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14 pages, 682 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Virtue Ethics and the Ecological Self: From Environmental to Ecological Virtues

by Gérald Hess

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010023 - 9 Feb 2024

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1437

This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias [...] Read more.

This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self. Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing, or something that complements it by adding the proper good of animals, organisms or ecosystems. Fulfilment is not that of a human self, but that of an ecological self: the natural environment or nature is not an external but an internal good. Therefore, the virtues or character traits that such an ecological self must nurture and develop leads us ultimately to distinguish—without opposing them—three different forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment, depending on whether it is anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric and whether nature is considered extrinsically or intrinsically. Such distinctions are also crucial to determine how we conceive of the political community and the collective goals that virtuous citizens assign to it (for instance, to preserve biodiversity, to tackle climate change, and so on). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

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12 pages, 220 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Virtue Ethics Interpretation of the ‘Argument from Nature’ for Both Humans and the Environment

by Nin Kirkham

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010019 - 22 Jan 2024

Viewed by 1472

Abstract

Appeals to the moral value of nature and naturalness are commonly used in debates about technology and the environment and to inform our approach to the ethics of technology and the environment more generally. In this paper, I will argue, firstly, that arguments [...] Read more.

Appeals to the moral value of nature and naturalness are commonly used in debates about technology and the environment and to inform our approach to the ethics of technology and the environment more generally. In this paper, I will argue, firstly, that arguments from nature, as they are used in debates about new technologies and about the environment, are misinterpreted when they are understood as attempting to put forward categorical objections to certain human activities and, consequently, their real significance is often overlooked. Secondly, arguments from nature, particularly as they are used in the context of debates over the use of new technologies, can be understood as appealing to human nature as a way to determine human limitations. Thirdly, arguments from nature can inform our discussion of what it is to be a human being or a person, and this kind of discussion can, in turn, inform our ethical deliberations in such areas of bioethics as euthanasia, abortion, etc. Finally, I conclude that a proper understanding of these arguments can help in establishing which virtues and which vices relate to our relationship with the non-human world—that is, which character dispositions are relevant to an environmental virtue ethics, with human nature as its foundation. A proper understanding of the argument from nature provides the basis for a ‘virtuously anthropocentric’ environmental ethics. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

19 pages, 278 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Virtue, Environmental Ethics, Nonhuman Values, and Anthropocentrism

by Marcello Di Paola

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010015 - 15 Jan 2024

Viewed by 1943

Abstract

This article discusses the encounter between virtue ethics and environmental ethics and the ways in which environmental virtue ethics confronts nonhuman axiology and the controversial theme of moral anthropocentrism. It provides a reasoned review of the relevant literature and a historical–conceptual rendition of [...] Read more.

This article discusses the encounter between virtue ethics and environmental ethics and the ways in which environmental virtue ethics confronts nonhuman axiology and the controversial theme of moral anthropocentrism. It provides a reasoned review of the relevant literature and a historical–conceptual rendition of how environmental and virtue ethics came to converge as well as the ways in which they diverge. It explains that contrary to important worries voiced by some non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists, environmental virtue ethics enables and requires a rich and nuanced engagement with nonhuman values of all sorts—intrinsic as well as extrinsic, moral as well as nonmoral, anthropocentric as well as non-anthropocentric—and neither presupposes nor implies moral anthropocentrism in its normativity. Finally, the article considers the fortunes of, and some challenges for, environmental virtue ethics in its application to the ethics of climate change, an increasingly central topic in environmental ethics. This article proceeds as follows: the first section introduces virtue ethics; the second section looks at axiological and normative themes in environmental ethics; the third section discusses environmental virtue ethics; and the fourth section considers its application to climate change. The fifth section draws some conclusions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

14 pages, 282 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?

by Damien Delorme, Noemi Calidori and Giovanni Frigo

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010011 - 9 Jan 2024

Viewed by 1483

Abstract

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric [...] Read more.

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

10 pages, 223 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Mutual Flourishing: A Dialogical Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics

by Esteban Arcos

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 6; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010006 - 29 Dec 2023

Viewed by 1287

Abstract

Environmental virtue ethics is about how things (nature) matter, and this is explicated through the virtues (character and dispositions of the agent). It has been suggested that human virtue should be informed by what constitutes our flourishing and by what constitutes nonhuman entities [...] Read more.

Environmental virtue ethics is about how things (nature) matter, and this is explicated through the virtues (character and dispositions of the agent). It has been suggested that human virtue should be informed by what constitutes our flourishing and by what constitutes nonhuman entities flourishing. Our flourishing, in other words, involves recognising their flourishing and autonomy. My purpose in this paper is to elucidate the notion of mutual flourishing through a study on the relational space that a recognising attitude or disposition of a loving and caring subject creates in its interactions with ‘earth others’. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

15 pages, 232 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Temperance, Humility and Hospitality: Three Virtues for the Anthropocene Moment?

by Jean-Philippe Pierron

Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010005 - 28 Dec 2023

Viewed by 1463

Abstract

As social and ecological transition and climate change raise issues that go far beyond individual responses, how can these challenges be balanced with ethical and political responses? This article intends to show that the strength of virtue ethics lies in the fact that [...] Read more.

As social and ecological transition and climate change raise issues that go far beyond individual responses, how can these challenges be balanced with ethical and political responses? This article intends to show that the strength of virtue ethics lies in the fact that it translates these abstract issues into concrete biographical events that shape lifestyles. The search for the good life in these matters then finds in temperance, humility and hospitality three virtues, private and social, to operate this translation. Humility makes explicit the deep interdependencies between the living, while temperance calls for practices that are attentive to these relationships, in the knowledge that our ways of life here have far-reaching consequences on the other side of the globe. This in turn invites us to restore hospitality to its cosmopolitical dimension. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

10 pages, 240 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Ecological Community: The Blind Spot of Environmental Virtue Ethics

by Rémi Beau

Philosophies 2023, 8(6), 112; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060112 - 23 Nov 2023

Viewed by 1400

Abstract

Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in [...] Read more.

Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in addressing collective action problems caused by global changes have heightened interest in these ethics. They offer a framework for meaningful individual actions independently of the commitment of other actors. However, by shifting the focus onto individuals, EVEs appear to grapple with the tension between anthropocentrism and respect for nature, as well as between self-flourishing and concern for other living beings. This article argues that this difficulty is rooted in the neglect within EVEs of the communitarian aspect of ancient virtue ethics. Drawing from Baird Callicott’s ecocentric approach and Val Plumwood’s works, this paper explores the possibility of conceiving ecological communities as collective frameworks in which both public and private virtues are defined and practiced. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

15 pages, 313 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Rethinking the Environmental Virtue of Ecological Justice from the Interdependencies of Non-Human Capabilities and Synergetic Flourishing

by Cristian Moyano-Fernández

Philosophies 2023, 8(6), 103; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060103 - 2 Nov 2023

Viewed by 2042

Abstract

The capabilities approach has largely addressed individual capabilities via a liberal framework common in its literature. However, a growing number of scholars concerned with sustainable human development are analyzing theories and methodologies that are both suitable for human flourishing and display a respect [...] Read more.

The capabilities approach has largely addressed individual capabilities via a liberal framework common in its literature. However, a growing number of scholars concerned with sustainable human development are analyzing theories and methodologies that are both suitable for human flourishing and display a respect for nature. This paper explores several forms of considering the value of non-animal and non-individual natural entities, such as ecosystems. I first expose some instrumental reasons why we may care about the flourishing of ecosystems and then other reasons based on the assumption that they have integrity and their own capabilities and, therefore, deserve moral consideration. I argue that despite the possible moral conflicts that may emerge between human and ecosystemic autonomy, they could be avoided by adopting an ecological justice virtue. I present this ecological justice characterized by some contributions of decolonial thought and environmental virtue ethics. I propose that if the capabilities approach was not anchored only in an individualistic ontology, it could better assume a multi-level axiology from which the inherent and instrumental value of ecosystems would be interconnected. And, to this end, I find the concept of synergetic flourishing helpful to accept an interdependent and non-human-centered recognition of the capabilities. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

18 pages, 516 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Plant-Centered Virtue Ethics: A Cross-Talk between Agroecology and Ecosophy

by Sylvie Pouteau

Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 97; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050097 - 17 Oct 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1433

Abstract

The claim that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is anthropocentric appears inherently aporetic since it implies that either anthropocentrism is virtuous or the whole environmental issue is anthropocentric, thus translating vices into virtues or vice versa. Another interpretation is that both the environment and [...] Read more.

The claim that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is anthropocentric appears inherently aporetic since it implies that either anthropocentrism is virtuous or the whole environmental issue is anthropocentric, thus translating vices into virtues or vice versa. Another interpretation is that both the environment and humanity are thought with a vicious conception of centeredness. Conversely, if centeredness is rightly addressed and humanity and its environment are considered as one and the same issue, the focus on anthropocentrism should also be different. By drawing on Felix Guatttari’s ecosophy, this paper proposes that EVE needs to be based on a philosophical understanding of agriculture. Thus, agriculture is the organic and epistemic matrix of our relation to the environment and not merely a section of an abstract environment nor one economic area among others. The environmental crisis is primarily a crisis of humanity within its agricultural matrix. To be an environmentally virtuous human being, a requirement is to face again the burden of our absolute need for food and for fruitful cooperation between farmers and plants, not only animals. This paper discusses the importance of plant ethics and plant topology to understand the specificities of the agricultural matrix. The emphasis will be placed on plant-centered virtue ethics and reframing anthropocentrism by drawing on transdisciplinary conversation with plant practitioners in the context of a research action project. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)

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