Natural Resources and Civil Conflict: The Role of Military Expenditures
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. A Simple Theoretical Framework
- (1)
- L(Conflict) = f(net gain from rebellion) = f(ER, C); dL(Conflict)/dER > 0
- (2)
- Expected Revenue (ER) = probability of successful rebellion (p)* revenue captured (T)where p is a decreasing function of military expenditures:
- (3)
- ER = p(M) × T with dp/dM < 0Revenues can be used by the government to finance the military, or they can be allocated for something else. Thus, we now write that p(M(T)), where M is military expenditure and T is revenues.
- (4)
- ER = p(M(T)) × TThe simplest relationship is where:military expenditures are a constant fraction, a, of revenues, T, so that M = aT; andthe probability of successful rebellion is decreasing in military expenditures:
- (5)
- p(M(T)) = 1 − aTwhere M, T, and a are normalized on the unit interval. This yields
- (6)
- ER = (1 − aT)TDifferentiating expected revenues with respect to T one obtains the following marginal effect:
- (7)
- d(ER)/dT = 1 – 2 × aTwhich is strictly decreasing in a, the share of revenues allocated to military expenditures.4
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Natural Resources and Civil Conflict
3.1.1. Total Natural Resource Rents
Sample Split
Robustness
- The average GDP share of total natural resource rents in MENA was around 15 percent. This is more than three times the average GDP share of total natural resource rents in the rest of the world.
- The average likelihood of civil conflict (civil war) outbreak in MENA was around three (two) percent while in the rest of the world, the average likelihood of civil conflict (civil war) outbreak was around four (two) percent.
- The average GDP share of military expenditures in MENA was around 7 percent; in the rest of the world the average GDP share of military expenditures was around 2 percent.
3.1.2. Commodity Price Windfalls
Cross-Country Time Series Regressions
Regressions Using Subnational Data for Africa
3.1.3. Oil Reserves and Discoveries
4. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Mean | Stdv. | Data Source | |
---|---|---|---|
Total Natural Resource Rents, in billion USD | 848 | 4010 | WDI |
Log Total Natural Resource Rents | 24.5 | 2.69 | WDI |
Total Natural Resource Rents as a % of GDP | 7.59 | 11.35 | WDI |
Log Total Natural Resource Rents as a % of GDP | 0.47 | 2.44 | WDI |
Military Expenditures as a % of GDP | 2.91 | 3.76 | WDI |
Log Military Expenditure as % of GDP | 0.65 | 2.93 | WDI |
Military Expenditures as a % of Central Gov. Expenditures | 10.67 | 9.18 | WDI |
Log Military Expenditures as a % of Central Gov. Expenditures | 2.05 | 0.8 | WDI |
Civil Conflict Onset | 0.05 | 0.22. | PRIO |
Civil War Onset | 0.03 | 0.16 | COW |
Civil War Onset | 0.02 | 0.12 | Collier and Hoeffler |
Civil War Onset | 0.02 | 0.14 | Fearon and Laitin |
Civil War Onset | 0.02 | 0.15 | Sambanis |
1st Pctl. | 5th Pctl. | 10th Pctl. | 25th Pctl. | 50th Pctl. | 75th Pctl. | 90th Pctl. | 95th Pctl. | 99th Pctl. | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 5.5 | 7.8 | 17 |
Military Expenditures as a Percent of Central Government Expenditures | 1.0 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 7.7 | 14.6 | 23.0 | 28.4 | 41.5 |
Natural Resource Rents as a Percent of GDP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.9 | 9.5 | 22.8 | 32.0 | 49.8 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Panel A: Low and Intermediate Military Expenditures % of GDP | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.16 *** (0.05) | 0.17 *** (0.05) | 0.14 (0.12) | 0.26 * (0.14) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 4191 | 4191 | 4191 | 4191 |
Panel B: High Military Expenditures % of GDP | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | −0.06 * (0.03) | −0.08 ** (0.04) | 0.01 (0.09) | −0.05 (0.12) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 1374 | 1374 | 1374 | 1374 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Replication Table A8, column 3 | Data on Military Expenditures Not Missing | Military Expenditures % of GDP Smaller Than 2 Percent | Military Expenditures % of GDP Smaller Than 2 Percent | Military Expenditures % of GDP Larger Than 2 Percent | Military Expenditures % of GDP Larger Than 2 Percent | |
Price Shock, t | −0.021 ** (0.011) | −0.030 * (0.017) | −0.013 (0.014) | 0.007 (0.014) | −0.038 (0.036) | −0.028 (0.033) |
Price Shock, t − 1 | −0.022 (0.014) | −0.059 ** (0.023) | −0.017 (0.021) | 0.007 (0.016) | −0.074 * (0.042) | −0.071 * (0.042) |
Price Shock, t − 2 | −0.017 (0.012) | −0.043 ** (0.022) | 0.012 * (0.007) | 0.026 ** (0.012) | −0.073 * (0.039) | −0.056 (0.040) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Country Trend | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
Observations | 5019 | 3066 | 1574 | 1574 | 1492 | 1492 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Replication of Col 1 Table 2 of Berman et al. (2017) | Replication of Col 1 Table 2 of Berman et al. (2017) for Military Expenditures Data not Missing | Military Expenditures Less Than 8.7% of Central Government Expenditures (Bottom 25th Percentile) | Military Expenditures Less Than 11% of Central Government Expenditures (Bottom 50th Percentile) | Military Expenditures More Than 11% of Central Government Expenditures (Top 50th Percentile) | Military Expenditures More Than 15% of Central Government Expenditures (Top 75th Percentile) | |
ln price mines > 0 | 0.086 ** (0.034) | 0.066 ** (0.034) | 0.138 ** (0.056) | 0.079 ** (0.037) | −0.008 (0.061) | −0.449 (0.503) |
Country-Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Cell FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 143,768 | 65,143 | 16,267 | 32,641 | 32,502 | 16,730 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Democracies | Democracies | Non-Democracies | Non-Democracies | |
Panel A: Replication of Cotet and Tsui (2013) Table 3 | ||||
Log Oil Wealth per capita, t | 0.035 (0.048) | 0.002 (0.047) | 0.199 (0.297) | 0.179 (0.292) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 2175 | 2175 | 2369 | 2369 |
Panel B: Low Military Expenditures | ||||
Log Oil Wealth Per Capita, t | 0.262 * (0.146) | 0.334 ** (0.137) | 0.892 ** (0.415) | 1.053 ** (0.432) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 580 | 580 | 1047 | 1047 |
Panel C: Intermediate and High Military Expenditures | ||||
Log Oil Wealth per capita, t | 0.052 (0.091) | −0.018 (0.072) | −0.081 (0.282) | −0.150 (0.275) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 1595 | 1595 | 1322 | 1322 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Democracies | Democracies | Non-Democracies | Non-Democracies | |
Panel A: Low Military Expenditures | ||||
Log Oil Wealth Per Capita, t | 0.263 * (0.137) | 0.333 *** (0.120) | 0.996 *** (0.378) | 1.157 *** (0.394) |
Kleibergen Paap F-Stat | 2.6 × 105 | 2.3 × 104 | 2000 | 2132 |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 580 | 580 | 1047 | 1047 |
Panel B: Intermediate and High Military Expenditures | ||||
Log Oil Wealth Per Capita, t | 0.030 (0.086) | −0.027 (0.070) | −0.060 (0.292) | −0.128 (0.271) |
Kleibergen Paap F-Stat | 2.8 × 104 | 2.8 × 104 | 1070 | 4116 |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 1595 | 1595 | 1322 | 1322 |
Panel C: Replication of Cotet and Tsui (2013) Table 3 | ||||
Log Oil Wealth Per Capita, t | 0.019 (0.047) | −0.004 (0.047) | 0.241 (0.304) | 0.215 (0.292) |
Kleibergen Paap F-Stat | 9.3 × 104 | 2.6 × 104 | 1794 | 4225 |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2175 | 2175 | 2369 | 2369 |
1 | See Brown and Keating (2015) for a detailed account of these civil conflicts over natural resources. |
2 | An important early contribution in the literature on conflict was the World Bank publication Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier et al. 2003). The finding relating the risk of civil conflict to the presence of natural resources was in general confirmed by subsequent literature, discussed in the paper below. |
3 | |
4 | In their empirical analysis, Collier and Hoeffler use natural resource endowments as a proxy for T. One could further fine tune the model by assuming that government receives a constant fraction, φ, of the resource rents, R, so that dT = φdR. |
5 | In Table 1, the panel spans the period 1970–2007; this is the longest period given the available conflict data from Bazzi and Blattman and data on natural resource rents and military expenditures from the World Development Indicators. In Table 2 and following tables, we will use data for a larger and longer panel. This larger and longer panel is based on conflict data from PRIO (2017) and as right-hand-side variable for the interaction term the average GDP share of military expenditures. |
6 | The same result was obtained in the previous literature, see for example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Specifically in Panel B of Table 1 the estimates can be interpreted as follows. At higher levels of GDP shares of natural resource rents, an additional percentage point increase in the GDP share of natural resource rents has smaller effects on conflict risk than at lower GDP share of natural resource rents, that is, there are diminishing effects. If one plots the relationship between conflict risk and the GDP share of natural resource rents based on the estimates in Panel B in Table 1, then there is a threshold at which the slope changes sign, that is, an inverted U-shaped relationship. However, to the right of the tipping point the (negative) marginal effects of resource rents on conflict risk are not significantly different from zero for sample values of GDP shares of natural resource rents. That is, at very high GDP shares of natural resource rents the sign of a marginal increase in natural resource rents on conflict risk is negative, but even at the 99th percentile of the GDP share of natural resource rents (which is around 50 percent) one cannot reject the null that the marginal effect is equal to zero at the conventional significance levels. |
7 | In Table 1, natural resource rents of country i in period t are interacted with country i’s average military expenditures as a share of central government expenditures. There are about twice as many country-year observations for the GDP share of military expenditures as for the GDP share of central government expenditures. Note that the theoretical framework in Section 2 is based on military expenditures as a share of central government expenditures. There is hence a trade-off: we have more statistical power when using the GDP share of military expenditures but the theoretical framework is based on military expenditures as a share of central government expenditures. Military expenditures as a share of central government expenditures are positively correlated with the GDP share of military expenditures (correlation coefficient is around 0.69). That is, countries with a larger GDP share of military expenditures also tend to have a large share of military expenditures in central government expenditures. |
8 | Ciccone (2019) shows that the result of a zero effect documented by Bazzi and Blattman (2014) is entirely driven by using an index that is based on time-varying exports weights. Ciccone (2019) shows, using the Bazzi and Blattman data, that when the price index is based on fixed exports weights, commodity export price shocks have on average a significant negative effect on civil war risk in sub-Saharan Africa. |
9 | A one standard deviation of log oil wealth per capita in the Cotet and Tsui dataset is around 10. All right-hand side variables in Cotet and Tsui’s dataset are divided by 100. |
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Civil Conflict Onset PRIO | Civil War Onset PRIO | Civil War Onset COW | Civil War Onset Collier and Hoeffler | |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Panel A: Log of Natural Resource Rents | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents, t | 0.93 ** (0.41) | 1.73 ** (0.86) | 0.83 * (0.49) | 1.87 ** (0.84) |
Log Natural Resource Rents, t * Country’s Average Military Expenditures % of Central Government Expenditures | −0.03 ** (0.01) | −0.09 ** (0.04) | −0.05 * (0.03) | −0.10 ** (0.05) |
Panel B: Natural Resource Rents % of GDP | ||||
Natural Resource Rents % of GDP, t | 0.216 ** (0.085) | 0.420 *** (0.129) | 0.240 ** (0.096) | 0.423 * (0.234) |
Squared Natural Resource Rents % of GDP, t | −0.002 * (0.001) | −0.002 * (0.001) | −0.001 (0.001) | −0.004 * (0.002) |
Natural Resource Rents % of GDP, t * Country’s Average Military Expenditures % of Central Government Expenditures | −0.005 ** (0.002) | −0.015 ** (0.007) | −0.012 ** (0.006) | −0.009 (0.012) |
Panel C: Log Natural Resource Rents % of GDP | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents % of GDP, t | 1.18 *** (0.44) | 3.67 *** (1.01) | 1.52 ** (0.74) | 3.62 ** (1.52) |
Log Natural Resource Rents % of GDP, t * Country’s Average Military Expenditures % of Central Government Expenditures | −0.04 ** (0.02) | −0.20 *** (0.06) | −0.09 * (0.05) | −0.20 ** (0.09) |
Country Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 1964 | 2298 | 2097 | 1659 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.29 *** (0.06) | 0.30 *** (0.06) | 0.30 ** (0.13) | 0.33 ** (0.14) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Log Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.20 *** (0.03) | −0.21 *** (0.04) | −0.16 ** (0.07) | −0.18 ** (0.08) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5565 | 5565 | 5565 | 5565 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.022 *** (0.008) | 0.026 *** (0.008) | 0.017 (0.014) | 0.025 * (0.015) |
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.006 *** (0.002) | −0.007 *** (0.002) | −0.004 * (0.002) | −0.005 ** (0.002) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5612 | 5612 | 5612 | 5612 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents, t | 0.18 *** (0.03) | 0.23 *** (0.04) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.18 * (0.10) |
Log Natural Resource Rents * Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.03 *** (0.01) | −0.03 *** (0.01) | −0.02 ** (0.01) | −0.02 ** (0.01) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5612 | 5612 | 5612 | 5612 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.43 *** (0.08) | 0.48 *** (0.09) | 0.40 ** (0.19) | 0.48 ** (0.23) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Military Expenditures (% of Central Government Expenditures), t | −0.02 *** (0.00) | −0.02 *** (0.00) | −0.02 * (0.01) | −0.02 * (0.01) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 2895 | 2895 | 2895 | 2895 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Panel A: Excluding Countries at or below the Bottom 10th Percentile of Natural Resource Rents (Less Than 0.1% of GDP) | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.15 ** (0.07) | 0.17 ** (0.07) | 0.34 ** (0.16) | 0.39 *** (0.18) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Log Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.17 *** (0.05) | −0.19 *** (0.05) | −0.17 * (0.09) | −0.20 ** (0.10) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5009 | 5009 | 5009 | 5009 |
Panel B: Excluding Countries at or below the Bottom 10th Percentile of Military Expenditures (Less Than 0.8% of GDP) | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.33 *** (0.06) | 0.35 *** (0.07) | 0.37 *** (0.14) | 0.40 *** (0.15) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Log Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.22 *** (0.04) | −0.24 *** (0.04) | −0.20 ** (0.08) | −0.23 *** (0.09) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5009 | 5009 | 5009 | 5009 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t | 0.23 *** (0.06) | 0.24 *** (0.06) | 0.29 ** (0.13) | 0.32 ** (0.14) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) * Log Military Expenditures (% of GDP), t | −0.15 *** (0.04) | −0.16 *** (0.04) | −0.16 ** (0.07) | −0.18 ** (0.08) |
Civil Conflict Onset, t − 1 | 2.14 *** (0.16) | 2.20 *** (0.17) | 0.23 (0.17) | 0.22 (0.18) |
Country FE | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5565 | 5565 | 5565 | 5565 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 | 0.32 ** (0.14) | 0.39 ** (0.15) | 0.38 ** (0.16) | 0.40 ** (0.17) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 * Log Country’s Average Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −0.15 * (0.09) | −0.17 * (0.10) | ||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 * Log Country’s Beginning of Sample Log Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −0.15 * (0.08) | −0.14 * (0.09) | ||
Civil Conflict Onset, t − 1 | 0.49 ** (0.16) | 0.45 *** (0.17) | 0.49 *** (0.19) | 0.52 *** (0.20) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 6363 | 6363 | 3708 | 3708 |
Civil Conflict Onset PRIO | Civil War Onset PRIO | Civil War Onset COW | Civil War Onset Collier & Hoeffler | |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Panel A: Log of Natural Resource Rents | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents, t − 1 | 0.88 ** (0.34) | 1.18 ** (0.52) | 0.68 ** (0.32) | 4.70 *** (1.32) |
Log Natural Resource Rents, t − 1 * Log Country’s Average Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −0.34 ** (0.18) | −0.66 ** (0.27) | −0.31 ** (0.15) | −2.74 *** (0.85) |
Panel B: Log of Natural Resource Rents % of GDP | ||||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 | 0.70 ** (0.33) | 0.90 ** (0.44) | 0.78 ** (0.34) | 3.56 *** (1.46) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 * Log Country’s Average Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −0.32 * (0.18) | −0.58 ** (0.29) | −0.40 ** (0.19) | −2.57 ** (1.05) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2368 | 2815 | 2593 | 1913 |
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 | 3.86 ** (1.50) | 12.29 ** (5.41) | 2.34 ** (0.93) | 5.15 ** (2.18) |
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 * Log Country’s Average Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −1.68 *** (0.62) | −4.85 ** (2.29) | ||
Log Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), t − 1 * Log Country’s Beginning of Sample Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −1.11 *** (0.41) | −2.04 ** (0.87) | ||
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 403 | 403 | 296 | 296 |
(A) | ||||
Civil Conflict Onset | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Commodities Included in ComPI | Oil and Gas | Capital-Intensive Commodities | Labor Intensive Commodities | All Commodities |
ComPI, t − 1 | 0.04 *** (0.02) | 0.03 ** (0.01) | 0.04 (0.14) | 0.02 * (0.01) |
ComPI, t − 1 * Log Country’s Average Military Expenditures (% of GDP) | −0.02 *** (0.01) | −0.02 *** (0.01) | −0.19 (0.14) | −0.02 *** (0.01) |
Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 8745 | 8745 | 8745 | 8745 |
(B) | ||||
GDP Share of Military Expenditures | ||||
25th Percentile | 50th Percentile | 75th Percentile | 90th Percentile | |
Panel A: ComPI includes Oil and Gas Only | ||||
Effect of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in ComPI on the Likelihood of Conflict Onset | 10.50 ** (4.15) | 7.50 ** (3.34) | 4.42 * (2.59) | 0.37 (1.96) |
Panel B: ComPI Includes Capital-Intensive Commodities Only | ||||
Effect of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in ComPI on the Likelihood of Conflict Onset | 7.05 ** (3.46) | 4.67 * (2.82) | 2.22 (2.28) | −0.99 (1.93) |
Panel C: ComPI Includes Labor-Intensive Commodities Only | ||||
Effect of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in ComPI on the Likelihood of Conflict Onset | −0.91 (2.78) | −2.88 (2.18) | −4.90 ** (2.39) | −7.56 ** (3.64) |
Panel D: ComPI Includes All Commodities | ||||
Effect of a 1 Standard Deviation Increase in ComPI on the Likelihood of Conflict Onset | 6.25 * (3.32) | 4.03 (2.72) | 1.74 (2.21) | −1.27 (1.90) |
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Arezki, R.; Brueckner, M. Natural Resources and Civil Conflict: The Role of Military Expenditures. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 575. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14120575
Arezki R, Brueckner M. Natural Resources and Civil Conflict: The Role of Military Expenditures. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2021; 14(12):575. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14120575
Chicago/Turabian StyleArezki, Rabah, and Markus Brueckner. 2021. "Natural Resources and Civil Conflict: The Role of Military Expenditures" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14, no. 12: 575. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14120575