Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China

Abstract

(1) Background: In the construction of an ecological civilization in China, the forestry industry has special characteristics which can produce both ecological and economic benefits. Environmental information disclosure can help the construction of an ecological civilization system; the study of the environmental information disclosures of forestry listed companies can help the development of ecological civilization construction and is conducive to considering forestry as a pilot model and extending to other industries; (2) Methods and results: Based on evolutionary game theory and stakeholder theory, an evolutionary game model of listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public was applied with MATLAB software to simulate and analyze the influencing factors of the environmental information disclosures of listed forestry companies; (3) Suggestions: Optimization of the environmental information disclosure mechanism of forestry listed companies includes: optimization of the environmental information disclosure mechanism, the reward and punishment mechanism, the environmental information sharing mechanism, and the interest coordination mechanism.

1. Introduction

Sustainability science is a science that integrates natural, human, and social sciences and studies the dynamic relationship between nature and society, with the interrelationship between environment, economy, and society as its core, and aims to provide the theoretical basis and technical means for sustainable development. It is the integration of the economy, society, and the environment and their intrinsic link [1,2]. The International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF), formally released by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) in December 2013, advocates the integration of various independent and decentralized reporting models into integrated reports that provide stakeholders with a comprehensive disclosure of an organization’s strategy, governance, performance, and outlook in an external environment, explaining how the organization creates value in the short, medium, and long term [3,4]. With the prominence of globalized environmental problems, sustainable development has become a worldwide concern [5]. The Chinese government proposes the construction of an ecological civilization, the essence of which is sustainable development elevated to the height of green development. Forestry enterprises have special significance in the construction of an ecological civilization. The Chinese government continues to introduce strategic decisions, laws, and regulations regarding the environment in order to increase awareness of the importance of the environment. The Chinese government clearly stated “’Sustainable Development’ in the China Agenda 21—China’s White Paper on Population, Environment and Development in the 21st Century” in 1994 [6]. Subsequently, several major strategic goals related to the environment are proposed, such as “Ecological Civilization” (2007), “Give high priority to making ecological progress ” (2012), “Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” (2017) [7], and “We aim to have carbon dioxide emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060” (2021) [8], and so forth. Creating an ecological civilization is about the sustainable development of the Chinese nation, about building a community of shared futures for mankind, and a community for man and nature. It is both an inherent requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and an objective demand for the sustainable development of mankind. Forestry enterprises can produce both economic, ecological, and social benefits of enterprises that can also be distributed in primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. Forestry enterprises have industry specificity and have a special status in the construction of an ecological civilization [9,10].

Environmental information disclosure is part of sustainability reporting, and environmental information disclosure needs to reveal not only the treatment of environmental pollution but also the use of environmental resources [11]. Although China is a late starter in environmental information research and disclosure, it is actively assuming environmental responsibility with the cooperation of the state, society, and enterprises. The Chinese government has continuously promoted environmental information disclosure of listed companies, for example, “Guidelines for Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Companies” by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China in 2010 [12], “Cooperation agreement on jointly developing environmental information disclosure of listed companies” by Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China and China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2017 [13], “Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic of China” by Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China in 2018 [14], etc.

On the one hand, industry factors can affect the environmental information disclosure of enterprises [15]. Most of the existing studies are about environmental information disclosure by highly polluting enterprises [16], such as steel [17,18], coal, and paper industries, ignoring the special characteristics of the forestry industry. In China’s industry classification, forestry includes the paper industry, which pollutes the environment, and forest cultivation enterprises, which have ecological benefits for environmental protection [19]. Since forestry enterprises in China have unique ecological benefits compared to enterprises in other industries, forestry enterprises have a broader range of environmental responsibilities [20,21]. Therefore, the study of the environmental information disclosures of listed forestry companies is more representative and important for sustainable development. On the other hand, with the deepening concept of environmental protection and the rapid rise of new media [22], the public has become more diversified in the way they monitor environmental information disclosure, which in turn has increased the sense of public participation in environmental monitoring. In conclusion, the existing studies do not fully recognize the special characteristics of forestry, nor do they analyze the strategy of environmental information disclosure in the three dimensions of enterprise, government, and the public.

Based on the hotspots and frontiers of environmental information disclosure research, this study adopts a multi-disciplinary approach, multi-level and multi-perspective, to study the environmental accounting information disclosure mechanism of Chinese forestry listed companies oriented in the construction of an ecological civilization. This paper conducts evolutionary game simulation research from the perspective of the stakeholders of forestry listed companies, so that forestry listed companies can create economic benefits and safeguard ecological benefits at the same time and provides theoretical references for improving the environmental information disclosure system and the content of sustainable development reports.

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to discuss the pyrotechnic game among listed forestry companies, government regulators, and the public in the process of environmental information disclosure in China. By changing the values of relevant parameters and using MATLAB for policy research, the evolutionary trends of the three parties in the process of environmental information disclosure are found. Finally, suggestions are made based on the game results: (1) optimize the environmental information disclosure mechanism; (2) establish a reward and punishment mechanism; (3) build an environmental information sharing mechanism; and (4) create an interest coordination mechanism. Certain theoretical basis and improvement suggestions are introduced for the regulatory system of the environmental information disclosure of Chinese listed companies.

The innovation and contributions of this paper are mainly in the following aspects. First, we provide a methodology to analyze the environmental information disclosure stakeholder strategies in the sustainability reporting of listed forestry companies through an evolutionary game research approach to address article methodological heterogeneity. Second, China is an interesting research context for the subject with a special research significance in terms of the orientation of corporate behavior in the context of its national policy. Forestry is a state property right in China. However, there is no research on the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies in China with the evolutionary game as the research method. Finally, it helps to improve the environmental information disclosure mechanism of forestry listed companies and extend it to other industries. By analyzing the game behavior of the government, listed company, and public in the process of environmental information disclosure, as well as the factors that influence the game choice strategy, we can establish a mechanism for the environmental accounting information disclosure of listed forestry companies.

This study is relevant, professionally and scientifically, for the forestry industry and can highlight the characteristics of the forestry industry and the social and ecological benefits of forestry enterprises that are different from other enterprises. It can improve the development of the current environmental accounting information disclosure system of forestry enterprises. When other industries make an environmental accounting information disclosure framework, it is of great practical significance that they can use the environmental accounting information disclosure of the forestry industry as a reference and to provide examples for them.

This paper is divided into five chapters. Section 2 describes the relevant theoretical foundations and literature review to provide the basis for the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the logical relationships among the stakeholders of environmental information disclosure of the forestry listed companies. Section 4 describes the evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, and finally, in Section 5, suggestions for optimization of the environmental information disclosure mechanism in China are made.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Environmental Information Disclosure

International theories on environmental disclosure mainly focus on legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, institutional theory, voluntary disclosure theory, signaling theory, and other theories. The other theories include, for instance, power change theory, media agenda-setting theory, media richness theory, etc. [23]. The research on environmental information disclosure in China originated from 1992 when Jiashu Ge published “A New Wave of Western Accounting Theory in the 1990s—Green Accounting Theory”, which then gradually started the research on environmental information disclosures and related fields, such as sustainable reports, CSR reports, ESG reports, integrated reports, etc. At present, most of the research on the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies in China is focused on the research of disclosure content, disclosure methods, and influencing factors; it lacks the research of forming a system. The disclosure of environmental accounting information of listed forestry companies in China is not high, not uniform, and not comprehensive [24]. They need more qualitative descriptions and have too little quantitative information [25] and high self-interest [26]. Studies on the factors influencing the environment of listed forestry companies in China include: the size of the firm [27], the proportion of independent directors [28], and the heterogeneity of corporate executives [29], which are positively correlated; they are negatively correlated with firm performance, debt and financing needs, the shareholding of the largest shareholder, and political affiliation. The research on the environmental accounting disclosure of listed forestry companies in China is still under development. The research areas of environmental information disclosure are shown in

Table 1. Literature review on environmental information disclosure.

Research Direction	Main Points
Theory	Legitimacy theory [30],
	Stakeholder theory [31],
	Information asymmetry [32],
	Voluntary disclosure [33],
	Institutional theory [34], etc.
Environmental Information Sources	Integrated reporting [35,36],
	Sustainability reporting [37],
	CSR report [38],
	ESG report [39],
Factors influencing environmental information disclosure	Company Scale, etc.
	Internal factors: Industry sensitivity [31,40,41], financial performance [42], environmental performance [43], quality of environmental information disclosure [41], etc.
	External Factors: Political and corporate system [36,44], public opinion monitoring, media coverage [16], public environmental awareness [45], etc.

.

The research in the field of environmental information disclosure in China has changed from basic model research to deep research on information quality. The social responsibility of enterprises has been increasing, and heavy pollution industries have been constantly used as typical case studies. In the context of sustainable development, as the construction of China’s ecological civilization continues to deepen and the research on environmental information disclosure continues to deepen, it is not only the heavily polluting industries that need to make environmental information disclosures, but all industries should take corresponding social responsibility and make environmental information disclosures. Research on the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies has not received sufficient attention.

2.2. Evolutionary Games

Game theory is generally considered to have started with the introduction of the idea that “conflicts can be analyzed mathematically” in Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 book The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [46]. Evolutionary games were pioneered by M. Smith and R. Price and applied to several fields of study such as epidemiology [47,48], medicine [49], physics [50], environmental research [51,52], management [53,54,55], economics [53,56], and finance [57]. Evolutionary games are considered as the exchange and combination of neoclassical and evolutionary economics, reconciling the conflict between the research paradigms of evolutionary and equilibrium theories, and reflecting the absorption and acceptance of evolutionary economics by mainstream economics [58]. Compared with classical game theory, the evolutionary game is a kind of dynamic game which is based on the theory of biological evolution and takes finite rationality as the premise, replacing the individual participants in the game with a crowd of participants, and the decision maker achieves a stable equilibrium state through continuous trial and error, learning, imitation, and adjustment of strategies.

2.3. Environmental Information Disclosure and the Evolutionary Game

Research on the application of evolutionary game theory in the field of environmental information disclosure already exists. Firstly, an evolutionary game analysis has been conducted from the government and business perspectives. Jia Jingquan et al. constructed an evolutionary analysis of government environmental information regulators and company strategies and found that the steady state of government environmental information regulation is related to the cost of environmental information disclosure by companies, government environmental information disclosure regulation, and the intensity of penalties [59]. Benyue Zhang and Yan Jiao analyzed the game between government and enterprises on environmental accounting information disclosure and gave suggestions for government supervision [60]. Zhao Haiyan et al. studied the influences of enterprises, government, and environmental auditors on corporate environmental information disclosure through a dynamic game model under incomplete information [61]. Peng Xiaobing and Wang Xiaohe found that the lack of a punishment mechanism in the environmental information disclosure game leads to information asymmetry from the evolution of environmental public crisis [62]. Secondly, from the perspective of media monitoring, Kaize Zhang et al. simulated the evolutionary game of business and government to analyze the degree of influence of media monitoring on the strategy choice of government and business [22]. Qin Jun and Yuan Xiaosi applied the evolutionary game to study the relationship between listed companies and information regulators to derive the relationship between the cost of environmental information disclosure, the cost of violation, and the cost of government regulation [63]. Thirdly, evolutionary game study with three evolving subjects; Zeng Jia’s research was based on evolutionary game theory in the context of an environmental protection inspection and the problem of strategy choice among the three main parties: the central environmental protection inspector, the government, and listed companies in the polluting industry [64]. Wang Qiuyang constructs a three-party game model based on the stakeholder theory for listed companies, CPAs, and SEC, and gives three-party proposals [65].

Therefore, in the existing literature, the study of environmental information disclosure based on evolutionary game theory mainly focuses on enterprises and governments, while some studies include the media in the game subjects. Although there are articles based on stakeholder theory, they are different from this paper in terms of research dimensions. There is a lack of focus on the forestry industry in existing studies. This paper takes forestry listed companies as the research object, based on evolutionary game theory, and researches the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies from the stakeholder’s perspective and then introduces certain theoretical basis and improvement suggestions for the supervision system of environmental information disclosure of Chinese listed companies.

3. Game Model

3.1. The Logical Connection between the Subjects of Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Forestry Companies

Based on information asymmetry theory, there is information asymmetry among users of the disclosed environmental information of listed forestry companies, including shareholders, managers, creditors, the government, and the public [66]. In the process of the production and operation activities of listed forestry companies and economic interaction of stakeholders, there is an inequality of rights and obligations, i.e., the managers of listed companies, as information superior parties, fail to fulfill their obligation to disclose environmental accounting information to information inferior parties (such as investors, the government, and the public), thus causing stakeholders to be at a disadvantage in environmental accounting information and making inappropriate judgments due to information asymmetry, which in turn causes an imbalance of interests between listed companies and interested parties and ultimately damages the interests of stakeholders at the disadvantage of information. The logical relationship of stakeholders in environmental information disclosure is shown in Figure 1.

3.2. Model Assumptions

Hypothesis 1 (H1).

In the analysis of the evolutionary game in this paper, there are three participating subjects: forestry listed companies, government supervision departments, and the public. All three participating subjects are finite rational. The strategy choice space of the listed forestry companies is x = (high-quality disclosure, low-quality disclosure); the strategy choice space of the government supervision department is y = (mandatory, voluntary); and the strategy choice space of the social public is z = (supervision, no supervision).

Hypothesis 2 (H2).

The probability that listed forestry companies choose to disclose environmental information is x ∈ [0, 1] and the probability that they choose not to disclose environmental information is 1 − x; the probability that government departments choose to make mandatory disclosure of environmental information to listed forestry companies is y ∈ [0, 1] and the probability that they choose not to make mandatory disclosure of environmental information to listed forestry companies is 1 − y; and the probability of the public choosing to supervise the listed forestry companies is z ∈ [0, 1] and the probability of choosing not to supervise the listed forestry companies is 1 − z.

Hypothesis 3 (H3).

The cost of forestry listed companies in choosing high-quality environmental information disclosure is C_h, the cost of environmental management is C_e, the cost of disclosing low-quality environmental information disclosure is C_l, and C_h > C_l > 0; the benefit obtained by forestry listed companies in disclosing environmental information is G_e. When forestry listed companies make a high-quality environmental information disclosure, they will gain credibility A_h from the public; when forestry listed companies make low-quality environmental information disclosure, they will gain credibility Al from the public and A_h > A_l > 0. Generally, the public will not supervise the high-quality environmental information disclosure, but the public has high expectations and the social public will still supervise; the social public gains benefits E_s from the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies and the cost of social public supervision is C_s; the government gains benefits E_g from environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies.

Hypothesis 4 (H4).

The cost of mandatory disclosure of environmental information to listed forestry companies by government departments is C_g, and if listed forestry companies do not disclose or cannot meet the standard disclosure of environmental accounting information, the listed forestry companies will be punished by setting a fine amount of F_g, and the listed forestry companies that disclose environmental information with high quality will be rewarded with a reward amount of B_g.

Hypothesis 5 (H5).

If the government adopts voluntary management measures for the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies when the public supervises forestry listed companies, there will be information truthfulness problems in the supervision of the public on the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies due to the asymmetry of information. Let the probability of truthfulness in the supervision of the public on the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies be δ∈[0, 1] and the probability of falsehood is 1 − δ. The cost that government regulators need to pay to verify the truthfulness of social public supervision is C_v and the loss that listed forestry companies need to bear for the truthfulness of social public supervision is D_e, including loss of credibility and loss of social image.

Hypothesis 6 (H6).

When listed forestry companies do not violate the law and cause pollution to the environment, the cost that listed forestry companies need to bear is (1 − δ) D_e when public supervision lacks authenticity; meanwhile, the cost that government supervision departments need to pay for this is (1 − δ) C_v. When the listed forestry companies disclose low-quality environmental information and the public supervision has authenticity, the cost that the listed forestry companies need to bear is δD_e and the cost that the government supervisory department needs to bear is δC_v. The main parameter settings and their meanings are shown in

Table 2. Main parameter settings and their meanings.

Parameters	Significance
x	The proportion of listed forestry companies choosing high-quality environmental information disclosure
y	The proportion of governments choosing to mandate environmental accounting disclosure
z	The proportion of society choosing to monitor environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies
Ch	Costs of forestry listed companies in selecting high-quality environmental information disclosure
Ce	Costs of environmental management for listed forestry companies
Cl	Disclosure of the cost of choosing low-quality environmental information disclosure by listed forestry companies
Ge	Benefits obtained from the disclosure of environmental information by listed forestry companies
Ah	The credibility of listed forestry companies when high-quality environmental information is disclosed
Al	The credibility of listed forestry companies when low-quality environmental information is disclosed
Es	Benefits to the public
Eg	Government gains benefits
Cg	Costs of mandatory environmental information disclosure by government departments to listed forestry companies
Fg	Government fines for listed forestry companies that provide no or low-quality environmental information disclosure
Bg	Government incentive payments for listed forestry companies that actively engage in high-quality environmental information disclosure
Cv	The cost that government regulators need to pay to verify the authenticity of social public monitoring
CS	The cost of social public monitoring
De	Forestry listed companies need to bear the loss of public supervision of the authenticity of the community
δ	Probability of truthfulness of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies

.

3.3. Model Construction

Based on the above assumptions, this paper constructs a game matrix between listed forestry companies, the government, and the public, as shown in

Table 3. Game matrix of mixed strategies of forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public on environmental information disclosure.

Strategy Profile	Forestry Listed Companies, Government Regulators, The Public
(High-quality, Mandatory, Supervision)	(Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah + Bg, Eg − Cg − Bg, Es − Cs)
(High-quality, Mandatory, No Supervision)	(Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah + Bg, Eg − Cg − Bg, Es)
(High-quality, Voluntary, Supervision)	(Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah − (1 − δ)De, Eg − (1 − δ)Cv, Es − (1 − δ)Cs)
(High-quality, voluntary, No supervised)	(Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah, Eg, Es)
(Low-quality, Mandatory, Supervision)	(Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − Fg, Eg + Fg − Cg, Es − Cs)
(Low-quality, Mandatory, No Supervision)	(Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − Fg, Eg + Fg − Cg, Es)
(Low-quality, Voluntary, Supervision)	(Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − δDe, Eg − δCv, Es − δCs)
(Low-quality, Voluntary, No Supervision)	(Ge − Cl − Ce + Al, Eg, Es)

.

The mixed strategy game matrix among the three-game subjects in Table 3 can be obtained as follows:

The expected benefit of forestry listed companies when they choose a “high-quality” environmental information disclosure strategy is E₁, and the expression is

$$\begin{gathered} E_1=yz\left(G_e-C_h-C_e+A_h+B_g\right)+y\left(1-z\right)\left(G_e-C_h-C_e+A_h+B_g\right) \\ +\left(1-y\right)z\left(G_e-C_h-C_e+A_h-\left(1-\delta \right)D_e\right)+\left(1-y\right)\left(1-z\right)\left(G_e-C_h-C_e+A_h\right) \end{gathered}$$

(1)

The expected return for a listed forestry company choosing a “low-quality” environmental information disclosure strategy is E₂, expressed as

$$\begin{gathered} E_2=yz\left(G_e-C_l-C_e+A_l-F_g\right)+y\left(1-z\right)\left(G_e-C_l-C_e+A_l-F_g\right)+\left(1-y\right)z\left(G_e-C_l-C_e+A_l-\delta D_e\right) \\ +\left(1-y\right)\left(1-z\right)\left(G_e-C_l-C_e+A_l\right) \end{gathered}$$

(2)

The average expected value of forestry listed companies is $\overline{E_{e1}}$, the expression is

$$\overline{E_{e1}}=x{E}_1+\left(1-x\right)E_2$$

(3)

It follows that the replicated dynamic equation of replication for the probability of high-quality environmental information disclosure strategies for listed forestry companies is

$$Fx=\frac{dx}{dt}=x\left(E_1-\overline{E_e}\right)=x\left(1-x\right)\left(E_1-E_2\right)=x\left(1-x\right)\left[A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+y\left(B_g+F_g\right)+z\left(1-y\right)\left(2\delta -1\right)D_e\right]$$

(4)

The expected return when the government chooses a “mandatory“ strategy is E₃, which is expressed as

$$E_3=xz\left(E_g-C_g-B_g\right)+x\left(1-z\right)\left(E_g-C_g-B_g\right)+\left(1-x\right)z\left(E_g+F_g-C_g\right)+\left(1-x\right)\left(1-z\right)\left(E_g-C_g+F_g\right)$$

(5)

The expected return when the government chooses a “voluntary“ strategy is E₄, which is expressed as

$$E_4=xz\left[E_g-\left(1-\delta \right)C_v\right]+x\left(1-z\right)E_g+\left(1-x\right)z\left(E_g-\delta C_v\right)+\left(1-x\right)\left(1-z\right)E_g$$

(6)

The average expected value of government is $\overline{E_{e2}}$, the expression is

$$\overline{E_{e2}}=y{E}_3+\left(1-y\right)E_4$$

(7)

It follows that the replicated dynamic equation for the probability of the government’s mandatory strategy for environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies is

$$F\left(y\right)=\frac{dy}{dt}=y\left(E_3-\overline{E_{e2}}\right)=y\left(1-y\right)\left[F_g-C_g-x\left(B_g+F_g\right)+xz(1-2\delta )C_v+z\delta C_v\right]$$

(8)

The expected benefit to the public when they choose to monitor the environmental information disclosure strategy of listed forestry companies is E₅, and the expression is

$$E_5=xy\left(E_s-C_s\right)+x\left(1-y\right)\left[E_s-\left(1-\delta \right)C_S\right]+\left(1-x\right)y\left(E_s-C_s\right)+\left(1-x\right)\left(1-y\right)\left(E_s-\delta C_s\right)$$

(9)

The expected benefit to the public when they choose not to monitor the environmental information disclosure strategy of listed forestry companies is E₆, and the expression is

$$E_6=xy{E}_s+x\left(1-y\right)E_s+\left(1-x\right)y{E}_s+\left(1-x\right)\left(1-y\right)E_s$$

(10)

The average expected value of the social public is $\overline{E_{e3}}$, with the expression:

$$\overline{E_{e3}}=z{E}_5+\left(1-z\right)E_6$$

(11)

It follows that the replicated dynamic equation of replication for the probability of the public’s monitoring strategy for environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies is

$$F\left(z\right)=\frac{dz}{dt}=z\left(E_5-\overline{E_{e3}}\right)=z\left(1-z\right)\left[x\left(y-1\right)\left(1-\delta \right)C_s-\left(1-x\right)\left(1-y\right)\delta C_s-y{C}_s\right]$$

(12)

4. Model Analysis

4.1. Evolutionary Game Model Stability Analysis

4.1.1. Stabilization Strategies for the Probability of Choosing “High Quality” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategies for Listed Forestry Companies

According to the replication dynamic Equation (4) constructed above and the differential equation stability theorem and Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), it can be seen that the forestry listed company strategy in a stable state must meet: F(x) = 0 and F’(x) < 0. Thus, the derivation of Equation (4) yields

$$\frac{dF\left(x\right)}{dx}=\left(1-2x\right)\left[A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+\left(B_g+F_g\right)y+z\left(1-y\right)\left(2\delta -1\right)D_e\right]$$

(13)

Order:

$$M\left(z\right)=A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+\left(B_g+F_g\right)y+z\left(1-y\right)\left(2\delta -1\right)D_e$$

(14)

Since ∂M(z)/∂z > 0, M(z) is an increasing function concerning z, i.e., the choice of environmental information disclosure strategy for listed forestry companies contains the following cases.

①

When $z<z_0$, M(z) < 0, $M\left(z\right)<0$, $F\left(x\right){|}_{x=0}=0$ and $F^{\prime }\left(x\right){|}_{x=0}<0$, then x = 0 has stability, so the stability strategy of forestry listed companies is to choose low-quality environmental information disclosure.

②

When $z>z_0$, $M\left(z\right)>0$, $F\left(x\right){|}_{x=1}=0$ and $F^{\prime }\left(x\right){|}_{x=1}<0$, then $x=1$ has stability, so the stability strategy of listed forestry companies is to choose high-quality environmental information disclosure.

③

When $z=z_0$, $M\left(z\right)=0$, $F\left(x\right)=0$ and $F^{\prime }\left(x\right)=0$. Then $x\in \left[0,1\right]$ are in a stable state, so it is not possible to determine their stable strategies where the threshold value $z_0$ is

$$z_0=-\frac{A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+\left(B_g+F_g\right)y}{\left(1-y\right)\left(2\delta -1\right)D_e}$$

(15)

In summary, the phase diagram of the evolution of the strategies of listed forestry companies is shown in the following Figure 2.

Figure 2 shows the phase diagram of environmental information disclosure strategy choices of forestry listed companies in different situations. Firstly, when $z=z_0$ and z₀ is as shown in Equation (15), the probability of environmental information disclosure strategy of forestry listed companies are volumes V_x1 and V_x0, as seen in Figure 2; secondly, when z < z₀, the probability of forestry listed companies choosing a low-quality environmental information disclosure strategy is volume V_x0; and thirdly, when z > z₀, the probability of forestry listed companies choosing a high-quality environmental information disclosure strategy is volume V_x1.

4.1.2. Stabilization Strategy for the Probability of the Government Choosing a “Mandatory” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategy for Listed Forestry Companies

According to the replication dynamic Equation (8) constructed in the previous section, combined with the differential equation stability theorem and the evolutionary stabilization strategy rule, if the government strategy is in a steady state, it must satisfy that F(y) = 0 and F’(y) < 0. Therefore, the derivation of Equation (8) yields

$$\frac{dF\left(y\right)}{dy}=\left(1-2y\right)\left[F_g-C_g-\left(B_g+F_g\right)x+xz\left(1-2\delta \right)C_v+z\delta C_v\right]$$

(16)

Order:

$$N\left(x\right)=F_g-C_g-\left(B_g+F_g\right)x+xz\left(1-2\delta \right)C_v+z\delta C_v$$

(17)

Since $\frac{\partial N\left(x\right)}{\partial x}<0$, N(x) is a decreasing function with respect to x, the governmental strategy choice contains the following cases:

①

When $x<x_{10}$, $N\left(x\right)>0$, $F\left(y\right){|}_{y=1}=0,$ and $F^{\prime }\left(y\right){|}_{y=1}<0$, then y = 1 has stability, so the government’s stability strategy is to force environmental accounting information disclosure.

②

When $x>x_{10}$, $N\left(x\right)<0$, $F\left(y\right){|}_{y=0}=0,$ and $F^{\prime }\left(y\right){|}_{y=0}<0$, then y = 0 has stability, so the government’s stability strategy is voluntary environmental accounting disclosure.

③

When $x=x_{10}$, $N\left(x\right)=0$, $F\left(y\right)=0$, and $F^{\prime }\left(y\right)=0$, then $y\in \left[0,1\right]$ are in a stable state, so it is not possible to determine their stable strategies where the threshold $x_{10}$ is

$$x_{10}=-\frac{F_g-C_g+z\delta C_v}{z\left(1-2\delta \right)C_v-\left(B_g+F_g\right)}$$

(18)

In summary, the evolutionary phase diagram of the government’s strategy is shown in the following figure.

Figure 3 shows the phase diagrams of the government department’s strategy choice for the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies under different circumstances. Firstly, when $x=x_{10}$, x₁₀ as shown in Equation (8), the probability of government departments’ environmental information disclosure strategy for forestry listed companies are volumes V_y1 and V_y0, as seen in Figure 3; secondly, when $x=x_{10}$ the probability of government departments’ choice of mandatory environmental information disclosure strategy for forestry listed companies is volume V_y0; and thirdly, when $x<x_{10}$, the probability of government departments’ choice of listed companies’ voluntary environmental information disclosure strategy, when $x>x_{10}$, is the probability of volume V_y1.

4.1.3. Stabilization Strategy for the Probability of the Public Choosing the “Monitoring” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategy

According to the replication dynamic Equation (12) constructed in the previous section, combined with the differential equation stability theorem and the evolutionarily stable strategy rule, the social public strategy in a stable state must satisfy: F(z) = 0 and F’(z) < 0. Therefore, the derivative of Equation (12) yields

$$\frac{dF\left(z\right)}{dz}=\left(1-2z\right)\left[x\left(y-1\right)\left(1-\delta \right)C_s-\left(1-x\right)\left(1-y\right)\delta C_s-y{C}_s\right]$$

(19)

Order:

$$L\left(x\right)=x\left(y-1\right)\left(1-\delta \right)C_s-\left(1-x\right)\left(1-y\right)\delta C_s-y{C}_s$$

(20)

Since $\frac{\partial L\left(x\right)}{\partial x}>0$, L(x) is an increasing function concerning x, the social public strategy choice contains the following cases.

①

When $x<x_{20}$, $L\left(x\right)<0$, $F\left(z\right){|}_{z=0}=0,$ and $F^{\prime }\left(z\right){|}_{z=0}<0$, then $z=0$ has stability, so the stable strategy of the social public is not to supervise the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies.

②

When $x>x_{20}$, $L\left(x\right)>0$, $F\left(z\right){|}_{z=1}=0,$ and $F^{\prime }\left(z\right){|}_{z=1}<0$, then $z=1$ has stability, so the stable strategy of the social public is to supervise the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies.

③

When $x=x_{20}$, $L\left(x\right)=0$, $F\left(z\right)=0,$ and $F^{\prime }\left(z\right)=0$, then $z\in \left[0,1\right]$ are in a stable state, so their stable strategies cannot be determined where the threshold $x_{20}$ is

$$x_{20}=\frac{y-\delta \left(y-1\right)}{\left(y-1\right)\left(1-2\delta \right)}$$

(21)

In summary, the evolutionary phase diagram of the social public’s strategy is shown in the following Figure 4.

Figure 4 shows the phase diagram of the public’s strategy choice for environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies under different circumstances. Firstly, when $x=x_{20}$, x₂₀ as shown in Equation (21), the probability of government department’s environmental information disclosure strategy for forestry listed companies are volumes V_z1 and V_z0 as seen in Figure 4; secondly, when $x<x_{20}$, the probability of social public’s choice of environmental information disclosure supervision strategy for forestry listed companies is volume V_z0; and thirdly, when $x>x_{20}$, the probability of social public’s choice of not supervising the strategy of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is volume V_z1.

4.1.4. Three-Party Subject Stabilization Strategy

The replication dynamic equations of listed forestry companies, the government, and the public constitute a replication dynamic system of environmental information disclosure interest subjects:

$$F(N)=\{\begin{array}{c}F(x)=\frac{dx}{dt}=x(1-x)[A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+y(B_g+F_g)+z(1-y)(2\delta -1)D_e]\\ F(y)=\frac{dy}{dt}=y(1-y)[F_g-C_g-x(B_g+F_g)+xz(1-2\delta )C_v+z\delta C_v]\\ F(z)=\frac{dz}{dt}=z(1-z)[x(y-1)(1-\delta )C_s-(1-x)(1-y)\delta C_s-y{C}_s]\end{array}$$

(22)

Assuming that time is continuous in this paper, the evolutionary game equilibrium strategy is the local equilibrium point of the replicated dynamic system forestry listed companies, the government, and the public. These are the decision-makers of the strategy, their strategies for environmental accounting information disclosure change with time, and the maximum benefit is obtained by changing the strategy continuously. The stability of the strategy combinations of the three-game subjects can be judged according to Lyapunov’s first law. When Equation (22) replicates the dynamic equation system F(N) = 0, the listed forestry companies, the government, and the public will get the local equilibrium points E₁ (0, 0, 0), E₂ (0, 0, 1), E₃ (1, 0, 0), E₄ (0, 1, 0), E₅ (1, 1, 0), E₆ (1, 0, 1), E₇ (0, 1, 1), and E₈ (1, 1, 1). According to Friedman (1991), the stability of differential equations was proposed to be analyzed through the method of Jacobi matrices [67]. The Jacobi matrix is obtained from the three-way replication dynamic equation as

$$\begin{gathered} J=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}\frac{\partial F\left(x\right)}{\partial x}& \frac{\partial F\left(x\right)}{\partial y}& \frac{\partial F\left(x\right)}{\partial z}\\ \frac{\partial F\left(y\right)}{\partial x}& \frac{\partial F\left(y\right)}{\partial y}& \frac{\partial F\left(z\right)}{\partial z}\\ \frac{\partial F\left(z\right)}{\partial x}& \frac{\partial F\left(z\right)}{\partial y}& \frac{\partial F\left(z\right)}{\partial z}\end{array}\right] \\ =\left[\begin{array}{ccc}(1-2x\mathrm{)}[A_h-C_h+C_l-A_l+y(B_g+F_g)+z(1-y)(2\delta -1)D_e]& x(1-x)[B_g+F_g+z(2\delta -1\left)D_e\right]& x(1-x)\left(\right(1-y\left)\right(2\delta -1)D_e\\ y(1-y)[B_g+F_g+z(1-2\delta \left)C_v\right]& (1-2y)[F_g-C_g-x(B_g+F_g)+xz(1-2\delta )C_v+z\delta C_v]& y(1-y)\left[x\right(1-2\delta )C_v+\delta C_v]\\ z(1-z)(y-1)C_s& z(1-z)(x-\delta )C_a& (1-2z)\left[x\right(y-1\left)\right(1-\delta )C_s-(1-x\left)\right(1-y)\delta C_s-y{C}_s\end{array}\right] \end{gathered}$$

(23)

According to Lyapunov stability theory, the asymptotic stability of the system at the equilibrium point needs to be discussed by the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix of the system [68], i.e., all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix need to be less than 0 to satisfy the condition of asymptotic stability of the system. If all the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix have negative real parts, the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable; if at least one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix has positive real parts, the equilibrium point is unstable; if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix have negative real parts except those with zero real parts, the equilibrium point is in a critical state and the stability cannot be determined by the sign of the eigenvalues. Next, the asymptotic stability of each equilibrium point is analyzed according to Lyapunov’s indirect method, as shown in the following

Table 4. Asymptotic stability analysis of the dynamic system of replication of listed companies, government departments, and the public in the forest industry.

Equilibrium Point	Characteristic Root			Stability Condition	Stability
	λ1	λ2	λ3
E1 (0,0,0)	Ah − Al − Ch + Cl	Fg − Cg	−δCs	Ah − Al < Ch − Cl Fg < Cg	Asymptotic stability point
E2 (0,0,1)	Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + (2δ − 1)De	Fg − Cg + δCv	δCs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point
E3 (0,1,1)	Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + Bg + Fg	Cg − Fg − δCv	Cs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point
E4 (1,0,0)	−Ah + Al + Ch − Cl	−Cg − Bg	−(1 − δ)Cs	Ch − Cl < Ah − Al	Asymptotic stability point
E5 (0,1,0)	Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + Bg + Fg	Cg − Fg	−Cs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point
E6 (1,0,1)	Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − (2δ − 1)De	(1 − δ)Cv − Cg − Bg	(1 − δ)Cs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point
E7 (1,1,0)	Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − Bg − Fg	Cg + Bg	−Cs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point
E8 (1,1,1)	Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − Bg − Fg	Cg + Bg − (1 − δ)Cv	Cs	Positive characteristic root	Unstable point

.

According to Table 4, when $F_g-C_g<0$ and $A_h-A_l-C_h+C_l<0$ two asymptotic stabilization points can be obtained for the replicated dynamic system of the evolutionary game among listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public about environmental information disclosure.

According to the assumptions and evolutionary analysis process of the assigned dynamic system, the initial state of the system is assigned in two initial paths.

The first initial path: the initial assignment satisfies $F_g-C_g<0$ and $A_h-A_l-C_h+C_l<0$, the cost C_h = 3 for forestry listed companies to choose high-quality environmental information disclosure, the cost C_l = 1 for forestry listed companies to choose low-quality environmental information disclosure, the social reputation A_h = 2 obtained when forestry listed companies choose high-quality environmental information disclosure, the social reputation A_l = 0.8 obtained when forestry listed companies choose low-quality environmental information disclosure, the cost of supervision of forestry listed companies’ environmental information disclosure by government departments is C_g = 1.5, the cost paid by the public for supervision of forestry listed companies’ environmental information disclosure C_s = 1, the incentive money B_g = 2 for companies conducting high-quality environmental information disclosure by government departments, the amount of fine F_g = 1, the cost paid by the government department to verify the authenticity of social supervision C_v = 1, and the loss borne by the listed forestry companies to the real public supervision D_e = 3. The MATLAB program was used to simulate the dynamic system and get the three-party evolutionary game replication dynamic phase diagram, as shown in Figure 5a.

The second initial path: the initial assignment satisfies $-(A_h-A_l-C_h+C_l)<0$, the cost of forestry listed companies to choose high-quality environmental information disclosure C_h = 3, the cost of forestry listed companies to choose low-quality environmental information disclosure C_l = 1, the social reputation obtained when forestry listed companies choose high-quality environmental information disclosure A_h = 2, the social reputation obtained when forestry listed companies choose low-quality environmental information A_l = 0.8, the cost of supervision by government departments for environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies is C_g = 1.5, the cost paid by the public for supervision of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies is C_s = 1, the incentive money of government departments for companies that make high-quality environmental information disclosure is B_g = 2, the amount of fines imposed by government departments on companies that fail to disclose environmental information is F_g = 1.5, the cost paid by the government department to verify the authenticity of social supervision C_v = 1, and the loss borne by the listed forestry companies to the real public supervision D_e = 3. The MATLAB program was written to simulate the dynamic system and the three-party evolutionary game replicates the dynamic phase diagram, as shown in Figure 5b.

4.2. Evolutionary Game Simulation Analysis

4.2.1. Simulation of a Three-Group Evolutionary Game with Parameter Changes

This section assigns values to individual parameters and simulates them. In order to verify the validity of the evolutionary stability analysis, the model is assigned numerical values in the context of realistic situations considering the above analysis. Therefore, in this paper, the parameters are determined on this basis with reference to relevant literature [69,70].

① As shown in Figure 6a, when the behavioral strategy probability of forestry listed companies x = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, the three groups evolve paths separate from each other under the change of environmental information disclosure strategy probability of forestry listed companies. When the value of y is fixed and the value of z decreases, the faster the convergence rate of x and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state; when the value of z is fixed and the value of y decreases, the faster the convergence rate of x and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state. This shows that the factors influencing the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies are at the level of supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies by government departments and the supervision system of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies by the public. However, if in a situation where the moral level is high and the truthfulness of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is high, the level of strategy evolution of governmental departments on environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is opposite to the level of strategy evolution of social public on environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies; if it is in a situation where the level of morality is not high enough and the truthfulness of public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is to be confirmed, the trend of the evolution level of the strategy of government departments on the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is the same as the evolution level of the strategy of public disclosure of environmental information of forestry listed companies.

② As shown in Figure 6b, when the probability of government department behavior strategy y = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, the three groups form mutual evolutionary paths under the change of the probability of government department’s environmental information disclosure strategy for forestry listed companies. When the value of x is fixed and the value of z decreases, the faster the speed of convergence of y and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state; when the value of z is fixed and the value of x decreases, the faster the speed of convergence of y and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state. When the public chooses a fixed strategy for environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the government department can reach the equilibrium state faster for the environmental information disclosure strategy of forestry listed companies when the public chooses the strategy for environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies which tends to not supervise. When the public chooses a fixed strategy for environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies and the quality of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies gradually decreases, the government department can reach the equilibrium state more quickly for the environmental information disclosure strategy of listed forestry companies. The factors influencing the government department’s environmental information disclosure strategy are the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies and the social public’s supervision system of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies. If in a social environment with high moral standards, rational and fair, the authenticity of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is high, and the authenticity of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is high, the evolution level of environmental information disclosure strategy of forestry listed companies is opposite to the evolution level of supervision strategy of government departments on forestry listed companies, that is, the higher the quality of environmental information disclosure of listed companies, the more lenient the supervision strategy of government departments on forestry listed companies. Conversely, if the moral standard of the social environment is low and there is no objective and fair standard, the authenticity of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is low, contrary to the above conclusion.

③ As shown in Figure 6c, when the probability of social public behavior strategy z = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, the three groups form mutual evolutionary paths under the change of probability of social public’s environmental information disclosure strategy for forestry listed companies. When the value of x is fixed and the value of y decreases, the faster the speed of convergence of z and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state; when the value of y is fixed and the value of x decreases, the faster the speed of convergence of z and the shorter the time to contract to the steady-state. That is, when the public chooses the strategy of monitoring the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the strategy of environmental information disclosure quality of forestry listed companies remains unchanged, and the government department adopts a strategy that tends to be voluntary for the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies under the condition that the truthfulness of the public monitoring of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is high, the public monitoring of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies will stimulate the improvement of the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies. When the public chooses the strategy of monitoring the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the strategy of monitoring the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies by government departments remains unchanged, and the strategy of decreasing the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, in the case of high authenticity of the public’s monitoring of the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, will instead lead to the public’s behavior orientation. This indicates that the factors influencing the strategy of public supervision orientation towards environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies are at the level of supervision of government departments on environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies and the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies. If in a social environment with high moral standards, rational and fair, the truthfulness of the public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is higher, the level of strategy evolution of environmental information disclosure quality of forestry listed companies is opposite to the level of strategy evolution of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies by government departments, and it is concluded that if the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is higher, the government departments’ supervision strategy of forestry listed companies is more lenient. If we are in a social environment where the level of morality is not high enough and the true extent of public supervision of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is yet to be confirmed, the trend of the evolution level of the strategy of environmental information disclosure quality of forestry listed companies is the same as the evolution level of the strategy of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies by government departments, i.e., the higher the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the more the strategy of government departments on forestry listed companies will evolve. The higher the quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the stricter the supervision strategy of government departments on forestry listed companies.

4.2.2. The Evolutionary Influence of Different Factors on the Behavioral Strategies of Tripartite Subjects

Since different parameters have different sensitivities to the evolutionary strategies of forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public, this paper only selects parameters that have sensitivities to the evolutionary strategies of different subjects for simulation analysis. The initial strategies of the ternary actors of forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public are set as x = y = z = 0.5.

According to Figure 7, the strategic impact of different influencing factors on the evolutionary game of different groups can be seen: (1) The higher the cost of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies is unfavorable to the extent that forestry listed companies can afford, and the appropriate cost of environmental information disclosure can instead make forestry listed companies disclose environmental information of higher quality. (2) When the credibility of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies reaches the critical value, the higher it is, the more it stimulates the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies. If the credibility of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies does not reach the critical value, forestry listed companies will tend to disclose environmental information of low-quality instead. (3) Fines and incentives from government departments to listed forestry companies can only motivate listed forestry companies to improve the quality of environmental information disclosure in the short term, but in the long term when the fines and incentives from government departments to listed forestry companies reach a critical point, the environmental information disclosure strategy of listed forestry companies still tends to be a low-quality environmental information disclosure. (4) In the short term, the higher the cost of government regulation of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies, the faster the government’s strategic behavior will be oriented towards a “voluntary” regulatory strategy. In the long run, the higher the cost of environmental information disclosure by government departments, the faster the government departments’ strategic behavior will be oriented towards “voluntary” regulatory strategies. (5) The cost of monitoring by the public and the cost paid by government departments to verify the authenticity of public monitoring will affect the behavior orientation of government departments and the public. First, the cost of public monitoring will reduce the public’s motivation to monitor the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies.

Based on the above evolutionary game simulation, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) The game between listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public is a dynamic evolutionary process. The optimal model is for listed forestry companies to disclose “high-quality” environmental information, for government departments to adopt a “voluntary” regulatory model for disclosure of environmental information by listed forestry companies, and for the public to adopt a “non-supervisory” model. (2) Government penalties, incentives, and regulatory costs for environmental information disclosure by listed forestry companies are all short-term influences on subject behavior strategies.

5. Mechanism Optimization

The establishment of the system and the construction of the system is not only the result of human design but also the result of the common choice of the stakeholders. The optimal mechanism is to meet the goal of maximizing the interests of all stakeholders while achieving the optimal allocation of all influencing factors among them. Therefore, according to the previous article on the “rights, rules, and interests” of listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public, as well as the analysis of environmental information supply and demand, the relevant elements in the evolutionary game model are formed into a comprehensive system to achieve the construction of an environmental information disclosure mechanism of listed forestry companies in China in the context of ecological civilization construction. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game and simulation of the three parties, namely, listed forestry companies, government departments, and the public, the construction of the environmental information disclosure mechanism of listed forestry companies in China requires government departments to set up a system of supervision and management laws and regulations and reward and punishment mechanisms; listed forestry companies to improve the quality of internal environmental information management; and the public to maintain a rational and fair monitoring attitude. In response to the above analysis, the environmental information disclosure mechanism of listed forestry companies in China should be developed from the following ideas.

5.1. Optimize Environmental Information Disclosure Mechanism

According to signaling theory and legitimacy theory, the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies is required by government departments to compulsorily disclose environmental information for environmental legitimacy management on the one hand, while on the other hand, other listed companies not classified as highly polluting industries either disclose environmental information that is beneficial to enterprise development or do not fully disclose it. Thus, it will cause the problem of information asymmetry among government departments, the public, and other stakeholders. Therefore, to optimize the existing environmental information disclosure mechanism, government departments should formulate relevant laws and regulations to refine the content, manner, and requirements of environmental information disclosure of enterprises to solve the problem of excessive differences in the content and uneven quality of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies from the root. Meanwhile, forestry listed companies should follow the environmental information disclosure system formulated by the government, optimize the cost of environmental information disclosure, strengthen internal environmental management and internal control, and consider the maximization of ecological benefits of government departments and the maximization of interests of the public while considering the maximization of benefits for forestry listed companies.

5.2. Reward and Punishment Mechanism

In terms of a reward and punishment mechanism, forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public can check each other and cooperate to achieve the ultimate goal of ecological civilization, which requires the macro-control of government departments to coordinate the management of the three parties and establish a mechanism of mutual supervision and interconnection of rewards and punishments among the three parties. It is due to the lack of an effective reward and punishment mechanism that makes forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public lack the behavioral orientation of tripartite coordination and management. At present, China’s environmental management policies mainly focus on preferential policies for enterprise environmental protection, investment, and taxation, but a lack of connection with the public results in the lack of a completed closed-loop reward and punishment mechanism among forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public. At the same time, to avoid the limited and critical value of reward and evaporation, the management should focus on differentiation and diversity, and the government departments should encourage the disclosure of environmental information of listed forestry companies and increase the supervision of the public on the disclosure of environmental information of listed forestry companies from the perspective of “right, responsibility, and benefit”. The government departments should encourage the disclosure of environmental information of listed forestry companies and increase the supervision of the public on the disclosure of environmental information of listed forestry companies.

5.3. Environmental Information Sharing Mechanism

From the perspective of the long-term development of ecological civilization construction, there is a practical need for cooperation among government departments, listed forestry companies, and the public to achieve the goal of ecological civilization. However, due to information asymmetry, the behavioral orientation of government departments, listed forestry companies, and the public cannot reach the optimal state. The establishment of an environmental information sharing mechanism can help government departments to grasp national environmental information more macroscopically and meet environmental information needs to formulate relevant policies and ecological civilization systems; for listed forestry companies, environmental information sharing can help avoid transaction costs caused by information asymmetry; for the public, it can help to understand the existing environmental information status and increase the awareness of environmental protection.

5.4. Benefit Coordination Mechanism

From the perspective of stakeholders, the main interest conflicts among listed companies on forestry, government departments, and the public are reflected in the different pursuits of benefits, with enterprises pursuing the maximization of economic benefits, government departments pursuing the maximization of ecological benefits, and the public pursuing the maximization of social benefits. According to the need for ecological civilization construction in China, government departments need to coordinate the different interests of enterprises, the government, and the public. Therefore, to achieve the optimal strategic model of environmental information disclosure among listed companies, government departments, and the public, it is necessary to establish an effective interest coordination mechanism to balance the “rights, responsibilities, and benefits” among the three parties, i.e., to regulate the interest orientation among the three parties, so that each party can perform its duties to achieve the optimal strategy of environmental accounting information disclosure and add to the construction of ecological civilization.

6. Discussion

Stakeholders of environmental information disclosure identify multiple subjects of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies based on the interest orientation of “rights, responsibilities, and benefits”. They include government departments, forestry enterprises, and the public. In the process of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the three subjects have their own responsibilities and needs. Environmental information flows among the subjects and they constitute the environmental information disclosure system of forestry listed companies.

According to Figure 1 and Figure 5, the game strategy choices of three subjects, namely, forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public, will affect each other. Therefore, in the process of mechanism optimization, forestry listed companies, the government, and the public should be considered as a whole. Other scholars also make the same stakeholder delineation [25].

According to the analysis in Section 4.2.2 above, rewards or penalties are different for environmental information disclosure strategies of listed forestry companies in the long and short term. Many scholars have also proposed the establishment of reward and punishment mechanisms for China’s environmental information disclosure system based on their own research [55,71]. According to the results of this paper, it is found that there is a critical value for reward or punishment. The closed-loop mechanism of rewards and punishments among the government, listed forestry companies, and the public are better than the regulatory rewards and punishments mechanism limited to between the government and enterprises.

The establishment of an environmental information sharing mechanism in China can eliminate information asymmetry as much as possible. It can meet the needs of enterprises, the government, and the public for environmental information. At the same time, it can promote the circulation of environmental information among enterprises, the government, and the public and improve the quality of environmental information disclosure, thus completing a dynamic and virtuous cycle. However, the mechanism requires the support of computer technology. Integration of computer technology with environmental information disclosure mechanisms could be a direction for future research. The government needs to take the lead in building an environmental information sharing platform and setting up a corresponding information security mechanism. While providing a platform for environmental information disclosure for listed forestry companies, it safeguards the environmental information security of listed forestry companies to avoid leakage of commercial secrets. This can guarantee the information security of environmental information disclosure of forestry-listed companies.

At present, the practice of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies in China has made some progress, the environmental information disclosure of heavy pollution industry is especially in good practice. However, the quality of environmental information disclosure in the forestry industry in China is slightly inadequate. Because of the late development of environmental information disclosure in China, China’s environmental information disclosure mechanism follows the idea of “design first and then implement, then gradually improve, first partially and then comprehensively”. Therefore, in the process of vigorously developing an ecological civilization in China, listed forestry companies, as a special industry, have more room for environmental information disclosure practice.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, the following conclusions are drawn from the simulation analysis of the evolutionary game of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies’ interest-related topics: (1) The strategy choices of forestry listed companies, government departments, and the public on environmental information disclosure will influence each other. (2) The forestry listed companies’ environmental information disclosure is high-quality, the government department’s supervision strategy for forestry listed companies is voluntary, and the social public does not supervise is in stable equilibrium. (3) The cost and credibility of the environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies, the cost of government regulation, incentive payments and fines, and the cost of supervision by the social public all have an impact on the tripartite evolutionary game equilibrium strategy of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies in China oriented by ecological civilization construction.

On this basis, this paper proposes the driving mechanism of environmental information disclosure of forestry listed companies in China oriented by ecological civilization construction, including (1) the optimization of an environmental information disclosure mechanism, (2) a reward and punishment mechanism, (3) an environmental information sharing mechanism, and (4), an interest coordination mechanism to promote the optimal equilibrium strategy. The mechanism of environmental information disclosure is proposed to facilitate the successful realization of the optimal equilibrium strategy.

Although this paper has done the above-mentioned research to derive mechanism recommendations, there will still be practical difficulties in the process of implementation, and it is necessary to continue to improve the environmental information disclosure mechanism of this study in order to find an environmental information disclosure mechanism applicable to the whole industry, which will be an important direction to be explored in the future.