in the mesopelagic zone, which drive the biological carbon print on the one hand side and also act as a potential source for food for the growing number of people worldwide.

This Special Issue aims to foster urgent research questions related to sustainability, environmental, resource and development economics, including—but not limited to—game theoretic analysis of:

  • Management of common-pool resources;
  • Cooperative and non-cooperative games;
  • Social and environmental economics and policy;
  • International environmental agreements;
  • International development agenda, SDGs and grand challenges;
  • Resource governance—including energy, food, agriculture, aquaculture, water and land management;
  • Application of game multi-species games;
  • Faustmann formula;
  • Gordon–Shaefer model;
  • Strategic interaction in management of fisheries;
  • Game theory in management of deep sea fisheries;
  • Applications of game theory in studies on climate change engineering;
  • Climate change and climate justice modelling;
  • Public and environmental health;
  • Decisions on the determination of the magnitude of exploration of natural resources;
  • Management of conflicts related to the distribution of water resources;
  • Common pool resources and public goods governance;
  • Adaptation, mitigation and resilience action to tackle vulnerability and multifaceted injustice;
  • Nash and Stackelberg open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in distributional bargaining games;
  • Nash–Cournot equilibria concepts and their applications;
  • The role of environmental discounting in distributional games related to climate economics;
  • Berntrand duopoly equilibria in environmental studies;
  • Cournot equilibria;
  • Competition and monopole behavior in resource and environmental economics;
  • Innovation of productive processes for sustainable development;
  • Law and economics, policy, and regulation analysis;
  • Strategic competition on economic rent;
  • Interaction in international trade with nonrenewable natural resources;
  • Application of game theory in modeling issues related to international development cooperation
  • Strategic interaction patterns in geoengineering, especially solar radiation management
  • Game theory perspectives on non-binding environmental agreements, such as nationally determined pledges within the Paris Agreement.

We invite authors to submit their full-size research articles, short conceptual review papers and notes on this topic to this Special Issue of Games. Related subjects, approaches and methodologies from any discipline—applied either empirically or theoretically—are welcome. Interdisciplinary works and contributions pertaining to diverse schools and streams of research are strongly encouraged. 

Dr. Elkhan Richard Sadik-Zada
Prof. Dr. Andrea Gatto
Prof. Dr. Luigi Aldieri
Dr. Giovanna Bimonte
Prof. Dr. Luigi Senatore
Prof. Dr. Concetto Paolo Vinci
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • sustainable development
  • sustainability
  • energy economics
  • development economics
  • resource governance
  • social economics
  • environmental economics
  • energy policy
  • food policy
  • cooperative and non-cooperative games
  • strategy

Published Papers (5 papers)

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Editorial

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4 pages, 177 KiB  
Editorial
Game Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics, and Sustainability Research
by Elkhan Richard Sadik-Zada, Andrea Gatto, Luigi Aldieri, Giovanna Bimonte, Luigi Senatore and Concetto Paolo Vinci
Games 2024, 15(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15010005 - 31 Jan 2024
Viewed by 1421
Abstract
The present investigation elaborates on the level of game theory application for the applied and theoretical analyses of climate change and development studies. This editorial shows that the common good character of global climate alongside the increasing internalization of environmental externalities through national [...] Read more.
The present investigation elaborates on the level of game theory application for the applied and theoretical analyses of climate change and development studies. This editorial shows that the common good character of global climate alongside the increasing internalization of environmental externalities through national regulations and international environmental treaties jointly result in the increasing congruence between the context of climate change problems and the game theoretical method. Furthermore, the adoption of the Paris Accord by the overwhelming majority of developing countries as well as the disproportionate vulnerability of the Global South have led to an increasing shift in focus with regard to international development cooperation, from poverty alleviation and economic growth to green growth and circular economy solutions, within developing countries. The underutilization of game theory in the context of development studies is not satisfactory. This paper underlines the importance of implementing an impetus to researchers for scholarly discussions and applications of game theory in a discourse on the following topics: 1. economic growth; 2. climate change mitigation and adaptation; and 3. a broader socioeconomic development. Full article

Research

Jump to: Editorial

19 pages, 706 KiB  
Article
Border Games: A Game Theoretic Model of Undocumented Immigration
by Julide Yazar and Robert J. Gitter
Games 2023, 14(5), 58; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050058 - 24 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1429
Abstract
We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination [...] Read more.
We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination country, and the undocumented immigrants from the Source Country. We show that the impact of border enforcement is dampened because strategic interaction between the players will tend to mute any unilateral changes. We also study the effect of uncertainty in the labor market on migration issues and analyze the two cases where policymakers have to make their decisions before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the market state is realized. Full article
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15 pages, 373 KiB  
Article
A Differential Game for Optimal Water Price Management
by Andrea Caravaggio, Luigi De Cesare and Andrea Di Liddo
Games 2023, 14(2), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020033 - 05 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1279
Abstract
This article studies a leader–follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the [...] Read more.
This article studies a leader–follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the interior solution is considered), and the following different tariff schemes are analyzed: linear scheme, increasing block tariff, and convex tariff. Numerical simulations highlight how tariff convexity and seasonality in buyer’s preferences affect water price and demand, and the dynamics of the basin over time. The study shows that synchrony or asynchrony between basin recharge and buyer cyclical demand can dramatically affect the dynamics and basin levels observed at the end of the time period considered. Additionally, the presence of a large number of fluctuations in buyer preferences affects basin fluctuations, while natural recharge may help in maintaining acceptable levels of future water demands. Full article
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18 pages, 304 KiB  
Article
Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions
by Naoto Aoyama and Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva
Games 2023, 14(2), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020026 - 16 Mar 2023
Viewed by 1250
Abstract
Under the ‘new normal’ in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. [...] Read more.
Under the ‘new normal’ in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional governments and a benevolent central government interact strategically in dynamic games in which there are provisions of federal and regional public goods and interregional income and fiscal transfers, the population is attached to regions and hybrid work creates a common labor market in the federation. In this setting, we first show that decentralized leadership is inefficient if the center controls income transfers only. This result provides an efficiency enhancing motivation for the center to additionally control earmarked transfers: we demonstrate that decentralized leadership is efficient whenever the center controls both income and earmarked transfers. However, this is not the only federal regime in which decentralized leadership is efficient. It is efficient in the absence of earmarked transfers if it is appropriately selective: when the regional governments commit to the provision of the federal public only and the center redistributes income across regions. Full article
19 pages, 1254 KiB  
Article
COVID-19 Activities: Publicness and Strategic Concerns
by Todd Sandler
Games 2023, 14(1), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010007 - 12 Jan 2023
Viewed by 1196
Abstract
This paper considers the diverse public good characteristics of COVID-19 activities along with their strategic implications. The underlying aggregator technologies, which relate individual contributions to the amount consumed, affect the prognosis for the supply of COVID-related activities. Weakest-link activities assume a particularly pivotal [...] Read more.
This paper considers the diverse public good characteristics of COVID-19 activities along with their strategic implications. The underlying aggregator technologies, which relate individual contributions to the amount consumed, affect the prognosis for the supply of COVID-related activities. Weakest-link activities assume a particularly pivotal role in curbing the spread of COVID-19. For instance, the propagation of COVID-19 through new strains is disproportionately influenced by those countries with the smallest vaccination rates or least isolation actions. Diverse income distribution among at-risk countries raises the need to “shore up” weakest-link countries’ provision to lift global supply. Generally, shoring-up actions result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with unfavorable collective action prospects. As the number of countries requiring shoring up increases, the less favorable is the prospect for addressing provision shortfalls. Also, as the number of capable countries to do the shoring up increases, the prospect for successful action diminishes. The paper also examines the strategic implications of other aggregators—e.g., best shot and better shot—associated with COVID-inhibiting actions. To address best-shot anti-COVID actions, countries must pool or coordinate actions to meet a threshold. A host of institutions—e.g., the World Health Organization or public-private partnerships—can facilitate shoring-up weakest-link activities or coordinating best-shot actions. Full article
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