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Article

Peace Engineering in Practice: China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy and Its Global Implications

1
International Affairs Office, Changchun University, 6543 Weixing Road, Changchun 130022, China
2
Centre for Energy, Materials and Telecommunications, Institut national de la Recherche Scientifique, 1650 Boul. Lionel-Boulet, Varennes, QC J3X 1P7, Canada
3
Department of Engineering, Faculty of Agriculture, Dalhousie University, Truro, NS B2N 5E3, Canada
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2023, 15(2), 1442; https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021442
Submission received: 12 December 2022 / Revised: 8 January 2023 / Accepted: 10 January 2023 / Published: 12 January 2023

Abstract

:
As the world’s largest energy importer, consumer and with the second-largest economy, China is heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Massive energy imports make China a major stakeholder in the world energy trade, with significant implications and repercussions on the global economy. The desire to be energy independent and the environmental impact of fossil fuels is prompting China to diversify its energy supply, adapt its domestic energy infrastructure, and deploy renewable energy technologies on an unprecedented scale. Intending to position itself internationally, China has developed an energy diplomacy strategy while formulating international relations policies. In particular, the government emphasizes sustainable development through the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies, which will help build Western China while simultaneously reducing pollution across the country, elevating China to a position of global leadership in the energy sector. Intellectual property and technological capabilities developed in China can be exported worldwide, including in the regions where the population has limited or no access to energy. In addition, this strategy will have worldwide implications as it will directly or indirectly help achieve several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including clean energy, education, eradicating poverty, climate action and sustainable cities and communities. On this basis, we anticipate that China’s energy policies may have long-lasting prospects for global peace, thus constituting an interesting and relevant case study for the emerging concept of “peace engineering.”

1. Introduction

Functioning as an essential material for human survival, energy is a core strategic element for economic development, social stability, and environmental protection [1]. Energy, conflict and poverty are intertwined. As economic globalization continuously expands, the world’s wealth gap is increasing. Despite trade, aid and other financial means being used, several regions are still plagued by conflict and poverty. To a large extent, there can be no sustainable development without peace and vice versa. In such instances, large amounts of funding in the form of aid may not make those regions’ societies more stable and prosperous but rather lead to corruption and further conflict, thereby stifling development [2,3]. Instead, “peace engineering”, i.e., reducing and eliminating conflict-induced violence through the use of innovative research, technology, policy, systems-level thinking and design [4], can provide a clear pathway to address sustainable development by incorporating conflict and peace outcomes into business practices, project design and implementation [5]. However, peace engineering is an emerging discipline and a framework for understanding it is needed.
China, as the world’s largest energy importer and consumer, enjoys rapid economic growth and is simultaneously experiencing a growing energy demand. While China is a major power producer, it imports significant amounts of fossil fuels, including oil, coal and natural gas. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecast, China will become the largest oil consumer in the 2030s. Massive energy imports make China a major stakeholder in the world energy trade, with significant implications and repercussions on the global economy. However, the dependence on foreign energy poses challenges to China’s energy security. For instance, the Middle East and Africa are dominant sources of China’s imported oil, while these regions are politically unstable. In addition, the oil must be shipped through the Strait of Malacca, which is a bottleneck jointly controlled by Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia and overseen by the U.S. Navy, exposing the oil transportation to the risk of blockades. Aware of the potential disruption in energy supply and related consequences, China has made considerable efforts to ensure its energy security, both internally and externally. Domestically, China has implemented a concrete strategy to enhance energy efficiency and strengthen energy saving, such as adjusting energy pricing, monitoring energy consumption and tightening fuel economy standards. In addition, China actively engages in the promotion of domestic energy supplies from both conventional and renewable sources. In particular, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and address environmental concerns, China has promoted the use of renewable energy, including hydropower, wind power and solar power. Currently, China is already leading in renewable energy technologies. According to China’s energy regulator National Energy Administration, China’s total renewable energy capacity reached 1063 GW in 2021, which accounts for 44.8% of the country’s total power generation capacity. Internationally, China has employed energy diplomacy and engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The need for investment protection and transnational project management can further promote multilateral cooperation between China and its Eurasian neighbors.
In terms of bilateral relations, China has been building collaborative relationships with energy-exporting countries and actively investing in their energy sector. For example, the Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have played a major role in investing in foreign oil projects since the 1990s, especially in Africa and Central Asia. Multilaterally, China actively participates in regional forums and advocates for energy dialogue. In particular, China proposed the “Belt and Road” initiative (BRI) in 2013, which aims to promote connectivity and cooperation between Eurasian countries in the fields of infrastructure, policy, trade, finance, and culture. In 2019, the “Belt and Road Energy Partnership” (BREP) was officially inaugurated in Beijing, leading to an investment in the energy sector which accounts for about 40% of China’s investment in countries and regions along the “Belt and Road”. In March 2022, 147 countries joined the BRI with China, spreading across all continents: 43 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 in the European Union, 25 in East Asia and the Pacific, 20 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 18 in the Middle East and North Africa and 6 in Southeast Asia.
Although the concept of peace engineering has not yet entered China’s policy discourse, its energy exports and investments indirectly influence conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction. China’s energy diplomacy strategy ensures domestic energy security, promotes sustainable economic and social development and accelerates the growth of relevant countries and regions through energy exports and infrastructure investment. This strategy broadly addresses the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [6,7], the grand challenges identified by the United Nations in 2015 to promote a long-term peaceful co-existence of all living species on planet Earth [8]. The increasing international trade in energy stimulated economic development (SDG8), which provides a foundation to build sustainable cities and communities (SDG11) and eliminate poverty (SDG1). The industrial structural adjustment in response to the energy policies also contributes to SDG9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure). The engagement of China in international cooperation on sustainable energy can benefit the energy targets of SDG7 (affordable and clean energy), advance environmental protection for SDG13 (climate action) and revitalize global partnerships for sustainable development (SDG17). In turn, addressing several SDGs provides an entry point for peace engineering based on its conflict resolution, diplomacy and peacebuilding.
In this article, we test the research hypothesis that China’s energy diplomacy strategy represents a case study in “peace engineering”. China’s strategy, in turn, may contribute to addressing directly or indirectly several SDGs. We focus on the three aspects of China’s energy diplomacy, including energy imports and foreign investment, adjustments to energy infrastructure and renewable energy development. We argue that this overall strategy may play a positive role in attaining multiple SDGs. In this respect, the significance of the study is: (1) China’s energy diplomacy was analyzed as an example of peace engineering by highlighting its role in addressing the SDGs; (2) an analysis of the empirical case in China reveals how peace engineering can be acted upon in practical situations, which can help policy makers in developing future policies to optimize the use of resources; (3) it highlights the importance of peace engineering and its potential for practical use in developing policies.

2. Methodology

This study explores the role of China’s energy diplomacy strategy as a case study of “peace engineering”. In particular, we study how this strategy is likely to address, in part, several SDGs.
To answer “how” and “why”, we used a single case research methodology [9], based on the case study of China’s energy diplomacy strategy by considering different factors and parameters. We then correlated the impacts of China’s energy diplomacy with the notion of peace engineering. In particular, data were collected from multiple sources (such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Trade Tracker, and China National Bureau of Statistics), surveys and literature reports. We then developed a comparative analysis, combined with assumptions and mathematical methods. The following are the main key points we considered to build a generalized database case study with global implications:
(a)
We analyzed the production and consumption of fuel (e.g., oil and gas) in China and assessed the corresponding CO2 emissions per year.
(b)
The diversification of energy resource imports, especially oil and natural gas imports data from different countries along with China’s global energy investment were analyzed.
(c)
China’s energy structure adjustments for peace engineering, such as energy consumption per GDP from 1949 to 2021, proportions of different types of energy consumption and net electricity generation by fuel type from 2000–2020 were assessed in this case study.
(d)
We analyzed China’s electricity technology construction projects including electrical power generation and transmission in China from 2010 to 2020.
Several other factors need to be considered to develop an optimized methodology that reduces the trade-off and enhances the synergies between them at a specific scale. Our proposed approach is more generic, yet offers a pathway to understanding peace engineering for innovation and development.

3. China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy and Peace Engineering

As a highly industrialized and densely populated country, China’s economy has been growing very rapidly during the past two decades. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s population reached 1.4126 billion in 2021, and its total GDP exceeded USD 17.73 trillion, ranking second in the world. China’s large population and massive production require a substantial energy supply. It is estimated that China’s energy demand will increase further by 60% from 2015 to 2035.
Figure 1 shows the production and consumption of major fuels in China in the last decade. China is the world’s largest producer of coal, as well as its largest consumer. After several years of decline, China’s coal consumption grew by nearly 2% (4.38 billion short tons) in 2018, then slowed to 1% (4.43 billion short tons) in 2019 and less than 1% (4.46 billion short tons) in 2020. Although China produces most of the thermal coal it burns (including black coal and lignite), it still needs to import coking coal to produce high-quality steel. In terms of petroleum and other liquids, China consumed around 15.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2021, which is an increase of about 6% over 2020 (840,000 b/d). Although China was the world’s fifth largest producer of oil and other liquids in 2021, most of its production comes from legacy fields that rely on expensive enhanced oil recovery techniques. China’s natural gas production has been steadily rising during the past several years. In 2021, the China National Oil Corporation’s natural gas production is estimated at 7.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), which is an increase of 8% over 2020. However, its natural gas demand increased faster per year. For instance, China’s natural gas consumption raised from 11.9 Tcf in 2020 to 13.4 Tcf in 2021. This makes China the world’s third-largest natural gas consumer after the United States and Russia. Overall, due to its limited natural resources, China is highly dependent on importing energy. By the early 2030s, China may become the world’s largest energy importer, with imports surpassing Europe, and import dependence will rise from 15% to 23% [10]. The energy import has led China to be quite influential in world energy markets and brings energy security pressure.
In contrast with most other countries that import vast amounts of fossil fuels, China does not have an official voice regarding international oil and gas prices, whose fluctuations directly impact its economic development. An increase in international oil and gas prices inevitably increases China’s private sector operating costs, and simultaneously induces other problems, such as decreased domestic demand, increased foreign exchange expenditures, decreased trade surplus and increased cost of raw materials [11,12]. More importantly, the international trade of oil and natural gas is impacted by economic factors as well as political ones, such as the domestic policies of export countries and the diplomatic relations between export countries and import countries, which all significantly affect the price and quantity of oil and gas exports.
In addition, the stability of the oil and gas supply is of more significant concern for the Chinese government than for energy price fluctuations. Oil-producing countries may suddenly cease oil and gas exports due to political unrest, economic, public order and even piracy. For example, Libya, which accounted for 2% of the world’s crude oil production, completely cut off its crude oil during the civil war in Libya in 2011. The Central Asia Gas Pipeline, China’s largest foreign natural gas import channel, reduced its supply because Turkmenistan’s Turkmengas unexpectedly reduced its exports, which resulted in China’s largest recent ‘gas shortage’ [13].
In addition, the large consumption of fossil fuels caused increasing environmental problems (Figure 1) [14,15]. Environmental protection and climate governance have put forward higher requirements for China’s energy industry and its energy policy [16,17]. China relies on its enormous coal reserves to maintain a high level of energy self-sufficiency, while coal combustion is far more polluting than oil and natural gas. The mining, processing and burning of coal will produce a lot of dust, sulfide and nitrogen oxides, and release lead, mercury, chromium and other harmful elements to the environment. China announced that it would achieve carbon neutrality in 2060. To deal with a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions and high pollution levels, China intends to replace the old coal-fired systems with new, cleaner technology-based fired units featuring ultra-low emissions [18]. Achieving a coal phase-out, however, will require firmer action. In fact, coal power capacity continues to increase due to growing energy demand. For example, in 2020, China commissioned 76% (38.4 GW) and retired 23% (8.6 GW) of the world’s new coal-fired power plants, resulting in a net increase of its coal-fired power plants of 29.8 GW. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic poses additional challenges to coal consumption and emissions in China. In addition, China has started to vigorously promote reforms to reduce coal use and actively carry out the ‘coal to gas’ policy that uses natural gas and other energy sources to replace coal. However, the implementation of these plans has been very slow due to unstable natural gas import sources, as well as problems such as underdeveloped complementary technology and infrastructure.
To deal with the long-term and complex issues mentioned above, China is currently focusing on the following three actions based on its current energy and economic situation: (i) diversify its energy imports and involvement in large-scale foreign resource investment; (ii) adjust its domestic energy structure, reduce coal consumption, and develop alternative energy technologies; (iii) encourage investment in the development of renewable energy and clean energy-related industries.
These energy diplomacy strategy efforts not only influence China but also present a global impact during their implementation. China has gradually become a major stakeholder in the world economy, contributing more towards the world’s energy trade. Its trade and investment in oil and gas-producing countries and countries along its transport routes will also promote economic and social development in these regions. Its breakthroughs in renewable energy and other relevant industries have accelerated technological progress and promotion and helped to develop underprivileged areas. These efforts may benefit the major societal challenges such as poverty, energy, health, climate change and other issues that hinder peace and long-term sustainability, which fall into the scope of peace engineering [19]. In this sense, we view China’s recent energy diplomacy strategies and its global impact as a case study in peace engineering.

3.1. Diversification of China’s Energy Import and Investment for Peace Engineering

3.1.1. Diversification of Energy Resource Imports

Domestic policy and diplomatic factors may cause instability in the energy supply of oil and gas-producing countries; therefore, China decided to diversify its energy sources. For now, China imported crude oil from 44 countries, including 9 Middle Eastern countries, 14 African countries, 3 North Caspian Sea countries, and 5 South American countries. Figure 2 depicts the top 15 countries from which China imported oil in 2021. The value of Chinese purchases of crude oil from its top 15 suppliers amounted to a subtotal of USD 212.3 billion in 2021, increasing by an average of 33.8% from the USD 158.7 billion worth of imported crude petroleum bought from those top 15 providers during 2020. This significant increase in crude oil import could be related to the new refinery capacity and strategic inventory stockpiling. Saudi Arabia is China’s largest oil import source country, representing an overall 19%. On a regional basis, the majority of China’s oil imports originated from countries in the Middle East. After the United States lifted its ban on exporting crude oil at the end of 2015, its oil exports to China suddenly increased from 1,085,008 tons in 2016 to 6,499,610 tons in 2020 (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Even under the background of the China–United States trade conflict, China’s oil imports from the United States in 2021 remained high, which accounts for 2% of its total crude oil imports. It indicates that China and the United States are still able to maintain strong energy trade relations even if they are in an unstable political situation due to the enormous attraction of energy imports and exports. Promoting diversification of oil and gas import countries significantly reduces the risk of shortage due to supply being cut off.
In terms of resource transport, most of China’s oil enters via sea routes. However, due to its relatively weak maritime power, China has always paid attention to the security of its shipping routes. For the oil and gas exporting countries bordering China by land, China focuses on maintaining good diplomatic relations with them while actively planning and constructing oil and gas pipelines. In 2019, China imported 4.67 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, and pipeline imports account for 38%, most of which are from Turkmenistan. In December 2021, China began importing natural gas from Russia through the Power of Siberia pipeline (Figure 3). However, compared with sea transport, oil and gas pipeline transport is not very flexible, their construction cycle is long, and the cost is higher than those of oil and gas transport ships. At the same time, oil and gas pipeline transport presents major benefits, such as lower transport costs as well as a stable and reliable oil supply.
China is exerting its influence on world trade based on its increasing demand for energy sources. The energy trade between China and other countries or regions around the world gradually stimulates the economic development of each other. In addition, the construction of oil pipelines also benefits diplomatic relations between countries.

3.1.2. Diversification of China’s Energy Global Investment

China has been continuously investing in global power projects since 2003. From 2005 to 2022, the value of China’s global investment and construction combined is USD 2.25 trillion. This figure includes over 3800 projects across energy, transportation, metals, technology, and property sectors, among which more than 1000 energy projects comprised ~35% of the total economic value.
Figure 4 depicts the ranking of China’s global energy project investment amounts from 2005 to 2022, including direct investment and construction investment. Their annual investment in energy projects rose rapidly from USD 9.4 billion in 2005 to USD 67 billion in 2015. From 2016 to 2019, there has been a downward trend, which may be mainly attributed to China’s regulatory policies against speculative capital outflows and foreign investment regulatory scrutiny in some jurisdictions and industry sectors. From 2020 to 2022, the COVID-19 worldwide pandemic suppressed investment, while construction is in the process of recovering. Until 2022, China’s accumulated global direct investment in the energy sector reached USD 791.77 trillion, including over 230 projects whose investment exceeded USD 1 billion. The European Union, Brazil, Pakistan, Canada and Australia are the countries and regions where China has been investing the highest amount of money in its foreign energy projects. These investments all individually exceed USD 30 billion and are USD 75.92 billion, USD 58.85 billion, USD 48.04 billion, USD 41.59 billion and USD 39.75 billion, respectively. As for developed countries and developing countries or regions with relatively advanced infrastructure, such as the European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, etc., they mainly focus on direct investment. In contrast, developing countries with underdeveloped infrastructure, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Laos and others mainly focus on construction investment [20].
So far, China’s global energy projects involve all types of energy. In their total investment, oil, coal, hydroelectric, natural gas and alternative energy technologies (such as renewable energy, electric vehicles, etc.) comprised 23%, 17%, 14%, 13%, and 5%, respectively [20,21]. In terms of capacity, a total of 81 G.W. global power plants are directly/indirectly owned by China. Compared with state-run energy enterprises that are large and make cautious decisions, privately-run energy enterprises with flexible operation mechanisms are also capturing energy market opportunities. Furthermore, as they are privately-run enterprises, foreign governments and markets accept them more easily than state-run enterprises. In terms of direct foreign investment, they can sidestep some countries’ overly politicized understanding of China’s energy enterprises’ foreign investment. In recent years, with a series of adjustments in policy and legislation, the monopoly of state-owned energy enterprises’ is being destabilized [22]. Private capital is being encouraged to participate in the development and operation of foreign oil and gas fields by using China’s BRI as policy guidance for worldwide investment. During the second year of the proposal of the BRI slogan (2014), China participated in 68 global acquisitions in the energy and mining industries, including 43 acquired enterprises that were privately owned, involving an amount of USD 9.295 billion, which represents over 41% of the total amount. For the first time, transactions involving acquisitions of global privately-owned enterprises during the first half of 2016 had a higher amount compared with those for state-owned enterprises. In the 20 largest procurements, the acquisition amount for privately-owned enterprises was two-thirds of the total amount, indicating that privately-owned enterprises have enormous potential for foreign investment. In addition to direct investment, Chinese privately-owned enterprises also participate in the upstream industry of the oil supply chain. At the beginning of 2017, oil and gas enterprises from Shandong and Sichuan provinces established an industry alliance and implemented a market strategy of ‘equipment to oil’, by linking their crude oil and oil and gas equipment exports. Unlike traditional oil and gas trade, relevant enterprises use their strategies to integrate technology, funding and equipment to participate in upstream industrial development, such as exploiting and refining oil and gas.
Conflicts and poverty are simultaneously symptoms and causes of unhealthy local social development. An important reason for global conflicts and poverty is low productivity, which results in an inability to respond to sickness and famine. Moreover, the low employment rate of the youth labor force causes social dissatisfaction as well as increases the likelihood of conflict. China’s energy diplomacy provides investment and training, which are good channels for eliminating conflicts and poverty. Although China’s energy diplomacy initiative is to address its domestic energy needs, China’s global energy investment presents a long-term and stable influence on the local economic and social environments. First, a large amount of funding will help construct and upgrade oil and gas infrastructure and industries within trading countries. It will also benefit relevant industries in building critical infrastructures such as transportation and ports, which are highly beneficial to local economic development. Economic and social growth can stabilize social foundations and reduce the occurrence of conflict and poverty in countries that China trades with, indirectly maintaining social stability in these areas. Second, a large amount of long-term infrastructure construction can benefit technology transfer and the cultivation of the local labor force. The unemployment problem among the youth labor force is an important factor that causes social tension. China’s investment contracts often include a clause regarding a proportion of jobs reserved for the local workforce, promoting employment of local labor. In addition, these large construction projects involve many local technicians and overall manpower, who stimulate their skills development by using China’s equipment and technology. The local labor force can be absorbed into a new social division, receiving professional training from Chinese engineers and technicians. For example, the United Nations has signed an agreement with China, intending to help 40 million people out of poverty in countries along the Belt and Road. In this context, energy investment is a crucial aspect. In 2015, President Xi Jinping welcomed the President of Chad, Idriss Deby, to China to attend the high-level Forum on Poverty Reduction and Development, highlighting that China and Chad should take advantage of their respective strong economic complementarities. On 25 April 2020, China officially established the “Belt and Road” energy partnership with 29 countries. Focusing in particular on energy cooperation, China actively expands practical cooperation in production capacity, infrastructure construction, industrial park development, agriculture, telecommunications, desertification prevention and control, talent training and other fields. In addition, China has the opportunity of adding aid clauses related to aspects such as education and healthcare, which can allow it to benefit from energy supply while also providing for the well-being of local societies. As a result, China’s energy exports and investments indirectly reduce poverty and conflicts, which broadly fall into the concept of ‘peace engineering’.

3.2. The Adjustments of China’s Energy Intensity for Peace Engineering

3.2.1. Energy Structure Adjustments

Regardless of the diversifying of China’s energy imports, the development of China’s economy still prompts its ever-increasing domestic energy demand. In addition to the urgency of dealing with environmental protection and carbon emissions, China has expended enormous efforts toward energy structure adjustments to reduce the proportion of fossil fuels in its total energy consumption and promote improvements in a global governance system of carbon emissions. Figure 5 displays China’s energy consumption per thousand USD of GDP between 1949 and 2021, showing a decrease from 15.16 (1949) to 5.04 (2021) in British thermal unit (Btu) per chained (2012) dollar. By increasing the efficiency of energy use, to a certain extent, China has alleviated its energy import needs.
Since 2017, the Chinese government has begun to promote the use of a 10% ethanol-gasoline mix (E10), gradually making vehicle emission standards more strict, continuing to vigorously promote the development of electric cars and formulating a timetable to phase out fuel oil [23]. The proportion of motor oil as a percentage of overall oil consumption decreased from 55% in 2012 to 40% in 2016, and its proportion is expected to further decrease with adjustments in future policy.
Figure 6 illustrates China’s relative energy consumption concerning various energy sources and its degree of self-sufficiency during the last decade. The portion of coal consumption has been decreasing from 70% (2011) to 57% (2021), while China’s overall energy structure is biased towards coal use. Before achieving any breakthroughs in the technology of utilizing coal in a clean way, China still needs to find a balance between phasing-out coal, costs and energy security. The proportion of petroleum (~20%) and natural gas (5%) almost did not change from 2011 to 2021, while their self-sufficiency rates have halved, indicating the degree of dependence on import sources continues to increase. As such, China’s energy sector depends overwhelmingly on fossil fuels. In this context, China has been deploying major resources and investments to diversify its energy infrastructure. Specifically, hydropower (8%), nuclear power (2%) and other renewables (8%) account for growing shares of the overall energy consumption. Overall, fossil energy consumption is gradually decreasing from 2009 to 2021. Until 2021, the proportion of non-fossil energy included 17% of primary energy consumption, the proportion of natural gas was limited to 9% and the proportion of coal consumption was controlled to within 54%. However, the total portion of clean energy is still relatively small (~18%). In the short-term, fossil fuels are expected to play a leading role in satisfying China’s energy needs. The development and utilization of clean and low-emission energy have become the main trend of the energy economy [24]. China’s government is focusing on energy structure optimization and regards developing clean and low-carbon energy as the main direction of its energy policy.

3.2.2. Industrial Structure Adjustments for Peace Engineering

The reduction in coal consumption is conducive to energy intensity reduction, while coal has always been the primary energy source of China. To effectively reduce the energy intensity, China is constantly adjusting its industrial structure. There are two main components of industrial structure adjustment-industrial upgrading and optimization. The government aims to gradually reduce its proportion of coal and oil in domestic energy consumption. Industrial upgrading is usually defined as the ratio of the added value of the secondary/tertiary industry to GDP [25]. In 1952, the added value of China’s primary, secondary and tertiary industries accounted for 50.5%, 20.8% and 28.7%, which turned into 58.8%, 38.7% and 2.5% in 2005, respectively. However, in 2020, the average proportion of the three turned into 7.7%, 37.8% and 54.5%. The energy intensity of the secondary industry is often higher than that of the service-based tertiary industry; therefore, promoting the transfer from the secondary to the tertiary industry can significantly promote energy saving. On the other hand, industrial structure optimization, where the energy resources are transferred from low- to high-energy-efficiency industrial sectors to improve energy efficiency, can indirectly affect carbon emissions through technological progress [26]. In addition, the human resources employment structure is strongly correlated to China’s industrial structure. In 2012, China’s primary, secondary and tertiary industries employed 170 million, 217 million, and 358 million people, accounting for 22.9%, 29.1% and 48.0%, respectively. In comparison to 2012, the proportion of primary and secondary industries in 2020 decreased by 10.6 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively, and the proportion of the tertiary industry increased by 11.9 percentage points. These data indicate that the coordination between the employment structure and the output value structure of the three industries has been significantly improved.

3.3. China’s New Energy Economic Development for Peace Engineering

3.3.1. The Development of Renewable Energy

China is increasing investment in alternative energy technologies to change its energy import needs, despite fossil fuels still representing its primary source of China. Greenpeace recognizes that China is a major actor in the global energy revolution. At the end of 2021, the global photovoltaic market added an installed capacity of about 940 GW, of which China contributed one-third (306 GW), ranking first worldwide [27]. In terms of wind power, the global total installed capacity in 2021 was 830 GW, of which China contributed 328.48 GW. China is a world leader in wind power generation, with the largest installed capacity of any country and continuing rapid growth of new wind facilities. With its large land area and long coastline, China has exceptional wind resources. At the end of 2020, wind power will remain the third largest source of electricity in China, accounting for 6.1% of total electricity generation. However, China’s offshore wind power development has been slow, mainly due to a lack of experience in the field among domestic turbine manufacturers. This has forced local developments to use foreign products, leading Siemens to become the largest supplier of offshore wind turbines in China. Another problem is the huge investment required for offshore development and the associated risks, which discourage private companies.
On the other hand, as a traditional renewable energy source, hydroelectric power has always been one of China’s major focuses among alternatives to fossil fuels, also thanks to suitable geographical landscapes that allow harnessing this resource. In 2015, China’s installed hydropower capacity was 356 GW, up from 172 GW in 2009, including 23 GW of pumped storage hydropower capacity. According to the International Hydropower Association, China is the world’s largest producer of hydropower in 2021. However, hydropower generation depends on a reliable water supply, and variations in rainfall between summer and winter influence the output of hydropower. Therefore, the use of hydropower alone does not fully meet the electricity demand. As a result, exploring the feasibility of a mixed hydropower-wind power-solar power electrical system, using different types of energy time complementarity, adjusting the electrical grid’s load, and increasing energy use efficiency all have enormous economic and social benefits [28]. Furthermore, relying on China’s enormous agricultural production, bio-energy development also has considerable potential.
Figure 7 displays the proportion of China’s renewable energy from 2000–2020. The proportion of non-fossil energy installations for China’s net electricity generation has increased from 18% (2000) to 33% (2020), yet at the same time, China’s ecological and environmental constraints continue to become more severe. Coal still dominates in electricity generation. It requires China to expand electricity production for electrified transportation, heating, and industrial processes for the low-carbon transition. This, in turn, is expected to stimulate the rapid development of renewable energy technologies. This is particularly true in the ecologically fragile western part of China, where renewable energy has an important significance for local economic development and environmental governance [29,30]. In the next 20 years, China’s growth in renewable energy use is expected to exceed the total amount of that in Europe and the United States [29,31].

3.3.2. The Development of Electricity Technology

The development of China’s electricity technology is significant for its energy security and energy diplomacy. This is because renewable energy including solar energy, nuclear energy and wind energy have space limitations and cannot be stored, so they need to be transformed into electrical energy for transmission and distribution. Electricity production varies based on different regions and seasons; therefore, efficient long-distance electricity transmission and smart electricity deployment technology are in need.
In recent years, China has continued to invest in electrical power generation and transmission (Figure 8), and within ten years (2009–2020), it has invested a total of USD 604 billion in electrical energy, and USD 736 billion in its electrical grid. China is by far the world’s largest producer of electrical power and has the world’s largest growth rate with electricity of 7779.1 TWh in 2021, comprising 29% of the global total (B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy 2021). For now, a large proportion of China’s renewable energy infrastructure is concentrated in its northwest provinces, which are suitable for adopting large-scale concentrated development models. However, western China is sparsely populated. Transporting a significant amount of electricity from western China to regions in densely populated eastern China is a major challenge. As for electricity transmission, China has realized enormous achievements in terms of direct current ultra-high transmission, as well as smart electricity grids. Investments in projects to transport electricity from western to eastern China totaled about 1340 billion US dollars, ensuring the eastern and southern provinces’ electricity security. According to Global Data (a leading data and analytics company), the U.S., China, and India will propel the global markets, with these three countries accounting for a share of 42.4% (transmission) and 44.8% (distribution) of the global market value in 2024.
China has invested enormous resources in producing electricity, not only ensuring its domestic production and consumption yet also accumulating a considerable reserve of technology and funding. Renewable energy technologies have good development potential in the countries surrounding China, including, for example, Central Asia’s wind power resources and Southeast Asia’s hydropower resources. In the next several years, as China works toward deploying an advanced electrical grid, long-distance electricity transmission losses will further decrease, allowing China to significantly increase its import of electricity generated from renewables. Power transmission requires major infrastructure such as power grids and substations, which means that if China wants to import electrical energy, the power infrastructure in exporting countries must be enhanced. In this sense, electrical energy import will bring China’s economy and investment closer proximity to those of its neighbors. During the construction of electrical infrastructure, communication in terms of logistics, trade and resources will further develop, which will better link China’s market with its neighbors. This process is likely to prompt China to take more responsibility for the local economy, environment and society and simultaneously impact its energy diplomacy policy.

3.4. Progress and Future Opportunities towards Peace Engineering

Peace engineering is very important to national security, particularly concerning the sustainable management of scarce resources in terms of public health, water and energy [5]. To promote sustainable development, China carried out the guideline of “coexistence between energy development and eco-safety” and focused on promoting cleaner and renewable energy sources. In particular, China has made great progress in effective international energy technology cooperation with many developing countries. China’s new energy policy is conducive to energy saving and emission reduction and to curbing climate change. In 2022, the General Office of the State Council of China forwarded the implementation plan on promoting the high-quality development of new energy in the new era issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration, which aims to anchor the goal that China’s total installed capacity of wind and solar power generation will reach more than 1.2 billion kW by 2030, and accelerate the construction of a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy infrastructure. China’s policies also actively encourage the purchase and use of new energy vehicles through a variety of financial incentives. According to the Interim Measures for the Administration of Financial Subsidies for Energy Conservation and New Energy, the subsidy for hybrid electric vehicles and light commercial vehicles ranges from USD 600 to USD 37,500 [32]. From 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2020, a suite of new energy vehicle models was made exempt from vehicle purchase tax. The encouragement of new energy vehicles can effectively reduce China’s consumption of traditional fossil fuels, reduce global energy tension, and reduce competition and potential conflict with other countries in energy consumption, thus contributing to peace engineering.
In addition, the China Energy Engineering Group has successively completed the design, consulting and construction of many engineering projects in energy-exporting countries including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Cuba, Turkey, Russia, Botswana, Sudan, etc. The engineering principle, research and development outcomes and engineering project experiences of China in energy infrastructure construction were adopted in these countries. Taking into account China’s comparative advantages in industrial products and labor, China’s energy cooperation with these developing countries can facilitate the economies of the countries involved and constitute the basis of a peaceful relationship simultaneously. In forging relationships with energy consumers, China encourages policy dialogue and communication to reduce unpleasant competition and safeguard global energy market stability. For example, the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue and the U.S.-India-Japan-South Korea Energy Dialogue are used to promote energy cooperation.
Although China’s energy diplomacy strategy aims to ensure its energy security and promote the sustainable development of its economy and society, a significant transformation in economic growth, human development, poverty reduction and inequality reduction has been seen in China. Such efforts are playing a positive role in achieving the SDGs, specifically SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 7 (Clean and Affordable Energy), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). In this respect, China has deployed major efforts to adjust its domestic energy structure, and actively participates in the global governance issues of environmental protection and carbon emissions. Its goal is consistent with SDG 13 (Climate Action). China is exerting great influence in this field to assert its role in achieving SDG 13. With the rapid development of new energy and power technologies in China, it will soon be possible to carry out global communication and industrial transfer, and further address SDG 7. Consequently, China’s SDG index score increased from 63.42 in 2000 to 72.36 in 2022, according to the Sustainable Development Report.
As for the prospect of advancing the peace engineering and SDGs, China has an opportunity to play a major role in driving the efforts such as promoting multilateral development through peaceful exchanges, overcoming difficulties and obstacles at home and abroad, and promoting the construction of an international comprehensive strategic partnership, to promote world peace and development. In addition, China also has an opportunity to accelerate the transition towards renewables, adjusting the structure of energy consumption and conversion, and building a national economic system and a resource-saving society with low resource consumption, less environmental pollution and good economic benefits. It may significantly accelerate the transition towards renewables by constructing relevant industrial frameworks, accelerating China’s proliferation of new energy technology in low- and middle-income countries, and even guiding Chinese enterprises to invest in these countries and regions. When China’s new energy infrastructure construction reaches saturation, it is likely to shift industry and technology to impoverished countries and regions by expanding its industry scale to lower costs and increase its competitiveness.

4. Conclusions and Perspectives

The long-term and complex nature of China’s increasing demand for energy, and in particular renewable energy, is having a deep and widespread global impact. Although its massive and growing energy demand has resulted in criticism, it has also allowed China to become a major stakeholder in the worldwide energy industry, for example, by prompting significant involvement in global energy investment and infrastructure construction. At the same time, China’s domestic economy is also undergoing enormous changes to reduce fossil fuel consumption and in response to environmental protection and reduction of carbon emissions. Long-term renewable energy research and investment have resulted in China developing enormous technological and industrial know-how, with major progress in energy technologies which are being increasingly used worldwide.
Overall, thanks to its recent energy diplomacy strategies, China has positioned itself internationally as a major player in addressing the SDGs nationally and globally. On this basis, China’s worldwide initiatives related to energy imports and the development of new energy technologies are having a positive impact on reducing poverty in developing regions and eliminating conflict. As such, they can be viewed, broadly speaking, as an interesting case of ‘peace engineering’, in particular, due to their influence on eradicating poverty from developing regions and reducing conflicts, largely thanks to access to energy resources that were previously not available, as well as to a newly trained labor force and new infrastructure. The concept of peace engineering has gone global. An analysis of the empirical case in China reveals how peace engineering can be acted upon in practical situations.

Author Contributions

Writing—original draft preparation, L.L.; writing—review and editing, L.J., G.S.S. and F.R.; supervision, F.R. Funding acquisition, L.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by Key Project, Social Science Foundation of Jilin Province (Grant No. 2022A10) and Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of the Ministry of Education in China (Grant NO. 18YJC880020). F.R. is grateful to the Canada Research Chairs program for partial salary support.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. This data can be found here: Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf; Global Trade Tracker https://www.globaltradetracker.com/; China Global Investment Tracker https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/; National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2021/indexch.htm (accessed on 12 December 2022).

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Figure 1. Production and consumption of fuel in China and corresponding CO2 emission per year (Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database).
Figure 1. Production and consumption of fuel in China and corresponding CO2 emission per year (Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database).
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Figure 2. Import sources and proportions of China’s oil in 2021. (Data Source: Global Trade Tracker.)
Figure 2. Import sources and proportions of China’s oil in 2021. (Data Source: Global Trade Tracker.)
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Figure 3. China’s natural gas imports by source in 2021. (Data Source: Global Trade Tracker).
Figure 3. China’s natural gas imports by source in 2021. (Data Source: Global Trade Tracker).
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Figure 4. The economic value of China’s global energy projects (2005–2022) (billions of U.S. dollars). Data Source: China Global Investment Tracker. (Data Source: AEI China Global Investment Tracker).
Figure 4. The economic value of China’s global energy projects (2005–2022) (billions of U.S. dollars). Data Source: China Global Investment Tracker. (Data Source: AEI China Global Investment Tracker).
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Figure 5. Energy consumption per GDP in China from 1949 to 2021, in British thermal unit (Btu) per chained (2012) dollar. (Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China).
Figure 5. Energy consumption per GDP in China from 1949 to 2021, in British thermal unit (Btu) per chained (2012) dollar. (Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China).
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Figure 6. Proportions of different types of energy consumption in China (2009–2021). Pie chart: China’s energy consumption structure and degree of self-sufficiency. (Data Source: B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy 2022).
Figure 6. Proportions of different types of energy consumption in China (2009–2021). Pie chart: China’s energy consumption structure and degree of self-sufficiency. (Data Source: B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy 2022).
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Figure 7. China’s net electricity generation by fuel type, 2000–2020. (Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, EIA and International Energy Agency).
Figure 7. China’s net electricity generation by fuel type, 2000–2020. (Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, EIA and International Energy Agency).
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Figure 8. Full investment in electric power construction projects in China from 2010 to 2020, by usage in USD billions. (Data Source: National Energy Administration, China).
Figure 8. Full investment in electric power construction projects in China from 2010 to 2020, by usage in USD billions. (Data Source: National Energy Administration, China).
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Liang, L.; Jin, L.; Selopal, G.S.; Rosei, F. Peace Engineering in Practice: China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy and Its Global Implications. Sustainability 2023, 15, 1442. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021442

AMA Style

Liang L, Jin L, Selopal GS, Rosei F. Peace Engineering in Practice: China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy and Its Global Implications. Sustainability. 2023; 15(2):1442. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021442

Chicago/Turabian Style

Liang, Lin, Lei Jin, Gurpreet Singh Selopal, and Federico Rosei. 2023. "Peace Engineering in Practice: China’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy and Its Global Implications" Sustainability 15, no. 2: 1442. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021442

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