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Article

Freedom, Intentionality, and Trinitarian Love in Edith Stein’s Thought—The Need for a Phenomenology–Theology Dialogue to Have a Deeper Understanding of It

Faculty of Theology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago 7820436, Chile
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1377; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111377
Submission received: 14 July 2023 / Revised: 20 August 2023 / Accepted: 12 September 2023 / Published: 1 November 2023

Abstract

:
The school of phenomenology went with Edith Stein all her life and became one of the guiding strings of her thought, which deepens more and more on the experience of the crucified. The Steinian idea of freedom starts from philosophy. However, it is intimately crossed by the theological (and mystical) question, since, for the author, the historical realization of the human life is possible when it participates in the divine life because God configures his own life in perfect freedom. The basic idea in Stein’s proposal on human freedom is the self-configuration of oneself in the divine image. On the other hand, when Stein asks herself, “What is freedom?” she answers, “It means the same as this: I can”. What does this answer mean? In order to understand the comprehensiveness of Ich kann and its relation to self-configuration, it is necessary to realize the foundations that support this “I can”. Therefore, the present study will consider the two essential points of support for it: the phenomenological concept of intentionality (Intentionalität), proper to Brentano’s thought and inherited from Husserl, and the human experience of the phenomenon of divine love.

1. Introduction

Almost twenty years after the passing away of Therese Benedicta of the Cross in Auschwitz, in an interview (5 August 1962), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a friend and colleague of the saint, recognizes the contribution of the thought elaborated by Stein. When asked: “According to you, what do you think is the importance of the philosopher Edith Stein?” (Alfieri 2014, pp. 425–27). She answers, “Her main importance is probably in the fact that she was in the position to synthesize what she derived from her Catholic religious position—one might say, also from Thomism embraced with spiritual passion– and the phenomenology” (Alfieri 2014, pp. 425–27).
The testimony of the philosopher is worth remembering precisely to highlight the value of the synthesis between the Catholic faith and the phenomenology of Stein, who enriched theological contemplation with a phenomenological reflection. A science that, for her, will contribute with “a way of philosophizing that differs from the usual way of dealing with things” (Alfieri 2014, pp. 425–27). Her phenomenological perspective, impregnated with a rich religious experience: “The reign of Carmelite absoluteness, the reign of Dominican «pure truth», the reign of Benedictine «liturgical style»—all these together could well be at the basis of the Christian reign of both the philosophy of the «science of being,» and of a true «feminine guide»” (Przywara 2000, p. 162); allowed her a rigorous philosophical thought that sought to conceive freedom as part of her Christian realization concerning her Hebrew tradition and her dialogue with the Truth.
Bearing in mind the structure of phenomenological thought in Stein, it is interesting to dwell on the only text where she writes down the question, “What is freedom?”. She answers immediately: “It means the same as this: I can” (Stein 2010b, p. 79).1 The foundations that support and complement the “I can” must be clearly understood to comprehend the breadth of her response. Therefore, the present study will address the essential supporting points to this question: the phenomenological concept of intentionality, from Brentano’s thought and inherited from Husserl, and love as human experience founded on divine love, since for Stein there is only one phenomenon that is established as a criterion of interpretation of freedom that configures and promotes humanity, and that is the experience of love as the definitive manifestation of God.
Edith Stein revealed the bond between intentionality and love from the systematization of the idea of freedom from her life and work. The theological question touches on her philosophy. Hence, for the author, the historical realization of human life and its temporal realities are a participation in the divine life since God configures his life in perfect freedom (Stein 2013a, p. 309). The author’s novelty lies in developing the idea of human freedom as a relational experience based on the trinitarian dynamic of love. In other words, the free relationship experienced by the persons of the Trinity is the basis of human freedom, which also allows its self-configuration.
To address the issue, we will divide the study into four parts:
  • On the idea of freedom, beginning with “I can”;
  • The role of intentionality in Stein’s idea of freedom;
  • Trinitarian Love as the foundation of Stein’s idea of freedom;
  • Stein’s proposal: Liebesgemeinschaft as a key to link love, intentionality, and freedom.

2. On the Idea of Freedom, Beginning with “I Can”

First, we speak of an idea and not a concept, because the experience of freedom cannot be contained within a definition, nor can it be standardized. This can also be seen in the course of the author’s life and thought, which show an intensification of the idea of freedom, ranging from the philosophical understanding of free acts to the mystical–phenomenological elaboration of a being liberated by the Cross, a liberation that Stein herself conceives of as one of the most characteristic elements of the experience of freedom and of being free in the image of God. Steinian anthropology seeks to integrate the different elements—body, soul, spirit—that constitute the personal experience. For her, both the body and the soul belong to the self, since it embraces and delimits them spiritually. The author integrates the reflection of free acts because she recognizes that
“under the term «person» we have understood the conscious and free “I” (bewußte und freie Ich). It is «free» because it is «master of its acts» (Herr seiner Taten), because it determines its life out of itself—in the form of «free acts.» The free acts are the person’s first field of domain (Herrschaftsbereich)”.
In this article, we will start from the basis of the idea of freedom, from the reflection that begins with the “I can”. It is necessary to clarify that this first step, taken from the Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932–1933), will provide us with the fundamental elements related to consciousness, which will later allow us to open the exploration of the human being, who is, among other things, free, intended in their existence, and called to fulfill themselves in love. This analysis will be enriched with other texts by Edith Stein.
So, what is freedom? Stein answers in chapter VI of Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person, in which she addresses “The animal in man and the specifically human”. For context, this issue is preceded by two questions: first, what does it mean that both men and women are responsible for themselves? And then, what does spirituality mean?3 That introduces the question: “What does freedom mean? It means the same as this: I can. As awake, spiritual, I see myself in a world of things, but it is not imposed on me simply: things invite me to go after them, to contemplate them from different sides, to penetrate into them” (Stein 2010b, p. 79).4
The text above allows us to take the first step in this study, since it is impossible to speak of freedom, love, or intentionality in the human being without understanding that the person is a free I, an intentional I, and an I that loves. Therefore, we will begin the matter with these summarized lines, which will help us to highlight three elements that express the core of meaning and which, consequently, constitute the key to deepening her idea of freedom: “I can” (Ich kann), “awake, spiritual” (waches, geistiges), and “it is not imposed on me” (sie zwingt sich mir nicht einfach auf).

2.1. “I Can”

The first thing Stein does when referring to this “I” is emphasize consciousness’s undeniable presence. Regarding the “I”, and in the words of Husserl: “the Ego, as unity, is a system of the «I can.» In this regard a distinction is to be made between the physical “I can” (the Bodily and the one mediated by the Body) and the spiritual” (Husserl 2000, p. 266).
There is also a distinction between Bewußtsein (self-consciousness) and Gewissen (moral consciousness) in German. Freedom is deeply linked to that “I” as self-consciousness, which is the center of the unification of the subject. The influence of Husserl’s Logical Investigations is once again recognized.5
As Ales Bello states, “It can be said that the pure self and the consciousness are the mirrors in which the experiences that come from the realities of the psyche and the spirit are reflected” (Ales Bello 2011, p. 31). In this manner, the consciousness establishes the person as the subject of his experiences, as the active agent of personal, psychic, and spiritual operations. However, it is not a self without selfhood (Selbst ohne Selbstigkeit) nor a beginning without content (Anfang ohne Inhalt), but already materialized in itself, a being endowed with a core («kernhaft» Seiendes) (Stein 2005a, pp. 266–67), which does not mean that it is closed in on itself, but that it is dynamic, for it has not been brought into existence for itself, but within a world in order to participate in it (Stein 2005a, pp. 266–67). This expresses that openness is proper to it since being in openness means its “«freedom» and its elevation above all «natural» being” (Stein 2005a, pp. 266–67).6 In this way, the dynamic and open self journeys to find itself from itself, with itself, but not for itself, but rather elevated for another. Thus, as Stubbemann explains, it is not a solely personal process, but “although the person must collaborate through their freedom in self-knowledge, they cannot, however, arrive by themself to their center. It is God who must call them to enter within themself. True knowledge is, therefore, always the work of grace” (Stubbemann 2003, pp. 88–89). This is what Stein—referring to Teresa of Avila—expresses as “the strange step that the soul takes in its reflection [… that] crosses from the walls of the ring to its innermost depths” (Stein 2013a, p. 524).7
The “I can” of the consciousness reveals four other aspects relevant to understanding its interaction:
  • The human being has a will, which means it is an “I” that can and a “I” that is capable (Husserl 2000, p. 270);
  • The act of power or power to leave demands a rational distinction;
  • The “I” may or may not for itself because it is self-aware and knows itself (Stein 2010b, p. 41);8
  • The free activity of the “I” (freie Ichtätigkeit), which emanates from the «interior,» manifests the real unity of soul and spirit (Stein 2005a, p. 171). The latter also implies taking charge of their distinction. Stein addressed this in various investigations.9
“I can”, as an expression of freedom, is an experience that decisively opens the person. The opening belongs to their being. Stein understood it in that way when she formulated that the existence of the human being is open inward—for itself—and outward—to grasp the world within itself (Stein 2010b, p. 32).
In essence, in the conception of the human being that Stein takes from Husserl, and which he draws from the Pauline tradition of a tripartite root (cf. 1 Thess 5:23), it is held that the human being is what is formed by a physical, animate, and living body (Pezzella 2003, pp. 16–17).
The following scheme must be approached correctly to understand freedom and, thus, not fall into the distortion of the mediating role of the soul. This is what Stein warns when she asserts that
“the traditional three-part division of body-soul-spirit is not to be understood as if the soul of the human being were a third realm between the two that already existed without it and independent of each other: in it, spirituality and sensuality meet and intertwine (verflochten). It is precisely this that separates the self-being (das Eigentümliche) from the spiritual soul (Geistseele), from the sensitive soul (Sinnenseele), and the pure spirit (reiner Geist). The human being is neither animal nor angel because he is both in one”.
The feature of being simultaneously linked to the sensitive and the spiritual distinguishes it from animals and angels. It constitutes an “I can” that transcends the action itself and allows it to configure its life from itself freely.

2.2. “Awake, Spiritual” (Wach, Geistig)

The conscious self is “awake, spiritual”. Assuming the absolute reality of the life of the self and, therefore, the consistency of its continuity, it is discovered that the awakened self finds its existence in its continuous present, enabling it to determine its life and drive its experiences. “Thus, the self transcends itself in the direction of something in which the “I” has the ground of its being (i.e., a transcendence opposite to that of transcendental idealism)” (Stein 2005a, p. 244).
The awakening to life of the human spirit manifests itself when it discovers itself as free and open (Erschlossenheit. Stein 2005a, p. 267). This awareness makes it possible to overcome the anguish of being thrown into existence and to advance in discernment facing the question: awake for what? At this point, Stein also reminds us that the person does not awaken on their own, nor are they originally free and open. However, along with the awakening of the original freedom and openness, they have been given the ability to remain free and open. Thus, the possibility of losing both is recognized at the same time (Stein 2005a, p. 267). Personal responsibility for our “unity of experience” (Erlebnis-Einheit) is highlighted.10
Edith Stein agrees with Hedwig Conrad-Martius about the spiritual being of the human being, which can only be affirmed when the person is considered free. As a result of this condition, the person can be elevated above himself, which is only possible from a rebirth of the spirit (Stein 2005a, pp. 176–77). This dimension will be of profound relevance for the development of Steinian thought. She finds in the Spirit of God the creative and dynamic capacity by which the human being, as a divine image, can access the mysteries of Revelation and participate in the plan of salvation for eternal life. To this point, we can add that when Stein affirms that the person is the image of God, she says so because she understands that “he can know and want freely” (Stein 2005b, p. 29), analogically applying (Stein 2013a, p. 10) the divine attribute of freedom to the human being and recognizing God as absolutely free. Therefore, when we assert that God is love and that love is the freest thing there is (Stein 2015b, pp. 18–19 and Stein 2013a, p. 355), it is clear that the human being
“is not just an organism, but an animated living being (ein beseeltes Lebewesen) that is formed from within, that in its way […] is open to itself and its environment (Umwelt); and finally, it is a spiritual entity (geistiges Wesen) that is cognitively open to itself and others, and that can shape itself (gestalten) and others freely and actively”.
The person’s spiritual nature effectively enables being a son or daughter of God (Stein 2005b, p. 29). This nature distinguishes him from the rest of the visible Creation, elevating him to the condition of a human being, that is, a spiritual, conscious, and free person. Consciousness is conceived as openness (Erschlossenheit) and the possibility of perceiving, while freedom configures the possibility of going after what is perceived (Stein 2005a, p. 256).
In conclusion, the essence of the human being is illuminated in their spiritual nature as a participation of the divine Spirit. This nature plays a leading role, both in the configuration of one’s freedom and in that of the external world. For Stein, the spirit makes the person a person and by which the human being can be called the image of God (Stein 2005b, p. 18; Caballero 2010, pp. 40–41), resembling Him as no other being will be able to.

2.3. “It Is Not Imposed on Me” (Sie Zwingt Sich Mir Nicht Einfach Auf)

When the “I” enters the world, it risks being affected by the impressions that configure reality. What it hears, sees, and feels may occupy a greater or lesser space in the consciousness, but it concerns it only superficially, without the depths of the soul (der Grund der Seele) being affected (Stein 2010b, pp. 85–86).
It is possible to deepen the soul–world relationship through the distinction between “natural-ingenuous soul-life” (das natürlich-naive Seelenleben) and “liberated soul-life” (das befreite Seelenleben), which Stein introduces in Freiheit und Gnade (1921), to speak of the life of the human soul:
  • For Stein, “natural-ingenuous soul-life” is a constant change of impressions and reactions the soul receives from outside, and the subject takes as an object through the spirit. Although the soul receives impressions from outside, and these have an impact on the whole person, the soul is not at the mercy of them, nor is it unable to react (it is one thing to suffer the happenings of the world and quite another to allow itself to be ruled by them). On the contrary, the soul, together with its positions (Stellungnahmen), is situated in a unique and unrepeatable space from which it not only experiences reality but can also shape it;
  • “Liberated soul-life”. Here, the life of the soul is not driven from without but from within. The most radical thing about this soul-life is that the deepest center—the one from within—is guided from above (Stein 2014a, p. 11), so that “to be raised to the realm above means for the soul to enter completely into itself. Furthermore, vice versa: It cannot take root in itself without being raised above itself, right into the realm above. […]. This is what we call «liberated» (befreit)” (Stein 2014a, p. 11).
Since the subject accepts the world with the spirit and receives the impressions of the world in his soul, the difference is that these impressions do not move him. The soul accepts them with its center anchored above so that its positions (Stellungnahmen) are given to it from above, and the soul that listens allows itself to be guided and moved obediently without being determined or subjected by the world (Stein 2014a, pp. 11–12).
In consequence, the “I can”, the “awake, spiritual”, and the “it is not imposed on me” are fundamental elements of the idea of freedom found in Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932–1933), which exposes the personal character of the human being, as well as the link between freedom and conscience, since we are capable of knowing and willing freely. On this basis, we can go on to review the role played by intentionality.

3. The Role of Intentionality in Stein’s Idea of Freedom

From Husserl, Stein learned to separate philosophical research from the experience of Revelation, considering that philosophy should be “truly «pure;» that is, it should not accept anything that is not examined and does not respond to the methodological principle of evidence” (Ales Bello 2013, p. 272). Nevertheless, this did not make much sense for Stein, since she considered that “if the search has Truth as its goal, every contribution, wherever it comes from, must be considered valid. Therefore, if Revelation provides ideas or indications, these must be used and considered so that they can be clarified and reworked” (Ales Bello 2013, p. 272).
With time, even while distancing herself from the master, our author does not cease to be a phenomenologist. What she assumed and what she abandoned could be summarized as follows: from Husserl, she preserves the method, the intuitions about subjectivity, empathy, and the intersubjective character of the human being; but she does not share the absolute faith in the cognitive capacity of the person as the ultimate criterion of truthfulness, excluding the opening towards a superior knowledge (Del Gaudio 2004, pp. 41–42).
Of the phenomenological element, Stein highlights one above the rest: intentionality (Intentionalität). It is typical of the thought of Franz Brentano and was coined by Husserl (Husserl 2000, pp. 277, 422, 424, 427). As the Danish philosopher Dan Zahavi explains, they are “experiences that are all characterized by being conscious of something, that is, which all possess an object-directedness” (Zahavi 2003, p. 14). Acts “are intentional regardless of whether or not their object exists” (Zahavi 2003, p. 17). This is independent of the fact that, for Husserl, “we are ‘zunächst und zumeist’ directed at real objects in the world” (Zahavi 2003, p. 19). Zahavi establishes two points. First, for Husserl, “Husserl claims that intentionality is not merely a feature of our consciousness of actually existing objects, but also something that characterizes our fantasies, our predictions, our recollections, etcetera; and 2) that Husserl argues that the intended object is not itself a part of or contained in consciousness (Hua 19/385)” (Zahavi 2003, p. 19). That is why Stein cannot overlook the relevance of this element since the denial of intentionality correlates with the denial of the mind’s orientation toward truth (Sokolowski 2000, p. 10). On the other hand, no intentional experience can lack quality or matter since they constitute the intentional essence of the act (Zahavi 2003, p. 27).
A frequent mistake has been to misinterpret Husserlian analysis concerning intentionality “by claiming that his identification of the intentional object and the real object can be taken in support of a metaphysical realism” (Zahavi 2003, p. 39).
Regarding the dimension of the person’s spiritual being, the Husserlian concept of intentionality will help understand the living experience of a transcendent and incarnated freedom. As Stein formulates it:
“[…] The spiritual being is a being in itself. The spiritual has an «interior» (Inneres) in an alien (fremd) sense to the spatial-material. When it «goes out of itself,» it happens in many ways: as an approach to the «objects» (what Husserl calls the «intentionality» of the spiritual life/Intentionalität des geistigen Lebens), as a purely spiritual sheltering from alien spirits (für fremde Geister) that cohabits in them; but also as putting itself in place […], in such a way that it remains no less in itself. From that inner center it configures itself (gestaltet es sich) and closes all that it is and that which it appropriates—in an appropriation, which in turn is only possible for the spiritual (nur dem Geistigen möglich ist)–, together in unity (zur Einheit zusammen)”.
Intentionality as going out of oneself is an essential characteristic of the spirit, whether as an orientation towards another or as a self-structuring in space, finding or developing itself in the self-configuration of the being that lives. It is characteristic of the spirit that it does not lose itself in going out but instead is enriched in this exercise of going out-encountering. Stein establishes a link between this dynamic and the trinitarian dynamic:
“We have before us the spirit in its purest and most perfect realization when in the total self-surrender of the divine persons, in which each is completely detached (entäußern) from its essence (Wesen) and yet conserves (bewahrt) it entirely, each is wholly in itself and wholly in the others”.
Understanding the spiritual as interiority in openness is crucial in our author. For her, “spiritual living is active, meaning it is intentional” (Redmond 2007, p. 109). It can be understood better through the analogy of the Spirit-infinite-Spirit-finite and the idea of participation in the divine life. At this point, Stein refers to the Metaphysische Gespräche of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, to ask about the significance of the concept: “It is said that the human being, insofar as he rises above himself in personal freedom, is born of the spirit, of the «original I» (Ur-Ich)” (Stein 2005a, p. 266). Then, in confrontation with the Metaphysical Conversations, she continues her reasoning:
The personal self is already in itself materialized, entity «endowed with core» («kernhaft» Seiendes), so that thus, as it is, it is not brought into existence «for itself alone» («für sich allein» ins Dasein gesetzt), but within a world, from which because of the openness, which belongs to its very being, it can gain content and life”.
For Stein, everything created is analogous to its original being but differs from all non-personal entities (Seienden). It shows that “its «freedom» and elevation above all «natural» (naturhafte) being, has been given” (Stein 2005a, pp. 266–67). The author remarks that because of its personal-spiritual being, what it is can and must be configured as a form through which its matter is configured, that is, “insofar as to this form belongs openness, it can and must allow itself to be configured (gestalten) through what comes from outside” (Stein 2005a, p. 267). In this sense,
“«can» (Können) is inseparable from the idea of freedom, and to both belongs inseparably (unabtrennbar) the «can let» (Unterlassenkönnen). Moreover, the «should» (sollen) presupposes all this. The free power and the should (sollen) that is related to it are inseparable from openness (Erschlossenheit), and to this openness as free belongs a power to be able to self-close (Sichverschließenkönnen)”.
Some of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative is present in this proposal (Fichte 2002, p. 46). However, the most relevant allusion to the Kantian thou shalt because thou oughtest is when there is a case of a duty that obliges beyond natural forces (Stubbemann 2003, p. 91). It is there where the need for the help of grace emerges with greater clarity.
One of the most relevant factors in the implementation of intentionality for freedom is its participation in the process of the self-configuration of the human being. The fact that it is a transversal component allows it to be present in the different stages of individual development. For Stein, in the going out of itself of the spirit, “the elementary form of what is specific to the life of the human soul is revealed to us: intentionality or being directed towards the opposite (Gegenständliches)” (Stein 2010b, pp. 80–81). In the intentionality, a threefold movement can be found: “The I, which is facing (zugewendet) towards an object; the object (der Gegenstand), which it faces; and the act, in which the I lives in each case and is directed (richtet) in this or that way towards an object” (Stein 2010b, pp. 80–81).
According to Stein, in this articulation between the I that is confronted, the object it faces, and the act in which the self lives and directs itself to this object, freedom intervenes in the following way: the world that the free person—or that the self—perceives through its senses, invites it to deepen its contemplation. It is a living experience that directs, that motivates incessantly to move on to new perceptive acts that open the person to new elements of the perceptive world (Stein 2010b, pp. 80–81). The direction that the motivated and intentional person freely assumes allows him to trace the course toward consolidating what he should be. To illustrate it in a better way, Stein resorts to the image of the artist (Künstler):
“The «idea» enlightens the artist, attracts him, does not leave him alone, and drives him to create. Thus, it also seems that what is above the living being as goal and realization (Ziel und Vollendung), a stream (ein «Zug» auszugehen) that directs its development. This stream can be felt as people mature, even from the awakening of reason. The image of what is to become can be grasped more or less clearly. Free conduct is oriented accordingly (in the striving for perfection and self-education) […] And even where there is a conscious (bewußt) search towards a known goal, this striving enters into the service of one that is not fixed by it, but one already independent and existing, and only then comes to light from its clandestinity (Verborgenheit) originally inherent in the free activity”.
In conclusion, as a free and spiritual person, the self builds its life through intentional acts (Stein 2010b, pp. 83–84), and the spiritual life, for its part, gives content to the formation of this construction.

4. Trinitarian Love as the Foundation of Stein’s Idea of Freedom

Behind all of the above, the “I can”, and the power of the life of the spirit that unfolds in intentional acts, a new clue is given as to what freedom means for Stein: the exercise of giving oneself (to). As a phenomenologist, she values the self-giving of things and the intentionality of self-giving. However, at the same time, as a seeker of Truth and a believer, she reasons that this self-giving is an unfolding of the self-giving of God, of whom we are the image.
For Stein, self-giving is established as essential for the realization of human freedom since it makes possible the unfolding of the soul, self-configuration, and spiritual openness as a trinitarian self-giving, constituting at the same time the heart of Stein’s contemplation, that is to say, the freedom is possible by the Infinite Spirit.
On the other hand, the mediation of the Spirit gives an authentic sense of being liberated (Befreitheit) proposed by Stein, which, far from being a catharsis with its relation to the world, means to give oneself to God, Who manifests himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but also in the image of each man and each woman, shows himself as common-unity.12
Throughout the Steinian corpus, the idea of freedom is elaborated more or less conscious of its trinitarian conception, together with the affirmation of a spiritual mediation that recognizes its foundation in the trinitarian dynamic. The content of this mediation is God himself, who is Love. This will imply understanding each person in the image of God and in openness to the finite and the eternal. The trinitarian is the foundation of the relational, and love is the foundation of the trinitarian.
For its part, the Trinity as the foundation of the relational is discovered recurrently in the Steinian corpus. The author exposes in various writings that the fact of being, living, and belonging to the great body of humanity has its roots in the trinitarian mystery, a mystery that informs the dynamics of personal relationships ad intra and ad extra, thus becoming the image and archetype of the human common-unity. This idea unites the experiences of communion and relationship, since “the vocation to union with God is a vocation to eternal life” (Stein 2013a, p. 422). The following texts stand out:
(1)
Conference Christliches Frauenleben (1932). She recognizes how Augustine, Thomas, and the subsequent tradition saw the image of the Trinity in the spirit of the human being (Stein 2015a, p. 105);
(2)
Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932–1933). She describes a Christian anthropology that encompasses the “goodness of human nature, of the freedom of the human being, of his vocation to perfection, of his responsible position” (Stein 2010b, p. 9), based on the prescription that “in his spirit is imprinted the image of the Trinity” (Stein 2010b, p. 9). She portrays this profound conviction in one of her poems: Ich bleibe bei Euch… (1939): “The innermost chamber of the human soul/Is the most beloved abode of the Trinity,/His heavenly throne on earth […]”, and the heart of Jesus “is the heart of the Divine Trinity/And the center of all human hearts,/Which gives us the life of the Divinity” (Stein 2015b, p. 180);
(3)
Kreuzeswissenschaft (1941–1942). In an Augustinian line, she asserts, but from the hand of John of the Cross: “Love in its highest realization is to be one (Einssein) in the free mutual surrender: that is the divine intra-trinitarian life” (Stein 2013b, pp. 147–48);
(4)
Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), Chapter VII on the Image of the Trinity in Creation. There she states that in every sphere of the real, there is a trinitarian unfolding of the being, proposing to link the three fundamental forms of real being (wirkliches Seins) to the Trinity, that is, the Father as animic being (seelisches Sein), the Son as corporeal (leiblich) and the Holy Spirit as free and disinterested exhalation (das freie und selbstlose Ausströmen)”, as spirit (Geist) (Stein 2013a, p. 308). She also proposes—thankfully and explicitly valuing the contribution of Augustine of Hippo—that “the human spiritual life must be considered as trinitarian (dreifaltiges) and trine (dreieiniges)” (Stein 2013a, p. 377), referring to the triads: memory-intelligence-will (Gedächtnis, Verstand und Wille), and spirit-love-knowledge (Geist, Liebe und Erkenntnis), as three and one (Stein 2013a, pp. 377–78), representing Father-Son-Holy Spirit.
It is possible to speak of the union of the soul with the life of the Trinity because the spiritual nature of the soul (Geistnatur der Seele), that is, its personal-spiritual being (ihr persönlich-geistiges Wesen) (Stein 2013a, p. 391), is presupposed. For this reason, the person is capable of a free and conscious spiritual life, and the human spirit can be considered the image of God in a sense distinct from the rest of creation (Stein 2013a, p. 391).
Stein places love as the fundamental analogy between God and the human being (Heimpel 2005, pp. 214–15). In the argumentative formula developed in Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), the author has shown a much more thoughtful philosophical-theological elaboration concerning the concept of the image of God and the participation and collaboration of the human being in it, as well as the idea of the Trinity as the foundation of the relational.
In other words, love makes possible the participation of all creation in God and constitutes the key to the divine dynamic, revealing God not only as Love but also as Lover and Beloved. This provides an essential clue: “Divine love reveals itself as without beginning and end (anfangs- und endlos), as a perpetual cycle, revolving only [for] the good, out of the good, in the good and toward the good” (Stein 2013c, pp. 75–76). This statement leads us to admit that if God as love moves Himself, He as the cause of Himself, in turn, requires Himself to move, which is only possible by recognizing in Him the “unity of essence (Einheit des Wesens) in three persons, perfect community”, of which the human being is the image (Stein 2015b, p. 12). This last point was written down by the author in 1930 under the title “Trinität als Urbild” as part of her reflection: Was lerne ich von St. Benedikt für die Theorie des Gemeinschaftslebens?:
“The unity of essence (Einheit des Wesens) in three persons implies the perfect unity of life (Einheit des Lebens) in knowledge, in love, [and in] inner and outer work. Among human beings, the unity of humanity (Einheit des Menschentums), but also individual diversity [imply], therefore, limits of oneness (Gemeinsamkeit)”.
For Stein, it was vital to deepen the Trinity as the foundation of a community life mobilized by love since love is the freest thing.13
For the one who lives and acts in the image of God, this exercise is the “to give oneself as the action of someone who possesses oneself” (Stein 2013a, p. 355). For God, on the other hand, this is not an act since He “is love itself or whose being (Sein) is love” (Stein 2013a, p. 355). As the author states: “Divine love itself must be a person: the Person of love (die Person der Liebe)” (Stein 2013a, p. 355), and that person is the Holy Spirit, the Infinite Spirit. He is the only one with the essential characteristics to be so. He is love personified because he is a Person and a Gift.14
In the Person of Love, the bond of the natural elevated by the supernatural is established in the historical and concrete experience of the relationship. To conceive love as the foundation of the trinitarian is only possible in this relationship, which can certainly occur at different levels or degrees of perfection according to the spiritual openness of the soul that accepts it.
Two biblical moments have inspired the author to develop the question of the relationship between God and the person who participates in his Gift:
(1)
The theophany of the burning bush, when Yahweh responds to Moses’ question: “I AM WHO I AM” (Ex 3:14). For Stein, the key is in the divine actuality (the one who is), and it is given “not as an attainment or coexistence (Nacheinander oder Nebeneinander) of temporal «acts,» but from eternity, completely one in the unity of the one divine «act,» in which all the different meanings of «act»—real being, living presence, complete being, spiritual movement (geistige Regung), free act (freie Tat)—fully coincide” (Stein 2013a, p. 295).
The author sees that God reveals himself in this scene: “I live, I know, I want, I love (Ich lebe, Ich weiß, Ich will, Ich liebe)” (Stein 2013a, p. 295). Yahweh’s response does not manifest as a succession of acts—in the bush or the burning fire—but in listening and speaking to Moses. To speak constitutes the act of divine love, free and voluntary. God speaks because he wants to, because he wants to establish a relationship with Moses, and in him, with all his creation.
(2)
“That they may all be one”. For Stein, the first of the three signs of divine filiation (Gotteskindschaft) is discovered in the passage of St. John: Unum ese cum Deo.15 The declaration or desire “that they may all be one […] may they also be in us” (Jn 17:21) is the highest expression of divine life in communion with human life. About this biblical episode, the author explains:
“He became (geworden) one of us, but more than that: one with us. That is the wonderful thing about the human race, that we are all one. If it were (wäre) otherwise, we would be (stünden) as autonomous (selbständige) and separate individuals, free and independent (unabhängig) side by side (nebeneinander); consequently, the fall of one could not have dragged (ziehen) the fall of all. Then, on the other hand, the price of the atonement (Sühnepreis) could well have been paid by us and attributed (zugerechnet) to us. However, its righteousness would not have pierced (übergegangen) the sinners; no justification (Rechtfertigung) would have been possible. Nevertheless, He became one corpus mysticum with us: He, our head, we, His members”.
The text of Exodus appears in Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), while the text of the evangelist is used previously in Das Weihnachtsgeheimnis (1931). The value of considering both is to offer an overview of a certain con-sequence in the understanding of God’s love articulated by the author, who, at the entrance to her spiritual and mystical stage, begins to develop a robust theology of unity in love as the foundation of all that is possible and real.
Up to this point, such love is expressed in the historical self-giving of the Triune God. It unfolds from the immensity of creation down to the smallest human community because it is in “the Divine Trinity (Dreifaltige Gottheit) in which we seek the archetype (Urbild) of what we call meaning and fullness of life (Sinn und Lebensfülle) in the creaturely realm” (Stein 2013a, p. 354).
When we approach Stein’s idea of freedom, it is essential to remember our author’s reading of Duns Scotus’ thought, linking love and freedom. According to a study by Alfieri, she uses explicit Scotist references in Finite and Eternal Being (Alfieri 2015, pp. 11–13) that reinforce that love is the freest thing there is.16 The nature of freedom can be attained through love because love is the foundation of every way of free-personal relations. Because “when one is free, nothing can prevent him from persevering. Love is the giving of oneself (Verschenken seiner selbst). Only he who possesses (besitzt) himself can give himself. One possesses oneself, meaning one can dispose of oneself (verfügen). But to possess oneself in this way appropriately means to be a person” (Stein 2015b, pp. 19–20).

5. Stein’s Proposal: Liebesgemeinschaft as a Key to Link Love, Intentionality, and Freedom

God’s love, which is absolutely free, unfolds in a trinitarian way in relation. God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is the pure actuality of love and manifests in their divine common-unity. Edith Stein identifies the foundation of this image of God in the Liebesgemeinschaft.
The author provides an original clue: in connection with our first fathers, we do not speak of a community, but in its place, we call it a community of love.17 The concern for love as the foundation of community resurfaces with great intensity by introducing the concept of Liebesgemeinschaft. This concept establishes the dialog between love, intentionality, and freedom, although it does not appear very often in the Steinian corpus (only six times).18
Besides the use of the word Liebesgemeinschaft, the six writings have two elements in common: first, they address the relationship between human bonds before and after the fall, and second, they all postdate the Husserlian publication on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity (Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928).19 Given that the idea of Liebesgemeinschaft is developed in this work, it would be reasonable to question whether Husserl’s proposal could be related to Stein’s use of the community of love. At first, the suspicion seems valid because it is also Husserl himself who, some years before, would install the concern for love as a fundamental problem of phenomenology. It can be seen how this interest is presented in one of his unpublished manuscripts from the years 1920–1921, when he writes that love is one of the main problems of phenomenology according to the intentional elementary sources and according to their revealed forms of the intentionality that emerges and takes effect from the depths to the heights and universal expanses.20
One of the most relevant characteristics that love exhibits in Husserl’s analysis is constituting itself as a “founding element of community” (Crespo 2012, p. 25), a community that “has the character of a Liebesgemeinschaft, which is, above all, a community of tending” (Crespo 2012, p. 25).
However, based on this, some similarities can be noted, but also differences between the two proposals (Husserl’s and Stein’s). Unlike her mentor, Stein directs her reflection in such a way that she presents love as the foundation and catalyst of the positions intake (Stellungnahmen) by each human being, acting as a founding element not only of the experience of the community but also of the person himself since it does not only reveal who I am but speaks from who I am and towards who I am. This tending reveals intentionality that goes beyond the limits of one’s nature and aspires to more. For the author, this cannot be experienced except from freedom, which contributes to the fact that this process can be considered a unique and genuine life project, inseparable from nature and grace.
Stein gives Liebesgemeinschaft as the definition of community when she speaks of the original experience, of the experience of the human being in perfect union and surrender to God, and not simply as a common quality of having something in common, as the communitas is usually quickly understood. The author uses Liebes-gemeinschaft aiming at the etymological sense of the Greek word: κοινωνία as communion, community, and participation, also as a close relationship of mutuality, a close (intimate) union, gift.21 Thereby, Stein elevates the participation mentioned above to participation in the Love.22 In other words, it is not enough to have something in common, nor is belonging or a sense of belonging to something or someone, but what is decisive is mutual knowledge in Love. This is precisely the value of having the experience of the community and being constituted in it.
To deepen the Steinian understanding of Liebesgemeinschaft and its relevance for freedom, the following will review the insights made by the author in the four referred lectures:
(1)
In Die theoretischen Grundlagen der sozialen Bildungsarbeit (1930), she addresses the theme of the union of love as the result of a human education that promotes the fundamental values necessary to establish positive links between the members of each society:
“This is the consoling result to which our research directs us: the well-guided school performs a work of social formation, which makes people fit for every possible community (Gemeinschaft). It develops the ability and sense of civility (Gemeinsinn), readiness (Bereitwilligkeit) of order, and subordination (Ein- und Unterordnung), which is proven both in the family and in public life. And it can lead to a community of love (Liebesgemeinschaft) with all persons in God”.
In this case, Liebesgemeinschaft manifests as hope for consummating the eschatological destination. It expresses a voluntary desire to recapitulate all in Christ (anakefalaiosis), which the Triune God finally brings about. For this, it is fundamental to safeguard personal unity concerning the communitarian whole, not only in the dynamics of human communion but also and more particularly, vis-a-vis with the communion with God, in Whom the experience or participation in the mystical body of Christ (Maskulak 2007, p. 119) does not lead to dissolution,23 but to the confirmation of the self that is given.
(2)
Regarding the lecture Beruf des Mannes und der Frau nach Natur- und Gnadenordnung (1931), she emphasized the following:
“Here [Gen 2:20–25], we do not speak of a dominion (Herrschaft) of the man over the woman. She is called «companion» and «helper» («Gefährtin» und «Gehilfin»), and it is said of the male that he will be joined (anhangen) to her and that the two will become one flesh. This indicates that the life of the first human couple (Menschenpaares) is to be thought of as the most intimate community of love (Liebesgemeinschaft), that they cooperate (zusammenwirken) as a single entity (einziges Wesen) in perfect harmony of forces, just as, before the Fall, in each individual, all forces were in perfect harmony, senses, and spirit in right relationship (Verhältnis), with no possibility of conflict”.
Concerning the spousal relationship that occurs in the creation of man and woman, Stein opts for a biblical perspective, reviewing Genesis to the letters of St. Paul (Stein 2015a, pp. 62–65),24 staying with the Old Testament account for its foundation. The Liebesgemeinschaft manifests as a reminder that there was no supremacy, but rather a fullness among them. It was not only by nature but by divine will. This also reveals an anthropology of complementarity, typically characteristic of Steinian speech.
Before making her apology or justification for the woman as companion and helper, Stein takes up again the trinitarian reflection she addressed in previous lines,25 where she delicately recalls the image of the Trinity not only to deepen the question about the need for a man not to be alone, but also how this relationship should be established with the company with which he would form his community:
“Why it would not have been good for him to be alone comes again from the Word of God. God created man and woman in the image and likeness of God. But God is Triune (dreieinig): as from the Father proceeds (hervorgeht) the Son and from the Son and the Father the Spirit, so the woman proceeds (ausgegangen) from the man, and both the offspring (Nachkommenschaft). And again, God is Love. But love cannot be between less than two (as St. Gregory in the homily on the sending of the disciples said, they were sent 2 by 2)”.
God is Triune; God is Love. From this, it is somewhat easier to make visible the need to link the image of the dynamic of the community of love—deeply affected by the Original sin—to the foundation of trinitarian life. The same can be seen in the other two texts of the same conference in which the Liebesgemeinschaft appears: the community of love needs to be rescued and restored in its dignity by the Trinity:
“The consequence of the Fall for the woman is the fatigue of giving birth (die Mühsal des Gebärens), and for the man, the struggle for existence (Daseinskampfes). In addition, there comes as punishment for the woman the subjugation under the man’s lordship. That he will not be a good lord (Herr) is indicated by his attempt to shift (abzuwälzen) the responsibility for sin from himself to the woman. The pure (ungetrübte) community of love (Liebesgemeinschaft) is abrogated”.
“The calling (Berufung) of man and woman is not precisely the same according to the original order, the order of fallen nature, and the order of redemption. Initially, both were given together: preserving their likeness to God (Gottähnlichkeit), the lordship over the earth, and the reproduction of the human race. A supremacy of man, which seems to be expressed in his earliest temporal creation, has not yet been deepened in detail (näher erläutert). After their Fall, the relationship between them is converted from a pure community of love (Liebesgemeinschaft) into a relationship of domination and subordination (Herrschafts- und Unterordnungsverhältnis) and denatured (entstellt) by concupiscence”.
(3)
The conference Christliches Frauenleben (1932) was given to the Catholic Women’s Organization in Zurich over four days. Stein delves into the various aspects that are revealed as part of her constant concerns, namely “the feminine soul”, “the formation of women”, “feminine activity”, and, finally, where the following text will be framed, the “life of women in the light of eternity”:
“Perhaps from here, one can access the mysterious fact (geheimnisvollen Tatsache) that God did not call women to the priesthood (Priestertum). On the one hand, it can be interpreted as punishment (Strafe) since the first rebellion against the divine will was effected by a woman. However, on the other hand, it can be seen as special merit of grace that the Lord never wants the bride consecrated to Him to leave his side, that all power in his kingdom comes to her through loving union (liebenden Vereinigung) with Him, [and] should not be reciprocated through the transmission of power: a reflection of that most intimate community of love (innigsten Liebesgemeinschaft) which He has ever contracted with a person (die er je mit einem Menschen eingegangen), [is] the union with the Mother of God”.
Although the text is critical of women’s experience within the Church, Stein suggests that the role of the Liebesgemeinschaft is to reveal the universal and creative dimension of the community of love. It cannot be conceived simply as an image or symbol of God’s union with his Creation. It is a concrete experience because, from such a community of love, it would be incumbent upon lovers to enjoy the full might of their common kingdom equally.
(4)
Lastly, two quotations are shown in the conference Aufgabe der Frau als Führerin der Jugend zur Kirche (1932). In these, an ecclesiological reflection is presented once again, but this time more sharply:
“The earliest access to human understanding is the conception (Auffassung) of the Church as a community of believers. He who believes in Christ and his Gospel expects the fulfillment of his promises, clings to him in love, and keeps his commandments; he must, with all those who are of the same mind, unite in the most profound community of conviction and community of love (tiefste Gesinnungs- und Liebesgemeinschaft verbinden)”.
In this first passage, the author understands that the Church, as the great community of love centered on Christ, not only generates life from shared and lived love but, with faith and hope in the establishment of the definitive Kingdom of God, contributes as a small shoot (junge Reis) to maintain this unity in an imperishable way. Waiting is active and dynamic, and passivity is far from passive in those who love, especially if they love the One who gathers all creation to Himself.
In this conference, the Liebesgemeinschaft initiates the community in the awareness of the effect of freedom lived in the relationship: it is the cooperation and responsibility that derive as an ontological imperative from love, and it is not reduced to the believing practice but calls for the concrete action of the duty to be—through morality and ethics—of the living of the self in community. Husserl expressed something similar: “The real I loves (Das echte Ich liebt), is lovingly devoted to its real goal, and its concern is a loving concern. Real life is indeed life in the Love (Leben in der Liebe). So that completely synonymous is called ‘life in the absolute should’ (Leben in dem absoluten Sollen)”.26
Christ’s being manifests that we constitute a living body; therefore, there can be no staticity, bias, or exclusion, much less exclusivity, because the Holy Spirit directs it. A Spirit that gives himself and keeps us open to the multiple possibilities of love.
The second text that makes use of the concept of Liebesgemeinschaft in that lecture continues to do so from an ecclesiological line of argumentation:
“Eve’s proceeding (Hervorgehen) from the side of the first Adam is interpreted as a model of the emergence (Hervorgehens) of the new Eves—among them Mary first, but then the whole Church—from the open side of the new Adam. The woman who is in a truly Christian marriage, that is, in an indissoluble community of life and community of love (Lebens- und Liebesgemeinschaft) with which the spouses are united, represents (darstellen) for the Church, the Bride of God (Gottesbraut)”.
Unlike the lecture Beruf des Mannes und der Frau nach Natur- und Gnadenordnung (point 2), Stein leaps. She moves from the description of the union between man and woman, Adam and Eve, under the images of the marital bond to the explanation of how starting from Christ, the new Adam, the Virgin Mary and the entire ecclesial community become renewed figures of a woman and present themselves as brides of God.27 There is an even higher insinuation that the bride and groom have not yet consummated the marriage covenant, although they already mutually promised each other for the betrothal. The tension of the promise reveals the aspiration and intentionality present in each lover for contact with the beloved and their community, so that the community of love grounded in God is manifested under the eschatological character of the spousal in which we all participate. As Stein explains, becoming can only aspire to28. The fullness of something constitutes the goal of this tendency, which allows each creature to orient itself toward its perfection (Stein 2013a, p. 273).
With the data offered, the difference between Husserl and Stein regarding the use of Liebesgemeinschaft is also confirmed, even if it may have impacted the author’s evaluation of the moral and ethical categorical imperative of the idea of community. At the same time, it is recognized that having its roots in love, the Liebesgemeinschaft is conferred an ontological-practical value, which Husserl affirms as “a revealing element of individuality […] and […] of its founding character of the community” (Crespo 2012, p. 16). However, this was not enough for Stein. This is visibly expressed in chapter VII of the “Image of the Trinity in Creation” in Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936). This chapter is one of the most beautiful in the synthesis of her thought:
“The closest approximation to this pure love, which is God, in the creaturely realm is the surrender (Hingabe) of finite persons to God. It is true that no finite spirit (endlicher Geist) can completely embrace the divine Spirit. But God—and He alone—completely encompasses every created spirit: whoever surrenders himself to Him attains in loving union with Him the highest perfection of being (Seinsvollendung) in that love, which is simultaneously knowledge, the devotion of the heart (Herzenshingabe) and free action”.
The passage offers a couple of keys concerning Liebesgemeinschaft: First, one cannot reach, understand, or surrender to God if one is alone. Surrender is in relation because God—Person—is someone and not something that can be grasped or received without considering the free action of his will to give himself and the human freedom to receive him. Moreover, God Himself has revealed Himself as Triune and Community between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, nothing can be claimed about Him without the mediation of another or the absolutely Other Himself. In other words, the community is inescapable on the way to God. If not from the God-Trine-Community, He reveals Himself through the human community or with the support of the angelic community, and even if He does so from nature, He does so from the contemplation of the whole of created beauty.
On the other hand, being capax Dei only speaks of the original capacity of the human being to embrace eternity and God’s divinity. However, it does not resolve the question of how to do it. The trinitarian dynamic expresses the answer in his love’s unfathomability. Thus, when the author states that no finite spirit can fully embrace or embrace God, she means it cannot do so without freely and voluntarily surrendering itself in loving union with Him.29 Therefore, love elevates the whole human being: in his knowledge—reason—and in his devotion of the heart—and all that it represents, such as sensibility, passions, and non-formal knowledge—transforming the free action of the person into liberation.
It is vital to highlight the expressions endlicher Geist and göttlicher Geist used by Stein. She does not speak directly of creatures or persons, but specifically of spirits: finite spirit, to refer to the human person, and divine Spirit, to speak of God. In this way, the relevance and substance of the spiritual dimension as the foundation of the relationship of all creation with its Creator is declared.30

6. Summary and Closure

I will follow Edith Stein’s expression: “Love in its highest realization is to be one in free mutual self-giving: That is the divine intra-trinitarian life” (Stein 2013b, pp. 147–48). For Stein, how the free person experiences freedom is in a trinitarian way; therefore, if the human being does not open himself to the world of possibilities arranged by the Infinite Spirit, if he has not unfolded his freedom, he will not be able to experience it properly in a divine way.
The author does not present a guide of processes or steps to unfold freedom because each experience is unique and requires its realization according to what each person must become, but this must start from the awareness of one’s spiritual nature, which contains at its base the Steinian assertion of Ich kann, that is, from the I can do to the I can become for others and for transcendence, and thus be liberated (Befreitheit) by grace.
In the Steinian corpus, this idea of human freedom as an experience in relation has been confirmed. What is proper to an experience in a trinitarian way is the relationship as a dynamic of openness in love enabled by the Infinite Spirit. In this relation, each human person, in the image of the divine persons, can progress in love, which makes it possible to build bridges of dialogue, humanization, and divinization among us with God and all his creations.
Love is the first act of participation of the human being in the Triune life of God, which Stein identified as the archetype of human life. With this, the author also gives room to non-believers, allowing them to participate in the divine community manifested in the human community of the Mystical Body of Christ. In this sense, for Stein, charity is the universal path that precedes the analogia entis31 and is the antecedent for recognizing oneself as a son or daughter and the image of God.32
In this global view of the human being, we find an optimistic anthropology expressed in Edith Stein’s thought. She is aware that we have been created for God, to love and for all, for the present and eternity, and being image already contains the potentialities to become truly image and sons in the Son, and thus to unfold our freedom as personal self-configuration.
In short, both intentionality and love demand a profound understanding of the life of the finite and Infinite spirit. Particularly about the Infinite Spirit, God’s Gift reveals itself as the Person of Love who creates and recreates the indelible bonds that unite God and us to each other. Human freedom will be achieved in relation and openness due to the personal and spiritual character of the soul.

Funding

This research was funded by Advanced Human Capital Formation Program of the National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research of the Government of Chile. Grant number 21160960.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1
I have translated all the quotations from the Steinian corpus.
2
To deepen in the steinian anthropology and its links with phenomenology, it is suggested the work of (Wulf 2005) and (Pezzella 2003).
3
The answer she provides in the same text is: “Personal spirituality means to be awake and open (Wachheit und Aufgeschlossenheit) […] Knowledge of oneself is openness to the inside, knowledge of others is openness to the outside. So much for the first interpretation of spirituality” (Stein 2010b, p. 78). When Stein refers to awakening and openness, she proposes that the meaning of spirituality (Geistigkeit) is to lead the person to an interiority that allows him to awaken his conscience and open up to the inner and outer world.
4
“Was besagt Freiheit? Es besagt dasselbe wie das: Ich kann. Als waches, geistiges Ich schaue ich in eine Welt von Dingen hinein; aber sie zwingt sich mir nicht einfach auf: Die Dinge fordern mich auf, ihnen nachzugehen, sie von verschiedenen Seiten zu betrachten, in sie einzudringen”.
5
Hua XIX/1, §1. See also: (Bewußtsein 2004, p. 80).
6
On her side, “Stein, with many philosophers, nuances the scope of freedom. By his freedom man can rise above all his «natural» being. By his free act «he rises» from a lower to a higher attitude, he departs from a clumsy-mode-of-being akin to the animals and ascends to a free-mode-of-being” (Redmond 2007, p. 110).
7
For the philosopher, the starting point is necessarily the self. Both self-awareness and self-knowledge are necessary exercises of the human soul, which mediates through its spiritual dimension, opening the person to others and to God.
8
In contrast to the human soul, Stein says: “It seems to me that unconsciousness (Unbewußtheit) is a characteristic that belongs essentially (wesenhaft) [to the plant]”. For the vegetative soul lacks “that in which we usually see what is most proper to the soul as such: an inner openness (eine innere Aufgeschlossenheit)”, an openness proper to the human soul. Both quotations, taken from (Stein 2010b, p. 41).
9
For example, Einführung in die Philosophie (1917–1920), cf. (Stein 2010c, pp. 144–46); Individuum und Gemeinschaft (1918–1919), cf. (Stein 2010a, pp. 191, 193, 196); Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932–1933), cf. (Stein 2010b, pp. 101, 104); Chapter VII of Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), cf. (Stein 2013a, p. 357); the appendix of Die Seelenburg in Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), cf. (Stein 2013a, p. 525).
10
By unity of experience “is meant a common totality, which is built up in the conscious life of the I, which is built up over time, and which is «concretized» in this time. Whether it is a free action or an involuntary event, what kind of experiential content (Erlebnisgehalt) is involved, is of no importance” (Stein 2013a, pp. 47–48).
11
Also in (Stein 2005a, pp. 87–88): “[…] the particularity (Eigentümlichkeit) of spiritual acts, from which a new being emerges, is Analogon of the divine creative power (göttliche Schöpfermacht); the particularity of those acts, which in a specific sense bear the name of «acts,» «free» (freien) acts or «willing» (willentlich) acts, is Analogon of the divine freedom”.
12
The term common-unity does not appear in Stein’s work. Still, it will be used to analogize the experience of the communion of the mystical body of Christ with the idea of community that appears in Stein (which is based on this Body).
13
Stein quotes Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio, q.4, §6, from Duns Scoto, cf. (Stein 2013a, p. 355, quote 85).
14
Stein refers to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part Ia, a. 1, resp., q. 37. And “Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost”, also in Summa Theologica, Part Ia, a. 2, resp., q. 38.
15
The second sign is: Ut omnes unum sint in Deo; and the third: Fiat voluntas tua!, cf. (Stein 2014b, p. 9).
16
In her Schulheft (1935) she writes about it, cf. (Stein 2015b, pp. 19–20). Then, in Endliches und ewiges Sein (1935–1936), cf. (Stein 2013a, pp. 355, 375–376, 382).
17
We refer only to the parents since the biblical passage does not speak of children until “the man knew his wife Eve” in Gen 4:1, at which time they had already been expelled from the Garden of Eden.
18
The term is found in four of her conferences. Also appears in Dietrich von Hildebrand’s recension on Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft and within her spiritual writings as part of the publication of the celebration of the golden jubilee celebration of Sister Maria Theresia Freystätter’s profession (21 July 1940), which Stein translated from Latin.
19
Cf. Hua XIV, 172 and (Crespo 2012, pp. 15–32).
20
Cf. Husserl’s unpublished manuscript of series E, recovered from (Crespo 2012), 16: “Liebe im echten Sinn ist eines der Hauptprobleme der Phänomenologie, und das nicht in der abstrakten Einzelheit und Vereinzelung, sondern als Universalproblem. Nach den intentionalen Elementarquellen und nach ihren enthüllten Formen der von den Tiefen zu den Höhen und universalen Weiten hervortreibenden und sich auswirkenden Intentionalität (Ms. E III 2/36b)”.
21
Reference can also be made to its variants: κοινóς, (in) common; κοινóω, call common; κοινωνέω, share, take part, participate, give a share; κοινωνικός, generous and κοινωνός, partner, sharer (cf. «κοινωνία» in Aland et al. 1993, pp. 101–2).
22
Unless it is used in another context (socio-cultural, political, etc.), for example, the definition of community used by Stein in her lecture Die theoretischen Grundlagen der sozialen Bildungsarbeit (1930): “The community is a body with several members, and the diversity of individualities (Mannigfaltigkeit der Individualitäten) corresponds to the diversity of functions in the great body” (Stein 2001, pp. 24–25).
23
“The Greek Fathers refer to it as anakefalaiosis and theosis and insist that they did not refer to it as the dissolution of our finitude as concrete individuals in the divine infinity” (Noemi 2012, pp. 170–71).
24
Stein examines the texts of 1 Cor 11:3–16; 1 Cor 7:14–16; Eph 5:22–33; 1 Tim 2:9–15; Gal 3:24ff.
25
“The first word in the Holy Scriptures that deals with the human being assigns a common vocation to man and woman. Gen 1:26–29: «Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness […]». Thus, immediately in the first account of the creation of the human being, the differentiation between male and female is mentioned. But both have a triple task in common: to be the living image of God (Gottes Ebenbild), to have offspring, and to rule (beherrschen) the earth. It is not said here that this threefold task is to be performed by each in a different way […]” (Stein 2015a, p. 58).
26
Cf. Ms A V 21/90ª. German text from (Crespo 2012, p. 23).
27
Stein uses the term Gottesbraut (bride of God).
28
The concept of aspiration is not used regarding the relationships within the Trinity, which also manifests a theological awareness from the author, who recognizes in the trinitarian life an extraordinary and particular experience that corresponds only to God.
29
It would be different to understand embracing (umfassen) as containing (enthalten) God in his infinity from human finitude, which is not the case.
30
This idea could be close to the Plotinian notion, where One and Pneuma are coincident, the same, which is God, as absolutely transcendent.
31
In the sense of the great Aristotelian fundamental law: “In the realm of being and the transcendentals, the real precedes the possible” (Przywara 2013, p. 180. Aristotheles is quoted here, Metafísica IX 8 1049 B 9–10).
32
Stein finds in the trinitarian relationship ad intra and ad extra the foundation of the imago Dei.

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Bello, H. Freedom, Intentionality, and Trinitarian Love in Edith Stein’s Thought—The Need for a Phenomenology–Theology Dialogue to Have a Deeper Understanding of It. Religions 2023, 14, 1377. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111377

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Bello H. Freedom, Intentionality, and Trinitarian Love in Edith Stein’s Thought—The Need for a Phenomenology–Theology Dialogue to Have a Deeper Understanding of It. Religions. 2023; 14(11):1377. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111377

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Bello, Haddy. 2023. "Freedom, Intentionality, and Trinitarian Love in Edith Stein’s Thought—The Need for a Phenomenology–Theology Dialogue to Have a Deeper Understanding of It" Religions 14, no. 11: 1377. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111377

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