Policy Evaluation of Demonstration Cooperative Construction: Evidence from Sichuan Province, China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Framework of the Study
2.1. Nudge–Imitation Theory
2.2. Research Hypothesis
3. Data Collection, Models, and Variables
3.1. Data Sources
3.2. Model Settings
- (1)
- The matching method must be selected. There are a variety of matching methods to choose from when using propensity score matching, and there are no obvious differences between the various matching methods. However, due to certain measurement deviations between different matching methods, even if the same sample data are processed, heterogeneous measurement results will be produced. If the results obtained after applying multiple matching methods are similar or even consistent, the matching results are robust and the sample validity is good [49]. Therefore, to enhance the reliability of the results, the authors of this paper selected three mainstream matching methods.
- ①
- Radius matching—that is, the absolute distance that limits the propensity score (), where is the sample standard deviation of the propensity score—is generally recommended [49]. After calculation, the authors of this paper set the matching radius to 0.065.
- ②
- ③
- Third is local linear matching, that is, not using kernel regression but using local linear regression to estimate w(i,j).
- (2)
- A balance test must be conducted. If the estimation of the propensity score is accurate, the distribution between the matched treatment group and the control group should be relatively uniform. Generally, the standardized bias is used to test, and the calculation formula is as follows:
3.3. Variable Description
3.3.1. Explained Variables
- (1)
- The potential policy effect of democratic management. The democratic management of cooperatives includes members’ full right to know, effective participation, equal voting rights, and ultimate control over the decision-making process, especially the distribution plan [12]. To a large extent, members’ understanding and participation in the management and decision making of the cooperative are enacted through the member (representative) general assembly. The establishment, operation, and information disclosure of the board of directors and supervisors are also important ways for members to understand and participate in the cooperative’s affairs. Therefore, two variables, the operation of “three meetings” and the method of surplus distribution, were selected to measure the policy effect of democratic management of the demonstration cooperatives. Among them, the operation of “three meetings” is indicated by whether the cooperative council, supervisory board, and member (representative) meetings are working normally. The method of surplus distribution is expressed by whether the proportion of the cooperative’s distributable surplus returned according to the transaction volume (amount) between the members and the cooperative is not less than 60%.
- (2)
- Potential policy effect of economic strength. Four variables were selected to measure the economic strength policy effect of demonstration cooperatives: total investment by members, the fixed assets of cooperatives, the total annual operating income of cooperatives, and the input–output ratio of cooperatives.
- (3)
- Potential policy effect of service capability. Four variables were selected to measure the serviceability policy effect of a demonstration cooperative, including the number of members joining the cooperative, the number of annual training people in the cooperative, the average income that members are helping to increase, and the number of surrounding farmers being driven.
- (4)
- Potential policy effect on product quality. Two variables, the agricultural product quality certification and the number of registered trademarks, were selected to measure the policy effect on the product quality of demonstration cooperatives.
- (5)
- Potential policy effect of social repercussions. Social repercussions mainly refer to the reputation of a cooperative in the local or wider area and the contribution of the cooperative to the local area to obtain corresponding social recognition. Therefore, two variables, the number of times the cooperatives have won commendation awards and the number of jobs created, were selected to measure the policy effect of the demonstration cooperatives’ social response.
3.3.2. Core Explanatory Variables
3.3.3. Control Variables
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Analysis of Influencing Factors of Cooperatives Being Rated as Demonstration Cooperatives
4.2. PSM Matching Results and Common Support Domain Analysis
4.3. Balance Test Analysis
4.4. Analysis of the Policy Effect Results of Demonstration Cooperatives
4.5. Robustness Check
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Frequency | Proportion (%) | Frequency | Proportion (%) | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Type of cooperative | Big planters lead | 313 | 61.49 | Leading industry | Crop farming | 316 | 62.08 |
Village cadres lead | 91 | 17.88 | Animal husbandry | 181 | 35.56 | ||
Company lead | 45 | 8.84 | Service industry | 12 | 2.36 | ||
Other | 60 | 11.79 | |||||
Industrial scale | out of scale | 40 | 7.86 | Demonstration level | Demonstration cooperative | 279 | 54.81 |
small scale | 70 | 13.75 | Of which: county and city level | 183 | 35.95 | ||
medium scale | 215 | 42.24 | Provincial and National | 96 | 18.86 | ||
Large scale | 184 | 36.15 | Non-demonstration cooperative | 230 | 45.19 |
Total Sample | Demonstration Cooperatives | Non-Demonstration Cooperatives | Mean Diff. | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Land size | 41.233 | 50.673 | 29.783 | 20.980 * |
Labor cost | 37.962 | 49.652 | 23.782 | 25.870 *** |
Capital investment | 68.662 | 93.973 | 37.958 | 56.015 *** |
Training cost | 1.282 | 1.573 | 0.930 | 0.643 *** |
Variable Name | Variable Definitions | Mean | S.D. |
---|---|---|---|
Explained variable | |||
Operation of “three meetings” | The directors’ board, the supervisors’ board, and the members’ general assembly (representatives) are sound and effectively functioning; yes = 1, no = 0 | 0.837 | 0.369 |
Surplus distribution method | The ratio of distributable surplus to be returned according to the trading volume (amount) between members and the club shall not be less than 60%; yes = 1, no = 0 | 0.063 | 0.243 |
Total Membership Contributions | The actual total investment of cooperative members (10 thousand yuan) | 130.24 | 201.75 |
Fixed assets | The total fixed assets of cooperatives (ten thousand yuan) | 153.41 | 223.28 |
Total operating income | The total income of the cooperative in 2020 (ten thousand yuan) | 162.45 | 353.25 |
Input–output ratio | The ratio of total investment to the total income of cooperatives in 2020 | 0.768 | 0.359 |
Number of Members | The actual number of members of the co-op as of the end of 2020 | 68.141 | 107.9 |
Annual training | The total number of people organized by the cooperative in 2020 for members and non-member farmers to conduct intensive training | 97.922 | 220.50 |
Help members increase their income | In 2020, whether the cooperative helped members to increase their average income. Based on the per capita disposable income of rural residents, residents, and urban residents in Sichuan Province in 2020 (1.6, 2.7, and 3.8 ten thousand yuan, respectively), it was divided into four intervals: [0, 1.6) = 1, [1.6, 2.7) = 2, [2.7, 3.8) = 3. [3.8, +∞) = 4 | 1.063 | 0.307 |
Drive the number of farmers | Number of surrounding farmers driven by cooperatives by the end of 2020 | 147.60 | 287.84 |
Product quality certification | Product quality certification level owned by the cooperative: no certification = 0; pollution-free product certification = 1; green food certification = 2; organic food certification = 3 | 0.727 | 1.147 |
Number of registered trademarks | Total number of registered trademarks owned by cooperatives | 0.473 | 0.994 |
Number of awards | The total number of praises, awards, and honorary titles received by cooperatives | 1.573 | 3.435 |
Number of jobs | Number of permanent jobs that cooperatives can provide | 4.055 | 4.159 |
Core explanatory variables | |||
Demonstration cooperative | Whether the cooperative is a demonstration cooperative; yes = 1, no = 0 | 0.549 | 0.498 |
Select Equation Control Variables | |||
Chairperson characteristics | |||
Gender | Male = 1, Female = 0 | 0.820 | 0.385 |
Age | Chairperson’s age | 46.192 | 8.958 |
Education | Education years of the chairperson | 11.347 | 3.241 |
Management experience | The length of the chairperson’s management experience (years) | 10.169 | 7.635 |
Industry experience | The length of time that the chairperson has been engaged in the current industrial management (years) | 8.331 | 6.638 |
Cooperative characteristics | |||
Duration | Co-op survival time by the end of 2020 (years) | 5.769 | 3.058 |
Workplace | Does the cooperative have a permanent office; yes = 1, no = 0 | 0.88 | 0.315 |
Industrial scale | Scattered planting, free-range farming = 1; small scale = 2; medium scale = 3; large scale = 4 | 3.069 | 0.900 |
Environmental characteristics | |||
Relative position | Motor vehicle driving distance from the cooperative to the nearest demonstration cooperative of the same industry (km) | 9.641 | 15.707 |
Governmental support | Number of government-supported affairs for cooperatives in 2020 | 1.075 | 1.037 |
Variables | Demonstration Cooperatives | Non-Demonstration Cooperatives | Mean Diff. |
---|---|---|---|
Operation of “three meetings” | 0.939 | 0.713 | 0.226 *** |
Surplus distribution method | 0.082 | 0.039 | 0.043 ** |
Total Membership Contributions | 173.033 | 78.912 | 94.121 *** |
Fixed assets | 206.882 | 89.233 | 117.649 *** |
Total operating income | 235.427 | 74.217 | 161.209 *** |
Input–output ratio | 0.820 | 0.705 | 0.115 *** |
Number of Members | 95.398 | 35.348 | 60.050 *** |
Annual training | 144.685 | 41.622 | 103.063 *** |
Help members increase their income | 1.100 | 1.017 | 0.083 *** |
Drive the number of farmers | 205.548 | 77.526 | 128.022 *** |
Product quality certification | 0.954 | 0.452 | 0.501 *** |
Number of registered trademarks | 0.682 | 0.217 | 0.465 *** |
Number of awards | 2.461 | 0.491 | 1.969 *** |
Number of jobs | 4.893 | 3.035 | 1.858 *** |
Variables | Coefficients (Std. Error) | Marginal Effects (Std. Error) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Gender | −0.105 | (0.293) | −0.019 | (0.052) |
Age | 0.188 ** | (0.096) | 0.034 ** | (0.017) |
Age squared | −0.002 | (0.001) | 0.000 | (0.000) |
Education | 0.004 | (0.037) | 0.001 | (0.007) |
Management experience | −0.026 | (0.016) | −0.005 | (0.003) |
Industry experience | 0.027 | (0.022) | 0.005 | (0.004) |
Duration | 0.140 *** | (0.048) | 0.025 *** | (0.008) |
Workplace | 1.154 *** | (0.387) | 0.206 *** | (0.067) |
Industrial scale | 0.558 *** | (0.141) | 0.100 *** | (0.024) |
Relative position | 0.260 *** | (0.099) | 0.046 *** | (0.017) |
Governmental support | 0.433 *** | (0.117) | 0.077 *** | (0.020) |
Hanyuan county | 1.178 | (0.832) | ||
Jiangyou county | 0.254 | (0.739) | ||
Luojiang county | 0.583 | (0.716) | ||
Mianzhu county | −0.873 | (0.726) | ||
Anzhou county | 0.875 | (0.796) | ||
Pingshan county | −0.052 | (0.738) | ||
Xuzhou county | 0.271 | (0.723) | ||
Yilong county | 1.244 | (0.782) | ||
Enyang county | −0.05 | (0.628) | ||
Constants | −9.437 *** | (2.523) | ||
Observations | 509 | |||
Wald chi2 (20) | 99.65 *** | |||
Pseudo R2 | 0.229 | |||
Log pseudolikelihood | −270.319 |
Covariates | Unmatched Matched | Radius Matching | Kernel Matching | Local Linear Regression Matching | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
%bias | t-Test | %bias | t-Test | %bias | t-Test | ||
Gender | Unmatched | 1.00 | 0.12 | 1.00 | 0.12 | 1.00 | 0.12 |
Matched | 8.80 | 1.00 | 8.00 | 0.91 | 7.00 | 0.81 | |
Age | Unmatched | 24.20 | 2.74 *** | 24.20 | 2.74 *** | 24.20 | 2.74 *** |
Matched | −6.70 | −0.76 | −4.80 | −0.55 | −7.90 | −0.91 | |
Education | Unmatched | 12.80 | 1.45 | 12.80 | 1.45 | 12.80 | 1.45 |
Matched | 5.00 | 0.59 | 3.90 | 0.46 | 3.00 | 0.37 | |
Management experience | Unmatched | 22.80 | 2.56 ** | 22.80 | 2.56 ** | 22.80 | 2.56 * |
Matched | −1.00 | −0.11 | −1.30 | −0.14 | −5.70 | −0.62 | |
Industry experience | Unmatched | 36.40 | 4.09 *** | 36.40 | 4.09 *** | 36.40 | 4.09 *** |
Matched | −10.30 | −0.96 | −6.50 | −0.62 | −11.90 | −1.10 | |
Duration | Unmatched | 64.90 | 7.19 *** | 64.90 | 7.19 *** | 64.90 | 7.19 *** |
Matched | 6.50 | 0.70 | 8.50 | 0.92 | −1.00 | −0.10 | |
Workplace | Unmatched | 51.00 | 5.91 *** | 51.00 | 5.91 *** | 51.00 | 5.91 *** |
Matched | −1.20 | −0.23 | −1.20 | −0.23 | 1.50 | 0.27 | |
Industrial scale | Unmatched | 76.20 | 8.65 *** | 76.20 | 8.65 *** | 76.20 | 8.65 *** |
Matched | 9.60 | 1.26 | 10.00 | 1.32 | 8.90 | 1.15 | |
Relative position | Unmatched | 36.80 | 4.14 *** | 36.80 | 4.14 *** | 36.80 | 4.14 *** |
Matched | −7.50 | −0.87 | −5.20 | −0.61 | −5.30 | −0.63 | |
Governmental support | Unmatched | 51.30 | 5.67 *** | 51.30 | 5.67 *** | 51.30 | 5.67 *** |
Matched | 15.50 | 1.71 * | 15.20 | 1.68 * | 14.40 | 1.59 | |
Hanyuan county | Unmatched | 23.70 | 2.6 ** | 23.70 | 2.6 ** | 23.70 | 2.6 ** |
Matched | −8.60 | −0.78 | −5.70 | −0.53 | −12.40 | −1.10 | |
Jiangyou county | Unmatched | 11.30 | 1.26 | 11.30 | 1.26 | 11.30 | 1.26 |
Matched | −5.20 | −0.52 | −5.70 | −0.57 | −7.10 | −0.70 | |
Luojiang county | Unmatched | 19.60 | 2.17 ** | 19.60 | 2.17 ** | 19.60 | 2.17 ** |
Matched | 6.90 | 0.77 | 6.10 | 0.67 | 4.20 | 0.46 | |
Mianzhu county | Unmatched | −4.70 | −0.54 | −4.70 | −0.54 | −4.70 | −0.54 |
Matched | 3.50 | 0.44 | 1.60 | 0.19 | 2.20 | 0.27 | |
Anzhou county | Unmatched | 19.80 | 2.18 ** | 19.80 | 2.18 ** | 19.80 | 2.18 ** |
Matched | 4.50 | 0.48 | 5.60 | 0.61 | 3.70 | 0.40 | |
Pingshan county | Unmatched | 4.70 | 0.53 | 4.70 | 0.53 | 4.70 | 0.53 |
Matched | 0.60 | 0.07 | −0.10 | −0.01 | 2.90 | 0.33 | |
Xuzhou county | Unmatched | 9.30 | 1.03 | 9.30 | 1.03 | 9.30 | 1.03 |
Matched | −6.70 | −0.69 | −8.80 | −0.89 | −9.50 | −0.96 | |
Yilong county | Unmatched | 24.90 | 2.73 *** | 24.90 | 2.73 *** | 24.90 | 2.73 *** |
Matched | −5.50 | −0.52 | −1.10 | −0.11 | −3.40 | −0.33 | |
Enyang county | Unmatched | −55.40 | −6.24 *** | −55.40 | −6.24 *** | −55.40 | −6.24 *** |
Matched | 2.90 | 0.34 | 2.50 | 0.29 | 6.90 | 0.82 |
Variables | Radius Matching | Kernel Matching | Local Linear Regression Matching | Mean of ATT | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ATT (S.D.) | t-Stat. | ATT (S.D.) | t-Stat. | ATT (S.D.) | t-Stat. | ||
Operation of “three meetings” | 0.056 (0.052) | 1.08 | 0.061 (0.050) | 1.23 | 0.059 (0.054) | 1.10 | 0.059 |
Surplus distribution method | 0.009 (0.028) | 0.32 | 0.012 (0.027) | 0.43 | 0.008 (0.029) | 0.27 | 0.010 |
Total Membership Contributions | 0.456 * (0.272) | 1.67 | 0.499 * (0.262) | 1.90 | 0.463 * (0.281) | 1.65 | 0.473 |
Fixed assets | 0.484 ** (0.225) | 2.15 | 0.530 ** (0.217) | 2.44 | 0.443 * (0.232) | 1.91 | 0.486 |
Total operating income | 0.530 ** (0.223) | 2.38 | 0.560 *** (0.214) | 2.61 | 0.490 ** (0.230) | 2.13 | 0.527 |
Input–output ratio | 0.060 (0.046) | 1.29 | 0.068 (0.044) | 1.54 | 0.064 (0.048) | 1.34 | 0.064 |
Number of members | 0.596 *** (0.168) | 3.55 | 0.594 *** (0.162) | 3.67 | 0.545 *** (0.174) | 3.14 | 0.578 |
Annual training | 0.745 *** (0.242) | 3.08 | 0.767 *** (0.233) | 3.29 | 0.684 *** (0.250) | 2.74 | 0.732 |
Help members increase their income | 0.094 *** (0.028) | 3.38 | 0.093 *** (0.027) | 3.41 | 0.094 *** (0.028) | 3.38 | 0.094 |
Drive the number of farmers | 0.665 *** (0.210) | 3.16 | 0.648 *** (0.202) | 3.21 | 0.606 *** (0.217) | 2.79 | 0.640 |
Product quality certification | 0.288 ** (0.134) | 2.15 | 0.301 ** (0.129) | 2.32 | 0.271 ** (0.138) | 1.97 | 0.287 |
Number of registered trademarks | 0.253 ** (0.105) | 2.42 | 0.268 *** (0.102) | 2.63 | 0.268 ** (0.107) | 2.51 | 0.263 |
Number of awards | 1.419 *** (0.277) | 5.12 | 1.422 *** (0.274) | 5.19 | 1.384 *** (0.280) | 4.94 | 1.408 |
Number of jobs | 0.828 * (0.428) | 1.93 | 0.833 ** (0.417) | 2.00 | 0.806 * (0.438) | 1.84 | 0.822 |
Variables | ATT | S.E. | Z-Stat. |
---|---|---|---|
Operation of “three meetings” | 0.038 * | 0.023 | 1.688 |
Surplus distribution method | 0.017 | 0.030 | 0.556 |
Total Membership Contributions | 0.356 * | 0.183 | 1.948 |
Fixed assets | 0.233 | 0.167 | 1.393 |
Total operating income | 0.462 ** | 0.182 | 2.539 |
Input–output ratio | 0.054 * | 0.032 | 1.688 |
Number of members | 0.524 *** | 0.117 | 4.467 |
Annual training | 0.579 *** | 0.170 | 3.395 |
Help members increase their income | 0.091 *** | 0.024 | 3.747 |
Drive the number of farmers | 0.640 *** | 0.155 | 4.143 |
Product quality certification | 0.187 | 0.120 | 1.555 |
Number of registered trademarks | 0.305 *** | 0.096 | 3.165 |
Number of awards | 1.524 *** | 0.288 | 5.292 |
Number of jobs | 0.901 ** | 0.416 | 2.169 |
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Chen, R.; Khan, N.; Zhang, S. Policy Evaluation of Demonstration Cooperative Construction: Evidence from Sichuan Province, China. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 12259. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191912259
Chen R, Khan N, Zhang S. Policy Evaluation of Demonstration Cooperative Construction: Evidence from Sichuan Province, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(19):12259. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191912259
Chicago/Turabian StyleChen, Rui, Nawab Khan, and Shemei Zhang. 2022. "Policy Evaluation of Demonstration Cooperative Construction: Evidence from Sichuan Province, China" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 19: 12259. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191912259