A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Chain Profit Distribution in the Context of Common Prosperity

Abstract

As the new mode of resource allocation and profit distribution governance, common prosperity will be achieved effectively through the “third distribution” of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to regulate profit. The performance level of CSR is directly related to the profitability of the entire supply chain and its member enterprises. In the study, based on the utilization of the Shapley value method, by incorporating CSR elements, a preliminary model of profit allocation for four cooperative scenarios in the supply chain is constructed and modified to take into account the level of CSR implementation. Based on the modified model, the relationship between the performance level of CSR and the total profit of the supply chain and the member enterprises’ profit is analyzed. The study shows that the total profit of the supply chain is linearly and positively correlated with the performance level of CSR. In contrast, the profit of supply chain members has a nonlinear positive correlation with CSR performance. The impact of the whole level of CSR fulfillment on the profitability of the entire supply chain varies at different stages. Finally, the findings are discussed from the perspectives of the government, industry organizations, supply chain managers, and supply chain member enterprises, providing valuable references for the research and practice of comprehensively promoting CSR fulfillment in supply chains and realizing common prosperity.

1. Introduction

Eradicating poverty to achieve common prosperity is a shared ambition and a global challenge. Even today, with advanced technology, abundant commodities, and social progress, eradicating poverty is still an essential task for all countries, especially developing countries and the most significant global challenge in the world. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights regard eradicating poverty and achieving development as fundamental human rights. In 2015 at the U.N. Development Summit, leaders in countries jointly adopted the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with poverty eradication as its primary goal. In 2020, China completed the target of reducing poverty ten years ahead of schedule, with 98.99 million poor rural residents below the existing poverty line lifted out of poverty, and 832 impoverished counties and 128,000 impoverished villages were removed from the poverty list. Although China has eliminated absolute poverty, the problem of unbalanced and insufficient development is still prominent, with the fact that a significant gap in growth and income distribution between urban and rural areas and relative poverty persisting for a long time. It is urgent to enhance the importance of promoting common prosperity for all people in the process of building a modern and robust socialist country comprehensively. Common prosperity is universal prosperity based on eliminating relative poverty and polarization and achieving comprehensive human development and social progress through sharing the achievements of reform and development [1,2].

In recent years, the general lack of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has exacerbated deteriorating relations between supply chain enterprises, squeezed interests, an imbalance between production and sales, and other consequences. With the COVID-19 pandemic, this lack has even seriously affected the stable development of the supply chain and the promotion of common prosperity, which has caused increasing concern in academia, business, and other social groups. To solve the problem of relative poverty effectively and achieve common prosperity, the Chinese government should not only focus on the reasonable distribution of public social resources but also guide and motivate enterprises to take the lead in fulfilling their social responsibilities, building fair and reasonable mechanisms for interest linkage, and realizing the safe, stable and sustainable development of industrial chain and supply chain. The 10th meeting of China’s Central Financial and Economic Committee in 2021 presented that the 3rd distribution in corporate social responsibility would be regarded as an effective way to regulate profit distribution and achieve common prosperity, aiming to balance the relationship between efficiency and fairness and help groups with the poor resource in the supply chain, including micro and small enterprises (MSEs), smallholder-farmers and other partners, improve the ability to create wealth and achieve income growth through the construction of the reasonable benefit-sharing mechanism. This paper aims to solve the following problems: (1) Under the four modes of cooperation that currently exist in China’s supply chains, how can a reasonable benefit distribution scheme be constructed to ensure equitable benefits for resource-poor groups such as MSEs and smallholder farmers? (2) What is the essential impact of the level of CSR implementation on the overall benefit of the supply chain and the benefits of member enterprises?

The paper consists of the following chapters: Section 2 is relevant literature. Section 3 makes model assumptions and parameters setting. Section 4 carries out the model construction and solution. Section 5 carries out model modifications and case studies. Section 6 analyses the relationship, gives policy suggestions and concludes.

2. Related Literature

2.1. Research on the Supply Chain Profit Distribution

Since profit allocation is a crucial factor affecting supply chain partnerships emphasized generally, many scholars have devoted their efforts to the research on profit allocation by utilizing the Shapley method, Myerson model, kernel method, game theory, and other methods.

Initially, Shapley used the marginal contributions of members to determine their importance in the alliance and proposed the method of Shapley value to solve the problems in the profit distribution of members in a supply chain alliance [3]. Kalai and Samet found a method for measuring the weight of Shapley value indicators, which guided solving the problems in weighting factors of supply chain indicators [4]. Faigle and Kern applied the Shapley value method to improve the original model [5]. Next, based on Myerson’s model optimization, the mechanisms of cooperation and profit allocation among the participating firms were analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky [6]. Waller and Xu etc., studied the profit distribution of cooperation in supply chain channel and believed that the strengths and weaknesses of the parties in non-cooperation, as well as their different positions in the channel, should be used as a reference basis in the distribution of channel profit [7,8]. According to the research of Jaber and Osman on the profit distribution of a two-stage supply chain, the delayed payment allowed could be a decision variable to coordinate the distribution of benefits [9]. Krajewska and other scholars researched profit distribution based on Cooperative Game Theory [10,11]. Tatarczak studied the profit distribution among members of the fourth-party logistics supply chain alliance system with the Game Theory and conducted a case verification [12]. Meanwhile, the fact that applying the Shapley value method helped obtain more equity in allocating benefits was verified [13]. Therefore, the Shapley value method is selected as the primary research method in this study.

At the same time, in the study, the contract mechanism could effectively promote information communication between member companies in the supply chain, improve the whole operational efficiency, and achieve practical cooperation and mutual benefit [14]. As a result, various approaches, such as revenue sharing and volume discount contracts, were beginning to be applied to enhance the equity and rationality of schemes to distribute revenue [15]. Ning et al. designed a model to allocate revenue based on supply chain contracts to ensure keeping fair and suitable revenue in supply chain alliances [16]. To better coordinate the revenue of the supply chain, Arani et al. proposed a new hybrid revenue-sharing option contract through Cooperative Game Theory [17]. Kong et al. constructed a benefit-sharing contract model from two dimensions, price, and service, to achieve Pareto optimality in a dual-channel supply chain for agricultural products [18]. In the study by Panda et al., the mind of resolving conflicts in the channel and allocating profit through bargaining was produced [19]. In summary, the equitable distribution mechanism can help resolve conflicts of interest among supply chain members.

2.2. Research on Supply Chain Benefits Distribution of MSEs and Smallholder Farmers

The existing research proved that a practical scheme to allocate profit could motivate members to participate supply chain [20], the factors whose status in the chain directly affected the amount of their benefits allocation [21]. Despite that, some studies have argued extensively that the participation of resource-poor groups such as MSEs and smallholder-farmers in supply chains can help raise income levels for achieving industrial prosperity, sustainable business performance [22] and common prosperity [23], in actual operation, due to the lack of social responsibility of supply chain enterprises and the pursuit of maximizing their own interests, resource-poor groups, such as MSEs and smallholder farmers, experienced the unfairness of interests squeezed and marginalized [24]. It was impossible to achieve absolute fairness in the process of sharing benefits in practice [25]. Hence the unfair and unreasonable supply chain benefit distribution mechanism affected the sustainable development of enterprises and common prosperity negatively.

In China’s current process of achieving common prosperity, MSEs and smallholder farmers with poor resources focus on solving relative poverty.

2.3. Research on CSR

In 1924, Oliver first proposed the concept of CSR in his book—The Philosophy of Management [26]. Since Bowen formally introduced the definition of CSR, stating that “voluntary social responsibility on the part of businessmen is a viable way to resolve economic problems and achieve the economic goals preferably” [27], more and more scholars have begun to study CSR. According to the research by Eells in 1960, the main factors to cause enterprises to undertake social responsibility were changes in human needs, the role of the operators in firms, the enterprises, and economic system, and society itself [28]. Carroll mapped the four constituent elements of CSR (economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic) into a pyramid mode [29]. Afterward, scholars analyzed the degree of interaction between CSR and corporate performance [30,31] demonstrated the necessity of CSR for sustainable development [32,33], and found that CSR and the performance of suppliers were positively related [34,35,36]. Scholars have proposed two explanations for the relationship between CSR performance and financial performance: (1) the active fulfillment of social responsibility enhances corporate reputation and then improves profitability [37]. (2) The level of CSR fulfillment contributed to corporate performance and sustainable development [38,39]. (3) More and more enterprises advocated the practice of corporate social responsibility guided by the interests of stakeholders [40] and regarded CSR as the foundation for their survival and growth [41,42].

With the promotion of CSR, more and more scholars began to study the CSR of the supply chain. Hsueh and Chang optimized channels and improved supply chain network coordination through CSR sharing [43]. Ma and Shang et al. Studied the impact of the CSR cost on the effort commitment and profits of supply chain members [44]. Hsueh introduced a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain and CSR performance [45]. Modak, Panda, and Sana analyzed the impact of CSR on competitive decision-making among retailers and solved conflicts through pricing contracts [46]. Liu and Xu studied the impact of CSR behavior and consumer preferences on product differentiation, compared the decision-making effects under decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making, and built a new supply chain coordination mechanism based on value-added profit considering consumer preferences [47]. Lin and Xiaochen found that government intervention could adjust the relationship between CSR and stakeholder orientation to a certain extent through government intervention [40].

Existing research results have fully demonstrated the interrelationship between CSR performance and supply chain performance. Still, most of them have centered on CSR in the individual enterprise, while few have studied the whole supply chain and its members. Many works of literature demonstrate the relationship between CSR and corporate performance, but few studies on the impact between them.

The distribution of benefits among supply chain node enterprises has major implications for the stability and the supply chain’s overall performance. It is an important aspect that relates to whether the legitimate rights and interests of supply chain node enterprises can be protected and whether the supply chain can develop in a long-term and sustainable condition. The fulfillment of CSR is the basis of efficient cooperation in the supply chain and is directly related to the supply chain’s overall interests and the node enterprises. To a certain extent, the level of CSR implementation reflects the cooperating willingness and efforts of supply chain node enterprises. The distribution of supply chain benefits on the basis of CSR holds definite rationality and incentive.

The current research results have fully demonstrated the relationship between the performance of CSR and the performance of the supply chain, but most of them study the social responsibility of individual enterprises, and few of them study the whole supply chain and member enterprises; There are many documents demonstrating the relationship between CSR and corporate performance, but few studies on their impact mechanism. In this case, the benefit distribution of the supply chain considering CSR will be an important means to achieve the sustainable development of the supply chain and the common prosperity of supply chain enterprises.

This study introduces the factor of CSR, distributes and amends the interests of the four cooperation modes in China’s supply chain with the help of the sharply value method, and discusses the Enlightenment of the research results to the Chinese government, industry organizations, and supply chain enterprises. The possible contributions are: (1) to build a profit distribution model which provides a prerequisite for the reasonable distribution of the interests of the supply chain on the basis of the current four cooperation modes in the supply chain and the factors in CSR; (2) to provide theoretical support for decision-making of government, industry organizations and enterprise by revealing the essential impact of the level of CSR performance at different development stages on the interests of supply chain consolidation and member enterprises; (3) to enrich further the theoretical achievements in the field of systematic research on the benefit distribution of supply chain in the new era.

3. Model Assumptions and Parameters Setting

3.1. Model Assumptions

Based on the literature review, this paper constructs a supply chain profit distribution model based on the perspective of common prosperity and considering the factors in CSR fulfillment, and makes a modification on the basis of the Shapley value method to reveal the relationship between the level of CSR fulfillment and the supply chain’s overall earnings as well as the earnings of member enterprises and display the degree of their interactional influence, to provide a reference for the safety and stability of the current supply chain and its high-quality development.

To facilitate formulation and analysis of the problems in the research, we made the following hypothesis in the supply chain revenue model:

H1:

The supply chain consists of a supplier (S), a manufacturer (M), a retailer (R), and many customers (C).

H2:

Based on CSR, the supply chain members are willing to consider the customer needs adequately and recycle end-of-life (EOL) products for reproduction. On the one hand, the environmental pollution problem generated by EOL can be solved. On the other hand, its residual value can also be obtained. At the same time, the supply chain benefits are divided into two parts: one is the benefits brought by the forward supply chain, and the other is the benefits brought by the reverse supply chain.

H3:

All supply chain members hold the rational mind of seeking to maximize their returns.

H4:

The enterprises in the supply chain only conduct substantial cooperation with their other neighboring members in the chain. The possible cooperation situations are shown in

Table 1. Cooperation situations in the supply chain.

Cooperation Situations	Definition
[S, M, R]	S, M, and R are independent of each other without cooperation
[(S, M), R]	S cooperates with M but not R
[S, (M, R)]	M cooperates with R but not S
[(S, M, R)]	S, M, and R all cooperate and work together

.

3.2. Parameter Setting of CSR

In recent years, the lack of CSR has seriously affected the stability of supply chain cooperation and the interests of weak and small enterprises. It has attracted increasing attention from academia, business circles, and society. Consumers have also begun to attach importance to the perception of corporate social responsibility. More and more consumers are willing to buy the products of enterprises that attach importance to social responsibility. CSR perception refers to the information and knowledge that customers grasped in the performance of CSR, which could positively affect customers’ recognition of the enterprise [48]. By building emotional ties with the enterprise, customers were willing to provide corporate social support [49]. CSR perception measurement mainly involved identifying the company, purchasing intention, customer loyalty, and satisfaction [50]. Ming and Yuanzhu put forward the concept of customer CSR satisfaction, pointing out that it was a subjective feeling and satisfaction process of customers towards the way and content of CSR performed by enterprises, and verified that the satisfaction of CSR had a positive impact on customer purchase behavior [51]. The CSR performance can not only send positive signals to stakeholders and improve the enterprise’s reputation but also help improve customer satisfaction and help the sustainable development of the enterprise.

Based on previous research, this paper takes satisfaction of corporate social responsibility as a major adjustment parameter and incorporates it into the benefit distribution function of the supply chain. In this study, ‘r’($0\le r\le 1$) is used to represent the whole, fulfilling level of CSR in the supply chain, ‘$\theta$’($0\le \theta \le 1$) indicates the fulfilling level of CSR in the market, which means the current average level of CSR fulfillment in all companies, and ‘c’($0\le c\le 1$) refers to the sensitivity coefficient of customers’ overall social responsibility performance level of the supply chain. $cr\left(\theta \right)$ is used as customer satisfaction with CSR fulfillment, as set in Equation (1).

$$cr\left(\theta \right)=c\left(\frac{r-\theta }{1-\theta }\right)$$

(1)

Higher values of $cr\left(\theta \right)$ indicate a more vital willingness and more significant purchases by customers. If $r>\theta$, the customer will be satisfied with the product or service, so the desire to buy will strengthen, and the purchased quantity will increase. If they’re equal, the amount purchased will remain stable. On the contrary, $r<\theta$ expresses that the customer will not be satisfied with the product or enterprise; accordingly, the purchased quantity will decrease.

3.3. Other Parameters Setting

Suppose in the supply chain revenue model, the product unit selling price of suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers are P_S1, P_M1, and P_R1, respectively. In addition, P_S1 < P_M1 < P_R1, which is inferred by the law of product circulation. After that, their product unit cost is C_S1, C_M1, and C_R1 responsibility. In addition, the relationship between order quantity Q₁ and price P_R1 is shown in Equation (2).

$$Q_1=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]$$

(2)

In Equation (2), “a” (a > 0) is the maximum demand; “b” (b > 0) is the price sensitivity coefficient of the customer to the product.

Supply chain enterprises will recycle some of their products for reuse when fulfilling their social responsibility. The higher the recycling price, the more the recycling volume. The relationship between the recycling volume Q₂ and the price P_R2 is as follows:

$$Q_2=\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]$$

(3)

In Equation (3), d (d > 0) is the number of products voluntarily returned by customers out of environmental awareness, and e (e > 0) is the price sensitivity coefficient of customers to recycled products. The prices of recycled products by suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers are P_S2, P_M2, P_R2 (P_S2 < P_M2 < P_R2), the unit costs of products are C_S2, C_M2, C_R2, and the value of the recycled products themselves is V.

4. Model Construction and Solution

4.1. Initial Model Construction and Solution

According to the enterprise’s actual operation, each node enterprise’s revenue function in the supply chain can be obtained as follows.

$${\pi }_S=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S1}-C_{S1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(V-P_{S2}-C_{S2}\right)$$

(4)

$${\pi }_M=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M1}-P_{S1}-C_{M1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S2}-P_{M2}-C_{M2}\right)$$

(5)

$${\pi }_R=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{R1}-P_{M1}-C_{R1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M2}-P_{R2}-C_{R2}\right)$$

(6)

(1) For the case of [S, M, R], the supplier, manufacturer, and retailer aim to maximize their individual interests and maximize the returns. Thus, the maximum revenue model for the supplier is shown in Model I.

$$\begin{gathered} Max {\pi }_S=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S1}-C_{S1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(V-P_{S2}-C_{S2}\right) \\ S.t.\left\{\begin{array}{c}max {\pi }_M=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)[1+cr(\theta \left)\right]\left(P_{M1}-P_{S1}-C_{M1}\right)\hfill \\ +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)[1+cr(\theta \left)\right]\left(P_{S2}-P_{M2}-C_{M2}\right)\hfill \\ max {\pi }_R=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)[1+cr(\theta \left)\right]\left(P_{R1}-P_{M1}-C_{R1}\right)\hfill \\ +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)[1+cr(\theta \left)\right]\left(P_{M2}-P_{R2}-C_{R2}\right)\hfill \\ P_{R1}>P_{M1}>P_{S1}>0\hfill \\ P_{S2}>P_{M2}>P_{R2}>0\hfill \\ C_{S1}>0,C_{M1}>0,C_{R1}>0\hfill \end{array}\right. \end{gathered}$$

➀ After maximizing the interests of the retailers, P_R1 and P_R2 can be found as follows.

$$P_{R1}=\frac{1}{2b}\left(a+b{P}_{M1}+b{C}_{R1}\right)$$

(7)

$$P_{R2}=\frac{1}{2e}\left(e{P}_{M2}-e{C}_{R2}-b\right)$$

(8)

➁ Substituting (7) (8) into the manufacturer’s benefit model, P_M1 and P_M2 are obtained as follows.

$$P_{M1}=\frac{a}{2b}+\frac{1}{2}{P}_{S1}+\frac{1}{2}{C}_{M1}-\frac{1}{2}{C}_{R1}$$

(9)

$$P_{M2}=\frac{1}{2}{p}_{S2}-\frac{1}{2}{C}_{M2}+\frac{1}{2}{C}_{R2}-\frac{d}{2e}$$

(10)

➂ Substituting (9) (10) into the supplier benefit model, P_S1 and P_S2 are obtained as follows.

$$P_{S1}=\frac{a}{2b}-\frac{1}{2}{C}_{M1}-\frac{1}{2}{C}_{R1}+\frac{1}{2}{C}_{S1}$$

(11)

$$P_{S2}=\frac{V}{2}-\frac{d}{2e}+\frac{1}{2}{C}_{M2}+\frac{1}{2}{C}_{R2}-\frac{1}{2}{C}_{S2}$$

(12)

➃ Substituting (11) (12) into (7) (8) (9) (10), P_M1, P_M2, P_R1, and P_R2 are obtained as follows.

$$P_{M1}=\frac{3a}{4b}+\frac{1}{4}{C}_{M1}-\frac{3}{4}{C}_{R1}+\frac{1}{4}{C}_{S1}$$

(13)

$$P_{M2}=\frac{V}{4}-\frac{3d}{4e}-\frac{1}{4}{C}_{M2}-\frac{1}{4}{C}_{S2}+\frac{3}{4}{C}_{R2}$$

(14)

$$P_{R1}=\frac{7a}{8b}+\frac{1}{8}{C}_{M1}+\frac{1}{8}{C}_{R1}+\frac{1}{8}{C}_{S1}$$

(15)

$$P_{R2}=\frac{V}{8}-\frac{7d}{8e}-\frac{1}{8}{C}_{M2}-\frac{1}{8}{C}_{S2}-\frac{1}{4}{C}_{R2}$$

(16)

Optimum order quantities are as follows.

$$Q_1^{*}=\frac{a}{8}-\frac{1}{8b}{C}_{M1}-\frac{1}{8b}{C}_{S1}-\frac{1}{8b}{C}_{R1}$$

(17)

$$Q_2^{*}=\frac{d}{8}+\frac{Ve}{8}-\frac{e}{8}{C}_{M1}-\frac{e}{8}{C}_{S1}-\frac{e}{8}{C}_{R1}$$

(18)

➄ Based on Equations (7) to (16), this leads to the following returns for each nodal firm and the whole supply chain, shown below.

$${\pi }_S^1=\frac{1}{16b}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right){]}^2+\frac{1}{16e}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right){]}^2$$

(19)

$${\pi }_M^1=\frac{1}{32b}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right){]}^2+\frac{1}{32e}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right){]}^2$$

(20)

$${\pi }_R^1=\frac{1}{64b}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right){]}^2+\frac{1}{64e}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right){]}^2$$

(21)

$${\pi }_{SC}^1=\frac{7}{64b}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right){]}^2+\frac{7}{64e}\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right][d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right){]}^2$$

(22)

Let $A=\frac{[a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right){]}^2\left[1+cS\left(r,\theta \right)\right])]}{b}+\frac{{[d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right)]}^2\left[1+cS\left(r,\theta \right)\right]}{e}$

Then the benefits of the supply chain and nodal firms are as follows.

$${\pi }_S^1=\frac{A}{16},{\pi }_M^1=\frac{A}{32},{\pi }_R^1=\frac{A}{64},{\pi }_{SC}^1=\frac{7A}{64}$$

(2) For the case of [(S, M), R], the retailers aim at maximizing their interests, and the suppliers and manufacturers maximize the common returns through cooperation. Thus return model is shown in model II.

$$\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{cc}Max {\pi }_S+{\pi }_M\hfill & =\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S1}-C_{S1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right](V-P_{S2}\hfill \\ & -C_{S2})+\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M1}-P_{S1}-C_{M1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)[1\hfill \\ & +cr\left(\theta \right)]\left(P_{S2}-P_{M2}-C_{M2}\right)\hfill \end{array} \\ S.t.\{\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{c}\max {\pi }_R=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{R1}-P_{M1}-C_{R1}\right)\hfill \\ +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M2}-P_{R2}-C_{R2}\right)\\ P_{R1}>P_{M1}>P_{S1}>0\hfill \\ P_{S2}>P_{M2}>P_{R2}>0\hfill \\ C_{S1}>0,C_{M1}>0,C_{R1}>0\hfill \end{array}\hfill \end{array} \end{gathered}$$

Similarly, the supply chain benefits are calculated as below.

$${({\pi }_S+{\pi }_M)}^2=\frac{A}{8},{\pi }_R^2=\frac{A}{16},{\pi }_{SC}^2=\frac{3A}{16}$$

(3) For the case of [S, (M, R)], the suppliers aim at maximizing their interest, and the retailers and manufacturers maximize the common returns through cooperation. Thus return model is shown in model III.

$$\begin{gathered} Max {\pi }_S=\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S1}-C_{S1}\right)+\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(V-P_{S2}-C_{S2}\right) \\ S.t.\{\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{cc}max {\pi }_M+{\pi }_R\hfill & =\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M1}-P_{S1}-C_{M1}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S2}-P_{M2}-C_{M2}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{R1}-P_{M1}-C_{R1}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M2}-P_{R2}-C_{C2}\right)\hfill \end{array}\hfill \\ P_{R1}>P_{M1}>P_{S1}>0\hfill \\ P_{S2}>P_{M2}>P_{R2}>0\hfill \\ C_{S1}>0,C_{M1}>0,C_{R1}>0\hfill \end{array} \end{gathered}$$

Similarly, the supply chain benefits are calculated as below.

$${\pi }_S^2=\frac{A}{8},{({\pi }_M+{\pi }_R)}^2=\frac{A}{16},{\pi }_{SC}^2=\frac{3A}{16}$$

(4) For the case of [(S, M, R)], the suppliers, retailers, and manufacturers aim at maximizing the whole interest in cooperation. Thus return model is shown in model IV.

$$\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{cc}Max {\pi }_S+{\pi }_M+{\pi }_S\hfill & =\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S1}-C_{S1}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(V-P_{S2}-C_{S2}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M1}-P_{S1}-C_{M1}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{S2}-P_{M2}-C_{M2}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(a-b{P}_{R1}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{R1}-P_{M1}-C_{R1}\right)\hfill \\ & +\left(d+e{P}_{R2}\right)\left[1+cr\left(\theta \right)\right]\left(P_{M2}-P_{R2}-C_{R2}\right)\hfill \end{array} \\ S.t.\{\begin{array}{c}{P}_{R1}>P_{M1}>P_{S1}>0\hfill \\ P_{S2}>P_{M2}>P_{R2}>0\hfill \\ C_{S1}>0,C_{M1}>0,C_{R1}>0\hfill \end{array} \end{gathered}$$

Similarly, the supply chain benefits are calculated as below.

$${({\pi }_S+{\pi }_M+{\pi }_R)}^4={\pi }_{SC}^4=\frac{A}{4}$$

4.2. Model Construction and Solution Based on Shapley Value

The key to the coordinated operation in the supply chain is the cooperation and synergy between the supply chain nodal enterprises. The benefit distribution is an essential part of the supply chain cooperation mechanism, and its reasonableness determines the effectiveness of the supply chain operation. The importance of the individual in the group is revealed with Shapley’s method. It considers each partner’s contribution to the alliance, so it is widely used in the distribution of benefits in multi-cooperation [50]. The distribution of supply chain benefits based on Shapley’s value is more reasonable and effective.

Shapley value is the unique solution to the cooperative game through using an axiomatic approach. Let the n members form a supply chain set, N = {1, 2, …, n}. The cooperative subset among supply chain members is L, L = {1, 2, …, k}, and L is a subset of N. The members in L acquire some cooperative benefits by signing and performing cooperative agreements. It is assumed that V(L) is the maximum benefit obtained by the cooperative subset L of the supply chain, and the other subsets in N can be knitted into N-L cooperation. ${\varphi }_i\left[V\right]$ is the benefit that supply chain member firm $i$ should acquire in-game (N, V). A unique vector function exists for any n-member cooperative game (N, V).

$$\varphi =\left({\varphi }_1\left[V\right],{\varphi }_i\left[V\right],\dots ,{\varphi }_n\left[V\right]\right)$$

(23)

$${\varphi }_i\left[V\right]={\sum }_{L\left(i\in L\right)}\omega \left(\left|L\right|\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{i\right\}\right)\right]$$

(24)

$$\omega \left(\left|L\right|\right)=\frac{\left(n-\left|L\right|\right)!\left(\left|L\right|-1\right)!}{n!}$$

(25)

In the function, |L| denotes the number of cooperative members, V(L) is the maximum gain from the cooperative subset L, including firm $i$, and V (L\{$i$}) is the maximum gain from the cooperative subset L without firm $i$. In the supply chain game (N, V), each supply chain member receives a higher gain than that out of cooperation. According to the Shapley value method, for the above supply chain [(S, M, R)] scenario, the benefits received after allocation by suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers are shown in

Table 2. Calculation of ${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)$ based on the allocation of the supplier (S).

$\mathit{L}$	S	(S, M)	(S, R)	(S, M, R)
$V\left(L\right)$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{8}$	$\frac{A}{16}+\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{4}$
$V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	0	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}$
$V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{3A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{3A}{16}$
|$L$|	1	2	2	3
$\omega \left(\left|L\right|\right)$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$\omega \left(\left|L\right|\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)\right]$	$\frac{A}{48}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{96}$	$\frac{A}{16}$

, Table 3 and Table 4.

From Table 2, the benefits obtained from the supplier allocation are,

$${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)=\frac{A}{48}+\frac{A}{64}+\frac{A}{96}+\frac{A}{16}=\frac{7A}{64}$$

Table 3. Calculation of ${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)$ based on the allocation of the manufacturer (M).

$\mathit{L}$	M	(S, M)	(M, R)	(S, M, R)
$V\left(L\right)$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{4}$
$V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	0	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}+\frac{A}{64}$
$V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{3A}{64}$	$\frac{11A}{64}$
$L$	1	2	2	3
$\omega \left(L\right)$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$\omega \left(L\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)\right]$	$\frac{A}{96}$	$\frac{A}{96}$	$\frac{A}{128}$	$\frac{11A}{192}$

Table 3. Calculation of ${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)$ based on the allocation of the manufacturer (M).

$\mathit{L}$	M	(S, M)	(M, R)	(S, M, R)
$V\left(L\right)$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{4}$
$V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	0	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}+\frac{A}{64}$
$V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{3A}{64}$	$\frac{11A}{64}$
$L$	1	2	2	3
$\omega \left(L\right)$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$\omega \left(L\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)\right]$	$\frac{A}{96}$	$\frac{A}{96}$	$\frac{A}{128}$	$\frac{11A}{192}$

From Table 3, the benefits obtained from the supplier allocation are,

$${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)=\frac{A}{96}+\frac{A}{96}+\frac{A}{128}+\frac{11A}{192}=\frac{11A}{128}$$

Table 4. Calculation of ${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)$ based on the allocation of retailer (R).

$\mathit{L}$	R	(S, R)	(M, R)	(S, M, R)
$V\left(L\right)$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}+\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{4}$
$V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	0	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$
$V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$
$L$	1	2	2	3
$\omega \left(L\right)$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$\omega \left(L\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)\right]$	$\frac{A}{192}$	$\frac{A}{384}$	$\frac{A}{192}$	$\frac{A}{24}$

Table 4. Calculation of ${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)$ based on the allocation of retailer (R).

$\mathit{L}$	R	(S, R)	(M, R)	(S, M, R)
$V\left(L\right)$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}+\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{4}$
$V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	0	$\frac{A}{16}$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$
$V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{64}$	$\frac{A}{32}$	$\frac{A}{8}$
$L$	1	2	2	3
$\omega \left(L\right)$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$\omega \left(L\right)\left[V\left(L\right)-V\left(L\backslash \left\{S\right\}\right)\right]$	$\frac{A}{192}$	$\frac{A}{384}$	$\frac{A}{192}$	$\frac{A}{24}$

From Table 4, the benefits to suppliers are,

$${\varphi }_S\left(V\right)=\frac{A}{192}+\frac{A}{384}+\frac{A}{192}+\frac{A}{24}=\frac{7A}{128}$$

5. Modification and Solution of Model Based on CSR

In the actual operation of the supply chain, some members tend to ignore their corporate social responsibility to maximize their own interests, fail to fulfill the cooperation agreement, or even adopt unethical behaviors and transfer the responsibility to other enterprises, which seriously damages the whole interests of the supply chain and the interests of members. Therefore, considering CSR and perfecting the profit allocation mechanism will be conducive to creating a harmonious cooperation relationship, maintaining the security and stability of the supply chain, and achieving sustainable development. In view of this, in order to come up with a more reasonable allocation scheme, the algorithm above is revised in conjunction with the actual level of implementing CSR.

5.1. Model Construction Based on CSR

When the Shapley value method is utilized to allocate supply chain benefits, it is assumed that each member in the supply chain keeps an equal obligation to fulfill its social responsibility. Meanwhile, the supply chain consists of n members, and the level of CSR fulfillment of member i is $r_i$,$0\le r_i\le 1$. $r_i=0$ indicates that the enterprise is too irresponsible to participate in a supply chain. $r_i=1$ shows that the company is fully committed to its CSR and has achieved the ideal state of supply chain cooperation. The purpose of reasonable distribution of benefits is to urge enterprises to actively fulfill their social responsibilities, build a supply chain community of interests and work together to enhance the supply chain’s modernization.

The whole fulfilling level of supply chain social responsibility ’r’ depends on the level of CSR fulfillment of all enterprises in the supply chain, which is expressed as below:

$$r=\frac{1}{n}{\displaystyle \sum }_{i=1}^n{r}_i$$

(26)

The deviation of ‘$\mathsf{\Delta }{r}_i=r_i-r$’ between the level of CSR fulfillment of individual enterprise in the supply chain and the whole one in the supply chain is regarded as a correction parameter to adjust the distribution of benefits, ${\sum }_{i=1}^n\mathsf{\Delta }{r}_i=1$.

$\mathsf{\Delta }{r}_i>0$ ($r_i\ge r$) means that the enterprise has undertaken the relevant corporate responsibility and made a positive contribution to the supply chain; thus, it should share more benefits. $\mathsf{\Delta }{r}_i<0$ ($r_i<r$) means that the enterprise has failed to assume the corresponding responsibility effectively and made a negative impact on the supply chain. The benefits acquired will be reduced accordingly. $\mathsf{\Delta }{r}_i=0$ means that the level of social responsibility fulfillment of the enterprise is consistent with that of the supply chain, so it will not share additional benefits.

If the revenue allocated by the supply chain members is i (i = 1, 2, 3......, n). The whole revenue of the supply chain is $\pi \left(sc\right)$, and $\sum _{i=1}^n\pi \left(i\right)=\pi \left(sc\right)$. Then the adjusted revenue of the supply chain enterprise is:

$$\pi {(i)}^1=\pi \left(i\right)+\Delta R_i\pi \left(sc\right)=\pi \left(i\right)+\left(r_i-r\right)\pi \left(sc\right)$$

(27)

5.2. Example Analysis

Assuming the actual level of social responsibility fulfillment of suppliers, manufacturers and retailers is $r_S=81\%, r_M=63\%, r_R=75\%$, then the whole level of social responsibility of the supply chain is:

$$r=\frac{r_S+r_M+r_R}{3}=73\%$$

The benefit distribution scheme is amended concerning the fulfillment level of CSR of members and their contribution. The benefits revised for suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers are as follow, respectively:

$$\pi {(S)}^1=\frac{7A}{64}+\frac{A}{4}\left(81\%-73\%\right)=\frac{207A}{1600}$$

$$\pi {(M)}^1=\frac{11A}{128}+\frac{A}{4}\left(63\%-73\%\right)=\frac{39A}{640}$$

$$\pi {(R)}^1=\frac{7A}{128}+\frac{A}{4}\left(75\%-73\%\right)\frac{191A}{3200}$$

Conclusion 1: The distribution revised of supply chain benefits based on the level of CSR fulfillment takes enterprises’ contribution into account. From the essence of win-win cooperation in the supply chain, this distribution method can fundamentally curb the core supply chain enterprises squeezing the interests of MSMEs and smallholder farmers. It can also stimulate the core supply chain enterprises to improve their CSR performance and form a closer community of responsibility and interests with MSMEs and smallholder farmers.

6. Relationship Analysis and Policy Suggestions

6.1. Relationship Analysis

6.1.1. Relationship between the CSR Fulfillment Level and the Supply Chain Total Profit

To clarify the relationship between the CSR fulfillment level and the whole supply chain revenue, we conducted the following analysis based on the above-mentioned supply chain revenue model. According to Equation (1), the entire supply chain revenue model can be derived, as shown in Equation (28).

$$\pi \left(SC\right)=\frac{A_{1}c}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}r+\frac{A_1\left(1-\theta -c\theta \right)}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}$$

(28)

$$A_1=\frac{{[a-b\left(C_{R1}+C_{M1}+C_{S1}\right)]}^2}{b}+\frac{{[d+Ve-e\left(C_{R2}+C_{M2}+C_{S2}\right)]}^2}{e}$$

To simplify the calculation, assuming c = 1, we analyzed the relationship between the whole supply chain profit $\pi \left(SC\right)$ and the level of supply chain CSR fulfillment $r$ under the whole level of current social CSR fulfillment ($\theta =30\%$, $\theta =50\%$ and $\theta =70\%$), as shown in Figure 1.

When $\theta =30\%$, the supply chain’s whole profit is as follows:

$$\pi \left(SC\right)=\frac{A_{1}c}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}r+\frac{A_1\left(1-\theta -c\theta \right)}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}=\frac{5A_1}{14}r+\frac{1}{7}{A}_1$$

When $\theta =50\%$, the supply chain’s whole profit is as follows:

$$\pi \left(SC\right)=\frac{A_{1}c}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}r+\frac{A_1\left(1-\theta -c\theta \right)}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}=\frac{A_1}{2}r$$

When $\theta =70\%$, the supply chain’s whole profit is as follows:

$$\pi \left(SC\right)=\frac{A_{1}c}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}r+\frac{A_1\left(1-\theta -c\theta \right)}{4\left(1-\theta \right)}=\frac{5A_1}{6}r-\frac{1}{3}{A}_1$$

Figure 1 reflects the change in supply chain earnings trend with its overall level of social responsibility fulfillment. As the whole level of fulfillment of supply chain social responsibility $r$ increases, the whole supply chain revenue gradually increases. Furthermore, its increase is linearly related to the whole level of CSR fulfillment in the current society.

Conclusion 2: There is a significant linear positive relationship between the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$ and the whole level of CSR in the supply chain $r$. The whole supply chain revenue will rise with the increase of the whole level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain, and the whole benefits that the supply chain members rely on to share will be enlarged.

Conclusion 3: the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$ is negatively correlated with the whole level of CSR fulfillment in the market. In terms of other conditions, the whole supply chain revenue decreases when the whole level of CSR fulfillment in society increases. Conversely, the whole supply chain revenue increases when the whole level of CSR fulfillment in society decreases.

Conclusion 4: The degree of impact of the whole CSR fulfillment level on the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$ varies at different development stages. When the level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain is low, the whole level of CSR fulfillment has a significant effect on the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$; while when the level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain is high, the whole level of CSR fulfillment has a small impact on the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$. In addition, when the level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain reaches nearly 100%, the current overall level of CSR fulfillment has minimal influence on the whole supply chain revenue $\pi \left(SC\right)$.

6.1.2. Relationship between the CSR Fulfillment Level and the Profits of Supply Chain Members

The following study examines the correction of the level of CSR fulfillment on the distribution of profit of the supply chain members. According to Equation (27), the model for suppliers’ earnings distribution can be derived in Equation (29).

$$\pi {(S)}^1=\frac{c{A}_1}{18\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_S^2+\frac{\left(96-96\theta -32c\theta +21c+16c{r}_M+16c{r}_R\right)A_1}{576\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_S+\frac{\left(21-16r_M-16r_R\right)\left(3-3\theta -c\theta +c{r}_M+c{r}_R\right)A_1}{576\left(1-\theta \right)}$$

(29)

Similarly, according to Equation (27), the distribution of manufacturers’ earnings can be shown in Equation (30).

$$\pi {(M)}^1=\frac{c{A}_1}{18\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_M^2+\frac{\left(192-192\theta -64c\theta +33c+32c{r}_S+32c{r}_R\right)A_1}{384\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_M+\frac{\left(33-32r_S-32r_R\right)\left(3-3\theta -c\theta +c{r}_S+c{r}_R\right)A_1}{384\left(1-\theta \right)}$$

(30)

And the retailer’s distributive returns can be derived from Equation (31).

$$\pi {(R)}^1=\frac{c{A}_1}{18\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_R^2+\frac{\left(192-192\theta -64c\theta +21c+32c{r}_M+32cc{r}_S\right)A_1}{384\left(1-\theta \right)}{r}_R+\frac{\left(21-32r_M-32r_R\right)\left(3-3\theta -c\theta +c{r}_M+c{r}_M\right)A_1}{384\left(1-\theta \right)}$$

(31)

According to Equations (29)–(31), the relationship between the earnings of suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers and their level of CSR performance can be derived in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.

Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 reflect the relationship between suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers’ earnings, the level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain, and their developing trends. As the level of social responsibility of supply chain members goes up, the earnings of these members gradually increase, which is related to the whole level of CSR fulfillment $\theta$ currently and the CSR fulfillment level of other members in the supply chain.

Conclusion 5: The profits of supply chain members $\pi \left(i\right)$ are non-linearly and positively correlated with their own CSR fulfillment level, and their growth trajectory is parabolic. At the beginning of the supply chain, member enterprises’ fulfilling social responsibility, the level of CSR fulfillment influences insignificantly the profit of the members in the supply chain. Nevertheless, with a higher level of CSR fulfillment of the members, a greater contribution to enterprises’ earnings will be created.

Conclusion 6: The revenue of supply chain member $\pi \left(i\right)$ is related to the level of social responsibility fulfillment of its partners in the supply chain. The higher the level of social responsibility fulfillment of partner enterprises, the greater the contribution to the revenue of the other members and vice versa.

Conclusion 7: The whole profit of the supply chain $\pi \left(SC\right)$ is positively related to the level of social responsibility fulfillment of supply chain members $r$, and an increase of $r_i$ will lead to an increase in the whole profit of the supply chain.

Conclusion 8: At different stages of development, the degree of influence of the whole level of CSR fulfillment on the profits of supply chain members varies. When the level of CSR fulfillment of supply chain members $r$ is low, the current whole level of CSR fulfillment has an important impact on the profits of supply chain members. While the level of CSR fulfillment of supply chain enterprises $r$ is high, it will result in a minor impact of the current whole level of CSR fulfillment on the profits of supply chain members.

6.2. Policy Suggestions

6.2.1. Suggestions to the Government and Industrial Organization

(1) When the whole level of CSR fulfillment in the market is low, the government and industrial organizations should strengthen policy guidance and CSR awareness and set up benchmarks in the industries and society. The reason is that when the level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain $r$ is low, its revenue is greatly influenced by the average level of CSR fulfillment in society $\theta$ (Conclusion 4 and Conclusion 8), which will lead to some enterprises as opportunists being eager for short-term benefits and adopt “free-riding” to transfer their social responsibility. Therefore, especially at the beginning, policy guidance from government and industry organizations is crucial. First of all, a favorable environment for social responsibility fulfillment can be built by activities such as the annual CSR ranking so as to encourage more enterprises to take up more social responsibility, especially during the period of epidemic. Subsequently, the incentive mechanism related to enterprise income, such as tax concessions, incentives, or subsidies, can be improved to encourage enterprises to realize social responsibility actively, attract more SMEs and small farmers to join the supply chain and participate in the big market for contributing to achieving common prosperity.

(2) With the gradual improvement of the whole level of CSR fulfillment $\theta$, the whole level of CSR fulfillment $\theta$ has less impact on the earnings of supply chain members (Conclusion 3, Conclusion 4, and Conclusion 8) accordingly. In this case, dependence on policy guidance no longer plays a major incentive role, and the government and industry organizations need to increase their supervision, especially in the current construction of building a new development pattern and a unified national market. There is an urgent need to improve the credit system, institutionalize and normalize the annual selection activities, and simultaneously increase taxation, incentives, subsidies, fines, and other rewards and penalties, especially to aggravate penalties, so as to fundamentally curb “free-riding” of quick success, speculation and squeezing SMEs and small farmers. On the “blacklist of social responsibility failures,” all enterprises in society should be urged to fulfill their social responsibilities consciously to create a favorable ecological environment for achieving common prosperity.

(3) When the whole level of CSR fulfillment ‘$\theta$’ is high, the government and industry organizations should incorporate the level of CSR fulfillment into the evaluation and assessment mechanism of enterprises, improve the management system of enterprises, and help promote the formation of a unified national market (Conclusion 1, Conclusion 6 and Conclusion 7). On the one hand, they should accelerate the recycling of EOL products, develop green supply chains and solve the problem of resource shortage. On the other hand, they should motivate enterprises to consciously fulfill their social responsibility to build a harmonious cooperation relationship and business environment among enterprises to expand the common wealth of SMEs and small farmers comprehensively.

6.2.2. Suggestions to Supply Chain Managers

(1) In terms of enterprise management, supply chain managers should attach great importance to CSR extended to the entire supply chain network at all times, build a management mechanism based on CSR, and strive to improve the whole level of CSR fulfillment in the supply chain, and enlarge the whole benefits of the supply chain (Conclusion 2, Conclusion 3).

(2) In the selection of partners, supply chain managers should take the level of CSR fulfillment as an important assessment index and build an evaluation index system based on CSR to attract enterprises with a higher level of social responsibility fulfillment to join to improve the supply chain’s whole performance and the profitability of members (Conclusion 2, Conclusion 7).

(3) In terms of the distribution of cooperation benefits, supply chain managers must take the level of CSR fulfillment as an important distribution indicator because a more reasonable benefit distribution scheme can drive the common development of supply chain stakeholders, and the incentive mechanism improved CSR can comprehensively promote the modernization of the supply chain to help establish the solid national supply chain and realize common prosperity (Conclusion 1, Conclusion 2, Conclusion 7).

6.2.3. Suggestions to Supply Chain Member Enterprises

(1) In terms of the development of enterprises themselves, only through actively fulfilling their social responsibility, holding loyal customers, and creating lasting value can they have the opportunity to achieve more revenue and attain sustainable development (Conclusion 5 and Conclusion 7).

(2) In terms of supply chain practice, supply chain members should always pay attention to social responsibility and try their best to improve the level of CSR fulfillment in order to join the more competitive supply chain. Furthermore, they can share more supply chain benefits while their CSR fulfillment level is higher than the whole fulfillment level of their supply chain (Conclusion 5).

(3) In terms of optimizing the partnership, the profitability of supply chain members will be affected by the CSR fulfillment level of their partners. Therefore, supply chain members should incorporate CSR fulfillment into the cooperation agreement and monitor each other to ensure the common benefits of cooperation (Conclusion 7).

7. Conclusions

This study initially constructed a profit distribution model for four cooperation situations in the supply chain and modified it with the performance level of CSR based on Shapley’s value method and incorporating the elements of CSR. The substantive relationship between the performance level of CSR and the overall benefits of the supply chain and the benefits of member enterprises was analyzed, which would provide theoretical guidance for the government, industrial organizations, and enterprises to promote CSR in the supply chain, help vulnerable groups to eliminate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

(1) The reconstruction and revision of the supply chain income distribution model incorporating CSR can fundamentally and effectively curb the unfairness of supply chain core enterprises squeezing the interests of MSEs and smallholder farmers, build a more fair and reasonable interest distribution model, urging supply chain core enterprises to fulfill their CSR consciously, and form a closer interest community with MSEs and smallholder farmers, and achieve high-quality and sustainable development in the current uncertain environment.

(2) There is a significant linear positive correlation between the supply chain revenue π (S.C.) and its level of CSR fulfillment (r), but a negative correlation between π and the CSR fulfillment level of the individual enterprise (θ) in the market. Meanwhile, supply chain member enterprises’ income π(i) is positively correlated with their CSR performance level (r_i) non-linearly, and their growth trajectory rises in a parabola. In conclusion, only by effectively fulfilling the social responsibilities of supply chain enterprises can jointly maximize the overall benefits of the supply chain and share more benefits.

(3) In different development stages of supply chain CSR, the impact of the overall performance level of CSR (θ) on the overall revenue π (S.C.) of the supply chain is different. The lower the level of CSR in the supply chain, the more significant the impact on the overall revenue π (S.C.) of the supply chain and vice versa. It is urgent for the government, industry organizations, and supply chain managers to take CSR as a practical path to adjust income distribution and achieve common prosperity in combination with different development stages, formulate corresponding incentive and supervision policies, and achieve win-win and sustainable development of all member enterprises in the supply chain.

This study also has some limitations. This paper only considered the factors of CSR, constructed a supply chain benefit distribution and revision model, and analyzed the interaction between CSR and supply chain benefits. Suppose we can conduct an empirical analysis on CSR and income distribution in the supply chain for a specific industry in the later research. In that case, it will be closer to the actual problem, more targeted, and more practical.