The Impact of Rural Land Right on Farmers’ Income in Underdeveloped Areas: Evidence from Micro-Survey Data in Yunnan Province, China

Abstract

The rural land right has paved the way for the deepening of China’s agricultural land system, which is critical to the successful implementation of the rural revitalization plan in the new era. Based on the micro-survey data of farmers in Yunnan Province, we use an OLS model to empirically test the impact of rural land rights on farmers’ income in underdeveloped areas, and we use a stepwise regression method to test the mechanism role of land transfer willingness and behavior in the rural land right on farmers’ income. Benchmark regression results show that the implementation of rural land rights policy significantly increased the total income of farmers, which mainly comes from farm income. Although the rural land right policy has no significant impact on farmers’ non-farm income, the sign of right coefficient is positive. Mechanism analysis shows that the rural land right can increase the income of farmers by encouraging them to transfer to land. It shows that the property right of land is clear, which makes it easier for land to transfer and trade, and farmers can achieve a certain degree of scale operation, thereby increasing income. Finally, it is suggested that future fiscal funding in impoverished regions be directed toward land transfer links and that accompanying rules and regulations adequately protect farmers’ land contract management rights.

1. Introduction

Under the background of central rural revitalization, the core issue of China’s “agriculture, rural areas, and farmers” is still farmers’ income. China has implemented a number of regulations to strengthen and assist farmers in order to enhance their revenue. According to Acorn to China National Bureau of Statistics, rural China’s per capita disposable income will reach CNY 17,131 in 2020, doubling that of 2010 two years ahead of plan, and the growth rate will be faster than that of urban people for 11 years. However, with the economy under increasing downward pressure in recent years, the internal driving power and stamina for the continued and steady rise of farmers’ income have remained insufficient. The average annual growth rate during the thirteenth Five-Year Plan period is 6.74%, which is 4.21 percentage points lower than the average annual growth rate during the previous Five-Year Plan period. It is clear that only by addressing the issue of farmers’ continuing income growth can we address the current social imbalance and achieve common prosperity. After the family contract responsibility system, the central government planned in 2013 to “essentially complete the registration and certification of rural land contractual management rights in five years”. This is another significant development in China’s rural land system. The rural land right has altered the land rights relationship between the government, village collectives, and farmers, limiting village collectives’ residual control rights over land and endowing farmers with stronger property rights.

Farmers’ economic engagement is today broad, as indicated by the diversity of their labor structure. Thus, farmers’ income is influenced not only by their own factors, but also by rural institutional innovation and policy reform. Scholars look at the link between rural land rights and farmer income from the following angles [1,2,3]. First, land rights promote agricultural labor reallocation. When agricultural returns are high, rural land right expands farm labor inputs; when the non-agricultural sector is more efficient, rural land right expands nonfarm income [4,5,6]. Second, rural land right lowers land transaction costs and stimulates land transfer. Farmers with various transfer behaviors may choose to engage in appropriate activities as a result of the unrestricted land transfer market, greatly raising their income level [7,8]. Third, by reducing financial restraints and therefore raising agricultural labor income, rural land rights might stimulate agricultural investment or entrepreneurship [9,10]. In addition, some researchers discovered no significant effect of rural land right on increasing farmers’ income [11,12,13,14,15]. Do and Iyer (2008) [16] found that the confirmation of rural land right increased the non-agricultural employment time of farmers, but did not increase the income of farmers when studying the implementation of rural land rights confirmation policy in Vietnam in 1993. Zhang et al. (2020) [17] found that rural land right has no significant impact on the income of the planting industry, but it has significantly increased the operating income of farmers.

The preceding research on whether rural land rights may assist farmers in improving their income has not reached a uniform result, and research on the impact of rural land rights on farmer income in underdeveloped economic zones is rare. We use micro survey data from Yunnan Province, an underdeveloped economic region, to assess the impact of rural land right policy implementation to rural development from the perspective of the link between rural land rights and farmers’ income. First, this paper uses a questionnaire of farmers in Yunnan Province to study the impact of rural land rights on farmers’ income, and then investigates the causal relationship between the two using the tool variable method, providing a reference for the government to optimize land policies in underdeveloped areas. Second, using the stepwise regression approach, this article investigates the intermediate transmission mechanism of rural land rights, boosting the increase of farmers’ income, and thoroughly comprehends the relevance of rural land right policy implementation.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the background of rural land right policy; Section 3 describes the research hypothesis of rural land right on farmers’ income; Section 4 introduces the research data, variable selection, and benchmark model; Section 5 empirically analyzes the impact of land right on farmers’ income, and discusses the results; Section 6 summarizes the conclusions and provides recommendations.

2. Background of Rural Land Right Policy

China’s land-rights policy has a unique institutional foundation. Land ownership in rural China currently belongs to the collective, and farming households only have the right to contract and transfer land, as well as the corresponding right to income, under the current land property rights system. In fact, since the early 1980s, when the household contract responsibility system was linked to output, the Chinese government has been developing policies to stabilize the land contract relationship in order to encourage farmers to use land.

In 1993, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council proposed that “after the expiration of the original farmland contract period, it should be extended for another 30 years without change” and gradually implemented the “no increase in people, no increase in land, no reduction in people” policy in some areas (such as Guizhou). Although the Rural Land Contract Law of 2002 required the issuing of the land contract management certificate and the farmers’ signature on the contract, the influence on policy was not particularly significant. According to data from the fourth nationwide land survey, which was conducted in 2008, the proportion of people who held land contracts and land certificates was 43.6% and 47.7%, respectively, neither of which was more than half, while the proportion of people who held land contracts and certificates was only 41.2%. To further protect farmers’ land contractual management rights, the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed in 2008 that “the existing land contractual relationship should be stable and unchanged for a long time.” Some townships in eight provinces, including Shandong, Chongqing, and Sichuan, were chosen for small-scale pilots in 2009. Among them, the recognition of rights in Chengdu, Sichuan Province has yielded visible results [18].

The Central Committee’s No. 1 central document formally proposed in 2013 that “we should carry out the work of confirming, registering, and issuing rural land rights comprehensively, and basically complete the work of confirming, registering, and issuing rural land contractual management rights in five years”. In total, 105 counties (cities and districts) were chosen as the second batch of pilot projects to confirm, register, and issue certificates in the same year. The confirmation, registration, and certification of rural land contractual management rights reached a conclusion in 2019. According to the No. 1 central document, “we should carry out ‘looking back’, do a good job in the concluding work, properly resolve the remaining problems, and issue the certificate of land contractual management rights to farmers” after “basically completing the confirmation, registration, and certification of contracted land”. However, due to varying progress in different regions, as of the end of 2019, some regions had yet to publish confirmation and acceptance information.

3. Theoretical Hypothesis

3.1. The Impact of Rural Land Right on Farmers’ Income

Land right involves determining clear land ownership, use rights, and other rights via the application of contemporary scientific and technology means, in essence, land registration and certification of clear land property rights. The ownership of land surplus control right directly affects the stable and sustainable growth of farmers’ income [19]. Before the land property right was clear, land adjustment frequently occurred during the land contract period due to family population changes, virtual property rights, and land acquisition, which inevitably resulted in problems such as inaccurate land plots, unclear land coverage, inaccurate land area, and increased land disputes, resulting in a lack of protection of farmers’ development rights, stifling farmers’ income growth [20,21,22]. Deininger (2005) [23] discovered that if property rights are not clearly defined, rational individuals will undoubtedly struggle for scarce land resources, which will not only undermine farmers’ rights and interests but will also diminish resource allocation efficiency. Farmers have the right to control the land surplus once the land property right is established, which encourages farmers to increase their investment in land relationship specificity and land circulation, achieve appropriate scale operation, improve agricultural productivity, and then promote the growth of farmers’ income.

H1: 

The rural land right has a positive effect on farmers’ income.

3.2. Rural Land Right, Land Transfer, and Farmers’ Income

Land transfer refers to the transfer of land use right. That is, the farmer who owns the land contract management right transfers the land management right (use right) to other farmers or economic organizations, that is, retains the contract right and transfers the use right. The rural land right reduces the risk of property rights transaction by strengthening property rights protection, and reduces the cost of property rights transaction by clearly defining the ownership relationship, which helps farmers make rational decisions on rural land transfer [24,25]. On the one hand, once the land contractual management right is established, farmers with poor agricultural production technology will be able to rent out agricultural land and seek employment with confidence within the policy’s scope, increasing their income [26,27,28,29,30]. On the other hand, farmers with comparative advantages in agricultural production are more likely to transfer to land and engage in specialized agricultural production in order to increase their scale operating income [31]. Since the village collective controls the right to adjust the land and interfere with the planting type prior to the confirmation of the right, the farmers do not have the complete land management right, which leads to the farmers not having the residual control right of agricultural land, being unable to control the transfer to the land and obtain the post-event income of the transfer to the land investment, and the farmers’ land transfer investment facing great risks [32,33]. Following the confirmation of agricultural land ownership, the residual control right of agricultural land is assigned to farmers, allowing them to obtain complete land management rights, ensuring farmers obtain the post-profit of land transfer investment, assisting farmers to expand the land transfer area and carry out land scale management, and promoting the increase of their total income [34,35,36]. The efficiency of resource stock allocation is improved, and income levels are raised on both sides of the transfer, thanks to rural land transfers, which distribute land resources to farmers with more desire to demand land and agricultural management skills.

H2: 

The rural land right can improve the income of farmers by promoting land transfer.

4. Data and Methods

4.1. Study Aera

Yunnan Province lies in China’s southwest. It is located in the region known as the “hub of three Asia”, which comprises East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. It is an important part of the Yangtze River economic belt and the national pilot free trade zone. The overall land area of the province is 394,100 square kilometers, of which the mountainous area accounts for 88.64%, the plain, platform, and hills account for 11.36%. The main food crops include rice, corn, wheat, broad beans, potatoes, cereals, and soybeans. The province’s land rights registration for 368,667 hectares will be finished in 2020. Land transfer farmers account for almost 2 million households, or 20% of farming households in the province. The area of family-contracted arable land has grown to more than 800,000 hectares, and the proportion of transferred area to the province’s arable land has reached around 16%, boosting the intrinsic vigor of the basic rural management system and driving farmer income growth.

Figure 1 shows the map of the study aera. Overall, the proportion of people who have obtained the confirmation certificate in Yunnan Province is 78.1%. In terms of regions, Bao Shan City has the highest proportion of farmers who have confirmed their rights, accounting for 90.99%, while Di Qing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture has the lowest proportion, accounting for 68.75%. The completion of the land right of the aera may be due to the fact that among the farmers who have not yet received the confirmation certificate, some of the existing portion of the right to confirm the right and some farmers have been finished with the land measurement work. However, the confirmation certificate has not yet been issued.

4.2. Data Sources

The data used in this paper are mainly from the questionnaire survey of farmers conducted by Southwest Forestry University in Yunnan Province in January 2021. The survey was conducted in 16 cities (prefectures) in Yunnan Province, involving family structure (total population, number of elderly and children, education level), income (farm income, nonfarm income, and total income), land use (land transfer), and perception of rural land right policies (understanding of land right, perception of land ownership, satisfaction with the effect of land right). The questionnaire is distributed according to the proportion of rural population in each city and prefecture. The number of questionnaires distributed is shown in column (1) of

Table 1. Distribution of questionnaires.

City (Prefecture)	Total Number of Questionnaires	Valid Questionnaires
Kunming	255	197
Qu Jing	436	420
Yu xi	154	146
Zhao tong	457	327
Bao Shan	236	233
Lijiang	98	60
Pu er	211	116
Lin Cang	217	108
De Hong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture	99	54
Nu Jiang of the Lisu Autonomous Prefecture	40	33
Di Qing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture	39	16
Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture	284	259
Chu Xiong	197	133
Hani-Yi Autonomous Prefecture of Hong He	347	157
Wen Shan Zhuang and Miao Autonomous Prefecture	327	186
Dai Autonomous Prefecture of Xishuangbanna	102	35

, and the number of effective samples is shown in column (2) of Table 1. A total of 3500 questionnaires were distributed, with 3032 of them recovered. Following the removal of invalid samples, a total of 2478 valid samples were obtained.

4.3. Variables

1. Explained variable. We study the impact of rural land rights on farmer income with the goal of examining the increase in economic benefits brought to farmers by the farmland ownership determination policy. The total income of farmers is chosen as the explained variable, and two measurement indicators of farmers’ income sources, namely farm income and nonfarm income of farmers, are also introduced. A value of 1 means Below 10,000 yuan; 2 means 10,000–20,000 yuan; 3 means 20,000–40,000 yuan; 4 means 40,000–60,000 yuan; 5 means 60,000–80,000 yuan; 6 means 80,000–100,000 yuan; 7 means more than 100,000 yuan.

As shown in

Table 2. Distribution of farmers’ income.

Variable Names	Income Interval (yuan)	Confirmation Sample (%)	Unconfirmed Sample (%)	Total Sample (%)
Total income	10,000–20,000	20.11	22.94	21.11
	20,000–40,000	21.59	25.32	21.63
	40,000–60,000	21.42	20.00	21.51
	60,000–80,000	18.52	17.06	18.20
	80,000–100,000	13.09	9.36	12.27
	More than 100,000	5.28	5.32	5.29
Farm income	Less than 10,000	49.51	56.33	51.01
	10,000–20,000	26.33	24.40	25.91
	20,000–40,000	14.74	11.93	14.12
	40,000–60,000	6.41	4.04	5.89
	60,000–80,000	2.02	2.12	2.20
	80,000–100,000	0.98	1.28	1.05
Nonfarm income	Less than 10,000	17.28	15.60	16.91
	10,000–20,000	17.18	19.63	17.72
	20,000–40,000	27.52	30.28	28.13
	40,000–60,000	19.30	18.35	19.09
	60,000–80,000	10.29	9.36	10.09
	80,000–100,000	6.00	4.59	5.69
	More than 100,000	2.43	2.20	2.38

, the total income of farm households is primarily concentrated in the range of 20,000–40,000, accounting for 21.63% of total income, followed by the range of 40,000–60,000. In terms of classification, the proportion of farmer income in the range of 20,000–40,000 is 3.73 percentage points higher in the non-confirmed sample than in the confirmed sample. With 51.01%, farm households’ farm income was primarily concentrated below 10,000, and the proportion of farm households with farm income below 10,000 in the non-confirmed sample was 6.82 percentage points higher than in the confirmed sample. The proportion of farm income between 10,000 and 20,000 was 1.93 percentage points higher in the confirmed sample than in the non-confirmed sample, and the proportion of farm income between 20,000 and 40,000 was 2.81 percentage points higher in the confirmed sample than in the non-confirmed sample. Non-farm income of farm households can be seen to be distributed in four intervals, with the highest proportion of 28.13% in the 20,000–40,000 interval. The proportion of people in the 20,000–40,000 interval is highest in both the confirmed and unconfirmed samples, with the unconfirmed sample being 2.76 percentage points higher.

2. Explanatory variable. See

Table 3. Definitions and Descriptions of Variables.

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Definition	Mean	Standard Deviation
Explained variables	Total income of household (income)	2 means 10,000–20,000 yuan; 3 means 20,000–40,000 yuan; 4 means 40,000–60,000 yuan; 5 means 60,000–80,000 yuan; 6 means 80,000–100,000 yuan; 7 means more than 100,000 yuan	3.939	1.490
	Farm income of household (farm)	1 means Below 10,000 yuan; 2 means 10,000–20,000 yuan; 3 means 20,000–40,000 yuan; 4 means 40,000–60,000 yuan; 5 means 60,000–80,000 yuan; 6 means 80,000–100,000 yuan	1.851	1.102
	Nonfarm income of household (nonfarm)	1 means Below 10,000 yuan; 2 means 10,000–20,000 yuan; 3 means 20,000–40,000 yuan; 4 means 40,000–60,000 yuan; 5 means 60,000–80,000 yuan; 6 means 80,000–100,000 yuan; 7 means more than 100,000 yuan	3.143	1.524
Explanatory variables	Rural land right (right)	1 means that the certificate of confirmation has been obtained, 0 means that the certificate of right has not been obtained	0.780	0.414
Mediating variables	The willingness of land transfer (transfer)	1 means willingness and 0 means unwillingness	0.394	0.489
	Transfer out land (out-transfer)	1 means transfer out land, 0 means other	0.243	0.429
	Transfer into land (in-transfer)	1 means transfer into land, 0 means other	0.152	0.359
Characteristics of the household head	Gender (gen)	1 means Male, 2 means Female	1.131	0.337
	Age (age)	Age of the head of household	48.301	6.078
	Education level (edu)	1 means elementary and secondary schools, 2 means junior high schools, 3 means high schools and secondary schools, and 4 means junior colleges and above	1.642	0.740
	State of health (hea)	1 means good, 2 means fair, 3 means bad	1.486	0.580
Family characteristics	Family size (pop)	Family total population	3.68	0.849
	Number of children and elderly (raise)	Total number of old people and children to be supported in the family	1.15	0.9
	Average education of family (average)	Average education level of family members	2.165	0.607
Characteristics of rural land right policy	Understanding of power confirmation policy (under)	1 means no understanding at all, 2 means general understanding, and 3 means very understanding	1.897	0.489
	Ownership of contracted land (own)	1 means self, 2 means collective, and 3 means country	2.513	0.77
	Satisfaction with rights confirmation policy (sati)	1 means very dissatisfied, 2 means generally satisfied, 3 means very satisfied	2.407	0.538

for the definitions of all variables. The rural land right is conducive to improving the stability of farmland property rights because the core of farmland rights confirmation is to clarify the use rights of farmland to each household, and to fix the rights in legal form by issuing corresponding certificates to farmers. Therefore, whether the village has issued the farmer the contracted management right certificate will determine whether the farmland is confirmed. Accordingly, the answer to the question “whether the farmer has received the contracted management right certificate” in the questionnaire is as follows: “Yes” answers are assigned a “1”, while “no” answers are assigned a “0”.

3. Mediating variable. The intermediary variables are land transfer willingness and land transfer behavior. The willingness to transfer land is measured by “whether you are more willing to transfer land after land ownership is confirmed” in the questionnaire, with 1 indicating willingness and 0 indicating unwillingness. “Do you want your land to be transferred in or out” measures the land transfer behavior. If farmers choose land transfer out, 1 means land transfer out, and 0 means others. If the farmers choose to transfer into land, 1 means transfer into land, and 0 means others.

4. Control variables. To reduce the impact of missing variables on the research results, we have controlled the characteristics of household heads, family characteristics, and characteristics of the rural land rights policy.

Household head characteristics are gender, age, education, and health status [37,38,39,40].

① Gender (gen): Gender is a dummy variable; male values are assigned 1, and female values are assigned 0. Women’s household responsibilities (such as childcare, housework, and so on) generally limit their available labor and farming time. Male-headed households in rural areas earn more than female-headed households, particularly low- and middle-income households.

② Age (age): actual age of the interviewed head of household. Age affects the economic benefits of rural households in a variety of ways.

③ Education level (edu): This is a dummy variable. In general, the higher a farmer’s education level, the more conducive to the optimal allocation of agricultural production resources in rural production, the improvement in farmers’ ability to learn advanced production technology, and thus promotion of farmers’ income growth. A value of 1 means elementary and secondary schools, 2 means junior high schools, 3 means high schools and secondary schools, and 4 means junior colleges and above.

④ Health status (hea): this indicator was self-evaluated by the respondent and was also used as a dummy variable and assigned the following values: 1 means good, 2 means fair, 3 means bad.

Family characteristics include family size, dependency ratio of population, average education of family [41,42,43,44].

① Family size (pop): the total family population represents the family size.

② Number of children and elderly (raise): the more people raised by the family, the less the labor force, which has a certain negative impact on the income of family farmers.

③ Average education of family (average): a family with a higher average education level has gradually improved its labor productivity and skills, thereby increasing its family income. This indicator is the sum of the maximum years of education of all family members and divided by family total population.

The characteristics of rural land right policy include farmers’ understanding of right policy, satisfaction with the implementation of right policy, and awareness of land ownership [44,45].

① Understanding of power confirmation policy (understand): the indicator is a dummy variable, 1 means no understanding at all, 2 means general understanding, and 3 means very understanding.

② Satisfaction with rights confirmation policy (sati): the indicator is a dummy variable, 1 means very dissatisfied, 2 means generally satisfied, 3 means very satisfied.

③ Ownership of contracted land (own): the indicator is a dummy variable, 1 means self, 2 means collective, and 3 means country.

4.4. Model

4.4.1. OLS Regression Model

To analyze the impact of land right on farmers’ income, we constructed the following benchmark model.

$$incom{e}_i={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_{1}righ{t}_i+{\alpha }_{i}contro{l}_i+{\epsilon }_{1i}$$

(1)

where $incom{e}_i$ represents the income level of farmers, including total income, farm income, and nonfarm income. $righ{t}_i$ represents the status of land right, if the confirmation certificate has been obtained, then $righ{t}_i=1$, otherwise $righ{t}_i=0$. $contro{l}_i$ represents a set of control variables that may have an impact on farmers’ income level, including characteristics of the household head, family, and the rural land right. ${\alpha }_0$ is constant, ${\alpha }_1$ is the parameter to be estimated, ${\alpha }_i$ represents the coefficient of the control variable parameter, and ${\epsilon }_{1i}$ is the random error term.

4.4.2. Mediation Effect Model

In order to further study the impact path of the rural land right on farmers’ income, and test whether there was a mediating effect of land transfer between rural land right and farmers’ income, we constructed the following model.

$$transfe{r}_i={\beta }_0+{\beta }_{1}righ{t}_i+{\beta }_{i}contro{l}_i+{\epsilon }_{2i}$$

(2)

$$incom{e}_i={\gamma }_0+{\gamma }_{1}righ{t}_i+{\gamma }_{2}transfe{r}_i+{\gamma }_{i}contro{l}_i+{\epsilon }_{3i}$$

(3)

where the meanings of $incom{e}_i$ and $righ{t}_i$ are consistent with Equation (1). $transfe{r}_i$ is the mediating variable, i.e., willingness and behavior of land transfer. ${\beta }_0$ and ${\gamma }_0$ are constant terms. ${\beta }_1$, ${\gamma }_1$, and ${\gamma }_2$ are parameters to be estimated. ${\beta }_i$ and ${\gamma }_i$ are parameters of control variables. ${\epsilon }_{2i}$ and ${\epsilon }_{3i}$ are the random error terms.

5. Results and Discussion

This section first discusses the effects of rural land rights on farmers’ income levels, then moves on to robustness tests and endogeneity tests, before delving into the mechanisms underlying the effects of willingness and behavior of land transfer on farmers’ income.

5.1. Benchmark Regression Results

We used OLS to run preliminary regressions on the equations, and the estimation results are shown in

Table 4. Benchmark estimation results of rural land right on farmers’ income.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income	Income	Farm	Farm	Nonfarm	Nonfarm
Right	0.168	0.181 *	0.225 ***	0.245 ***	0.015	0.019
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.106)
Gen	−0.002	−0.010	−0.017	−0.012	0.016	0.000
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Edu	0.161 ***	0.155 ***	0.077 **	0.063 *	0.134 ***	0.140 ***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Age	−0.015 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.002	−0.003	−0.013 **	−0.011 **
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Hea	−0.360 ***	−0.358 ***	−0.166 ***	−0.162 ***	−0.292 ***	−0.297 ***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Pop	0.595 ***	0.590 ***	0.113 ***	0.098 ***	0.632 ***	0.642 ***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Raise	−0.642 ***	−0.643 ***	−0.121 ***	−0.100 ***	−0.658 ***	−0.677 ***
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Average	0.177 ***	0.148 ***	−0.020	−0.014	0.226 ***	0.180 ***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Under	0.119 **	0.113 *	0.091 *	0.075	0.067	0.074
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Own	−0.068 *	−0.077 **	0.008	0.008	−0.080 **	−0.089 **
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Sati	0.059	0.055	−0.097 **	−0.085 **	0.170 ***	0.159 ***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Constant	2.738 ***	3.153 ***	1.702 ***	1.977 ***	1.542 ***	1.836 ***
	(0.358)	(0.368)	(0.280)	(0.286)	(0.366)	(0.372)
Fixed city	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478
R-squared	0.130	0.156	0.023	0.066	0.127	0.173

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

. After controlling for basic household head characteristics and basic household information factors, the rural right has significantly increased the t farm income of farmers, which was significant at the 5% confidence level. After controlling for cities (prefectures) heterogeneity, the total income and farm income of farmers with confirmed rights are still higher than those with non-confirmed rights, both of which is significant at the 5% confidence level. Columns (5) and (6) show that land right has no significant effect on non-farm income, implying that non-farm income is determined by their own characteristics rather than by land right. As can be seen, land right in less developed areas has a significant positive impact on total income, with farm income accounting for the majority of the growth.

In terms of the remaining control variables, health has a negative income effect, whereas education has a positive income effect. The total number of households has a significant positive impact on farmer income. Obviously, as the population grows, so will the labor force engaged in agricultural production, and their income will rise accordingly. Simultaneously, we discovered that adolescent and elderly people have a significant negative impact on farmers’ total income. This is because the elderly and minors are the recipients of assistance, and their labor capacity is insufficient. Furthermore, the greater the farmers’ understanding of the rural land right policy, the greater their income.

5.2. Robustness Test

To ensure the reliability of the empirical results, we carried out relevant robustness tests. First, include macroeconomic control variables at the county level. To investigate the impact of land right on farmers’ income, we used economic indicators such as per capita GDP, secondary industry added value, tertiary industry added value, and total social consumption at the county level. The results are shown in

Table 5. Robustness test results of rural land right on farmers’ income.

Variable	Adding Macroeconomic Variables			Confirmation Samples after 2018
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income	Farm	Nonfarm	Income	Farm	Nonfarm
Right	0.182 *	0.243 ***	0.023	0.208 *	0.280 ***	0.006
	(0.105)	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.089)	(0.117)
Gen	−0.005	−0.009	0.002	−0.031	−0.029	0.005
	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.098)
Edu	0.157 ***	0.063 *	0.142 ***	0.220 ***	0.097 **	0.187 ***
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.056)
Age	−0.013 **	-0.002	−0.011 **	−0.011 *	−0.001	−0.010 *
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Hea	−0.354 ***	−0.158 ***	−0.297 ***	−0.362 ***	−0.181 ***	−0.274 ***
	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.058)
Pop	0.588 ***	0.099 ***	0.639 ***	0.589 ***	0.115 ***	0.627 ***
	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Raise	−0.637 ***	−0.099 ***	−0.673 ***	−0.644 ***	−0.093 **	−0.688 ***
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Average	0.148 ***	−0.015	0.181 ***	0.134 **	−0.029	0.171 ***
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.066)
Under	0.117 *	0.076	0.078	0.078	0.066	0.026
	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.069)
Own	−0.076 **	0.007	−0.087 **	−0.042	0.020	−0.058
	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.042)
Sati	0.051	−0.078 *	0.149 ***	0.068	−0.042	0.163 ***
	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.062)
GDP	0.042	0.102	−0.055	0.052	0.056	0.011
	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.078)	(0.103)
Industry	0.474	−0.069	0.372	20.380	0.137	0.365
	(0.409)	(0.318)	(0.414)	(0.464)	(0.356)	(0.471)
Service	0.474	−0.551	0.976 **	0.479	−0.459	0.909 *
	(0.466)	(0.362)	(0.471)	(0.536)	(0.412)	(0.545)
Consumption	−0.045 *	−0.074 ***	0.019	−0.067 **	−0.065 ***	−0.019
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.032)
Constant	2.656 ***	1.480 *	1.840 *	2.502 **	1.646 *	1.332
	(1.011)	(0.785)	(1.023)	(1.183)	(0.908)	(1.202)
Fixed city	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2478	2478	2478	1909	1909	1909
R-squared	0.159	0.071	0.176	0.171	0.092	0.182

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

columns (1)–(3). The estimated values in columns (1) and (2) show that the confirmation of rural land rights have a significant positive impact on farmers’ total income and farm income at least at the significance level of 10%, implying that the conclusion that the confirmation of rural land rights significantly increase farmers’ total income and farm income is stable. Column (3) shows that rural land right has no significant impact on farmers’ nonfarm income, and macroeconomic variables also have no significant impact, indicating that farmers’ nonfarm income is only related to their own characteristics.

The second step is to reduce the sample size. Yunnan Province began confirming and registering rights in 19 counties and districts in 2014, expanded the number of pilots in 2015, and completed the overall registration of land right in 50 counties and districts in 2018, while fully promoting the registration and certification of rural land rights. Therefore, we chose a sample of 1909 rural land contracting rights certificates obtained after 2018 to investigate the impact of land right on farmers’ income levels. Table 5 shows the results in columns (4)–(6). The regression results show that land right has a significant positive effect on total income at the 10% significant level, and land right also has a significant positive effect on farm income at the 1% significant level, but land right fails the test on nonfarm income, and total income is primarily determined by farm income, and it means the benchmark regression’s results are robustness.

5.3. Endogenous Test

We use instrumental variables for robustness testing in order to circumvent the problem of sample selection in the model and to overcome the endogenous problems caused by missing variables and reverse causality. In terms of tool variable processing, we choose the proportion of farmers in villages other than the village in the township where the farmers live to receive the certificate of rural land ownership confirmation. This is because the status of farmers receiving the certificate in other villages within the same township reflects the status of farmers in the township, which is related to whether the villagers receive the certificate. However, because this village’s farmers are omitted, there is no direct relationship between their family income and the family income of other farmers in the surveyed village. The results of the tool variable method are shown in

Table 6. Endogenous test of rural land right on farmers’ income.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income	Income	Farm	Farm	Nonfarm	Nonfarm
Right	2.374 **	2.475 **	3.550 ***	3.757 ***	−0.326	−0.374
	(1.051)	(1.134)	(1.081)	(1.172)	(0.932)	(0.997)
Gen	0.048	0.044	0.075	0.067	−0.009	−0.006
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Edu	0.158 ***	0.156 ***	0.068	0.061	0.140 ***	0.143 ***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Age	−0.014 **	−0.014 **	−0.003	−0.003	−0.011 **	−0.011 **
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Hea	−0.373 ***	−0.368 ***	−0.185 ***	−0.179 ***	−0.295 ***	−0.295 ***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Pop	0.553 ***	0.547 ***	0.041	0.036	0.648 ***	0.646 ***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Raise	−0.634 ***	−0.625 ***	−0.087 **	−0.081 *	−0.679 ***	−0.675 ***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Average	0.208 ***	0.211 ***	0.077	0.082	0.171 ***	0.170 ***
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Under	−0.152	−0.159	−0.324 **	−0.348 **	0.116	0.125
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.144)	(0.154)	(0.127)	(0.134)
Own	−0.048	−0.046	0.051	0.052	−0.094 **	−0.093 **
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Sati	0.023	0.017	−0.133 **	−0.130 **	0.164 ***	0.155 ***
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)
GDP		0.091		0.177 *		−0.064
		(0.094)		(0.091)		(0.086)
Industry		0.230		1.010 *		−0.494
		(0.560)		(0.544)		(0.504)
Service		1.255 **		0.647		0.841
		(0.628)		(0.602)		(0.565)
Consumption		−0.050 *		−0.082 ***		0.020
		(0.030)		(0.027)		(0.028)
Constant	1.685 **	0.020	−0.236	−2.561	2.068 ***	2.296
	(0.811)	(1.653)	(0.830)	(1.592)	(0.724)	(1.469)
Fixed city	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478
R-squared	0.006				0.169	0.171

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

. The Right coefficients in Table 6 are greater than the coefficients of the benchmark regression in Table 4, showing that the effect of rural land rights on total income and farm income of farmers was previously overestimated. Strong evidence supports the notion that total income and farm income are considerably positive.

5.4. Mechanism Analysis

Benchmark analysis shows that the rural land right can improve farmers’ total income and farm income, but how the rural land right affects total income and farm income needs to be discussed further. To investigate the impact of the rural land right on farmers’ income, we use land transfer as intermediary variables. Land transfers are further classified into two types: land transfers out and land transfers in. The virtual variable of occurrence or not represents the land transfer and its subdivided land transfer out and land transfer in, and the occurrence is assigned a value of 1, otherwise it is assigned a value of 0.

Table 7. OLS regression results of rural land right on intermediary variables.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Transfer	Out-Transfer	In-Transfer
Right	0.074 **	0.009	0.065 **
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.499 ***	0.363 ***	0.136
	(0.130)	(0.114)	(0.095)
Fixed city	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2478	2478	2478
R-squared	0.023	0.017	0.023

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.

shows the result of land right estimation on intermediate variables. Under the control of other variables and fixed city effect, rural land rights have a significant positive impact on land transfer and farm labor input, and this impact is significant at the 5% confidence level. This proves that once land ownership rights are established, farmers’ willingness to transfer land increases, as evidenced by an increase in the rate of land transferred to farmers.

There are three criteria for using the stepwise regression method to study the role of the mechanism: first, the regression of the main independent variable (rural land right) to the intermediary variable (land transfer), with a significant estimation coefficient; second, the regression of the main independent variable (rural land right) to the intermediary variable (land transfer); and the second is a significant estimation coefficient for the regression of the main independent variable (rural land right) to the dependent variable (farmers’ income). Third, the dependent variable is simultaneously regressed by the intermediate variable and the independent variable. If the estimation coefficient of the intermediate variable is significant while the regression coefficient of the main independent variable decreases but remains significant, the intermediate variable serves as an intermediary. If the regression coefficient of the main independent variable decreases and becomes non-significant, the intermediary variable takes over completely. The estimation results in Table 4 and Table 5 confirmed the first and second criteria, and both are valid. This paper continues to verify the third standard, that is, the intermediary variable and the core variable of rural land right are added to the benchmark model for estimation in order to provide rigorous evidence. The estimation results are shown in

Table 8. Mechanism regression results of rural land right on farmers’ income.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income	Income	Income	Farm	Farm	Farm
Right	0.182 *	0.170	0.174 *	0.243 ***	0.235 ***	0.218 ***
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)
Transfer		0.156 ***			0.106 **
		(0.057)			(0.044)
In-transfer			0.122			0.368 ***
			(0.078)			(0.060)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.656 ***	2.583 **	2.643 ***	1.480 *	1.430 *	1.440 *
	(1.011)	(1.010)	(1.011)	(0.785)	(0.785)	(0.780)
Fixed city	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478	2478
R-squared	0.159	0.162	0.160	0.071	0.074	0.085

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

.

The benchmark regression results using macroeconomic variables are shown in Table 8 columns (1) and (4). First, the estimation findings in column (2) of Table 8 demonstrate that controlling the willingness to transfer land in the benchmark model has no significant influence on total income, but it has a significant positive impact on total income at the 1% statistical level. This demonstrates that land transfer willingness has a complete intermediary effect in the path of determining rural land rights, affecting farmers’ total income. The estimation results in column (3) of Table 8 show that when the benchmark model controls for land transfer behavior, the direct impact of rural land rights is significantly positive, but the land transfer behavior has no significant impact on farmers’ income at the level of 10%. This shows that land transfer has no intermediary effect on farmers’ income in rural land rights. Second, the estimated results of Table 8 columns (5) and (6) reveal that land right has a large positive impact on farm income, the willingness to transfer land and transfer behavior have a statistically significant positive impact on farm income at a level of at least 5%, and the Right coefficient is smaller than column (3). This demonstrates that land transfer willingness and behavior have a partial intermediary effect in the influence of rural land rights on farm income.

6. Conclusions and Recommendation

The Chinese government has put in place a policy regarding rural land rights in order to further accelerate the rational flow of productive resources in rural areas and support the growth of farmers’ income. The goal of rural land rights is to ensure the implementation of farmers’ land rights and to create the institutional framework for rural economic growth. We utilize the OLS regression method to experimentally study the rural land right on farmers’ income in Yunnan Province based on the survey data of 2478 farmers in more than 100 counties of 16 cities and prefectures in the province. The final results were as follows.

First, the rural land right directly and significantly boosts the overall income of farmers in general, and the increase in total income is primarily due to farm income. The collective ownership of rural land, which has solidified the ownership of farmers’ contractual management rights in the form of certificates, has not changed as a result of the rural land right. This demonstrates that farmers are more inclined to engage in agricultural activities as a result of the property rights being further clarified, which has a positive impact on the growth of farm income for farmers.

Second, the rural land right has no significant impact on farmers’ nonfarm income. On the one hand, farmers’ nonfarm income is determined by their own characteristics; on the other hand, the structure of nonfarm income cannot be subdivided due to the limitations of the questionnaire survey, and the impact of land right on farmers’ various income structures cannot be studied in depth.

Third, according to a mechanism analysis, the goal of rural land rights policy is to raise farmers’ income by fostering the reform of the rural collective property rights system. It follows that if the “separation of three rights” in land is understood, property rights will be made clearer, land will be simpler to transfer and trade, and farmers will be able to operate at a given level of scale, improving farm income.

Based on the findings, this study is inspired by the following: first, land rights are a preferential agricultural strategy that can boost farmers’ income. It involves the vital interests of Chinese farmers and plays a critical role in resolving the “three rural” problems and revitalizing rural areas. Local governments should actively respond to and promote rural land rights and their subsequent improvement, appropriately establish corresponding policy support measures, implement the land right policy, improve the land transfer system, and, to a greater extent, play the role of land in promoting and ensuring farmer income increases, further improving income distribution in rural areas, and assisting development.

Second, in order to allow more farmers and families to engage in land transfers, the government should enhance investment in rural vocational education and raise rural inhabitants’ educational levels. The government should encourage and subsidize activities to improve agricultural production technology, accelerate the promotion of new agricultural technologies, and constantly improve the financial system to provide sufficient financial or credit support for farmers’ agricultural productive investment, in order to create conditions for farmers who rent land to increase agricultural production and operating income.

Third, based on the standard and perfect land management right transfer market, the land transfer should also be based on the platform. The cultivation of the rural land transfer market is a critical task, and the transaction rules of the rural land transfer market are constantly standardized and improved to ensure the legitimacy, compliance, and rationality of market transactions while reducing unnecessary transaction costs. The government should adhere to the principle of taking farmers and families as transfer subjects, encourage and promote the transfer of rural land management rights in the open market, so that more farmers and families can have the opportunity and ways to participate in the land transfer, particularly to allow farmers and families who rent land to obtain the scale benefit of land by expanding the market.

Yunnan Province is known as a “large mountainous province.” We investigate the influence of rural land rights policy on farmers’ income in Yunnan Province, providing scientific evidence for farmers in mountainous areas to better comprehend rural land rights. However, our study has several limitations. We solely analyzed the mechanism of land transfer in rural land rights on farmers’ income in the mechanism analysis. Some researchers argue that agricultural mechanization, information infrastructure, and rural finance can act as a bridge between rural land rights and farmer income [9,10,16]. As a result, in the future, we can enhance the relevant indicators based on the results of this questionnaire, and then investigate the impact of rural land rights on farmer income growth in underdeveloped economic areas.