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Games
Special Issues
Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments
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Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 May 2021) | Viewed by 11150

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. Marc Willinger

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement Montpellier (CEE-M), Montpellier, France
Interests: experimental economics; behavioural economics; environmental and resource economics; public economics; risk and decision
Prof. Dr. Yukihiko Funaki

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
Interests: cooperative game theory; experimental economics

Special Issue Information

Dear colleagues,

Both cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory offer a wide variety of approaches to the question of coalition formation. Over the last few decades, coalition formation theories have been applied to many important economic issues such as the formation of economic unions, the governance of global public goods and the stability of political parties. However, empirical evidence on the coexistence of small and large groups, instead of a grand Pareto-superior coalition, challenged the theoretical framework. Advances in cooperative and in non-cooperative game theory have provided new insights in coalition formation with heterogeneous groups at equilibrium. Yet many aspects of the process of coalition formation are not well understood. Progress in experimental design and behavioral modelling can shed new light on the roots of the formation and stability of coalitions. In this Special Issue, we wish to gather recent contributions, either theoretical or experimental, on the issue of coalition formation with a special focus on behavioral approaches.

Prof. Dr. Marc Willinger
Prof. Dr. Yukihiko Funaki
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • coalition formation
  • cooperative game theory
  • non-cooperative game theory
  • behavioral approaches
  • experimental design
  • behavioral modelling

Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

14 pages, 349 KiB  
Article
An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option
by Koffi Serge William Yao
Games 2021, 12(4), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040083 - 26 Oct 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2410
Abstract
This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat [...] Read more.
This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments)
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20 pages, 561 KiB  
Article
Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation
by Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki and Taro Shinoda
Games 2021, 12(3), 64; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030064 - 17 Aug 2021
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2661
Abstract
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects [...] Read more.
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments)
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11 pages, 1100 KiB  
Article
Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence
by Kenju Kamei
Games 2021, 12(1), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010022 - 03 Mar 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2535
Abstract
Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in [...] Read more.
Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments)
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16 pages, 376 KiB  
Article
Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach
by Takaaki Abe
Games 2021, 12(1), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014 - 01 Feb 2021
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2487
Abstract
In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that [...] Read more.
In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments)
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