Blockchain-Based Microgrid for Safe and Reliable Power Generation and Distribution: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methodology
- Identification of problem:
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- Recognize research questions;
- Screening of research article:
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- Identification of related articles
- Inclusion/exclusion based on title and abstract:
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- Removal of duplicate article.
2.1. Recognize the Research Question
- How might BC technology help incorporate renewable energy sources into microgrids?
- What are the main potential cybersecurity threats and challenges in microgrids?
- What are the cybersecurity standards and protocols in microgrids?
- Difficulties of implementing BC in SG and applications
- How can BC be integrated into the microgrid framework to guarantee an efficient, reliable, and secure microgrid distribution system that can efficiently predict and manage demand, record consumption data and trust, and make secure billing?
2.2. Identification of Related Articles
2.3. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Removal of Duplicate Articles
3. Related Works
4. Smart Grid, Microgrid, and Energy Management
4.1. Smart Grid
4.2. Microgrid
4.3. Microgrid and Energy Management
4.4. Benefits of Microgrid for Energy Management
4.4.1. Improved Energy Efficiency
4.4.2. Cost Savings
4.4.3. Grid Resilience
4.4.4. Customized Energy Solutions
4.5. Challenges to Microgrid Implementation in Saudi Arabia
4.5.1. Lack of Technical Expertise
4.5.2. Interoperability Issues
4.5.3. Cost and Economic Feasibility
4.5.4. Regulatory Barriers
4.5.5. Public Perception and Adoption
4.5.6. Harsh Environmental Conditions
4.5.7. Long Distance between Inhabited Locations
4.5.8. Cybersecurity Concerns
4.5.9. Type of Cybersecurity Attack on Smart Grids and Microgrids
- Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks: In the context of smart grids and microgrids, DDoS attacks can cause disruptions to the communication and control systems used to manage the flow of electricity. This can result in power outages or other system failures [50].
- Malware attacks: Malware attacks on smart grids and microgrids can compromise the systems used to monitor and control the flow of electricity, leading to system failures or disruptions. Malware can also be used to steal sensitive data or credentials, which can be used to carry out further attacks [51].
- Ransomware attacks: Ransomware attacks on smart grids and microgrids can result in system failures or disruptions, which can have serious consequences for public safety and the economy. In some cases, attackers may demand ransom payments in exchange for the decryption key needed to restore systems [52].
- Social engineering attacks: Social engineering attacks on smart grids and microgrids can be used to gain unauthorized access to critical systems or steal sensitive data. This can result in system failures or disruptions and compromise the security of the entire energy grid [53].
- Insider threats: Insider threats in the context of smart grids and microgrids can involve trusted employees or contractors who intentionally or unintentionally compromise security. It can include stealing data or credentials, introducing malware code, or failing to follow security protocols [54,55].
- Physical attacks: Physical attacks on smart grids and microgrids can involve vandalizing or damaging critical infrastructure, such as power lines, transformers, or substations. It can cause significant disruptions to the flow of electricity and pose a serious threat to public safety.
- Supply chain attacks: Supply chain attacks on smart grids and microgrids can involve exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party software or hardware used in the system. This can result in unauthorized access to critical systems, theft of sensitive data, or system failures or disruptions.
- Advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks: APT attacks on smart grids and microgrids involve using sophisticated techniques to gain persistent access to the network and steal sensitive data or cause system failures or disruptions. APT attacks can be difficult to detect and prevent, resulting in long-term damage to the energy grid.
- Credential stuffing attacks: Credential stuffing attacks on smart grids and microgrids involve using stolen login credentials to gain unauthorized access to critical systems. It can result in system failures or disruptions and compromise the security of the entire energy grid.
- Zero-day attacks: Zero-day attacks on smart grids and microgrids involve exploiting previously unknown vulnerabilities in software or hardware. This can result in unauthorized access to critical systems, theft of sensitive data, or system failures or disruptions. Zero-day attacks can be difficult to detect and prevent and can cause significant damage to the energy grid [56].
5. BC Enabled Micro Grid
5.1. BC Technology in the Energy Sector
5.1.1. Decentralization
5.1.2. Security
5.1.3. Transparency
5.1.4. Efficiency
5.1.5. Innovation
5.2. Potential BC Applications for Energy Management in Saudi Arabia
5.2.1. Energy Trading
5.2.2. Demand Response
5.2.3. Decentralized Energy Management
5.2.4. Environmental Concerns
5.3. Case Studies of BC Applications in Energy Management
5.4. Role of BC in Supporting Standards and Protocols for Cybersecurity in Smart Grids and Microgrids
6. BC-Based Framework for an Energy Microgrid in Saudi Arabia
- Energy Tracking and Trading Platform
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- Receive energy data from IoT sensors installed in the microgrid/community grid;
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- Convert energy data into digital format and timestamp it;
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- Store the energy data on a decentralized BC network;
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- Verify the energy data using a consensus mechanism;
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- Facilitate energy trading between energy producers and consumers based on smart contracts;
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- Execute energy transactions using cryptocurrencies or digital tokens;
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- Update energy data on the BC ledger and generate receipts for energy transactions.
- Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) Tracking System
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- Receive information about renewable energy production from energy producers;
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- Verify the authenticity of the information using a consensus mechanism;
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- Issue digital certificates for the amount of renewable energy produced;
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- Store the digital certificates on a decentralized BC network;
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- Facilitate the trading of digital certificates between energy producers and consumers based on smart contracts;
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- Execute certificate transactions using cryptocurrencies or digital tokens;
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- Update certificate data on the BC ledger and generate receipts for certificate transactions.
- Energy Management System (EMS)
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- Monitor energy demand and supply in the microgrid/community grid using IoT sensors;
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- Collect energy data and process it using analytics tools;
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- Use predictive analytics to forecast energy demand and supply;
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- Optimize energy use and distribution using automated algorithms;
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- Communicate with the energy tracking and trading platform to facilitate energy transactions.
- Decentralized Energy Marketplace
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- Provide a decentralized platform for energy trading;
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- Facilitate P2P energy trading using smart contracts;
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- Enable producers to sell excess energy to other microgrid/community grid consumers;
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- Provide transparency and traceability for the energy transactions using BC technology;
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- Ensure the security and privacy of energy data and transactions.
- Identity and Access Management System
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- Authenticate and authorize energy producers and consumers using digital identities;
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- Store digital identities on a decentralized BC network;
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- Provide role-based access control to energy data and transactions;
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- Ensure the privacy and security of digital identities using encryption and cryptographic techniques.
- Analytics and Reporting Platform
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- Collect and process energy data from the energy tracking and trading platform and EMS;
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- Generate reports and dashboards for energy usage, supply, and demand;
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- Provide real-time insights into energy consumption patterns and trends;
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- Facilitate decision-making for energy management and planning;
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- Ensure data accuracy and integrity using BC-based data storage and verification mechanisms.
Security Analysis of the Proposed Framework
- Immutability and Data Integrity: Using a blockchain ensures immutability and data integrity. Once data is recorded on the blockchain, it cannot be altered or tampered with, providing high trust and preventing unauthorized modifications. For example, the Cryptographic Hash Function (e.g., SHA-256) is used for immutability and data integrity.
- Consensus Mechanism: The consensus mechanism used in the blockchain ensures the agreement and validity of transactions among participating nodes. This mechanism helps prevent attacks such as double-spending and ensures the system’s integrity. Proof-of-Work or Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithms ensure blockchain data.
- Encryption and Privacy: Encryption techniques are applied to protect sensitive data, including digital identities, energy transactions, and personal information. It helps to ensure privacy and confidentiality, making it difficult for unauthorized parties to access or manipulate data. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with Homomorphic Encryption will provide a secure and reliable environment for security and privacy.
- Authentication and Access Control: The Identity and Access Management System implements strong authentication mechanisms and role-based access control. It ensures that only authorized users with the appropriate roles can access specific functionalities and data, reducing the risk of unauthorized access. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is used for strong Authentication and Access Control.
- Secure Communication: Secure communication protocols are employed to protect data transmission within the microgrid system. It prevents eavesdropping and unauthorized interception of sensitive information. Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols can be used for secure communication.
- Resilient Infrastructure: The microgrid system is designed with redundancy and fault tolerance mechanisms, ensuring the availability and reliability of energy supply. This resilience helps mitigate the impact of potential attacks or failures and maintains uninterrupted energy distribution.
- Auditing and Monitoring: The framework includes auditing and monitoring mechanisms to promptly detect and respond to security incidents. Logs of access events, transactions, and system activities are stored on the blockchain, enabling traceability and accountability. Real-time monitoring tools and anomaly detection algorithms can be implemented to identify potential security threats.
- Regulatory Compliance: The framework ensures compliance with relevant regulations and standards related to data protection, privacy, and energy trading. By leveraging blockchain technology, the system provides transparent and auditable records that can aid in regulatory compliance.
- Threat Mitigation: Using blockchain technology reduces the risk of centralized attacks as the distributed nature of the network makes it more difficult for malicious actors to compromise the system. Additionally, integrating cryptographic techniques and secure protocols helps mitigate various security threats.
7. Research Challenges and Future Work
- Scalability: Scaling BC technology to handle large transactions and data in a microgrid context is a significant challenge. Developing solutions to improve the scalability of BC networks while maintaining security and efficiency is crucial [91].
- Interoperability: Microgrids involve stakeholders, including energy producers, consumers, grid operators, and regulatory bodies. Ensuring interoperability between BC platforms and legacy systems is essential for seamless integration and data exchange [92].
- Protocol Design and Optimization: Continued research is needed to design and optimize BC protocols tailored to smart grid and microgrid applications. It includes developing consensus algorithms, smart contract frameworks, and data management techniques that address the unique requirements of the power generation and distribution domain [34].
- Integration with Emerging Technologies: Exploring the integration of BC with other emerging technologies, such as the IoT, AI, and edge computing, can unlock new possibilities for microgrid applications. Investigating how these technologies can complement each other and enhance the safety and reliability of power systems is an area for future work [93].
- Regulatory and Policy Considerations: As BC technology evolves, addressing legal, regulatory, and policy challenges becomes paramount. Research on developing frameworks, standards, and guidelines that promote the adoption of BC in the energy sector while addressing concerns regarding privacy, security, and governance is necessary.
- Safe and reliable power generation and distribution can be further realized and optimized by addressing these research challenges and future work in these areas.
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviation
Abbreviation | Definition |
SPOF | Single Point Of Failure |
BC | Blockchain |
P2P | Peer-To-Peer |
REC | Renewable Energy Certificate |
KSA | Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |
GASTAT | General Authority for Statistics, KSA |
CO2 | Carbon Dioxide |
NREP | National Renewable Energy Program, KSA |
SG | Smart Grid |
IoT | Intenet of Things |
AI | Artificial Intelligence |
PoW | Proof of Work |
PoA | Proof-of-Authority |
PoS | pProof Of Stake |
DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service |
APT | Advanced Persistent Threat |
REC | Renewable Energy Certificate |
EMS | Energy Management System |
SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
BFT | Byzantine Fault Tolerance |
ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
MFA | Multi-factor Authentication |
RBAC | Role-Based Access Control |
TLS | Transport Layer Security |
SSL | Secure Socket Layer |
Appendix A
Algorithm A1: Pseudo Code of Energy Tracking and Trading Function |
Input: energyProducers: A collection of energy producers in the system. energyConsumers: A collection of energy consumers in the system. energyTraders: A collection of energy traders in the system. energyPrices: A collection of energy prices. Output: energyTransactions: A list of energy transactions. FUNCTION energyTrackingAndTrading() WHILE TRUE IF energyProducers IS NOT EMPTY FOR EACH producer IN energyProducers DECLARE energyProduced AS INTEGER energyProduced = getEnergyProduced(producer) IF energyProduced > 0 energyTransactions.append(createEnergyTransaction(producer, energyProduced)) END IF IF energyConsumers IS NOT EMPTY FOR EACH consumer IN energyConsumers DECLARE energyConsumed AS INTEGER energyConsumed = getEnergyConsumed(consumer) IF energyConsumed > 0 energyTransactions.append(createEnergyTransaction(consumer, energyConsumed)) END IF IF energyTraders IS NOT EMPTY FOR EACH trader IN energyTraders DECLARE energyTraded AS INTEGER energyTraded = getEnergyTraded(trader) IF energyTraded > 0 energyTransactions.append(createEnergyTransaction(trader, energyTraded)) END IF IF energyPrices IS NOT EMPTY FOR EACH transaction IN energyTransactions DECLARE price AS INTEGER price = getEnergyPrice(transaction) energyPrices.append(price) END IF WAIT UNTIL NEXT INTERVAL END WHILE END FUNCTION |
Appendix B
Algorithm A2: Pseudo Code of Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) Tracking Function |
FUNCTION recTracking() WHILE TRUE IF recs IS NOT EMPTY FOR EACH rec IN recs DECLARE recIssued AS INTEGER recIssued = getRecIssued(rec) IF recIssued > 0 recTransactions.append(createRecTransaction(rec, recIssued)) END IF WAIT UNTIL NEXT INTERVAL END WHILE END FUNCTION |
Appendix C
Algorithm A3: Pseudo Code of Energy Management System (EMS) |
# Energy Management System (EMS) # Function to monitor energy demand and supply using IoT sensors function monitorEnergyDemandAndSupply(): while True: energyDemand = getEnergyDemandFromSensors() energySupply = getEnergySupplyFromSensors() # Process energy data using analytics tools processedData = processEnergyData(energyDemand, energySupply) # Use predictive analytics to forecast energy demand and supply forecastedDemand = forecastEnergyDemand(processedData) forecastedSupply = forecastEnergySupply(processedData) # Optimize energy use and distribution using automated algorithms optimizedDistribution = optimizeEnergyDistribution(forecastedDemand, forecastedSupply) # Communicate with the Energy Tracking and Trading Platform communicateWithTrackingAndTradingPlatform(optimizedDistribution) # Wait until the next monitoring interval waitUntilNextInterval() # Function to get energy demand from IoT sensors function getEnergyDemandFromSensors(): function getEnergySupplyFromSensors(): function processEnergyData(energyDemand, energySupply): function forecastEnergyDemand(processedData): function forecastEnergySupply(processedData): function optimizeEnergyDistribution(forecastedDemand, forecastedSupply): function communicateWithTrackingAndTradingPlatform(optimizedDistribution): function waitUntilNextInterval(): function main(): monitorEnergyDemandAndSupply() |
Appendix D
Algorithm A4: Pseudo Code for Decentralized Energy Marketplace |
# Smart contract for energy trading contract EnergyTradingContract: function initiateEnergyTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): # Perform necessary validations and checks if validateTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): # Transfer energy tokens or cryptocurrencies transferTokens(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price) # Update energy transaction on the blockchain ledger updateEnergyTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price) else: handleTransactionError() # Function to initiate P2P energy trading function initiateEnergyTrading(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): energyContract = EnergyTradingContract() energyContract.initiateEnergyTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price) # Function to handle energy token or cryptocurrency transfer function transferTokens(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): # Transfer energy tokens or cryptocurrencies from buyer to seller transferEnergyTokens(buyer, seller, energyAmount) # Transfer payment from buyer to seller transferPayment(buyer, seller, price) # Function to update energy transaction on the blockchain ledger function updateEnergyTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): # Create a new energy transaction record on the blockchain createEnergyTransactionRecord(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price) # Function to validate energy transaction function validateTransaction(seller, buyer, energyAmount, price): # Perform necessary validations, such as energy availability, price calculations, etc. if isEnergyAvailable(seller, energyAmount) and isPriceValid(buyer, price): return True else: return False # Function to check energy availability function isEnergyAvailable(seller, energyAmount): # Check if the seller has the required amount of energy available if seller.energySupply >= energyAmount: return True else: return False # Function to validate price function isPriceValid(buyer, price): if buyer.availableFunds >= price: return True else: return False |
Appendix E
Algorithm A5: Pseudo Code for Identity and Access Management Function |
function AuthenticateAndAuthorize(identity, role): authenticity = VerifyIdentity(identity) if authenticity is true: assignedRole = DetermineRole(identity) authorizedPermissions = RetrievePermissionsFromBlockchain(assignedRole) GrantAccess(authorizedPermissions) else: DenyAccess() function StoreDigitalIdentity(identity): uniqueIdentifier = GenerateUniqueIdentifier() encryptedIdentity = EncryptIdentity(identity) transaction = CreateTransaction(encryptedIdentity) includedInBlock = ReachConsensus(transaction) if includedInBlock is true: AssignUniqueIdentifier(uniqueIdentifier) else: HandleTransactionFailure() function ProvideRoleBasedAccessControl(identity, data): assignedRole = RetrieveRoleFromBlockchain(identity) authorizedPermissions = RetrievePermissionsFromBlockchain(assignedRole) if ValidateAccessRequest(authorizedPermissions, data): GrantAccess() else: DenyAccess() function EnsurePrivacyAndSecurity(identity): encryptedIdentity = EncryptIdentity(identity) secureTransmission = ProtectTransmission(encryptedIdentity) strongAuthentication = ImplementAuthentication(encryptedIdentity) UpdateSecurityMeasures() StoreLogsOnBlockchain() |
Appendix F
Algorithm A6: Pseudo Code for Analytics and Reporting Platform |
function collectAndProcessEnergyData(): while True: energyData = collectEnergyData() processedData = processEnergyData(energyData) generateReportsAndDashboards(processedData) provideRealTimeInsights(processedData) waitUntilNextInterval() function collectEnergyData(): function processEnergyData(energyData): function generateReportsAndDashboards(processedData): function provideRealTimeInsights(processedData): function waitUntilNextInterval(): collectAndProcessEnergyData() |
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Selection Criteria | Details |
---|---|
Exclusion |
|
Inclusion |
|
Ref | Year | Theme of the Paper | Technologies and Schemes Used | The Outcome of the Study |
---|---|---|---|---|
[15] | 2018 | Direct trade of renewable energy within the community without any third party. | Private BC | There is no government or other organization that regulates the market. The market is completely decentralized; direct trading of renewable energy within the community is supported. |
[16] | 2019 | Review of BC implementations and issues in smart grid. | No implementation was provided. | Reviews BC implementations in smart grids with technical details. Further discusses issues and research challenges for BC-based smart grids are discussed. |
[17] | 2020 | Minimizing the billing in local decentralized P2P energy consumption | Private BC with Proof of Work (PoW) Mechanism, Critical Peak Price (CPP), and Real-Time Price (RTP) schemes | Achieving optimal levels of energy use while simultaneously reducing overall power expenses with BC. |
[18] | 2020 | Optimizes energy flows in a microgrid and bilateral trading mechanism | Private BC, Smart Contract | Energy flow optimization and import cost reduction are two key benefits of the proposed methodology. |
[19] | 2020 | BC-based distributed energy transaction system | BC, Smart Contract | Proposes a seven-layer architecture for the microgrid’s BC-based distributed energy transaction system. |
[20] | 2021 | secured P2P energy transactions within a microgrid and a smart grid | Relaxed Consensus-Innovation (RCI), BC | It incorporates a microgrid and a smart grid utilizing a Relaxed Consensus-Innovation (RCI) algorithm for power, price exchange, and security against malicious attacks. |
[21] | 2021 | Supply chain management and sustainable development in Smart grid | ISM and fuzzy decision-making, BC | Examines the integration of BC technology in the smart grid and its implications for establishing a sustainable supply chain. To achieve this, the authors propose a layered theoretical framework. |
[22] | 2021 | P2P energy trading in the microgrid | fuzzy multi-objective programming model, genetic algorithm, BC | Encourage P2P energy trading without any centralized authority |
[23] | 2021 | P2P energy transactions and security of transactions | Multi-agent system, Private BC, smart contract | Reviews the role of BC in a distributed trading platform and propose a framework for transparent transactional activities |
[24] | 2021 | Profit maximization in microgrid | BC and Smart contract based framework | It reviews the role of BC and smart contract technology in microgrid systems for maximizing profits for the prosumer. |
[25] | 2021 | Review the research on BC application in microgrids and the reliability of transactions | Review article | It explores the application of BC in microgrids for the efficiency and sustainability of renewable energy systems. |
[26] | 2022 | Transaction management | Smart contract | Proposes a BC framework to record and manage transactions in a smart grid with smart contracts. |
[7] | 2022 | Microgrid and smart grid integration | Identity Management, BC | It examines the role of BC in facilitating decentralized communication, enabling cross-border networking, and supporting the incorporation of microgrids and energy communities. |
[27] | 2022 | Interoperability and communication between BC-based smart grids | Framework without implementation | It discusses the broader aspects of inter-microgrid transactions and interoperable communication between microgrids and smart grids but provides a general framework without implementation details. |
[28] | 2022 | Security of the distributed control systems and energy trading in microgrids | Proof-of-Authority (PoA) BC, Smart contract | It discusses the role of BC in securing microgrid systems and how to maximize the benefits for the users. |
[29] | 2022 | Review of BC-based P2P energy trading | Review article | Highlights the importance of BC technology in enabling decentralized transactions in smart grids |
[30] | 2022 | P2P Energy Trading | Fog Computing, IoT, BC | Proposes a novel algorithm for P2P energy trading in the Smart Grid. |
[31] | 2022 | Review the role of Industry 4.0 enabling technologies in Smart grids and energy distribution. | Review article focusing on Machine learning (ML), BC, and IoT in the Energy sector. | Highlights the role of Industry 4.0 technologies in transforming the energy system, focusing on IoT, AI, and BC |
[32] | 2023 | Review of different BC-enabled technologies for managing security and transaction of smart grids. | Review article | Compare different BC-based technologies that can enhance security and adjust electricity pricing in smart grids. |
[33] | 2023 | P2P energy trading | Game Theory, BC, smart contracts | The paper reviews different methodologies used to develop P2P energy exchange frameworks. |
[34] | 2023 | Review of different domains of applications | Review article | It discusses the various domains of smart grid applications and the role of BC. Further, it highlights the security concerns for each use case and solution. |
Our Study | 2023 | Overall aspects of Microgrid transaction, security, and its integration with Smart Grid | Provide a detailed framework and algorithm for implementation | Provide step-by-step transaction processing algorithms and interconnection of different entities and all possible aspects of microgrid working like P2P transaction, billing, Identity and access management, and renewable energy tracking. |
Example | Country | Year | Type of Attack | Details |
---|---|---|---|---|
Ukraine power outage [57] | Ukraine | 2015 | DDoS | In December 2015, a group of attackers used a DDoS attack to overload the servers of three Ukrainian power distribution companies, causing a widespread power outage that left over 225,000 customers without electricity for several hours. |
Dragonfly 2.0 [58] | Global | 2013 | APT | Dragonfly 2.0 is a malware campaign that has been targeting energy grids and other critical infrastructure around the world since 2013. The attackers behind the campaign have been using various techniques to gain access to energy grid control systems, including spear-phishing and watering hole attacks. |
City of Johannesburg ransomware [59] | South Africa | 2019 | Ransomware | In 2019, the City of Johannesburg in South Africa suffered a ransomware attack that affected its power grid, causing widespread power outages across the city. The attackers demanded a ransom of 4 Bitcoin, which the city refused to pay. |
Target breach [60] | United States | 2013 | Social Engineering | In 2013, attackers gained access to the systems of the US retailer Target by using a phishing attack to steal login credentials from an HVAC contractor. The attackers were able to take the credit card data of over 40 million clients. |
Metcalf substation attack [61] | United States | 2013 | Physical Attack | In 2013, attackers fired over 100 rounds of ammunition at the Metcalf substation in California, damaging transformers and other equipment. While the attack did not cause a power outage, it highlighted the vulnerability of physical infrastructure to attack. |
Colonial Pipeline attack [62] | United States | 2021 | Ransomware | The Colonial Pipeline, which provides over half of the petroleum for the US East Coast, experienced a ransomware attack in May 2021, forcing it to cease operations. Colonial Pipeline eventually paid the $4.4 million Bitcoin ransom requested by the attackers, a group going under the name of DarkSide. |
SolarWinds hack [63] | Global | 2020 | Supply Chain Attack | The SolarWinds Orion software (version 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 HF1) was found to have been compromised in December 2020 as a result of a sophisticated supply chain attack that affected numerous US government organizations and commercial businesses. The attackers thought to be a state-sponsored gang from Russia, could access private information and systems thanks to the infected software. |
Tesla’s AWS servers were hacked for cryptocurrency mining [64] | United States | 2018 | Credential Stuffing | In 2018, attackers were able to compromise Tesla’s AWS servers using credential stuffing, which involves using stolen login credentials from one site to gain access to another. The attackers used the compromised servers to mine cryptocurrency, which can be a lucrative source of revenue. |
Sandworm Team attack [65] | Global | 2019 | Insider Threat | In 2019, the investigative journalism site Bellingcat published a report on the GRU’s Sandworm Team. This Russian state-sponsored hacking group has been linked to multiple attacks on energy grids and other critical infrastructure. The report alleged that the group includes insiders who have helped to facilitate their attacks. |
Accellion FTA attacks [66] | Global | 2021 | Supply Chain Attack | In early 2021, attackers began exploiting vulnerabilities in the Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA), a popular file-sharing tool many organizations use. The attackers were able to steal sensitive data from numerous companies, including energy companies like Royal Dutch Shell and the Australian energy company Powercor. |
Enel ransomware attack [67] | Italy | 2020 | Ransomware | In 2020, energy giant Enel was targeted by a snake and Netwalker ransomware. |
Natanz nuclear facility attack [68] | Iran | 2021 | Insider Threat | In 2021, a cyberattack targeted Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, causing significant damage to its centrifuge assembly plant. The attack was allegedly carried out by insiders who were able to gain access to the facility’s control systems and cause the damage. |
Company/Project | Country | Application | Year |
---|---|---|---|
Power Ledger [70] | Australia | BC-based energy trading platform enabling P2P trading between renewable energy producers and consumers | 2016 |
TenneT [71] | Germany | Equigy, a BC-based platform enabling energy producers to participate in demand response programs and provide power to the grid thru peak demand times | 2020 |
Brooklyn Microgrid [72] | United States | BC-based energy trading platform enabling consumers to purchase energy directly from local renewable energy producers | 2017 |
TEPCO [73] | Japan | Energy Web Chain, a BC-based platform enabling secure and transparent data transactions between energy producers, consumers, and grid operators | 2019 |
Energie Wasser Bern [74] | Switzerland | BC-based energy trading platform enabling P2P trading between renewable energy producers and consumers | 2017 |
Wien Energie [75] | Austria | Local energy marketplace enabling P2P energy trading | 2018 |
Electron [76] | United Kingdom | National database for renewable energy certificates using BC technology to ensure authenticity and traceability | 2018 |
Thai Digital Energy Development (TDED) [77] | Thailand | A BC-based platform for tracking renewable energy certificates and ensuring compliance with renewable energy targets | 2019 |
KEPCO [78] | South Korea | P2P energy trading platform enabling consumers to trade energy directly with each other | 2019 |
Acciona [79] | Spain | A BC-based platform for tracking the production and consumption of renewable energy | 2020 |
Vattenfall [80] | Sweden | A BC-based platform for tracking the origin of renewable energy | 2021 |
SP Group [81] | Singapore | A BC-based platform for P2P energy trading | 2018 |
Enexis [82] | Netherlands | A BC-based platform for managing energy data | 2019 |
Électricité de France (EDF) [83] | France | A BC-based platform for managing the supply chain of renewable energy certificates | 2018 |
Xpansiv [84] | United States | A BC-based platform for tracking and trading energy commodities | 2018 |
Standard/Protocol | Details of Standard/Protocol | Role of BC |
---|---|---|
NISTIR 7628 [85] | NIST publication provides guidelines for securing smart grid systems. It covers several areas related to cybersecurity, including access control, network security, and incident response. | BC can provide secure and immutable logging of events and transactions, making tracking and tracing potential security breaches easier. It can also enable secure data sharing among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
NERC CIP [86] | This set of cybersecurity standards applies to the bulk power system in North America. The NERC CIP standards cover several areas related to power system security, including cybersecurity awareness, physical security, and incident response. | BC can provide secure and decentralized identity management, making controlling access to critical systems and information easier. It can also enable secure and transparent communication among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
IEC 62351 [87] | This set of standards developed by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) provides a framework for the secure communication and operation of power systems. It covers several areas related to power system security, including authentication and encryption, data integrity, and access control. | BC can provide secure and decentralized key management, making it easier to manage and protect cryptographic keys used for authentication and encryption. It can also enable secure and transparent communication among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
ISO/IEC 27001/27002 [88] | These complementary standards provide a framework for information security management systems (ISMS). They cover several areas related to information security, including risk assessment, access control, incident response, and security management. | BC can provide secure and immutable logging of events and transactions, making tracking and tracing potential security breaches easier. It can also enable secure and transparent information sharing among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
GB/T 22239 [89] | This set of cybersecurity standards developed by the Chinese National Standardization Technical Committee for Information Security guides the secure design, implementation, and operation of information systems and networks. | BC can provide secure and decentralized identity management, making controlling access to critical systems and information easier. It can also enable secure and transparent communication among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
SP 800-82 [90] | This publication by NIST provides guidelines for the secure design, implementation, and operation of industrial control systems (ICS). It covers several areas related to ICS security, including risk management, access control, network security, and system security. | BC can provide secure and immutable logging of events and transactions, making tracking and tracing potential security breaches easier. It can also enable secure and transparent information sharing among stakeholders in the energy sector. |
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Khubrani, M.M.; Alam, S. Blockchain-Based Microgrid for Safe and Reliable Power Generation and Distribution: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia. Energies 2023, 16, 5963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16165963
Khubrani MM, Alam S. Blockchain-Based Microgrid for Safe and Reliable Power Generation and Distribution: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia. Energies. 2023; 16(16):5963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16165963
Chicago/Turabian StyleKhubrani, Mousa Mohammed, and Shadab Alam. 2023. "Blockchain-Based Microgrid for Safe and Reliable Power Generation and Distribution: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia" Energies 16, no. 16: 5963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16165963