The Threshold Effect of Executive Compensation on Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Based on the Moderating Effect of Industry Competition
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypothesis
2.1. Executive Compensation and Corporate Environmental Responsibility
2.2. The Moderating Role of Industry Competition
3. Research Design
3.1. Data Source
3.2. Variable Description
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
3.2.2. Independent Variable
3.2.3. Moderating Variable
3.2.4. Control Variables
3.3. Model Construction
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
4.2. Main Regression Analysis
4.3. Robustness Test
4.3.1. Replacing Explained Variable
4.3.2. Robustness Test Based on the Tobit Model
4.3.3. Endogeneity Test with the Heckman Model
4.3.4. Further Analysis
5. Discussion and Conclusions
5.1. Theoretical Contributions
- (1)
- This study explores the nonlinear relationship between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility, provides a new perspective for the study of executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility, and constructs a unique analysis framework by introducing industry competition. The upper echelon theory holds that executives, as decision makers and executors of corporate environmental responsibility, are motivated by marginal benefits and costs [5]. Executive compensation is a key factor affecting corporate environmental responsibility. Increases in compensation enhance the self-confidence of executives, who will actively engage in corporate environmental responsibility and other social welfare activities. In addition, the ERG theory believes that low-level needs can gradually develop into high-level needs. Salary incentives are a crucial factor in the living standards of executives. When executives’ salaries are low, they will only pay attention to the financial performance and economic benefits of the company and ignore the implementation of other indicators of the company (such as corporate environmental responsibilities). When executive compensation crosses a certain boundary, the material living standards of executives are greatly improved, and executives whose material desires are satisfied will pursue higher-level needs, such as the fulfillment of corporate environmental responsibilities. Being able to manage higher-level needs and being able to demonstrate to other members of the board of directors and the public media of their noble moral qualities will help increase their reputation and promotion chances [76]. The results here show a U-shaped threshold effect between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility.
- (2)
- This study provides a new theoretical basis for industry competition to ease the threshold effect of executive compensation and enhance corporate environmental responsibility, and it further expands the stakeholder theory, agency theory, and other related theories. The stakeholder theory believes that companies should pay attention to stakeholders related to their production and operation, including investors, suppliers, and consumers. The needs and expectations of these stakeholders will directly affect the survival and development of the enterprise [33]. In the process of production and development, enterprises will face many industry competitors who provide similar or substitute products. The ability to survive and grow under industry competition requires enterprises to commit and implement in social welfare activities. Actively fulfilling corporate environmental responsibilities can maximize the interests of stakeholders related to the production and operation, improve the economic benefits, and strengthen the core competitiveness of the enterprise. A reasonable compensation mechanism can effectively promote corporate executive’s environmental awareness, prompting corporate executives to perform corporate environmental responsibilities and improve corporate environment. This paper uses industry competition as a moderating variable to test the U-shaped threshold effect of industry competition that eases executive compensation and enhances corporate environmental responsibility. This enriches expands the connotation of the stakeholder theory.
- (3)
- This paper explores the nonlinear relationship between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility, expands previous studies on the linear relationship of corporate environmental responsibility, and is the echo and expansion of the existing research. This paper argues that executive compensation has a significant U-shaped threshold effect on corporate environmental responsibility, and industry competition alleviates this U-shaped threshold effect. The conclusions of this paper expand the current research on CEO compensation and environmental strategies based on linear relationships, including the view based on management theory that the CEO acts in a non-profit rather than a completely selfish manner, so there is no need for explicit compensation measures to motivate the CEO to meet their environmental commitments [12]; that is, there is an inverse relationship between CEO compensation and environmental reputation/social responsibility [11,16,18,77], there seems to be a lack of link between incentives and corporate sustainability [78]. Based on institutional theory, institutional theory and environmental management research, some scholars believe that there is a positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility [23,41,43]. Some studies have shown that the pay differences between the CEO and other executives prompt the CEO to assume more social responsibility, so limiting the financial incentives of senior executives may damage their motivation to participate in corporate social responsibility [21,44]. In addition, some studies believe that incentive dominance has an inverted U-shaped effect on corporate performance [79], but overall, there is not much literature to explore the u-shaped relationship between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility. Most of the existing literature believes that there is a positive or negative linear relationship between executive compensation and corporate environmental responsibility. However, this view may be one-sided, which separates the relationship between executive demand stage and pursuit level. In this paper, based on the theory of demand hierarchy, and through the introduction of industry competition, this paper defines the boundary conditions of executive compensation affecting corporate environmental responsibility from different levels of demand, different degrees of competition in different industries, and under a variety of heterogeneous conditions. The findings of this paper not only provide new empirical evidence for giving full play to the incentive role of executive compensation in corporate environmental responsibility, but also deepen the understanding of corporate governance in eastern emerging economies.
5.2. Practical Contributions
5.3. Limitations
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Term | Symbol | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | Corporate environmental responsibility | Envrep | The eight indicators of environmental responsibility in (CNRDS) are weighted and averaged to measure corporate environmental responsibility. |
Independent variable | Executive compensation | Pay | The total salary of the top three executives and take the logarithm. |
Moderating variable | Industry competition | IC | The ratio of the total sales of the top four companies in the industry to the total sales of the entire industry. To maintain consistency in direction, a minus sign is used as a measure of industry competition. |
Control variables | Enterprise size | Size | Natural logarithm of total assets. |
Enterprise age | Age | The cumulative number of years from the establishment of the company to the current year. | |
Return on total assets | Roa | After-tax net profit to total assets, it is used to measure net profit per unit of assets creates. | |
Debt to assets ratio | Debt_a | Total debt to total assets. | |
Revenue growth rate | Grow | The ratio of the increase in business income this year to the total business income of the previous year. | |
Business nature | Soe | State-owned enterprise is 1, non-state-owned enterprise is 0. | |
Environmental investment | Env_inv | The proportion of investment in environmental pollution control of each province (city) in local GDP. | |
Environmental monitoring | Env_moni | The number of provincial (municipal) environmental monitoring agencies, plus 1 before taking the logarithm. | |
Environmental standards | Env_stad | The number of local environmental protection standards issued by each province (city) that year, plus 1 before taking the logarithm. | |
Environmental reports | Env_repo | The number of environmental protection reports in each province (city), plus 1 before taking the logarithm. |
Variable | Mean | SD | Min | Max | Observations |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Envrep | 3.160 | 1.620 | 0 | 8 | 3667 |
Pay | 0 | 1 | −10.94 | 4.780 | 3667 |
IC | 0 | 1 | −7.780 | 0.870 | 3667 |
Size | 22.73 | 1.320 | 20.17 | 26.02 | 3667 |
Age | 16.96 | 5.230 | 5 | 31 | 3667 |
Roa | 0.050 | 0.060 | −0.160 | 0.220 | 3667 |
Debt_a | 0.460 | 0.190 | 0.060 | 0.900 | 3667 |
Grow | 0.150 | 0.290 | −0.430 | 1.530 | 3667 |
Soe | 0.560 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 | 3667 |
Env_inv | 1.250 | 0.680 | 0.060 | 4.660 | 3667 |
Env_moni | 5.560 | 1.040 | 2.560 | 7.030 | 3667 |
Env_stad | 0.680 | 0.800 | 0 | 4.600 | 3667 |
Env_repo | 8.910 | 1.330 | 0 | 11.56 | 3667 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | |
Pay | 0.046 | −0.978 *** | −0.986 *** | −0.903 *** |
(1.43) | (−3.22) | (−3.25) | (−2.94) | |
Pay2 | 1.046 *** | 1.054 *** | 0.971 *** | |
(3.39) | (3.42) | (3.12) | ||
IC | 0.031 | 0.057 * | ||
(1.02) | (1.72) | |||
IC×Pay2 | 0.045 * | |||
(1.85) | ||||
Size | 0.358 *** | 0.344 *** | 0.343 *** | 0.344 *** |
(12.62) | (11.98) | (11.95) | (12.00) | |
Age | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
(1.44) | (1.35) | (1.37) | (1.42) | |
Roa | 0.037 | −0.059 | −0.061 | −0.097 |
(0.07) | (−0.11) | (−0.12) | (−0.18) | |
Debt_a | 0.010 | −0.002 | 0.014 | 0.007 |
(0.06) | (−0.01) | (0.08) | (0.04) | |
Grow | −0.090 | −0.082 | −0.082 | −0.087 |
(−1.03) | (−0.94) | (−0.94) | (−0.99) | |
Soe | 0.047 | 0.062 | 0.061 | 0.062 |
(0.79) | (1.04) | (1.02) | (1.04) | |
Env_inv | 0.081 | 0.085 | 0.083 | 0.085 |
(1.29) | (1.35) | (1.32) | (1.35) | |
Env_moni | −0.072 | −0.064 | −0.064 | −0.060 |
(−0.53) | (−0.48) | (−0.47) | (−0.44) | |
Env_stad | 0.021 | 0.020 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
(0.54) | (0.51) | (0.48) | (0.46) | |
Env_repo | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.050 | 0.048 |
(1.15) | (1.15) | (1.18) | (1.14) | |
Constant | −7.326 *** | −7.061 *** | −7.023 *** | −7.051 *** |
(−6.95) | (−6.69) | (−6.65) | (−6.68) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Area | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 |
Stkcd | 561 | 561 | 561 | 561 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Envrep_sub | Envrep_sub | Envrep_sub | Envrep_sub | |
Pay | 0.020 * | −0.330 *** | −0.335 *** | −0.305 *** |
(1.88) | (−3.31) | (−3.36) | (−3.03) | |
Pay2 | 0.357 *** | 0.362 *** | 0.332 *** | |
(3.53) | (3.57) | (3.25) | ||
IC | 0.019 * | 0.029 *** | ||
(1.94) | (2.62) | |||
IC×Pay2 | 0.016 ** | |||
(2.04) | ||||
Size | 0.116 *** | 0.111 *** | 0.111 *** | 0.111 *** |
(12.46) | (11.81) | (11.76) | (11.82) | |
Age | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** |
(2.35) | (2.27) | (2.30) | (2.36) | |
Roa | −0.017 | −0.050 | −0.051 | −0.064 |
(−0.10) | (−0.29) | (−0.29) | (−0.37) | |
Debt_a | 0.032 | 0.028 | 0.038 | 0.035 |
(0.56) | (0.49) | (0.66) | (0.61) | |
Grow | −0.037 | −0.034 | −0.035 | −0.036 |
(−1.29) | (−1.19) | (−1.20) | (−1.26) | |
Soe | 0.061 *** | 0.066 *** | 0.065 *** | 0.065 *** |
(3.08) | (3.34) | (3.31) | (3.33) | |
Env_inv | 0.025 | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.025 |
(1.19) | (1.24) | (1.19) | (1.23) | |
Env_moni | −0.023 | −0.021 | −0.020 | −0.019 |
(−0.53) | (−0.47) | (−0.46) | (−0.43) | |
Env_stad | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
(0.38) | (0.34) | (0.28) | (0.26) | |
Env_repo | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.023* | 0.023 |
(1.60) | (1.60) | (1.66) | (1.62) | |
Constant | −3.557 *** | −3.466 *** | −3.442 *** | −3.452 *** |
(−10.25) | (−9.98) | (−9.91) | (−9.94) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Area | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 |
Stkcd | 561 | 561 | 561 | 561 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | |
Pay | 0.045 | −0.967 *** | −0.976 *** | −0.887 *** |
(1.36) | (−3.11) | (−3.13) | (−2.82) | |
Pay2 | 1.033 *** | 1.042 *** | 0.953 *** | |
(3.27) | (3.30) | (2.98) | ||
IC | 0.033 | 0.061 * | ||
(1.07) | (1.79) | |||
IC×Pay2 | 0.048 * | |||
(1.93) | ||||
Size | 0.362 *** | 0.347 *** | 0.346 *** | 0.348 *** |
(12.41) | (11.79) | (11.76) | (11.81) | |
Age | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
(1.39) | (1.31) | (1.33) | (1.38) | |
Roa | 0.102 | 0.006 | 0.004 | −0.035 |
(0.19) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (−0.06) | |
Debt_a | 0.036 | 0.024 | 0.040 | 0.033 |
(0.20) | (0.13) | (0.22) | (0.18) | |
Grow | −0.088 | −0.079 | −0.080 | −0.085 |
(−0.97) | (−0.88) | (−0.89) | (−0.94) | |
Soe | 0.053 | 0.067 | 0.066 | 0.068 |
(0.86) | (1.10) | (1.08) | (1.11) | |
Env_inv | 0.088 | 0.092 | 0.090 | 0.092 |
(1.37) | (1.42) | (1.39) | (1.42) | |
Env_moni | −0.075 | −0.068 | −0.067 | −0.063 |
(−0.54) | (−0.49) | (−0.48) | (−0.45) | |
Env_stad | 0.027 | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.024 |
(0.69) | (0.66) | (0.63) | (0.61) | |
Env_repo | 0.052 | 0.052 | 0.053 | 0.052 |
(1.19) | (1.19) | (1.22) | (1.18) | |
Constant | −7.669 *** | −7.403 *** | −7.363 *** | −7.387 *** |
(−7.03) | (−6.78) | (−6.74) | (−6.77) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Area | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 | 3667 |
Stkcd | 561 | 561 | 561 | 561 |
Panel A: First-Step Regression—Estimating Inverse Mills | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Size | Age | Roa | Debt_a | Tobin | Ebit | Board | Lid_r | Cons | Year and Ind and Area | N | R2 | |
Envrep | 0.254 *** | 0.006 | 0.070 | −0.029 | 0.003 | −0.014 | 0.031 ** | −0.032 ** | −5.735 *** | Yes | 3702 | 0.129 |
Dummy | (8.94) | (1.17) | (0.13) | (−0.14) | (0.15) | (−0.85) | (2.11) | (−2.17) | (−8.79) | – | – | – |
Panel B: Second-Step Regression—Introducing Inverse Mills | ||||||||||||
Dependent Variable: Corporate Environmental Responsibility | ||||||||||||
Model 11 | Model 12 | Model 13 | Model 14 | |||||||||
Pay | 0.043 (1.30) | −0.997 *** (−3.24) | −1.005 *** (−3.26) | −0.918 *** (−2.95) | ||||||||
Pay2 | – | 1.062 *** (3.40) | 1.069 *** (3.42) | 0.982 *** (3.10) | ||||||||
IC | – | – | 0.030 (0.96) | 0.057 * (1.65) | ||||||||
IC×Pay2 | – | – | – | 0.046 * (1.81) | ||||||||
Size | 0.257 *** (4.62) | 0.233 *** (4.16) | 0.234 *** (4.18) | 0.233 *** (4.16) | ||||||||
Age | 0.003 (0.52) | 0.002 (0.40) | 0.003 (0.42) | 0.003 (0.45) | ||||||||
Roa | −0.291 (−0.53) | −0.392 (−0.72) | −0.394 (−0.72) | −0.435 (−0.80) | ||||||||
Debt_a | −0.071 (−0.38) | −0.094 (−0.50) | −0.077 (−0.41) | −0.088 (−0.47) | ||||||||
Grow | −0.099 (−1.10) | −0.092 (−1.02) | −0.093 (−1.03) | −0.097 (−1.07) | ||||||||
Soe | 0.036 (0.58) | 0.050 (0.82) | 0.049 (0.80) | 0.050 (0.82) | ||||||||
Env_inv | 0.077 (1.19) | 0.081 (1.25) | 0.079 (1.22) | 0.080 (1.24) | ||||||||
Env_moni | −0.042 (−0.30) | −0.035 (−0.25) | −0.034 (−0.25) | −0.030 (−0.22) | ||||||||
Env_stad | 0.028 (0.71) | 0.027 (0.68) | 0.025 (0.64) | 0.024 (0.61) | ||||||||
Env_repo | 0.037 (0.86) | 0.037 (0.85) | 0.038 (0.88) | 0.037 (0.84) | ||||||||
IMR | −0.766 ** (−2.09) | −0.837 ** (−2.28) | −0.822 ** (−2.24) | −0.846 ** (−2.31) | ||||||||
Constant | −2.616 (−1.54) | −2.077 (−1.22) | −2.094 (−1.23) | −2.026 (−1.19) | ||||||||
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||
Area | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||
Observations | 3561 | 3561 | 3561 | 3561 | ||||||||
Stkcd | 0.235 | 0.238 | 0.238 | 0.239 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | Envrep | |
Pay | −1.376 *** | −0.593 | −0.725 ** | −0.291 | −1.208 *** | 1.374 |
(−3.91) | (−0.62) | (−2.19) | (−0.21) | (−3.72) | (1.32) | |
Pay2 | 1.515 *** | 0.590 | 0.741 ** | 0.448 | 1.378 *** | −1.495 |
(4.08) | (0.63) | (2.19) | (0.32) | (4.13) | (−1.45) | |
IC | 0.001 | 0.110 ** | 0.066 | 0.064 | 0.028 | 0.115 * |
(0.02) | (2.00) | (1.48) | (1.24) | (0.72) | (1.69) | |
IC×Pay2 | 0.076 * | 0.041 | 0.136 *** | −0.001 | 0.025 | 0.051 |
(1.73) | (1.22) | (2.78) | (−0.02) | (0.68) | (1.29) | |
Size | 0.358 *** | 0.324 *** | 0.419 *** | 0.137 ** | 0.307 *** | 0.319 *** |
(9.57) | (6.40) | (8.55) | (2.19) | (8.31) | (6.66) | |
Age | 0.018 ** | 0.012 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.009 | −0.001 |
(2.09) | (1.51) | (1.50) | (1.12) | (1.42) | (−0.12) | |
Roa | −0.135 | −0.137 | −1.314 | 0.692 | −1.271 ** | 2.935 *** |
(−0.19) | (−0.18) | (−1.60) | (1.00) | (−1.97) | (3.19) | |
Debt_a | −0.035 | 0.176 | −0.188 | 0.342 | −0.065 | 0.250 |
(−0.15) | (0.64) | (−0.63) | (1.55) | (−0.30) | (0.81) | |
Grow | −0.164 | 0.015 | −0.065 | −0.103 | −0.047 | −0.161 |
(−1.42) | (0.12) | (−0.53) | (−0.85) | (−0.42) | (−1.15) | |
Soe | 0.134 | −0.061 | 0.008 | 0.029 | ||
(1.50) | (−0.73) | (0.11) | (0.27) | |||
Env_inv | 0.239 *** | −0.114 | 0.062 | 0.089 | 0.111 | 0.073 |
(2.87) | (−1.19) | (0.63) | (1.13) | (1.40) | (0.65) | |
Env_moni | −0.077 | −0.035 | 0.121 | −0.216 | −0.139 | 0.227 |
(−0.42) | (−0.17) | (0.58) | (−1.24) | (−0.78) | (0.91) | |
Env_stad | 0.052 | −0.010 | −0.027 | 0.069 | 0.061 | −0.033 |
(1.02) | (−0.18) | (−0.51) | (1.30) | (1.22) | (−0.48) | |
Env_repo | 0.006 | 0.095 | 0.030 | 0.047 | −0.009 | 0.167 ** |
(0.12) | (1.41) | (0.46) | (0.88) | (−0.16) | (2.34) | |
Constant | −8.300 *** | −7.411 *** | −9.496 *** | −1.803 | −6.023 *** | −8.589 *** |
(−5.83) | (−3.93) | (−5.24) | (−1.06) | (−4.07) | (−4.13) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Area | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2084 | 1583 | 1855 | 1812 | 2408 | 1259 |
Stkcd | 272 | 312 | 313 | 381 | 380 | 181 |
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Zhang, Y.; Zhang, X. The Threshold Effect of Executive Compensation on Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Based on the Moderating Effect of Industry Competition. Sustainability 2022, 14, 8711. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148711
Zhang Y, Zhang X. The Threshold Effect of Executive Compensation on Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Based on the Moderating Effect of Industry Competition. Sustainability. 2022; 14(14):8711. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148711
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Yang, and Xinxin Zhang. 2022. "The Threshold Effect of Executive Compensation on Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Based on the Moderating Effect of Industry Competition" Sustainability 14, no. 14: 8711. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148711