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Article

The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market

by
Ping Fang
1,
Liang Wan
2,* and
Wenpei Fang
3
1
School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
2
School of Public Affairs, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
3
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Energies 2023, 16(17), 6110; https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
Submission received: 1 June 2023 / Revised: 9 July 2023 / Accepted: 16 August 2023 / Published: 22 August 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Extreme Climate, Electricity–Carbon Markets, and Digitalization)
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Abstract

:
Improving the level of cooperative governance of open innovation projects is a key bridge and powerful starting point for promoting the full integration and coordinated development of different market systems. Against the background of the synergy of the electricity–carbon market, this study explores how a company chooses a cooperative governance mechanism and the implementation effects of governance mechanisms. The results, based on the sample data from 175 OIPs of companies in China, show that the collaborative dependence of a company promotes the implementation of relational governance; however, it has no significant effect on contract control. Meanwhile, both relational governance and contract control have significant positive effects on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. Moreover, knowledge transfer plays a mediating role in relational governance, contract control, and cooperative performance. The conclusion enriches the understanding of cooperative governance mechanisms, which has important implications for management research and the practice of open innovation projects. It also has certain practical significance for helping the power industry to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality.

1. Introduction

Responding to the increasingly severe climate change crisis and achieving the goal of net-zero carbon emissions is the general consensus of major countries in the world [1]. About 70% of the world’s carbon emissions come from the energy sector, and electricity is the single largest carbon emitter sector in the energy sector, accounting for more than 40% of China’s total carbon emissions [2]. The achievement of the carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals of the power sector, as well as an effective and extensive carbon trading market, are crucial to achieving the overall goal [3]. The findings of Gurrib et al. support the fact that there is an increase in energy efficiency where policymakers in China, Europe, and Japan are placing more emphasis on higher energy standards in construction and encouraging, through government support, the adoption of cleaner technologies, such as electric heat pumps, in light of higher fuel prices restraining consumer purchasing power [4]. At present, both China’s carbon market and electricity market are in their infancy and seem to operate independently of each other, but they have a natural connection in terms of trading subjects, trading products, and price correlation, and as the coupling and coordinated development of the electricity and carbon markets has become an inevitable trend, all these relevant topics belong to academic frontier issues [5]. Based on this, promoting the governance level of open cooperative innovation projects under the electricity–carbon market is a key bridge and a powerful starting point for promoting the full integration and coordinated development of different market systems, and it is also an important starting point for deepening the reform of the electricity market and realizing the “dual carbon” goal.
In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, the electricity industry has widely adopted open innovation projects for external cooperation to gain competitive advantages. For example, as early as 2016, the Beijing Environment Exchange and Shangneng Power Group jointly created the “Electric Carbon Treasure” product, and as recently as early 2022, Hubei province signed China’s first “Framework Agreement on Coordinated Development and Cooperation of Electricity–Carbon Market” to promote the coordinated development of the carbon market and the electricity market. Meanwhile, under the pressure of a highly competitive environment, more and more enterprises are choosing to cross organizational boundaries and integrate external knowledge and capabilities with the help of open innovation. Research shows that research and development (R&D) collaboration can effectively improve innovation performance [6,7,8,9,10]. Specifically, open innovation takes the project as the carrier, and the project is carried out by the cooperation of a focal company and partners using cross-organizational cooperation teams. Therefore, Chesbrough et al. proposed exploring open innovation at the level of R&D projects [11].
In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, governance mechanisms are an effective way for companies to deal with cooperation issues and prevent opportunistic risks [12,13]. In cross-organizational relationships, organizations manage cooperative activities through contract control and relationship governance, and some studies have proven that governance mechanisms significantly impact operational performance and customer satisfaction in supplier relationship studies [14]. However, governance mechanisms are still relatively insufficient according to open innovation project management research. Previous studies have only considered the effect and choice of governance mechanism from a single perspective of the focal company or the cooperative partners. For example, Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma believe that the cooperation purpose of focal companies (strategic cooperation or short-term cooperation) affects the choice of governance mechanism [12], and Wu et al. believe that enterprise resource input (specific assets) affects the implementation and effect of the governance mechanism [15]. Clauss and Kesting took cooperative instruction in industry–university–research cooperation as the research object and verified that the governance mechanism has a significant impact on knowledge integration, learning, and creation [16]. However, few studies have considered the potential role of partnership, and Chesbrough et al. proposed that partnership was an important factor in project-level studies of open innovation [11].
In open innovation projects (OIPs), the goal realization of the focal company depends on the knowledge and ability of the partners, and the partners need to create and share relevant knowledge in the process of cooperation, which makes the focal company and the cooperative partners form a relationship with a certain degree of cooperative dependence. Thompson pointed out, using organization theory, that organizations adopt specific ways to manage their dependence on the environment [17]. When the focal company has different degrees of cooperation dependence, it will have different rights and attitudes towards the cooperative partners, and these rebound to affect the governance mechanism of the focal company. At the same time, the governance mechanism is an important tool for the focal company to manage cooperative dependencies, and it will directly affect the process and results of cooperation [14,18]. First of all, knowledge transfer is the process of the cooperation dependence of the focal company, which acquires external knowledge through knowledge transfer [19]. This forms a process dependent on the cooperative partners and requires corresponding governance measures. Secondly, knowledge transfer is conducive to internal and external knowledge fusion and innovation, thus promoting the achievement of the cooperation goals. Therefore, from the perspective of cooperative dependence, this study explores how the focal company chooses an optimal governance mechanism in open innovation projects, and what influence the governance mechanism has on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance.
Under the background of dual carbon target constraints and the accelerated construction of a new power system, the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market has become an inevitable trend. After combing the literature, the current research on the electricity–carbon market has accumulated results in Western countries. However, China’s research on the electricity–carbon market is still in its infancy, mostly based on theoretical analysis and lack of systematic consideration. In terms of research content, the current research focuses on the following aspects: research on the coupling and coordinated development mechanism of electricity market and carbon market [20,21]; research on the formation mechanism of electricity comprehensive cost under the synergy of electricity–carbon market [22,23,24]; research on the joint operation mechanism under the coordination of electricity market and carbon market [25,26]. However, relevant research on cooperative innovation under the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market is relatively rare. Recent studies, such as Sun et al., began to discuss the noncooperative game equilibrium analysis of the electricity–carbon market, and provided suggestions for the mechanism construction of the electricity market and the carbon emission rights market based on the conclusions obtained [27]. Therefore, the research in this paper is helpful to enrich the research perspective and research content under the synergy of the electricity–carbon market.
Based on the points mentioned above, against the background of coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, by establishing a theoretical model and conducting an empirical analysis of 175 OIPs, this paper makes several contributions to the study of open innovation project management. First, it finds the basis for the selection of cooperative governance mechanism, among which the focal company cooperation dependence positively impacts the implementation of relationship governance. In contrast, contract control is more independent and not affected by cooperative dependencies. Second, this study proves that the governance mechanism positively impacts knowledge transfer and cooperation performance, indicating that the governance mechanism is an important guarantee to achieve cooperation goals. Third, this work reveals that knowledge transfer is an important process objective of governance mechanism; that is, knowledge transfer plays a significant mediating role in the governance mechanism and cooperation performance. Therefore, the research results of this paper have important practical significance for the management of open innovation projects; they are also of certain practical significance for promoting the power industry to achieve the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality.

2. Concept Definition

2.1. Cooperation Dependence

Among organizations, dependency refers to the organization’s requirements for key resources and the alternatives to key resource providers [28,29]. The evaluation of interorganizational dependency involves aspects such as substitutability and the essentiality of related resources to the organization. Specifically, the dependence of Organization A on Organization B is proportional to the resources that B can provide to A, and inversely proportional to the number of other organizations that can provide the same resources to A. Meanwhile, the power dependence theory shows that there is a symbiotic relationship between dependence and rights. In the process of social exchange, the dependent organization B will have corresponding rights in relation to the dependent organization A [28]. OIPs are innovative activities between different organizations. Such a project is usually initiated by the focal company, and it carries out innovation project cooperation by selecting external partners, including consumers, suppliers, competitors, universities, and research institutions [30]. Based on the resource dependence theory, the cross-organizational relationship between the focal company and the cooperative partners in OIPs is interdependent on resources and capabilities. Therefore, this paper defines cooperative dependence as a state in which one partner cannot grasp all the conditions to achieve the expected innovation goals, forcing that party to depend on the resources and capabilities of the other party.

2.2. Governance Mechanism

Governance is crucial to the stability of exchange relations [31]). Governance involves one organization influencing the behavior, process, and output of another organization through its power and mechanism [32]. Generally speaking, the adoption of a governance mechanism in a cooperative relationship contains two purposes: to control opportunistic behavior and to promote cooperative activities [33,34]. In cross-organization relationships, the governance mechanism usually includes formal contract control and informal relationship governance [16,35,36].

2.2.1. Contract Control

Contract control originates from transaction cost theory [37]. According to the transaction cost theory, due to bounded rationality, organizations cannot accurately predict the future situation before the transaction, leading to the risk of opportunistic behavior in the transaction process [38]. Liu et al. points out that contract control governs cooperative relationships through legal regulations and incentive mechanisms, seeking to mitigate the uncertainty of cooperation and reduce opportunistic behaviors in the process of cooperation [39]. Specifically, the formal contract will clearly specify the transaction details, cooperation process, rights, and obligations of the parties, and way to deal with various potential problems. Therefore, the effect of contract control depends on the accurate definition and reasonable control of cooperation roles, cooperation processes, and performance requirements [34]. However, in reality, a contract cannot cover all potential situations that may occur in the future; it can only deal with issues and conflicts that are explicitly covered in the terms of the contract [14].

2.2.2. Relationship Governance

Relationship governance originates from the social exchange theory. This type of governance pays great attention to personal factors in social exchange, involving trust, personal relationship, social identity, and mutual understanding [40,41,42,43,44]. Liu et al. point out that relationship governance emphasizes internal and moral control and effectively manages cooperative relationships by establishing consistent cooperative goals and a favorable cooperative atmosphere [39]. At the same time, relationship governance is characterized by frequent interpersonal interactions and is based on social relationship management of partners’ behaviors (e.g., informal personal communication) [14,41].
Previous studies show that trust and personal relationship formed based on relationship governance can effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors of partners [12,38]. Although relationship governance does not clearly stipulate what cooperative behaviors partners should take, trust can gradually improve partners’ sense of identity and make them commit more to the cooperative relationship [14]. On the one hand, it will make partners resist opportunism spontaneously; on the other hand, partners will also enhance their confidence in the reliability of cooperation and take the initiative to adopt “win–win” cooperation behaviors to promote the establishment of long-term cooperative relationships [18,42].

2.3. Knowledge Transfer

Knowledge transfer is an important concept in the field of knowledge management. Liyanage et al. defined knowledge transfer as the process of conveying specific information from one person or organization to another [45]. In the process of knowledge transfer across organizations, Kumar and Ganesh pointed out that the knowledge-demanding side will purposefully accept and use the knowledge shared by the knowledge provider [46].
Open innovation project is a typical cross-organizational, knowledge-intensive activity. The focal company launches open innovation projects to solve innovation problems by using external knowledge [47]. Therefore, the realization of open innovation goals requires partners to transfer knowledge to the focal company.

3. Research Hypothesis

3.1. Focal Company Cooperative Dependence and Governance Mechanism

Chesbrough proposed that enterprises can make use of knowledge and technology outside the organization for innovation; that is, use open innovation [48]. Open innovation requires enterprises to choose external partners for innovation collaboration across organizational boundaries. Therefore, in the open innovation project, the realization of the innovation goal of the focal company depends on the knowledge and technology of the cooperative partner; thus, the focal company relies on their partners for cooperation.
Due to differences in internal conditions and cooperation needs of the focal company, the focal company shows different degrees of dependence in different cooperation projects. According to the power-dependence theory, dependence determines the distribution of power among organizations [28]. When the focal company relies more on cooperation, its power in the cooperative relationship is weaker, and the cooperative partners will have more power in the cooperative relationship. The increase of the power of partners will not only enhance their autonomy in the process of cooperation, but also make the focal company face greater opportunistic risks. Contract control is an effective measure to prevent opportunistic behavior in cooperative relations [39]. To protect their interests in the cooperation, the focal company in a weak position of power will clearly define the objectives, rights, and obligations of cooperation through the contract, and will strengthen the evaluation of cooperation in the process of cooperation.
Sako and Helper pointed out that dependence strengthens partnerships [49]. According to the resource dependence theory, the focal company has a cooperative dependence on the partners, indicating that the partners constitute key resources for the success of innovative projects, and the partners are irreplaceable. This requires the focal company to strengthen its ties with the cooperative partner and adopt positive governance methods to promote the establishment of cooperative trust between the two sides to ensure that the focal company can effectively use the key resources of the cooperative partner. At the same time, Rusbult et al. pointed out that a company’s dependence on partners leads to a commitment to partnerships [50]. In the innovative cooperative relationship, the cooperation dependence of the focal company will also strengthen its attention to the cooperative relationship, and the focal company will devote itself to establishing a long-term cooperative relationship with the cooperative partner.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H1a. 
In open innovation projects, the focal company’s level of dependence on the cooperative partner is positively correlated with the degree of contract control.
H1b. 
In open innovation projects, the focal company’s level of dependence on the cooperative partner is positively correlated with the degree of relationship governance.

3.2. Governance Mechanism and Cooperative Performance

In cross-organizational open innovation projects, contract control and relationship governance are two common mechanisms for the focal company to governance partnerships. Among them, contract control ensures cooperative tasks and cooperative relations through the establishment of clear rules [39]. Specifically, contracts manage the cooperative partner by punishing breaches of contract and rewarding cooperative behavior. On the one hand, punishing breaches of contract can control the opportunistic behavior of partners and reduce the risk of cooperation; on the other hand, rewarding cooperative behavior can motivate partners to participate actively and promote cooperation integration.
Relationship governance encourages initiative to take relevant actions beneficial to the interests of partners with the help of social identity, social norms, mutual understanding, and trust. Poppo et al. pointed out that relationship governance can enhance the confidence of partners to establish long-term cooperative relationships [42]. At the same time, Yang et al. pointed out that the adoption of relationship governance by focal company can improve the cooperation satisfaction of partners [14]. As a result, the cooperative partners who are satisfied with and have confidence in OIPs will take the initiative to reduce opportunistic behavior and may increase investment in cooperation.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H2a. 
In open innovation projects, contract control by the focal company positively impacts cooperative performance.
H2b. 
In open innovation projects, relationship governance by the focal company positively impacts cooperative performance.

3.3. Governance Mechanism and Knowledge Transfer

The cooperative contract of an open innovation project is a formal agreement signed by the focal company and the cooperative partner, and the items in the agreement (e.g., cooperation objectives, rights, obligations) have legal effect. According to the transaction cost theory, contract control defines the cooperative relationship between the two parties in a legal form and guards against potential transaction risks; the contract will effectively control transaction costs and build a stable transaction environment. As a result, under the control of the contract, the interests of both parties can be effectively protected, thus laying a stable foundation for an environment promoting knowledge transfer in the process of cooperation.
Compared with contract control, relationship governance has advantages for unforeseen problems in the process of cooperation [51]. Hoetker and Mellewigt pointed out that relationship governance can promote trust, dependence, and cooperation between partners [34]. On the basis of trust, the two parties will carry out open communication and information sharing, but beyond that, the cooperative partner will voluntarily take risks and share special knowledge beyond the provisions of the contract [52]. At the same time, relationship governance can make the two parties understand each other and form a better tacit understanding of cooperation, which will also promote the integration and absorption of knowledge in the process of cooperation.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H3a. 
In open innovation projects, contract control by focal company positively impacts knowledge transfer.
H3b. 
In open innovation projects, relationship governance by focal company positively impacts knowledge transfer.

3.4. Knowledge Transfer and Cooperative Performance

Open innovation is a process in which the focal company absorbs knowledge from external cooperative partner and creates new knowledge [53,54]. In this process, the premise is the knowledge transfer from external cooperative partner. Knowledge transfer enables the focal company to directly acquire and use external knowledge in innovation [54], such as the cooperative partner transfer reports and technical documents that will directly help the focal company. In addition, knowledge transfer also promotes the generation of new knowledge [54]. When the knowledge of the cooperative partner and the original knowledge of the focal company complement each other and are transferred and exchanged, new values (e.g., ideas, knowledge, technology) may be created [18,55]. In particular, the transfer of the cooperative partner’s tacit knowledge helps the focal company form new innovation capabilities and achieve better cooperation performance.
In OIPs, contract control and relationship governance establish the basis and platform for cooperation. On the one hand, contract control provides a guarantee for knowledge transfer; on the other hand, relationship governance also builds confidence for the cooperative partner to share knowledge. Under the role of contract control and relationship governance, the efficiency of knowledge transfer between partners will be effectively improved, and the improved knowledge transfer promotes the performance of OIPs.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H4a. 
In open innovation projects, knowledge transfer positively impacts cooperative performance.
H4b. 
Knowledge transfer plays an intermediary role in contract control and cooperative performance.
H4c. 
Knowledge transfer plays an intermediary role in relationship governance and cooperative performance.
Based on hypothetical logic analysis, this paper draws on the dependence-rights theory, resource dependence theory, transaction cost theory, and social exchange theory, and proposes a theoretical framework model for the selection of focal company governance mechanisms and governance effects in open cooperative innovation. As shown in Figure 1, based on the background of collaborative development of the electricity–carbon market, this theoretical framework model takes the focal company cooperation dependence relationship in open innovation cooperation as the research starting point, and clarifies the relationship between focal company cooperation dependence and governance mechanism. Specifically, it defines the core company’s choice logic of contract control and relationship governance, and the potential impact paths of the two governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer and cooperation performance.

4. Data and Variables Construction

4.1. Sample

The data were collected during a large-scale electric–carbon market collaborative cooperation innovation development conference conducted in China. Most of the conference attendees were middle or senior members of enterprises, and they all had experience in innovation management. During the session, we presented the goal of our research to the 463 conference attendees. We invited participation in our research by all conference attendees who met our selection criteria: (1) your company has carried out at least one cooperative innovation project; (2) you have worked on at least one cooperative innovation project; and (3) you can get in touch with your last partner. A total of 281 conference attendees (out of the 463 conference attendees) who qualified for the study participated in our online survey. These respondents were asked to invite their partner from the last cooperative innovation project to respond to the online survey.
To reduce false consensus bias and common method variance, we used multisource data from the focal company and partner of the cooperative innovation project. Thus, before completing the questionnaire, we asked participants to fill in the basic information of the project, including the project name and their role in the project (focal company or partner). Then, we checked the congruence of the project descriptions from both sides of the cooperative innovation project. If the information from the partners about the project was inconsistent, or the project was only described by one side of the partnership, the data were considered invalid. After excluding incomplete responses and the outliers, we were left with 175 valid samples. The percentage of usable responses was 62.3% (175 out of 281 projects). The information from the usable responses for cooperative innovation projects is shown in Table 1.

4.2. Measures

Focal company cooperative dependence. The extent of focal company cooperation dependence was based on a scale by Zhao et al. [56]. The scale included six items addressing “technical advantages of partner”, “technical competence of partner”, “availability of potential partner”, “switching costs of focal company”, “loss of partner’ exit to focal company”, and “partner’s exit impact on focal company program”. Most were evaluated on a scale of 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “A great deal”, but the third question used the reverse measure. The Cronbach’s α value for the six-item scale was 0.862.
Contract control. Contract control assessment was based on a scale by Jap and Ganesan and Poppo and Zenger [51,57]. The scale covers four items: “The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly define cooperation objectives and various key performance indicators in the contract”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly stipulate partners’ rights, responsibilities and penalties for breach of contract in the contract”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner have accurately stated the execution requirements of the cooperation in the contract”, and “The focal company regularly evaluates the cooperative partner’s behavior according to the contract” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the four-item scale was 0.849.
Relationship governance. Relationship governance was assessed using a scale by Clauss and Kesting [16]. The scale has five items: “Members of the focal company regularly meet with the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has established close cooperative relations with the cooperative partner”, “There is always two-way communication between the focal company and the cooperative partner”, “It is very important for the focal company to establish frequent contact with the cooperative partner”, and “Frequent informal dialogues occur between focal company and the cooperative partner” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the five-item scale was 0.896.
Knowledge transfer. Data on knowledge transfer were gathered using a scale by Bresman et al. [58]. The scale has four items: “The focal company has acquired a lot of information and knowledge from the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has learned key technologies and capabilities from the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has improved its knowledge, technologies, and capabilities by learning from the cooperative partner”, and “The focal company applies the acquired knowledge, technology, and capabilities to open innovation projects” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the four-item scale was 0.887.
Cooperation performance. Due to the different goals of cooperative innovation projects in various industries, cooperation performance was based on subjective indicators, and we applied the subjective performance scale of Jambulingam et al. [59]. The scale includes three items. We measured cooperation by asking the members of both the cooperative partner and focal company to respond to the following: “The focal company and the cooperative partner always fulfill the common performance goals of cooperation”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner can always achieve the set goals on schedule”, and “More often than not, we attained our cooperative objectives” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). The Cronbach’s α value for the three-item scale was 0.786.
Control variables. Based on related research, this study uses the focal company scale, relationship development stage, and project characteristics as the control variables. Dröge et al. and Mithas et al. pointed out that large firms and mature relationships exert a greater influence on the process of exchange relationships [60,61]. Kim et al. pointed out that project characteristics directly affect the development of open innovation projects, including project type, project budget, and project cycle [62].
This study used SPSS20.0 and Amos26.0 to test the reliability and validity of the measurement variables. First, the Cronbach’s alpha and combined reliability values of all measured variables were greater than 0.7, which indicates that the scales produced strong internal consistency and good reliability. Second, the standardized factor loadings of all measured variables were greater than 0.6, and the average variance extraction value (AVE) was greater than 0.5, indicating good convergent validity among the scale factors. The specific measurement results are shown in Table 2.
This study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the construct validity of the measurement model. The results show that the five-factor measurement model had good goodness of fit (χ2 = 326.594, df = 195; χ2/df = 1.675; CFI = 0.939; TLI = 0.927; IFI = 0.940; RMSEA = 0.062). This goodness of fit is significantly better than other factor models, which proves that all the measured variables in this study have good discriminant validity. The specific results are shown in Table 3.

4.3. Common Method Variance

First, this study used Harman’s univariate analysis to test for common method variance. The results of unrotated factor analysis show that five factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, and the total explained variance accounts for 70.28%. Meanwhile, the results show that the explained variance of the first factor is only 30.6%, which does not exceed the limit of more than 50% explained by a single factor. Second, this study also adds common factors to the measurement model and constructs a six-factor measurement model to test the common method bias. The results show that the goodness of fit of the model (χ2 = 370.555, df = 177; χ2/df = 2.094; CFI = 0.910; TLI = 0.882; IFI = 0.0.912; RMSEA = 0.079) was significantly lower than that of the five-factor measurement model. Therefore, the analysis indicates no significant common method bias in this study.

5. Empirical Results

This research used structural equation modeling (SEM) to verify the hypothesized model. The results are shown in Table 4. Overall, the model explains 55% of the cooperation performance, and the goodness of fit of the model is good (χ2 = 503.071, df = 309; χ2/df = 1.628; CFI = 0.914; TLI = 0.902; IFI = 0.915; RMSEA = 0.060). Specifically, the results reveal a significant positive correlation between cooperation dependence and relationship governance of the focal company (β = 0.52, p < 0.001), while the relationship between cooperation dependence and contract control of focal company is not significant, which means that H1b is supported, but H1a is not verified. Secondly, the results reveal that the relationship between contractual control and knowledge transfer is significantly positive (β = 0.32, p < 0.01). This result suggests a significant positive correlation between relational governance and knowledge transfer (β = 0.39, p < 0.001), which supports H3a and H3b. Thirdly, the results indicate that the relationship between contract control and cooperation performance is significantly positive (β = 0.29, p < 0.05), and the relationship between relationship governance and cooperation performance is also significantly positive (β = 0.40, p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the results prove a significant positive correlation between knowledge transfer and cooperation performance (β = 0.29, p < 0.001). Therefore, H2a, H2b, and H4a are supported.
Furthermore, the study used the Sobel test to verify the mediation effect. The results show that the direct effect of contractual control on cooperation performance was significant (β = 0.254, p < 0.01), and the indirect effect of contractual control on cooperation performance through knowledge transfer was also significant (β = 0.148, p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the direct effect of relationship governance on cooperation performance was significant (β = 0.337, p < 0.001), and the indirect effect of relationship governance on cooperation performance through knowledge transfer was also significant (β = 0.150, p < 0.001). Therefore, H4b and H4c are supported.

6. Conclusions

In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, this study established a theoretical model to study focal company governance mechanism selection and the governance effect in OIPs. From the perspective of focal company cooperative dependence, this model explores the choice tendency of contract control and relationship governance and the potential impact of the two governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. Through the empirical study, the following meaningful results were obtained, which have important theoretical significance for management research on open innovation projects in an electricity–carbon market synergy scenario.
First, the research results reveal a significant positive correlation between the cooperative dependence of the focal company and the implementation of relationship governance, but there is no correlation between that dependence and the implementation of contract control. This result partly proves our hypothesis that the higher the dependence of the focal company on the cooperative partner, the more willing the focal company is to establish a good cooperative relationship and enhance their commitment to cooperative relationship. However, it may be a common practice for a focal company to implement contract control in OIPs, because OIPs are ultimately commercial cooperative behaviors, and contract control is always the basic guarantee to prevent opportunistic behaviors in commercial cooperation. This indicates that in OIPs, contract control is an inevitable measure of the focal company, while relationship governance is a complementary governance mechanism. This conclusion supports previous research on the complementary relationship between contract control and relationship governance [38,51].
Second, the results of the research show that both contract control and relationship governance in the focal company are significantly positively correlated with knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. The results prove that a focal company adopting positive governance mechanisms can effectively control opportunistic behaviors and promote bilateral cooperation activities. The focal company will take the initiative to enhance relationship governance to promote cooperation activities such as knowledge transfer, especially when they are highly dependent on cooperation. The results also show that knowledge transfer plays a significant mediating role in the relationship between contract control and cooperative performance, as well as relationship governance and cooperative performance. This proves that knowledge transfer is an important process in open innovation projects. On the one hand, contract control can improve the efficiency of knowledge transfer while protecting the cooperative interests of partners, and relationship governance can provide the foundation of trust for partner knowledge transfer. On the other hand, knowledge transfer from the cooperative partner to the focal company is conducive to the absorption, fusion, and recreation of new knowledge by the focal company [63], thus achieving better cooperative performance.
Thirdly, the research results show that the scale of focal company negatively correlates with cooperative performance, and project duration also negatively correlates with cooperative performance. This indicates that the larger the scale of the focal company or the longer the project duration, the poorer the project cooperation performance. First of all, although a larger focal company has more resources, it may need to invest in a wider range of innovation fields, making it difficult for the firm to pay much attention to a single open innovation project. On the contrary, when the scale of focal company is small, it carries out relatively few innovation projects, and OIPs may be more important to the firm, which will increase the investment in project resources. This means that a small-scale focal company can achieve better cooperation performance in OIPs. This conclusion reveals that small and medium-sized enterprises are more suitable for open innovation than large enterprises. Secondly, the longer the open innovation project duration is, the more tasks or difficulties the project will have, which leads to the difficulty of realizing the cooperative goal completely.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, P.F. and L.W.; methodology, L.W. and W.F.; software, W.F.; validation, L.W. and W.F.; formal analysis, P.F., L.W. and W.F.; investigation, W.F.; resources, L.W. and W.F.; data curation, W.F.; writing—original draft preparation, P.F., L.W. and W.F.; writing—review and editing, P.F. and L.W.; visualization, L.W.; supervision, L.W.; project administration, L.W.; funding acquisition, L.W. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by National Natural Science Foundation of China [72204243]; Ministry of Education, Humanities and social science research projects [20YJC630138]; New Liberal Arts Fund Expansion Project of University of Science and Technology of China [FSSF-A-230317] and Anhui Provincial Natural Science Foundation [2208085UD02].

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Energies 16 06110 g001
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
Energies 16 06110 g001
Table 1. Profiles of 175 cooperative innovation projects.
Table 1. Profiles of 175 cooperative innovation projects.
FeatureFrequencyPercent
Partner type
 User4324.7%
 Supplier5229.9%
 Competitor63.4%
 Technical institution3017.2%
 University and research institution126.9%
 Others3117.8%
Project type
 Research9353.4%
 Development8146.6%
Table 2. Measurement results of variable data (N = 175).
Table 2. Measurement results of variable data (N = 175).
ConstructItem DescriptionLoadingCRAVE
Focal Company Cooperation Dependence
(α = 0.86)		In an open innovation project, the technical capabilities of the cooperative partner have an advantage over the focal company.0.630.860.51
In an open innovation project, the technical capabilities of the cooperative partner have an advantage over other potential collaborators.0.67
There are multiple potential collaborators who can provide similar knowledge and capabilities.0.75
If the focal company changes the cooperative partner, it needs to bear a lot of money and time cost.0.78
The termination of cooperation by the cooperative partner will bring huge losses to your company.0.72
The termination of cooperation by the cooperative partner will have a great adverse impact on your company.0.73
Contract Control
(α = 0.85)		The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly define cooperation objectives and various key performance indicators in the contract.0.700.850.59
The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly stipulate partners’ rights, responsibilities and penalties for breach of contract in the contract.0.82
The focal company and the cooperative partner have accurately stated the execution requirements of the cooperation in the contract.0.83
The focal company regularly evaluates the cooperative partner’s behavior according to the contract.0.73
Relationship Governance
(α = 0.90)		Members of focal company regularly meet with the cooperative partner.0.770.900.64
The focal company has established close cooperative relations with the cooperative partner.0.83
There is always two-way communication between the focal company and the cooperative partner.0.76
It is very important for the focal company to establish frequent contact with the cooperative partner.0.82
Frequent informal dialogues occur between the focal company and the cooperative partner.0.81
Knowledge Transfer
(α = 0.89)		The focal company has acquired a lot of information and knowledge from the cooperative partner.0.750.890.67
The focal company has learned key technologies and capabilities from the cooperative partner.0.86
The focal company has improved its knowledge, technologies, and capabilities by learning from the cooperative partner.0.87
The focal company applies the acquired knowledge, technology, and capabilities to open innovation projects.0.79
Cooperation Performance
(α= 0.79)		The focal company and the cooperative partner always fulfill the common performance goals of cooperation.0.780.790.55
The focal company and the cooperative partner can always achieve the set goals on schedule.0.75
More often than not, we attained our cooperative objectives.0.70
Table 3. CFA of measurement models.
Table 3. CFA of measurement models.
Modelχ2dfχ2/dfCFITLIIFIRMSEA
Five-factor Measurement Model
(CD,CG,RG,KT,CP)		326.5941951.6750.9390.9270.9400.062
Four-factor Measurement Model
(CD,CG + RG,KT,CP)		771.3562033.8000.7350.6980.7380.127
Three-factor Measurement Model
(D,CG + RG + KT,CP)		1095.7462065.3190.5850.5350.5900.158
Two-factor Measurement Model
(CD,CG + RG + KT + CP)		1167.8432085.6150.5520.5030.5570.163
One-factor Measurement Model
(CD + CG + RG + KT + CP)		1455.2282096.9630.4190.3580.4250.185
Table 4. Hypothesis testing: structural equation modeling, SEM (N = 175).
Table 4. Hypothesis testing: structural equation modeling, SEM (N = 175).
Model RelationshipPath Coefficientt-Value
Focal Company Cooperation Dependence on Contract Control−0.05−0.911
Focal Company Cooperation Dependence on Relationship Governance0.52 ***5.628
Contract Control—Knowledge Transfer0.32 **2.679
Relationship Governance—Knowledge Transfer0.39 ***4.497
Contract Control—Cooperative Performance0.29 *2.614
Relationship Governance—Cooperative Performance0.40 ***4.636
Knowledge Transfer—Cooperative Performance0.29 ***3.797
Control Variables
Focal Company Scale—cooperative performance−0.097 **−2.618
Relationship Development Stage—Cooperative Performance−0.075−1.155
Project Type—Cooperative Performance−0.072−0.651
Project Budget—Cooperative Performance−0.005−0.136
Project Duration—Cooperative Performance−0.148 **−2.754
Model Fit
χ2 = 503.071, df = 309; χ2/df = 1.628; CFI = 0.914; TLI = 0.902; IFI = 0.915; RMSEA = 0.060
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001.
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Fang, P.; Wan, L.; Fang, W. The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market. Energies 2023, 16, 6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110

AMA Style

Fang P, Wan L, Fang W. The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market. Energies. 2023; 16(17):6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110

Chicago/Turabian Style

Fang, Ping, Liang Wan, and Wenpei Fang. 2023. "The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market" Energies 16, no. 17: 6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110

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