Management of Local Citizen Energy Communities and Bilateral Contracting in Multi-Agent Electricity Markets
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- To review agent-based alliances in the electricity sector;
- (2)
- To present and test a model for the formation and management of CECs;
- (3)
- To present and test a model for bilateral trading of electricity between CECs and opponents (e.g., producers, retailers, etc.).
2. Power System Alliances in Multi-Agent Systems
- GenCos or generators—represent utility companies or single generators and operate in a wholesale market;
- Traders—promote liberalization and competition, and simplify dealings either between sellers/buyers and the market operator or between sellers and buyers. Some traders can act as speculators in EMs.
- Consumers—represent end-use customers and operate in a retail market;
- System operator—maintains the system security, administers transmission tariffs, coordinates maintenance scheduling, and analyses the technical feasibility of all negotiated contracts;
- Market operator—regulates pool negotiations, and thus, is present only in a pool or hybrid market; uses a market-clearing tool, typically a standard uniform auction, to set market prices.
- Regulator agents—represent the agents that regulate transmission, distribution, last resource supply, management of markets and, in some cases, approves the rules for bilateral negotiation in the non-organized (sub-) markets;
- Aggregators—manage groups of players of the electricity market (currently these agents are commonly used to manage groups of renewable producers);
- Retailer or supplier agents—represent electricity retailers and operate in both a wholesale and a retail market.
- Coalition of consumers—represents a set of end-users and, in addition to the role of negotiating bilateral contracts in a retail market on behalf of these consumers, if the coalitions are large enough, they may also trade energy directly in the organized market.
- Virtual power plants—responsible for managing alliances of producers (including the responsibility of negotiating on behalf of such coalitions);
- Virtual power player (VPP)—responsible for managing a set of different technologies, such as power plants, distributed generation, energy storage systems, prosumers, and consumers, considering demand response programs.
- CECs—responsible for managing a set of supply and demand distributed resources, such as distributed generation, consumption, and storage. Normally, these resources are located on the local distribution grid of electricity, with the CEC bearing the responsibility for the electricity trading required by its members.
3. A Negotiation Model for Power System Alliances
3.1. Formation
3.2. Interaction
3.3. Negotiation and Agreement
3.4. The Adaptation of the Negotiation Model to CECs
4. Case Study on the Negotiation of a PPA between CECs and RES
4.1. Data
4.2. Negotiation and Results
5. Conclusions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AMES | Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems |
BESS | Battery energy storage system |
CEC | Citizen energy community |
DCF | Dynamic coalition formation |
DCF-S | DCF based on simulation |
DG | Distributed generation |
EM | Electricity market |
EMCAS | Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System |
EV | Electric vehicle |
EU | European Union |
FUM | Full unanimity mediated |
GAPEX | Genoa Artificial Power Exchange |
GenCo | Generation Company |
ISO | Independent System Operator |
MAS | Multi-agent System |
MASCEM | Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets |
MATREM | for Multi-Agent Trading in Electricity Markets |
PPA | Power purchase agreement |
PV | Photovoltaic |
RE | Representative |
RES | Renewable energy sources |
RM | Representative Mediator |
RM-IDM | Representative Mediator with Individual Decision Making |
SEPIA | Simulator for Electric Power Industry Agents |
SREMS | Short Medium run Electricity Market Simulator |
SBV | Similarity Borda Voting |
SSV | Similarity Simple Voting |
VAT | Value Added Tax |
VPP | Virtual power player |
VRES | Variable renewable energy sources |
WPP | Wind power producer |
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Player | Details | Energy-Part (€/MWh) | Other-Part (€/MWh) | Total Cost (€/MWh) | Technology Remuneration (€/MWh) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Consumer | Regulated tariff | 70.60 | 69.90 | 140.50 | - |
CEC (Consumers) | Market-based | 48.11 | 67.40 | 125.51 | - |
CEC (Consumers) | PPA | 55.56 | 38.45 | 95.01 | - |
Wind Aggregator | Market-based | - | - | - | 43.28 |
Wind Aggregator | PPA | - | - | - | 50.17 |
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Algarvio, H. Management of Local Citizen Energy Communities and Bilateral Contracting in Multi-Agent Electricity Markets. Smart Cities 2021, 4, 1437-1453. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities4040076
Algarvio H. Management of Local Citizen Energy Communities and Bilateral Contracting in Multi-Agent Electricity Markets. Smart Cities. 2021; 4(4):1437-1453. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities4040076
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlgarvio, Hugo. 2021. "Management of Local Citizen Energy Communities and Bilateral Contracting in Multi-Agent Electricity Markets" Smart Cities 4, no. 4: 1437-1453. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities4040076