Development of a Multi-Asset Risk Assessment Algorithm in the Context of Home Energy Management
1.2. Asset Management & Risk Analysis
1.3. Risk Management
2. Materials and Methods
- Scenario Generation: Depending on the parameters inserted by the user, the risk scenario is generated;
- Scenario Simulation: The scenario generated in the previous step is simulated considering the potential countermeasures and the cascading effect (i.e., the threat propagation and generation of the related impacts) and results in the possible outcomes;
- Likelihood Calculation: Following the outcome derivation, the corresponding likelihood is computed, starting from the probabilities of the triggering events;
- Impact calculation: The effect of each outcome is calculated in monetary terms, taking into account any related physical damage, out of service condition or revenue loss. In addition, potential injuries may be considered.
2.1. Topology Structure
2.2. Cascade Effect
- Not Mitigated.
- List of examined areas () in the building ;
- List of all possible threats ;
- The economic value of each area, denoted by ;
- The three levels of magnitude , which represents the intensity of a threat;
- The probability of a certain threat with a certain magnitude.
2.4. Scenario Generation and Likelihood Calculation
2.5. Scenario Simulation
- Prevented: within this outcome, the impact is prevented, and the propagation stops. In this case, no risk analysis is carried out, since the impact has no longer an effect on the target.
- Defused: an impact is defused when the countermeasures are effective in not letting it generate any damage. The defusion efficiency score of a countermeasure can be modelled as an effect that stops the propagation of the threat and sets the risk of the outcome to zero.
- Mitigated: in this situation, the impact happens but its effects are mitigated by the countermeasures applied. The mitigation efficiency score of a countermeasure can be modelled by a coefficient that reduces the probability of the occurrence of an outcome. The outcome probability in this case depends on the level of magnitude of the threat/impact.The probability of an outcome with low magnitude is:The probability of an outcome with medium magnitude is:The probability of an outcome with high magnitude is:
- Not Mitigated: when an impact is not mitigated it means that the countermeasures applied have no effect or that there are no countermeasures applied to the targeted element. In this case, the efficiency score is not computed and the probability of this outcome equals that of the scenario itself. Since one of the main features is the cascade effect, the outcomes that are mitigated or not mitigated can propagate to the connected elements of the model infrastructure generating new impacts. In order to propagate the impact and generate consequent impacts, a specific mapping is required for the risk algorithm (Figure 5).
- For a threat onto a target, the algorithm checks if the corresponding impact affects the target type.
- If yes, countermeasures (if available) are applied and the risk on the target is evaluated.
- The algorithm checks if the target holds any children.
- If yes, it verifies if the child’s target type is affected by the impact.
- If yes, countermeasures (if available) are applied and the risk on the child target is evaluated.
- Steps 4 and 5 are performed for all the target’s children.
- Steps 1 to 6 imply that the graph structure of the asset is explored following a depth first search logic.
- When any child is reached, the algorithm verifies if the current impact has any secondary impact that may affect the target type of the current child.
- If yes, countermeasures (if available) for all secondary impacts are applied and the risk to the current child is evaluated.
2.6. Countermeasures Application
- Preventing the impact: The prevention rate of the countermeasure is the probability that the countermeasure prevents the impact.
- Detecting the impact: The detection rate is the probability to detect the impact.
- Defusing the impact: The defusion rate represents the probability to defuse the impact.
- Mitigating the impact: The mitigation rate represents the probability to mitigate the impact.
- The effect rates of the countermeasure in regard to its four properties, i.e., prevention rate, detection rate, defusion rate, and mitigation rate—both individually and as correlated effect rate.
- Economic reference value for the asset operations: Single value, e.g., EUR 10,000 for the target (independent house) and its operations.
- The percentage of damage in the asset resulting of each impact.
2.7. Cost Calculation
- Percentage of physical damage of the target;
- Average hours of service interruption;
- Expected economic losses due to physical damage;
- Expected economic losses due to interruption of service.
2.7.1. Physical Damage Computation
2.7.2. Service Interruption Estimation
2.7.3. Risk Computation
3. Case Study
3.1. Topology Structure and Configuration
- Parent—Higher level entities
- Child—Entity related to parent entity.
- The root node is an asset named “independent house” which has six children:
- Roof, whose target type is “Area”.
- Garden, whose target type is “Area”.
- First Floor, whose target type is “Area”.
- Second Floor, whose target type is “Area”.
- Energy Storage, whose target type is “ Photovoltaic System “.
- Main Power Line, whose target type is “Device”.
- The first floor has, in turn, two children:
- Kitchen, whose target type is “Sub-Area”.
- Dining Room, whose target type is “Sub-Area”.
- The second floor has also two children:
- Master bedroom, whose target type is “Sub-Area”.
- Guest bedroom, whose target type is “Sub-Area”.
- The roof has one child:
- PV System, whose target type is “Photovoltaic System”.
- The kitchen has two children which represent two appliances:
- Washer, whose target type is “Electronic Device”.
- Fridge, whose target type is “Electronic Device”.
- The dining room has also two children:
- Dining HVAC, whose target type is “Electronic Device”.
- Dining TV, whose target type is “ Electronic Device”.
- Finally, the guest bedroom has a single child:
- Guest Bedroom HVAC, whose target type is “Electronic Device”.
3.2. Threats and Impacts
- Threat: An action or event that may cause danger, damage or any other unexpected behavior. Any threat has at least one impact.
- Impact: The effects and consequences of a threat on a given target type.
- For the target type “electronic device”, the threat “device obsolescence” may give rise to the impact “temporary malfunction”.
- For the target type “photovoltaic system”, the threat “PV system malfunction may produce the impact “low production”.
3.3. Risk Computation
3.3.1. User Interface
- The number of cascade appliances involved in the threat;
- The risk value (or cost)in EUR/year;
- The countermeasure installed against the threat;
- The detailed card of the devices involved;
- The probability (likelihood) value corresponding to the diverse threats;
- The device scenario presented with its corresponding impacts in euros;
- An indication of the most common action to avoid the specific threat;
- Use Case 1: Threat “PV system fault” on the target type “photovoltaic system”. The impact of this threat on the target type is “low production”. The input of the relevant information in the corresponding fields of the application returns as results:
There is only one target of type “photovoltaic system” in the “independent building” model. Furthermore, the impact “low production” may have secondary impacts related to it, namely “power supply interruption” and “discomfort”. These secondary impacts are taken into account in the risk computation.
- The risk average is low.
- Use Case 2: Threat “device obsolescence” on the target “dining room HVAC”; this target has type “electronic device”. The input of the relevant information in the corresponding fields of the application returns as results:
The impact of this threat on the target type “electronic device” is “temporary malfunction”. The impact “temporary malfunction” may have a “discomfort” impact as a secondary impact.
- The risk average is low.
- Use Case 3: Threat “power loss” on the root target “independent house”; whereas the threat “power supply interruption” has impact “power loss”. The input of the relevant information in the corresponding fields of the application returns as results:
- The target has six principal systems as children;
- A breakdown of risk level/probability/related threats per child;
- The risk average is low;
- A list of potential countermeasures that can be deployed.
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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|Impacts||Severity (1 to 10)||Threats||Probability|
|Power Supply Interruption||3||Power loss||0.049315068|
|Overconsumption||5||Energy demand overload, malfunction, heater involved, old device, no maintenance||0.136986301|
|Overvoltage||5||Energy demand overload, malfunction, heater involved, old device, no maintenance||0.041095890|
|Unplanned Maintenance||8||Malfunction due to improper use of appliances||0.071232877|
|Ordinary Maintenance||3||Servicing, cleaning, malfunction, filters substitution||0.032876712|
|Time Synchronization Error||6||NTP connection failure||0.002739726|
|Device Failure||10||Hardware/firmware failure||0.000547945|
|Application Error||9||Loss of internet connection||0.016438356|
|Bad Performance||8||Heater, fluid lacking, weather conditions, sediment buildup from weather residue||0.093150685|
|Battery Damage||6||Electrical/Mechanical/Chemical malfunctioning can damage the battery health||0.002739726|
|Repair||5||Diverse incidents can cause the need for repairs||0.001369863|
|Vandalism/Theft||10||Acts of vandalism can damage or destroy infrastructure||0.001369863|
|Cyber Attack||10||High interconnectivity is a gap that can lead to increase in cyber vulnerabilities (malicious attacks, system outages, bugs etc.)||0.001369863|
|Server Failure||6||The server in control of charging points can face problems such as intermittent lack of internet connection||0.002739726|
|Low Production||6||Uncleaned panels||0.093150685|
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Ottonello, D.; Fermi, A.; Ravizza, D.; Barbagelata, M.; Karatzas, S.; Chassiakos, A.; Papamanolis, A. Development of a Multi-Asset Risk Assessment Algorithm in the Context of Home Energy Management. Buildings 2023, 13, 428. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020428
Ottonello D, Fermi A, Ravizza D, Barbagelata M, Karatzas S, Chassiakos A, Papamanolis A. Development of a Multi-Asset Risk Assessment Algorithm in the Context of Home Energy Management. Buildings. 2023; 13(2):428. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020428Chicago/Turabian Style
Ottonello, Davide, Alessandro Fermi, Daniele Ravizza, Marco Barbagelata, Stylianos Karatzas, Athanasios Chassiakos, and Antonis Papamanolis. 2023. "Development of a Multi-Asset Risk Assessment Algorithm in the Context of Home Energy Management" Buildings 13, no. 2: 428. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020428