Who Is Gaining, Who Is Losing? Examining Benefit Sharing Mechanism (BSM) under REDD+ in India ^†

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the institutional structure of the Benefit Sharing Mechanism (BSM) under the Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in the global south, managing forest sustainably to conserve carbon (REDD+) in India. Moreover, this paper examines the problems and prospects of livelihood enhancement of the local community. The findings of the study indicate that the intervention of the carbon market promotes the neoliberal capitalist agenda which can adversely impact the livelihood of local communities through forest grabbing. The proposed top-down centralized model of BSM can hinder its effectiveness and increase leakage. At the local level, the existing institution of Joint Forest Management (JFM) in India failed to achieve sustainability and decentralized right-based forest management systems. Our work has led us to conclude without safeguarding the rights of local communities and securing basic necessities for local forest-dependent communities, livelihood enhancement would not be possible.

1. Introduction

Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in the global south, and managing forest sustainably to conserve carbon (REDD+) appeared in global climate change and forest management discourse in 2005 at the 11 Conference of Parties (CoP) of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC). It evolved in the subsequent CoP at Bali (2007), Poznan (2008), Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), Warsaw (2013), and Paris (2015). The notion of REDD+ was adopted from carbon trading under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto protocol (1997) [1]. REDD+ provides an opportunity for developed nations and corporations to offset their carbon by buying carbon credits from tropical forest-rich countries. It is argued that financial compensation will work as a positive externality to sustainably manage forest resources in developing nations.

REDD+ is disseminated as the most cost-efficient and fastest way of climate change mitigation and a win-win solution for biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation. Indeed, it is seen as a common platform to achieve the Paris Agreement target and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially goal 13 (Climate Action) and goal 15 (Life on Land) [2]. More than 70 developing nations including India have already implemented REDD+ projects [3].

The objectives of the paper are to critically assess the institutional structure of REDD+ Benefit Sharing Mechanism (BSM) in India and, moreover, to analyze the problems and prospects of livelihood enhancement of the local community at policy and ground levels.

2. REDD+ in Indian Context

India is one of the central actors within REDD+ negotiation who are compelled to add conservation activities [4]. To implement REDD+ projects, India submitted a readiness proposal for the national strategy in 2008 and modified the proposal in 2018. The first pilot projects are already implemented in the Khasi hill region of Meghalay, along with 27 more projects across the nation [5].

Further, India introduced the flagship program Green India Mission (GIM) under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2010. It aims to enhance 50 to 60 million tons of carbon sequestration capacity annually by increasing 10 million hectares of forest/tree cover [6]. The government of India claimed that the effort of GIM will lead to the achievement of National Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Accord.

Any Policy intervention on India’s forest landscape is crucial because it is one of the mega-diverse countries with 24.62 percent forest/tree cover. More than 200 million livelihoods directly depend on the forest [7,8].

3. Materials and Methods

This article analytically relied upon the environmental discursive approach of Hajer. Discourse is “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” [9]. It is particularly useful to understand how certain policies gain legitimacy over others and in analyzing institutional structure.

In the initial stages, we used international and national REDD+ policy documents, webpages, research articles, and newspaper articles to analyze the discourse and institutional structure of BSM. In the secondary stage, we conducted interviews with the forest department and NGO. In the final stage, conducted focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation with forest dwellers in Sundarban, India to understand the ground reality.

4. Discussion

Sharing financial benefits with local forest-dependent communities to sustainably use forest resources is the principal component of REDD+. After a decade of REDD+ implementation, there are no universally accepted BSM to equitably disburse the fund. The Cancun Agreement, Warsaw Framework, and Paris Agreement provide some guidelines for BSM [10]. Different nation-states adopted different institutional structures and benefit-sharing mechanisms.

4.1. Institutional Structure of BSM in India

India adopted a top-down approach toward BSM (Figure 1), where funds transfer from national to sub-national to division to local levels. At the national level, the Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) instituted the National Designated Entity (NDE) REDD+ with the incorporation of different ministry and forest bureaucrats. NDE REDD+ will be responsible for technical support and disbursement of funds to the sub-national level. Internal finance will be mobilized from allocation through GIM, Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA), Namami Gange Programme, and Green Highways Policy. Whereas at the sub-national level, State Forest Department (SFD) and REDD+ cell will transfer the funds to the Divisional level. After that, the divisional forest department will transfer the fund to the local-level institution Joint Forest Management (JFM) [7].

With all the decision-making power vested in the ministry or forest department, there is no space for the voice of the local community. The local institution JFM is heavily controlled by the forest department [11]. The nationwide implementation of REDD+ can centralize forest governance [12,13].

4.2. Problem and Prospect of Livelihood Enhancement

The livelihood of forest dwellers depends upon minor forest products and forest-based resources. The forest-dependent community of India mostly lived below the poverty line without basic facilities and amenities. A study showed that from the Khasi hill REDD+ project, there were no adequate financial incentives received by the local community, even though they lost their rights to collect minor forest products on the project site [14].

5. Conclusions

There are a number of problems discerned in existing BSM in India; firstly, at the international level, the intervention of the carbon market promotes a neo-liberal, capitalist agenda that adversely impacts the rights of the local community and undermines indigenous knowledge [15]. Secondly, at the national level, centralized BSM can hinder effectiveness and increase leakage. Finally, at the local level, the existing institution of JFM in India failed to achieve sustainability and decentralized right-based forest management systems over the last decades.

After decades of the REDD+ regime, no significant goals have been achieved. Even new powerful stakeholders are illegally accusing land without any prior consent from local people and promoting fast-growing commercially profitable mono-culture [16]. Further, the livelihood of forest dwellers has not improved on REDD+ sites in India. Our work has led us to conclude that without safeguarding the rights of local communities and securing basic necessities for local forest-dependent communities, livelihood enhancement would not be possible.