Macroeconomic Risks and Monetary Policy in Central European Countries: Parallels in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. A Simple Theoretical Framework: Framing the Issues
3. UMPs, Liquidity, and Exchange Rates in Emerging Market Economies
4. Empirical Evidence
4.1. Stylized Facts I: Inflation, Inflation Targets, and the Real Exchange Rate
4.2. Stylized Facts II: The Output–Inflation Gaps’ Relationship
4.3. Stylized Facts III: Extended Taylor Rules
4.4. Estimated Taylor Rules and Local Projections
5. Summary and Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
1 | Price stability should be understood here to mean inflation control. Whether there are biases in the measurement of inflation or relative price adjustments that temporarily show up in headline price level data price stability has come to mean low and stable inflation, but not zero inflation. |
2 | Several factors explain this conclusion. It takes time to gather data, but it also takes time for decision makers to understand the implications of these data and formulate a response, not to mention ensuring that the data that form the basis of their decisions are trustworthy (internal delay). This is reflected in the potential for monetary policy mistakes in failing to account for revisions to data in real time (e.g., Croushore 2011; Orphanides 2001). |
3 | We also point out that while UMPs created policy challenges for the central banks examined in this study, the new variants can be accommodated within the same flexible inflation targeting policy framework. Moreover, the role of the exchange rate is unaffected by UMPs. Instead, versions of QE further underscore what it means to be flexible in an IT framework. |
4 | The model represents the policy maker’s desire for exchange rate stability relying on a standard form of central bank objective to minimize inflation output gap and exchange rate volatility. However, from Equation (1), we observe that the exchange rate has no consequences for the simplified model, which focuses on the basics of inflation targeting no matter how the exchange rate variable is specified or interpreted. |
5 | Most central banks, at least until the financial crisis of 2008–2009, used an interest rate as an instrument to tighten or loosen policy. Other than some advanced economies that reached the zero lower bound (ZLB), or even negative nominal interest rates, the strategy has not changed; although, many central banks avail themselves of other instruments to complement the policy rate instrument. Indeed, the pandemic spurred the spread of UMPs beyond advanced economies. See, for example, Fratto et al. (2021). |
6 | In other words, changes in interest rates affect inflation and output developments through changes in aggregate demand. |
7 | For example, Carlin and Soskice (2014) refer to a version of Equation (1) as a monetary rule (MR), which, together with the Phillips curve and the IS curve of Equation (2), creates a three-equation model of the economy. Economic policy is then derived from the central bank loss function. Note, however, that their basic model does not incorporate exchange rate effects. |
8 | Of course, the model’s implications will rest partly on how expectations are determined. While this is true, it does not change the policy maker’s problem of reacting to gaps between observed and expected values. How expectations are determined is outside the scope of this paper. |
9 | “QE is similar to OMOs (open market operations) in the sense that it involves CBs to acquire assets, however, it is different from conventional OMOs in three important ways: first it was undertaken not to achieve a target policy rate, …; second, it involved purchase of far larger range of securities than OMO …; third, it was aimed at segments of the financial markets that were seen as having been unduly weakened by the financial crisis.” (Lombardi et al. 2018, p. 1233). |
10 | It is worth reminding the reader that, post-GFC, the focus in the Maastricht Treaty on goods and services inflation may well be misplaced. Financial asset prices play a larger role in monetary policy today. Convergence, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty, may well provide a misleading signal of the degree of actual economic integration between member and candidate economies. Moreover, 8 years since the GFC, the accumulated economic and financial distortions due to heavy central bank interventions also cloud the picture about how best to evaluate convergence. |
11 | The appendix in Bordo and Siklos (2021) contains the dating and details about inflation targeting regimes around the world. |
12 | We do not separately consider the role played by central bank independence or transparency. However, both these characteristics would provide additional support for our hypothesis since both have risen substantially over the period considered. For example, data from Romelli (2022) show that central bank independence rose from 0.62 in 1991 to 0.80 in 2017 in the Czech Republic; from 0.42 in 1991 to 0.75 in 2017 in Hungary; and from 0.79 in 1997 to 0.85 in Poland in 2017. The maximum degree of central bank independence is one. Turning to central bank transparency, data from Dincer et al. (2019) reveal that transparency went from 7.5 in 1998 to 14 by 2015 in the Czech Republic; from 4.5 to 12.5 in Hungary over the same period; and from 3.5 to 11 again over the 1998–2015 period in Poland. Maximum transparency would yield a score of 15. |
13 | One of the Maastricht conditions of entry into the Eurozone is meeting an inflation objective. The EU Commission and the ECB regularly update the reference inflation value for Eurozone entry via convergence reports generally every two years. While convergence involves several quantifiable criteria, the academic profession has tended to focus on inflation performance since this is reflected in many of the other convergence indicators (viz., interest rates and exchange rates), at least according to economic theory. History also suggests that there is judgment also involved especially concerning the timing of admission into the euro (e.g., see Mody 2018; Brunnermeier et al. 2016). See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-reports_en (accessed on 10 January 2023). |
14 | See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap11 (accessed on 10 January 2023). |
15 | Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) demonstrated progress toward convergence to the EU reference inflation rate in the period of their study (quarterly from January 1991 to January 2001). Siklos’ (2010) findings for the period of January 1995–April 2007 also suggest progress toward convergence throughout. Such a convergence implies a positive contribution of monetary policy to economic stabilization. |
16 | For a detailed description of the inflation targeting framework and maintaining the exchange rate system in the countries considered, see Ciżkowicz-Pękała et al. (2019). |
17 | In Hungary between 1995 and 2001, a crawling peg exchange rate system with a fluctuation band of ±2.5% guided monetary policy. The band of exchange rate fluctuations was widened to ±15% in 2001 and was maintained after the introduction of the inflation targeting system. Maintaining a dual target (inflation target and exchange rate band) created a potential conflict, but the main concern about losing competitiveness because of exchange rate appreciation kept the system until 20 June 2008, when floating was introduced. |
18 | In Norway, a small open economy like the three considered in this paper, the Norges Bank relies on six criteria to generate an appropriate future interest rate path. The second of these “rules” stipulates that “the inflation gap and the output gap should be in reasonable proportion to each other until they close. The inflation gap and the output gap should normally not be positive or negative at the same time further ahead.” (Kloster and Solberg-Johansen 2006, p. 119). This strategy is one that is common across most inflation targeting central banks. |
19 | |
20 | Policy rates did briefly come close to, but did not reach, zero during the height of the pandemic. |
21 | The debate about the stochastic properties of nominal interest rates and central bank policy rates has abated since the GFC but remains incompletely resolved with, on balance, evidence favorable to the interest rate smoothing phenomenon. Inter alia, see Romero-Ávila (2007) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). |
22 | While there is a consensus that the neutral real rate has declined over the past decade or more, there is also a great deal of uncertainty around point estimates as well as the precise source(s) of the decline. The recent review of the policy strategy of the ECB, the most relevant for the three central banks studied here, also highlights this result. |
23 | Poole (1999) is a classic illustration. We note that we also estimated but do not show a variety of Taylor rules, using OLS, but allowing for structural breaks and incorporating interest rate smoothing. None of the results based on estimated Taylor rule overturn the conclusion that the central banks in the three countries considered followed a flexible inflation targeting strategy with a view to stabilize output gap fluctuations. |
24 | Estimates are based on a so-called state space model where Rt = R*t + ut and R*t = R*t−1 + vt is latent (i.e., unobserved), which follows a random walk (i.e., only the immediate past value helps forecast its future value). The observed interest rate, R, fluctuates around R*. In a second version, R* is also impacted by the output gap. Since there is considerable uncertainty around estimates of R*, we use the same estimates for all three countries. |
25 | They are also the same as the ones the Fed reports in its Tealbook (“Report to the FOMC on Economics Conditions and Monetary Policy”). |
26 | These are semi-annual forecasts. We assume that the forecasts remain constant over two quarters, although converting the semi-annual forecasts to quarterly forecasts using the Chow–Lin method has no impact on the conclusions. |
27 | Some academics (e.g., see Svensson (2003)) have long recommended that central banks publish their reaction functions, and the issue was formally raised when legislative proposals were made to do so in the US (see, for example, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. 2015). |
28 |
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Variable | CZE | HUN | POL | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Forward-Looking | Backward-Looking | Forward-Looking | Backward-Looking | Forward-Looking | Backward-Looking | |
−0.09 (0.02) * | −0.08 (0.02) * | −0.05 (0.03) | −0.01 (0.03) | −0.09 (0.02) * | −0.13 (0.02) * | |
0.004 (0.01) | 0.06 (0.01) * | −0.07 (0.03) @ | 0.13 (0.05) * | −0.04 (0.01) * | 0.14 (0.02) * | |
−0.03 (0.01) * | 0.04 (0.01) * | −0.05 (0.02) @ | 0.08 (0.03) * | −0.05 (0.01) * | 0.03 (0.02) † | |
0.007 (0.007) | −0.004 (0.006) | −0.04 (0.02) @ | −0.06 (0.02) * | −0.01 (0.01) | −0.01 (0.007) † | |
−0.009 (0.005) | −0.005 (0.004) | 0.03 (0.01) † | 0.04 (0.01) * | 0.003 (0.006) | 0.01 (0.006) @ | |
0.81 (0.30) * | 0.51 (0.27) @ | −2.53 (0.87) * | −1.94 (0.85) @ | 0.47 (0.17) * | 0.76 (0.16) * | |
ER_COMMIT | −0.07 (0.08) | −0.06 (0.07) | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Constant | 0.23 (0.06) * | 0.06 (0.05) | 0.24 (0.20) | −0.25 (0.22) | 0.41 (0.08) * | 0.40 (0.10) * |
0.32 | 0.47 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.60 | 0.63 | |
F-stat | 6.37 (0.00) | 12.79 (0.00) | 4.39 (0.00) | 4.72 (0.00) | 19.01 (0.00) | 20.87 (0.00) |
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Ábel, I.; Siklos, P. Macroeconomic Risks and Monetary Policy in Central European Countries: Parallels in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Risks 2023, 11, 200. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11110200
Ábel I, Siklos P. Macroeconomic Risks and Monetary Policy in Central European Countries: Parallels in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Risks. 2023; 11(11):200. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11110200
Chicago/Turabian StyleÁbel, István, and Pierre Siklos. 2023. "Macroeconomic Risks and Monetary Policy in Central European Countries: Parallels in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland" Risks 11, no. 11: 200. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11110200