Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 April 2024 | Viewed by 1960

Special Issue Editors

School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
Interests: industrial organization; applied microeconomics; applied game theory; financial economics
Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Aguascalientes, Mexico
Interests: contract theory; corporate finance; industrial organization; matching

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Traditional industrial organization models have treated the firm as a “black box” and have primarily focused on how market structure affects variables such as prices, quantities, innovation and welfare. More recently, there have been attempts in the literature to open the “black box” and explore the interplay between organizational structures of firms and industrial organizations. This subfield has been termed Organizational Industrial Organization (OIO).

The organization of the firm, such as the vertical structure, make-or-buy decisions, and managerial incentive contracts, to name a few, affect prices and market performance but can also be affected by them. Firm productivity and financial variables can play an important moderating role in this relationship. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics.

The Special Issue welcomes the submission of papers in OIO. Papers may focus on the relationship between market structure and firm organization, such as firm boundary decisions, incentive contracts and corporate governance. We also seek papers that develop new applications of OIO, as well as experimental and empirical research that would guide the development of new theoretical research in this area.

Prof. Dr. Konstantinos Serfes
Prof. Dr. Kaniska Dam
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • organization of the firm
  • product market structure
  • firm boundaries
  • corporate governance
  • make-or-buy decisions
  • managerial compensation
  • capital structure

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

23 pages, 643 KiB  
Article
Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure with Learning-by-Doing Production Technologies
Games 2024, 15(2), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020009 - 29 Feb 2024
Viewed by 119
Abstract
Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the dynamic interactions in [...] Read more.
Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the dynamic interactions in the vertical chain when the monopolist sets the prices; we find that customer foreclosure may arise in equilibrium when the products are close substitutes and be welfare-enhancing. The rate of learning is lower than the social optimal and a social planner would tend to impose exclusivity more often compared to the downstream monopolist. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics)
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21 pages, 330 KiB  
Article
Vertical Relationships with Hidden Interactions
Games 2023, 14(6), 69; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14060069 - 31 Oct 2023
Viewed by 853
Abstract
In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract. The principal employs two agents who learn their task environments through their involvement. The principal cannot observe the task environments. It is important to note [...] Read more.
In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract. The principal employs two agents who learn their task environments through their involvement. The principal cannot observe the task environments. It is important to note that hidden interactions, such as acts of sabotage or help between the agents, have the potential to alter each other’s task environments. Our analysis encompasses two distinct organizational structures: competition and cooperation. Without hidden interactions, the competitive structure is optimal because the cooperative structure only provides the agents with more flexibility to collusively misrepresent their task environments. With hidden interactions, however, the cooperative structure induces the agents to help each other to improve the task environments while removing sabotaging incentives at no cost once collusion is deterred. As a result, the cooperative structure can be optimal in such a case. We discuss the link between production technology and organizational structure, finding that complementarity in production favors cooperative structures. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics)
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