Immigration Ethics: Sacred and Secular
Abstract
:1. On Immigration Restrictions and Defensive Harm
1.1. Consent-Based Justifications for Defensive Harm to Migrants
1.2. Liability Justifications for Defensive Harm to Migrants
1.2.1. Liability and Respect for the Law
1.2.2. Liability and Economic Harms
1.2.3. Liability and Freedom of Association
Freedom of association is widely seen as one of those basic freedoms which is fundamental to a genuinely free society. With the freedom to associate, however, there comes the freedom to refuse association. When a group of people get together to form an association of some kind (e.g., a religious association, a trade union, a sports club), they will frequently wish to exclude some people from joining their association. What makes it their association, serving their purposes, is that they can exercise this “right to exclude”.
1.2.4. Liability and Harm to Social Services
1.2.5. Liability and Preservation of Culture
1.2.6. Liability and Property Rights
1.3. Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harm to Migrants
1.3.1. Lesser Evils, Migration, and Crime
1.3.2. Lesser Evils and Catastrophe
2. God and Migrants
2.1. Migration and Respect for the Law
2.2. Migration and Economic Harm
2.3. Migration and Freedom of Association
2.4. Migration and Costs to Social Services
2.5. Migration and Preservation of Culture
2.6. Migration and Private Property
2.7. Lesser Evils, Migration, Crime, and Catastrophe
3. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | We also suspect that the usual arguments in defense of harm to migrants in service of border control fail given the background metaphysic presupposed by Islam and other of the world’s great religious traditions, but we are less sure about that. |
2 | It is not quite right that the harms of immigration enforcement are aimed just at defense of the interests of citizens; they are likewise aimed at defense of the interests of legal residents and visitors. We will talk going forward about citizens and their interests, but let it be understood that we have this wider group in mind. |
3 | |
4 | Talk of moral liability to harm originates with McMahan (2005, p. 386) and has since become a central concept in philosophical discussions of self-defense, punishment, and other harm-imposing practices. While there is some divergence in the way different theorists use the term ‘liability’, many use it to contrast liability with consent, as we have done here. See, for example, Tadros (2016, p. 113). |
5 | The idea that lesser evil considerations can make it permissible to infringe a right is accepted by most contemporary non-consequentialist moral theorists. See, for example, Thomson (1986), Kamm (2007, pp. 239–40), McMahan (2009, pp. 170–78), Rodin (2011, 2017, p. 30), Bazargan (2014), Quong (2015, pp. 252–57), and Frowe (2018). |
6 | Some hold that it is rights infringement rather than violation that is important, but we will ignore this complication for present purposes. |
7 | Most theorists agree that a person is liable to defensive harm only if they pose a threat to someone’s rights (or are responsible for making it reasonable for someone to believe they pose such a threat). Some theorists—most notably Thomson (1991, p. 302)—have argued that the threat of a rights-infringement is also sufficient for liability. But many theorists disagree. Some claim that an attacker must be responsible for his threat (Draper (1993, p. 84; 2016, chp. 4), Gordon-Solmon (2018, pp. 543–67), McMahan (2005, pp. 394–404; 2009, pp. 157–58, 175–77; 2011, p. 548), Otsuka (1994, 2016)). Some claim that an attacker must be culpable or blameworthy for his threat (Ferzan 2005, pp. 733–39; 2012, pp. 669–97). Some claim that an attacker must act on false assumptions about their target’s moral status (Quong 2020, pp. 34–57). |
8 | This opinion is also shared by theorists. The proportionality constraint—sometimes called the “narrow proportionality constraint” (McMahan (2009, pp. 22–24)—is one of the most widely accepted limits on defensive harm in the literature. |
9 | |
10 | According to Borjas and Katz (2007, p. 49), Mexican immigration from 1980 to 2000 reduced native U.S., high-school-drop-out wages by a little less than 5%. |
11 | For an authoritative overview, see Blau and Mackie (2017). Aside from the large fiscal contributions of migrants to U.S. public finances described below, migrants contribute an enormous amount to annual U.S. GDP: about USD 2 trillion in 2016 (Blau and Mackie 2017, p. 282). |
12 | A first-generation immigrant, for purposes of Blau and Mackie’s study, is any foreign-born person residing—authorizedly or not—in the U.S. (excluding those born abroad to U.S. citizens). The net present value of an immigrant, for purposes of their study, is the net value of all future costs imposed on social services by that immigrant and their children (and their children, their children, etc.) and all future tax payments from that immigrant (their children, etc.), discounted to the present by some standard interest rate. |
13 | For an excellent overview, see Caplan and Weinersmith (2019). |
14 | |
15 | |
16 | There are deep and interesting complications regarding questions about “liability aggregation”—questions concerning when and whether an individual who poses little threat on his own can be liable to significant defensive harm in virtue of his membership in a collective that poses great harm in the aggregate. We lack the space to engage these questions in the present paper. |
17 | Cf. Feinberg (1978, p. 102). |
18 | |
19 | A couple comments. First, the picture we will adumbrate here—which is heavily indebted to John Dominic Crossan (2011)—is, so we claim, the background metaphysic at the heart of Judaism and Christianity. But of course, there is no single religious tradition which is Judaism and no single religious tradition which is Christianity: there are many Judaisms and many Christianities. We do not mean to suggest that the background metaphysic we develop here is endorsed by all Judaisms and all Christianities. We do hold, though, that the background metaphysic and accompanying moral vision we will set out is that of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament and is at the heart of those forms of Judaism and Christianity that share the background metaphysic and moral vision of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. It is those traditions we mean to speak about in this paper; it is those traditions we have in mind by our talk of “Judaism” and “Christianity.” Adherents of those traditions, we say, should endorse an ethics of nearly open borders. Second, though we hold that the picture developed here is endorsed by the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, we lack the space to make the case here; arguing as much would be a big undertaking. Jesus’s use of ‘Abba’ language in reference to God, his teaching around the love neighbor commandment (the commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself), Paul’s suggestion in Acts (17:28–29) that we are all God’s children or offspring, language throughout Hebrew scripture like Malachi’s “Do we not all have one father? Did not one God create us?” (Malachi 2:10), God’s claim in Leviticus 25:23 that the land belongs to God and that its inhabitants are mere tenants: such are some of the data we would appeal to. For a more detailed argument, see Crossan (2011). |
20 | Such, we would say, is the import of Jesus’s Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37). |
21 | Some might object that, though the New Testament uses kinship language to refer to fellow Christ followers, it does not deploy that language to refer to humans more broadly. So too Hebrew scripture, where kinship language applies to fellow Jews but not to humans more broadly. In reply, we grant that kinship language in Hebrew and Christian scripture typically applies—biological family contexts aside—to, respectively, fellow Jews and Christians, but we would point out that there are cases in both Hebrew and Christian scripture where kinship language applies more broadly to fellow humans: e.g., Malachi 2:10 and Acts 17:28–29. Use of kinship language aside, we think a strong case can be made that the idea of kinship is central to the moral vision of both Hebrew and Christian scripture: it is the teaching of both scriptures that humans are to treat one another with the type of care owed to siblings and other members of one’s household. |
22 | We note, though, that there may well be situations in which it is permissible to deploy substantial defensive harm against a sibling or other household member for reasons other than protection of property. Were your sibling attacking your child, serious harm may well be warranted. |
23 | Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us on this. |
24 | Kind thanks to Paul Reasoner, Charles Taliaferro, Lee Weissman, and several anonymous referees for helpful comments and conversation. |
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Clark, D.J.; Crisp, T.M. Immigration Ethics: Sacred and Secular. Religions 2023, 14, 1. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010001
Clark DJ, Crisp TM. Immigration Ethics: Sacred and Secular. Religions. 2023; 14(1):1. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010001
Chicago/Turabian StyleClark, David J., and Thomas M. Crisp. 2023. "Immigration Ethics: Sacred and Secular" Religions 14, no. 1: 1. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010001