The Formation of Biaoquan and Zhequan as a Pair of Philosophical Concepts in Chinese Buddhism

Abstract

The general consensus in the field of Buddhist studies is that the terms “biaoquan” and “zhequan” are a pair of Buddhist philosophical concepts often used to designate two diametrically opposed forms of rhetoric. The former term constitutes its affirmative statement, while the latter defines a fact in negative terms—known in Christian theology as cataphatic and apophatic uses of language, respectively. Looking at the terms for which biaoquan and zhequan initially served as translations, especially in Xuanzang’s works, it would seem that these two concepts have not always appeared as a related pair representing the above-mentioned affirmative–negative dichotomy. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). In the case of zhequan, it corresponds, in different texts, to the three Indian Buddhist concepts of negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and exclusion of others (anyāpoha), with each use of the term “zhequan” carrying a different set of meanings and associated doctrines. Indeed, in various texts, the concept of zhequan might be opposed to the concept of biaoquan (*vidhi *sadhana) or opposed to pure negation (prasajya), or it might be applied on its own with no opposing concept. However, as Chinese Buddhism continued to develop throughout the Tang, biaoquan and zhequan came to be firmly associated and popularized as a pair of opposites. Looking at the doctrinal as well as the translation history of these two terms, this paper focuses on how they were used as a pair of opposing philosophical concepts, followed by an analysis of the profound influence of these two concepts on Chinese Buddhism.

1. Introduction

The terms biaoquan 表詮 and zhequan 遮詮, as a pair of concepts, have long been used in Chinese Buddhism to describe opposing rhetorical strategies for presenting truth statements. They have profoundly influenced the development of Chinese Buddhist philosophy, and they are still used by Chinese researchers to this day, informing the study of logic, doctrine, and Buddhist hermeneutics. In Introduction to the Hetuvidyā,1 Wangdao Chen defines the two terms as follows: “What confirms the positive connection of [the subject and its predicate] is called biaoquan (logically affirmative proposition) in Buddhist logic (Skt. hetuvidyā). What expresses the disconnection of [the subject and its predicate] is called zhequan (logically negative proposition) in Buddhist logic.” Chen here distinguishes the theses (pakṣa) in terms of the biaoquan/zhequan dichotomy in Buddhist logic, each end of the spectrum corresponding to logically positive and negative propositions, respectively.

Litian Fang (2002, p. 483) further expands the use of these concepts in Buddhist studies beyond their confinement to Buddhist logic, using them as conceptual tools for interpreting Chan rhetoric such as it is found in the discourses between Mazu 馬祖 and his disciples. Litian Fang says:

[The statements] (1) “Mind is Buddha” and (2) “Neither mind nor Buddha,” are two ways of expressing the relationship between the mind and the Buddha-nature of sentient beings, namely, biaoquan and zhequan. Biaoquan uses positive rhetoric to define the attributes and meanings of things, while zhequan uses negative rhetoric to reject attributes and meanings that things do not have. In the case of Mazu’s exchange with his disciples, the [statement] “Mind is Buddha” is biaoquan, while the statement “Neither mind nor Buddha” is zhequan. These [two statements] illustrate that there is no difference between the mind of sentient beings and Buddha-nature via biaoquan and zhequan insofar as they are related in the present moment, both directly pointing to [the truth of] “Buddha” and “mind”. As linguistic expressions, these two propositions are compatible [even though they seem to contradict one another] for they are complementary—they are not mutually exclusive statement.

Weiqun Yao (2014) goes a step further, claiming that biaoquan and zhequan were utilized in ancient India by early seekers after truth. Yao argues that “the Brahminical sacred text begins negation (zhe), after which [uses positive terminology] to describe an independent entity or an essence. In Buddhism (especially Mahāyāna Buddhism) “negation” speaks to the reality of things insofar as it denies that there is an independent entity or essence.”.

Regarding the modern use of the term “zhequan”, Cheng Lü (1991, p. 212) uses it in his Chinese translation of the title for the fifth chapter in Dignāga’s Pramānasamuccaya called “An Investigation into Zhequan” 觀遮詮品第五. In this instance, Lü uses zhequan to translate Dignāga’s concept of apoha, or anyāpoha.2 Weihong Zheng (1996, pp. 105–10), in an examination of biaoquan and zhequan, criticizes the previous notion that zhequan only designates negation or negative propositions, stating that zhequan is in fact conceptually closer to Dignāga’s concept of apoha/anyāpoha. Recent studies by Liangkang Ni (2008) and Xiang-yanxiang Zhou (2017) have also interpreted zhequan in terms of Dignāga’s concept of apoha/anyāpoha.

From the above discussion on biaoquan and zhequan in contemporary Chinese Buddhist scholarship, we may note that while they all use the concepts of biaoquan and zhequan, there are diverse opinions about the actual meaning of these two terms. The term biaoquan is less controversial among contemporary Chinese scholars, and disagreements regarding this conceptual pair usually revolve around the definition of zhequan.

The present consensus regarding the relationship between biaoquan and zhequan is that they constitute a conceptual pair. No one, however, has investigated the original meaning of these two terms or looked at when or why they were paired in Chinese Buddhism.3 To fill these gaps, this paper elaborates on their place in tradition, describing how they were established as a conceptual pair. As we see in this article, the terms biaoquan and zhequan came from Xuanzang’s translation work, where they were initially not considered a conceptual pair. Indeed, these individual terms carry multiple distinct definitions and associations. The former could designate both affirmation (*vidhi) as well as the general activity of speech, syllables, and words (nāma). The latter corresponds to at least three concepts: negation (*pratiṣedha, *vyāvṛtti, *nivṛtti), implicative negation (paryudāsa), and the exclusion of others (anyāpoha). In his translation of Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana (henceforth MSU), Xuanzang first used the terms to define a pair of complementary explanatory methods, namely the biaoquan men 表詮門 and zhequan men 遮詮門. This rhetorical dichotomy was used by later authors, gradually eclipsing the other definitions of biaoquan and zhequan so that, in time, they came to be exclusively associated with affirmation and negation in discourse. Later Buddhist interpreters continued using biaoquan and zhequan as a rhetorical pair, further cementing their association as a conceptual pair, leading in turn to the debates in our present day between modern Chinese scholars regarding the origins and the semantics of these terms. Bearing this in mind, the following provides context and definition for both biaoquan and zhequan.

2. The Three Instances of Zhequan

2.1. Implicative Negation

Because the concept of zhequan has more ambiguity than biaoquan, this paper first discusses the concept of zhequan. In Xuanzang’s translation of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha (NM), the word zhequan is used to express what is called “implicative negation” in Buddhist logic.

There are two types of examples: those by similarity and those by dissimilarity. An instance of an example by similarity is: “sound is impermanent, because it is produced immediately after effort; whatever is produced immediately after effort is impermanent, as a pot etc.” [An instance of an example by] dissimilarity is: “we see that things permanent are not produced immediately after effort, such as space”. The former is zhequan 遮詮, and the latter is only zhilan 止濫, because they enable [people] to infer objects through anvaya and vyatireka, respectively. Therefore, even if the opponent does not admit the existence of space, etc., as a real substance, stillthe [example by dissimilarity is sufficient to] show that, were the probandum absent, the absence of the reason would be necessarily proved.4

In this translation, the concept of zhequan is not paired with biaoquan but is defined in contrast to the concept zhilan 止濫. Reading the relevant passages in the NM, the meaning of these two terms is not immediately clear. Because the Sanskrit version of the NM has not been made public and there is no known ancient Tibetan translation, it is not possible to use the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the NM to aid in its interpretation. Fortunately, according to Shoryu Katsura (1981, pp. 63–64) there is a parallel in the Tibetan translation to the third chapter of Dignāga’s famous philosophical treatise, the Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS). The parallel passage in Tibetan reads as follows:

snga ma ni ma yin par dgag pa yin la phyi ma ni med par dgag pa yin par brjod do.5

Looking at this passage in the PS, it would seem the word zhequan as it appears in parallel NM passage designates implicative negation (paryudāsa), while the word zhilan refers to pure negation (prasajya).6

In the PS, Dignāga (c. 480–540) elaborates on how ākāśa (space) can be used in Buddhist logic as an example based on dissimilarity (Skt. vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). In Dignāga’s philosophy of inference, the example based on similarity enables one to infer the object of the proposition by positive concomitance (anvaya). On the other hand, the example by dissimilarity enables one to infer the object of the proposition by negative concomitance (vyatireka). According to Katsura (1981, pp. 63–65), given that this section elaborates on the properties of space, the implicative negation and pure negation—zhequan and zhilan, respectively—here relate to the words “impermanent” and “permanent”, respectively. In the example by similarity, the word “impermanent” is an implicative negation insofar as it is used to designate things that are impermanent—the negation is not used to merely deny substantiality or permanence. In the case of examples by dissimilarity, the primary purpose of the word “permanent” is not to affirm what is permanent by saying “permanent”, but to instead deny impermanence. Therefore, in Dignāga’s investigation of space (ākāśa)—whatever that may be—its describing/qualifying word “permanent” is without necessarily implying the existence of permanent space, etc.

As demonstrated in the parallel passages found in the PS it is clear that the word zhequan in the NM designates implicative negation(paryudāsa), while zhilan designates pure negation (prasajya), a different pair with no mention of a concept that we could liken to biaoquan.

2.2. Negation

In the discussion on the epistemological principle that “every cognition has an object” in the fifth chapter of Saṃghabhadra’s Shun zhengli lun 順正理論, the author explains how the cognition of non-existence (*abhāva) is possible. In this treatise, the author mentions the word zhequan:7

Since this cognition has language (*abhidhāna) as its object, it should not be thought that it arises without an object. The reason must be so. For example, people say “abrahman” or “anitya” and [other such negations]. [These words] negate things other [than what they refer to, such as Brahman-ness, permanence, etc.] but [these things] in and of themselves are not non-existent. Indeed, in these instances cognition arises of the language which negates Brahman-ness and permanence, etc. After language negates Brahman-ness and permanence, etc., it is the objects of speech that they refer to, namely a certain Kṣatriya and Saṃskāras, etc. However, all negative language is either with or without an object. The [negative language] with an object is, for example, “abrahman,” “anitya,” etc. Negative language without an object is, for example, “non-existent,” “nothing,” and such. If cognition arises from [negative language] that has an object, the cognition initially arises only by having the [negative] language as its object, and thus can recognize that the negated object [such as Brahman-ness] does not exist. The [cognition] that arises afterwards has the object of speech [e.g., a certain kṣatriya] as its own object, and realizes the absence of the negated object [e.g., brahman-ness] in the object of speech itself [e.g., a certain kṣatriya]. If cognition arises of [negative language] without an object as its own object, both the initial and subsequent moments of cognition arise only by having [negative] language as their objects, recognizing that the negated object does not exist.8

Saṃghabhadra first points out that this cognizance of non-existence is actually the cognizance of negative language, continuing on to explain the two kinds of negative language (zhequan mingyan 遮詮名言): negative language with an object and negative language without an object. The former refers to implicative negation, and the latter refers to pure negation. Interestingly, Saṃghabhadra also explains the cognitive processes of these two kinds of negation. The cognitive process of implicative negation involves at least two steps: First, cognition arises by having the negative speech as its object and realizes the absence of “Brahman-ness”, etc.. The subsequent moment of cognition realizes the absence of “Brahman-ness” in, say, a human of the warrior caste (kṣatriya). However, in the cognitive process guided by pure negation, the initial and subsequent cognitions only have negative language as their object. Given that the word translated in Saṃghabhadra’s work as “zhequan mingyan” includes both implicative negative language and pure negative language, zhequan here seems to have a broader semantic field than in the NM. Indeed, it is used as a more general designation of negation that includes both implicative negation and pure negation.

A similar use of the word zhequan is also found in Xuanzang’s translation of Bhāviveka’s *Hastaratna 大乘掌珍論.

In addition, other people who are arrogant in their cleverness make the following challenge: “If from the standpoint of ultimate reality all saṃskṛtas are like illusions, and are empty of essence, then they must be non-existent. Because [you] are attached to non-existence, you have the cognition of non-existence.” [Bhāviveka replied]: “[You detractors] want to cover up the faults of you own claims by uttering [such] slanderous words. Could it be that the reasoning established by those who cling to existence is correct, rather than those who make a claim for emptiness? Because to slander ultimate reality this way is a great mistake. The meaning of the word “non-existent” constitutes a negation (zhequan). You think that the primary purpose of this rhetoric is to affirm, but I would rather say that the primary purpose of this rhetoric is to negate. The word ‘non-existent’ only negates there being an “existent.” Once the function [of negation] is realized, there is no impetus to indicate other things. For example, if people speak of ‘not-white-silk’ we should not insist that this word indicates black [silk] and then claim the speaker has a faulty premise. [We hold that] the expression ‘not-white-silk’ is only a negation of ‘white silk,’ and once the function of [negation] has been fulfilled, there is no reason to speak of black, red, or yellow silk.”9

Bhāviveka’s detractors argue that according to the Madhyamaka theory of emptiness, things that are empty of essence are non-existent, at which point the Mādhyamikas may cling to reified “non-existence”. Bhāviveka explains that such a rebuttal is wrong, pointing out that the word “non-existent” in Mādhyamika thought is only an implicative negation aiming to negate “existents”, without affirming the existence of an entity called “non-existent”, just like the word “not-white-silk” only denies the whiteness of the silk without implying the silk itself is black, red, etc. Bhāviveka’s reply is based in the logics of both implicative and pure negation. Therefore, the word zhequan here should be interpreted as general negation (pratiṣedha) that includes both implicative negation and pure negation.

The term zhequan appears again in the translation of Bhāviveka’s *Hastaratna. It is Bhāviveka who developed the following argument, which was named as “the reasoning of the *Hastaratna” in Faxiang zong: “An asaṃskṛta is not a real entity because it does not arise, like flowers in the sky”10. According to this reasoning, flowers in the sky are not real entities and they do not arise, a logic following the reasoning of the example by similarity. Regarding asaṃskṛta in relation to these sky-flowers, the Sāṃkhya school’s position is presented as follows:

We believe that all things in the three realms, just like the flowers in the sky, arise through transformation—it is not that there are no flowers in the sky. Because the [flowers in the sky do in fact] exist, [to use of sky-flowers] in an example by similarity does not apply and goes contrary to that which you posit.11

The Sāṃkhyas claim that flowers in the sky arise from the transformation of a primary matter and are therefore real existent things. According to them, sky-flowers can therefore not be used as an example by similarity for the object asaṃskṛta. In response to such a view, Bhāviveka concludes that:

Since, [in this case], flowers in the sky constitute an example by similarity, they do not belong to the three realms. You should not say that because the three realms do exist, [sky-flowers] also exist. This statement shows that your wisdom is lacking. Negative language (zhequan yan) mainly aims to negate. Once it negates, its function is fulfilled and it says nothing more about the specific object of negation. Such a questioning has been explained before. Therefore, it is not what the heart of a wise man should believe.12

Bhāviveka is arguing that flowers in the sky are different from other things in the three realms—the former are non-existents and the latter are existents. The validity of Bhāviveka’s defense is not relevant to the subject of this paper, so I do not discuss it. In this second instance of the term zhequan, it is explicitly stated that the function of negation is key. Therefore, the term zhequan here in its usage does not refer to implicative negation but to pure negation. However, in view of the fact that Bhāviveka then states that this point has been explained in a preceding passage of *Hastaratna, we have reason to believe that the preceding passage refers to the first passage of *Hastaratna we analyzed above. If so, the term zhequan here must not have been translated from the Sanskrit prasajya but rather from the word pratiṣedha. Therefore, it can be said that in the *Hastaratna, the concept of zhequan is translated from pratiṣedha, a Sanskrit word that simply means negation, and only when Bhāviveka states his own claim does zhequan specifically mean pure negation.13

The term zhequan also appears in Xuanzang’s translation of the ninth chapter of Asvabhāva’s commentary, the She dacheng lun shi 攝大乘論釋 (Skt. Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana).

The śāstra [of Mahāyānasaṃgraha] says: “Here, the nature of the non-conceptual wisdom is to leave five characteristics: because (1) it is not without attention (*amanaskāra); (2) it does not transcend the *savitarka-savicāra-bhūmis; (3) it is not quietness caused by the cessation of representation and sensation (*saṃjñāveditanirodha); (4) it is not of the nature of forms (*rūpasvabhāva); (5) it is not the conceptual cognition taking tattva as its object (*tattvārthacitrīkāra). It should be known that what leaves these five characteristics is called non-conceptual wisdom.” The commentary says: “Based on the nature of the non-conceptual wisdom, its leaving from the five characteristics is stated. Through zhequan men (遮詮門), its essence (*svarūpa) is stated. Because it cannot be stated through biaoquan men (表詮門).”14

In this instance, biaoquan and zhequan are defined as two methods of explaining non-conceptual wisdom. According to the translated commentary, the essence of this form of wisdom can only be revealed by means of zhequan. Xuanzang’s translation is clear and unambiguous, making it is easy to understand the overall content of the commentary. However, it is not easy to tell from the Chinese translation what both these terms actually represent. Fortunately, there is a Tibetan translation of Asvabhāva’s commentary. It reads as follows:

ngo bo nyid kyi dbang du byas nas rnam pa lnga rnam par spangs pa zhes bya ba smos so || bzlog pa’i sgo nas mtshan nyid ston te | dmus long la gzugs bsnyad pa bzhin du bsgrub pa’i sgo nas brjod par mi nus pa’i phyir ro ||15

In parallel to this Tibetan translation, Xuanzang’s use of the term zhequan corresponds to the word “bzlog pa”, a translation of the Sanskrit words “*nivṛtti, *vyāvṛtti” meaning “negation”. The word biaoquan corresponds to “bsgrub pa”, a translation of the Sanskrit word “*vidhi, *sādhana” meaning “affirmation”. If this is true, then Asvabhāva here proposes that non-conceptual wisdom can only be described by means of negation, not by means of affirmation” This would be the earliest instance where we see the use of biaoquan (affirmation) and zhequan (negation) as a pair of opposite concepts. This confirms the earlier claim that the understanding of biaoquan/zhequan as an affirmation/negation pair espoused by Wangdao Chen, Litian Fang, and other scholars can indeed be traced back to a text translated by Xuanzang, namely the She dacheng lun shi 攝大乘論釋.

2.3. Exclusion of Others

The exclusion (apoha) theory, also known as the exclusion of others (anyāpoha) theory, is a system of semantics presented by Dignāga which holds that nominal words draw their meaning through the exclusion of everything other than their referents—the semantic correlate of a word such as “glass” is the exclusion of others such as “paper”, “plastic”, “metal”, etc. In Xuanzang’s translated oeuvre, there is no direct example of zhequan being used to translate Dignāga’s concept of apoha/anyāpoha. However, as Weihong Zheng (1996, pp. 107–8) points out, Xuanzang’s assistant Shentai 神泰 used the word zhequan to explain apoha in his own commentary on Dignāga’s NM. In addition, the same use of the term can be found in many Buddhist texts from the Tang dynasty onward, as we see in Woncheuk’s 圓測 Boreboluomiduo xinjing zan 般若波羅蜜多心經贊. Given that Dignāga’s PS, which explains the theory of apoha, had not yet been translated in the seventh century, it is likely that the apoha theory known to Shentai, Woncheuk, and others, would have been learned through the oral teachings given by Xuanzang during his translation work. Therefore, it is possible that the practice of interpreting the Sanskrit term apoha as zhequan may have come from Xuanzang’s oral teaching.

The following provides some examples of the use of the term zhequan in the commentaries written by Shentai and Woncheuk. For instance, in a commentary on Dignāga’s NM, Shentai writes:

[The NM says:] “The former is zhequan, and the latter is only zhilan.” This statement sets apart two separate instances [of inference]. The former [instance refers to] the example by similarity. The latter [refers to] the example by dissimilarity. All things have two properties. One is the particular property, only cognized by the five consciousnesses such as the visual [consciousness], though it may not be cognized by the conceptual mind and such. The second is the universal property, cognized by means of the conceptual mind and such. Words may only refer to universal properties, not to the particular properties of things because particulars are distinct from language. When referring to a universal property, [a word] excludes [everything] other than its referent before it may refer to this [universal property.] For example, the word “blue” refers to the universal property of blueness only insofar as it excludes yellow, [red, orange, etc.] things which are non-blue. If the word “blue” did not indeed exclude yellow things, etc., then yellow things would come [to mind] when the word “blue” is said. In order to designate their referents, all words must refer to [their referents] by excluding (zhe) other things. There is no [word] that refers to something without excluding other things. However, some words can only exclude other things without designating a referent. For example, the word “not-blue” does not refer to a not-blue thing. In the example by similarity, [the word] “the-things-being-produced-immediately-after-effort,” excludes the things-not-being-produced-immediately-after-effort by referring to things produced immediately after effort. [The word] “impermanent” excludes permanent things and refers to impermanent things arising and ceasing. Therefore, it is said [in the example by similarity] that exclusion comes first, and the reference follows. In the example by dissimilarity, [the word] “permanent” only excludes impermanent things—the word is not necessarily referring to permanent things. [The word] “not-produced” aims to exclude produced things without referring directly to a not-produced thing. The aim [of the example by dissimilarity] is [to show] that only impermanent things—where there is no “thesis-property”—are not-produced. The statement is a zhilan and does not refer to any real object. Therefore, [the NM] notes that “the latter is only zhilan”. “Because they enable [people] to infer objects through anvaya and vyatireka respectively” is to explain the above-mentioned distinctions. Because [in Buddhist logic] the example by similarity enables [people] to infer insofar as it has the thesis-property and reason-property, it is therefore both exclusionary and referential. This is because its own “thesis-property” and “reason-property” constitute zhequan. Because the example by dissimilarity enables [people] to infer only by departing from its own thesis-property and reason-property, it is only zhilan without any further referential aim.16

This is Shentai’s commentary on the passage in the NM regarding zhequan and zhilan mentioned in the previous section. In the previous passage, we noted that the word zhequan designates implicative negation, and zhilan designates pure negation. In his commentary, however, Shentai also includes Dignāga’s exclusion theory, thus adding yet another semantic dimension to the term zhequan, wherein it effectively functions as an indicator for both exclusion theory and implicative negation.17 Interestingly, the first half of Shentai’s commentary seemingly models itself after Dignāga’s exclusion theory, stating that words may only refer to universal properties, and the cognition of these universals must be cognized by means of excluding others. Indeed, in this commentary, the term “qianzhe yufa 遣遮餘法” is effectively a translation of “exclusion of others”, the Sanskrit term “anyāpoha”.

Dignāga’s own works do not explicitly attempt to marry exclusion theory with the theory encompassing implicative and pure negation. Shentai elaborates on the theory of the exclusion of others in terms of the two negations theory. Indeed, Shentai seems to equate the exclusion of others with implicative negation. This results in an apparent self-contradiction in his exegesis: Shentai begins by saying that all words may refer to universals through the exclusion of others, but then proceeds to mention that some nominal words are exceptional in that they may only negate the other without having an actual referent. This two-fold system does not follow from Dignāga’s exclusion theory but is instead Shentai’s own synthesis of these two different streams in Buddhist logic. It would seem that although Shentai has a clear understanding of the two negations theory as well as the apoha theory, there is significant deviation in Shentai’s commentary from Dignāga’s own theory.

The problem in reading this commentary is that Shentai does not distinguish between zhequan as exclusion of others and zhequan as an implicative negation. Looking through other related materials, we note that this problem is not unique to Shentai. For example, Woncheuk’s (613–696) commentary on the Heart Sūtra states:

All things may have two properties: a particular property and a universal property. A particular property is only cognized by perception, because it is not grasped by provisional cognitions (jiazhi 假智) and words. If provisional cognitions and words have objects to grasp, these are universal properties. For example, the word “blue” [takes the universal property “blue-ness” as its object] while diverse [particular] properties of a stem and a leaf may only be grasped by means of perception. Through provisional cognitions and words, only the universal properties of blue things may be revealed. The word “blue” negates yellow things, etc., thus [insofar as it excludes non-blue things] it is said to refer to blue things. Since it does not refer to blue things directly, it is called zhequan (=apoha). Regarding zhequan there are two theories. The first one is of Bhāviveka’s school which states that ultimate reality cannot be expressed using words or characterized by certain properties. [Bhāviveka] negates but has nothing to grasp, and establishes but has no commitment to its existence. The reasons and authoritative scriptures cited should be understood as above. The second is presented by Dharmapāla’s school. [He argues that] both conventional and ultimate realities exist, and both are separate from words. Given that “true nature” (Ch. zhenxing 真性; Skt. *tattva) is opposed to conventional [conditioned reality] the word “true nature” has a real referent. In Bhāviveka’s school, a master proposes something similar to [Dharmapāla’s] position. Therefore, Dharmapāla criticizes Bhāviveka: “On the level of ultimate reality, the [thesis] that all elements are empty holds the fallacy of *prasiddhasambandha.” In Bhāviveka’s theory, the paratantrasvabhāva is negated which is not accepted by Dharmapāla. Therefore, they hold different [theses.] Accordingly, the words “exist” and “not-exist” upheld by our school are both zhequan.18

In the first half of the above quotation, Woncheuk’s explanation of zhequan is basically the same as that of Shentai. Woncheuk is essentially providing an introduction to Dignāga’s apoha theory. According to his summary of Dignāga’s theory, the word “blue” does not directly speak of blue things but does so through the negation of yellow, orange, red, etc., things. In the second half of the passage, the argument between Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla is used as a background to present two interpretations of zhequan: Bhāviveka believes that zhequan is pure negation, which only negates without any reference to a real object; Dharmapāla believes that zhequan is an implicative negation, wherein the word may have a real referent. Therefore, although it is not entirely consistent with the interpretation of zhequan by Shentai, Woncheuk’s interpretation also mixes up Dignāga’s theory of exclusion with the two negations theory. We may also note that it is in the Tang dynasty that the term zhequan was indeed associated to Dignāga’s apoha theory, the intellectual origins of a tradition that came to color the understanding of zhequan in the works of modern scholars such as Cheng Lü and Weihong Zheng.

3. The Two Instances of Biaoquan

3.1. Affirmation

We noted at the beginning of this paper that the terms biaoquan and zhequan in Asvabhāva’s MSU correspond to affirmation (bsgrub pa, *vidhi, *sādhana) and negation (bzlog pa, *nivṛtti, *vyāvṛtti), respectively. This definition of biaoquan as “affirmation” is well attested to and is not further developed here.

3.2. The Activity of Speech, Śabda

Similar to the term zhequan, which has its own distinct history of usage in Chinese Buddhist scriptures, the term biaoquan also appears separately from its conceptual counterpart in various other texts. For example, Saṃghabhadra’s Shun zhengli lun 順正理論 says the following:

However, the speaker first grasps the nāma that he wants to [speak] in his mind, then he thinks: “I will make such-and-such a speech act and express such-and-such an object to others.” Then he speaks according to his own will, and the speech invokes syllables, and the syllables invoke nāmas, and it is the nāmas that reveal the object. On the basis of this continuous process, it is said that speech invokes nāmas, and it is the nāmas that reveal the objects. The reasoning must be established as above. If the nāmas are not included in the mind at the beginning, even when [someone] is intent to speak, there will be no fixed biaoquan 表詮 and the object [of speech] will not be recognized by others.19

This passage of Shun zhengli lun is a rebuttal of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, wherein Vasubandhu argues that the “nāma”, as a property dissociated from cognition, is useless.20 The word biaoquan does not appear again in this passage of Saṃghabhadra’s translated works, but its meaning is not difficult to determine. Saṃghabhadra establishes a relational and processual continuum of speech–syllable–nāma–object, in which speech invokes syllables, syllables invoke nāmas, and nāmas invoke their objects. Then, biaoquan, which is located somewhere between the speech act and the object, refers to the two links in the middle, the syllables and the nāmas. It is possible that the original Sanskrit word may be abhidhāna. In this instance, the concept of biaoquan is not opposed to zhequan. In fact, there is no opposing concept here: biaoquan is not defined in contrast to some other concept.

A similar use of biaoquan denoting a śabda, or speech act, is found in the first volume of the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論:

Others claim that the śabdas of the Vedas are permanent and can be used as a determined and correct means of cognition to speak of (biaoquan 表詮) dharmas. Some claim that all śabdas are permanent and depend on conditions for manifestation, after which reveal (quanbiao 詮表) [the objects]. These [claims] are all unreasonable. Why? First of all, since the śabdas of the Vedas are admitted to be viable for speaking of (nengquan 能詮) [the dharmas], then they would have to be impermanent, just like other śabdas given that other śabdas also have impermanent śabdas as their essence, just as bottles, clothes, etc. depend on many conditions.21

In this quotation, the three words biaoquan, quanbiao, and nengquan, are interchangeable and they all mean “speak of”, “reveal”, or the “śabdas that speak of dharmas”. The use of the term biaoquan in the Cheng weishi lun therefore differs from that in the Shun zhengli lun, which uses the term to designate the syllables and the nāmas in speech acts. That being said, although these two uses of the term differ, they remain semantically related insofar as they both refer to speech elements and, more generally, the activity of speech.

Finally, in his commentary on the last verse of Deva’s Catuḥśataka,22 Dharmapāla also gives an example of biaoquan in relation to general words/speeches.

The opinion that “[something] exists” (sat) and the opinion that “[something] does not exist” (asat) have both been removed, and [the opinion] that “[something] exists and does not exist” (sadasac) and “[something] does not exist and does not non-exist” should be similarly removed. While existents, etc., are explicable (ke biaoquan), however, true nature (*tattva) remains ineffable (jue biaoquan), showing that [true nature] is not an existent, etc.23

According to Dharmapāla, existents may be properly expressed via language, while true nature remains beyond the reach of words. Unlike the other example provided above, Dharmapāla does not, in this instance, discuss the forms of speech used to explain these things. Without any reference to affirmative or negative rhetoric, the terms “explicable” (ke biaoquan) and “ineffable” (jue biaoquan) are here related to the general activity of speech, not distinguishing between cataphatic and apophatic uses of language.

4. From Biaoquan and Zhequan to Biaoquan Men and Zhequan Men

As noted above regarding the development of biaoquan and zhequan as philosophical terms in the Chinese Buddhist tradition, both these concepts were closely related to Xuanzang’s translation activities. We also noted that in most early instances, these terms were not presented as opposing concepts, with the only exception being the treatise of interest in this section, the translation of Asvabhāva’s MSU. In Asvabhāva’s work, biaoquan and zhequan became two opposing methods (men 門) used to describe non-conceptual wisdom. Indeed, it would seem that the translation of Asvabhāva’s two-part hermeneutic framework made up of the biaoquan men and the zhequan men was, in a sense, more practical and applicable than the other varied definitions of biaoquan and zhequan. The broad semantic fields for both of these words were therefore fitted into Asvabhāva’s two opposing methods of interpretation, the biaoquan men and the zhequan men. In the NM, zhequan and zhilan are effectively presented as opposing concepts, but because they were not identified by Xuanzang as opposing methods of interpretation when they were translated, this perhaps made them less accessible, preventing them from being further promoted as a conceptual pair in Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, it would seem they were ultimately absorbed into the categories of biaoquan men and zhequan men as defined in the translation to Asvabhāva’s MSU.

Ultimately, in the writings of Xuanzang’s disciples, the pairing of biaoquan and zhequan became prevalent. For instance, in Kuiji’s 窺基 explanation on how examples by similarity and examples by dissimilarity both constitute existent things, biaoquan and zhequan are used as a pair of opposites.

The example by similarity as [a part of] proof, when proving an existent [as a thesis subject], must be an existent [entity], and when proving a non-existent [as a thesis-subject], must be a non-existent [entity]. Both affirmation (biaoquan) and negation (zhequan) are valid in these instances. However, the example by dissimilarity is not so regardless of [whether the example by dissimilarity is] existent or not. It may only negate, for it is essentially pure negation (zhilan). In this way, the word “permanent” negates the thesis[-property] “impermanent”, and the word “unproduced” affirms the absence of the reason[-property] “produced”. However, these mentions of “permanent” and “unproduced” are not meant to express two [properties] with existent entities because the purpose [of such words in the Nyāyapraveśa] is to show that the example by dissimilarity can also be non-existent entities. The NM states: “The former is zhequan; the latter is only zhilan. Because they enable [people] to infer objects through anvaya and vyatireka, respectively”. The former example by similarity both negates (zhe) and affirms (quan) because [the thesis-subject with an] existent [entity] should be established by [instances with] existent [entities], and [the thesis-subject with a] non-existent [entity] should be established by [instances with] non-existent [entities]. The latter example by dissimilarity only negates (zhilan), that is to say, that it negates (zhe) without affirming (quan). This is because the example by similarity is connected with (he 合) the probandum, and the example by dissimilarity is separate from (li 離) the probandum.24

Considering that Kuiji is one of Xuanzang’s disciples, it is worth paying special attention to how he uses the terms zhequan, biaoquan, zhe, and quan in his commentary. Kuiji uses the word zhequan in two ways: zhequan I means negation, as opposed to biaoquan, which means affirmation here, whereas zhequan II consists of both negation (zhe) and affirmation (biaoquan; quan). Zhequan II only occurs when mentioning Dignāga’s NM and is interpreted as a negation that also entails an affirmation.

Kuiji then comments that the example by dissimilarity, a proposition that “whatever is permanent is non-produced like space”, is a pure negation. That is to say, in this case, the words “permanent” and “non-produced” do not affirm the existence of some entity but appear only as the opposite of “impermanent” and “produced”. Kuiji explains that things that do not exist can effectively be used in an example by dissimilarity. In contrast, the example by similarity can refer to either existents or non-existents, depending on whether the object of the proof exists. When the example by similarity is an existent thing, then the words “impermanent” and “produced” in the statement are affirmations, i.e., they affirm the existence of something. When the example by similarity is something that does not exist, then these elements in the statement are negations, i.e., denying the existence of something. In terms of definitions and philosophical content, we see a clear instance of how the concepts of zhequan (=prayudāsa) and zhilan (=prasajya) in the NM are subsumed into the framework of zhequan men and biaoquan men of Asvabhāva’s MSU. Indeed, it would seem that Xuanzang’s own disciples do not fully understand his translations.

In the Commentary on the Humane King Sūtra, Woncheuk also refers to the zhequan men and the biaoquan men to explain the question as to “whether reading the Humane King Sūtra could protect one from four grave karmas”. Woncheuk writes that:

Among the different schools, there are four distinct responses. (1) [According to] the Sarvāstivādas, [when a monk commits and act that triggers the four grave karmas, he] may never abandon the precepts. (2) [According to] the school of Sautrāntika and Yogacāra, [the monk] will definitely abandon the precepts. (3) [According to] the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, some of his precepts may be abandoned and some may not. (4) [According to] the Vaitulya scriptures and the Sūtra of Meditating on Samantabhadra, if he repents, he will not abandon the precepts; if not, he will abandon the precepts. The [third and fourth statements] become the third and fourth points [above]... Points three and four speak to the same teachings by negation (zhe) and affirmation (biao). If it is through affirmation (biaoquan), it will appear as it does in the third point. If it is through negation (zhequan), it will appear as it does in the fourth point. Therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and the Vaitulya scriptures reveal the same teachings but in different forms. Based on the Vaitulya scriptures as well as this sūtra, the meaning of the four heavy karmas and five cardinal sins are established.25

The question with which Woncheuk struggles here is: If a monk commits one of the four grave sins, must he renounce the precepts? The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and the Vaitulya scriptures seem to hold different opinions. In order to reconcile these two opposite theses, Woncheuk explains that although the third and fourth points are different, the meaning is essentially the same. This is because, according to Woncheuk, the third and fourth sentences are instances of biaoquan (point 3) and zhequan (point 4) that reveal the same teaching using different formulations of the same truth statement—namely that if he repents, he will not give up the precepts; if he does not repent, he will give up the precepts. By describing the third point of this fourfold logical argument (Skt. catuṣkoṭi) as affirmation (biaoquan) and the fourth point as a negation (zhequan), Woncheuk argues that they both represent the same meaning though they differ in terms of how they point to the truth—via affirmation or via negation. It is obvious that the use of the concepts of biaoquan and zhequan in this case is consistent with the biaoquan men and the zhequan men defined in Asvabhāva’s MSU, respectively.

Similarly, in a commentary on the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Wonhyo (617–686) elaborates on the four-part logical statement claiming that:

(1)

Some Buddha-nature belongs to deluded beings (Skt. icchantikas) but not to people with wholesome roots.

(2)

Some Buddha-nature belongs to people with wholesome roots but not to icchantikas.

(3)

Some Buddha-nature belongs to both of them.

(4)

Some Buddha nature belongs to none of them.26

Wonhyo comments:

Regarding these two [kinds of people], the two first sentences expel two extreme opinions by relying on negation (zhequan). The latter two sentences that combine these two [kinds of] people are developed to show the middle way according to method of affirmation (biaoquan men).27

Wonhyo states that the first sentence denies the one-sided statement that “icchantikas definitely have no Buddha-nature” by means of negation; the second sentence once again denies the equally one-sided statement that “icchantikas definitely have Buddha-nature” by means of negation; and the third sentence directly affirms that Buddha-nature, unlike the proposition that a rabbit may have horns, does not exist; the fourth sentence directly affirms that Buddha-nature, unlike empty space, does exist. Wonhyo is clearly using the conceptual pairing of biaoquan and zhequan in the sense of affirmation and negation. This is the basic meaning of biaoquan men and zhequan men in Asvabhāva’s MSU.

We can see that both biaoquan and zhequan were once widely used mainly as a hermeneutic tool in the exegetical works of Xuanzang’s disciples and of their contemporaries. The ambiguous and varied meaning of these two terms were gradually made clearer, and we saw that, in most instances, they were reduced to the two methods of affirmation and negation introduced in Asvabhāva’s MSU.

5. Conclusions

This paper showed that in most of Xuanzang’s translations, the terms biaoquan and zhequan are not opposite—or even related—concepts but instead have their own various definitions. We saw that the term biaoquan can designate either an affirmation, a general speech act, or speech elements such as syllables and nāmas. The term zhequan has three possible definitions: (1) implicative negation, (2) negation, and (3) exclusion of others. In the NM, the concept of zhequan (implicative negation) represents the opposite of zhilan (pure negation), while biaoquan is not mentioned at all. In the Shun zhengli lun, the terms biaoquan and zhequan are not related to each other—biaoquan is the activity of speech, syllables, and nāmas, while zhequan is negation. In the translation to Bhāviveka’s *Hastaratna, it only mentions “zhequan” as negation, once again without biaoquan. In the works of several of Xuanzang’s disciples, the word zhequan is sometimes used to refer to Dignāga’s concept of exclusion of others (anyāpoha). It is, indeed, only in the translation of Asvabhāva’s MSU that the two first appear as a pair of opposing concepts.

Because Xuanzang’s translation of Asvabhāva’s MSU explicitly established the hermeneutic methods known as the biaoquan men and the zhequan men, this pair of concepts was given great theological significance, gradually subsuming the semantic variance of biaoquan and zhequan into the categories of affirmation and negation, respectively. The works of Kuiji, Woncheuk, and Wonhyo all show such a tendency in their exegesis. Therefore, although other uses of biaoquan and zhequan occasionally appeared in the Chinese commentarial tradition, these do not disprove a general trend in the Tang when the two terms biaoquan and zhequan were finally established as a pair of fixed terms. This is the early history of the formation of this pair of Buddhist terms, two concepts that have long been points of contention and debate among Buddhists and among scholars.

It would seem that in the short span of one generation, from Xuanzang to his disciples, there must have been some confusion vis-à-vis the original meaning of these concepts. Two important issues remain unanswered. Firstly, assuming that Xuanzang translated these texts with reference to Sanskrit manuscripts, there is little possibility that he could have completely misunderstood or perhaps confused these concepts. That begs the question: why did Xuanzang use the terms biaoquan and zhequan to translate so many philosophical concepts taken from Sanskrit? Should he not have used different words to describe different concepts? Secondly, during histranslation workshops, Xuanzang often provided oral teachings such as may be found in the large number of explanatory phrases included in the translation to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. It is likely that Dignāga’s theory of exclusion of others would also have been transmitted in a similar oral form.28 Can we, therefore, conjecture that Xuanzang did not actually intend to treat biaoquan and zhequan as a pair of fixed terms and did not have a systematic teaching related to them, but that it was the disciples, influenced by the translation of Asvabhāva’s MSU, who actively tried to unify all the examples of biaoquan and zhequan? If such conjecture is justified, we must also consider a more crucial question: the scholarly community sometimes speculates about the doctrine of the Faxiang school (faxiang zong 法相宗) as transmitted by Xuanzang based on the commonality of the various commentaries written by his disciples. Is such speculation not also shaken by the implication that these disciples played such an active role in the promotion of biaoquan and zhequan as a pair of concepts?