1. Introduction
The existing power grid infrastructure is considered as an engineering marvel [
1]. However, these traditional power grids cannot cope with the increasing demand for reliable power and are susceptible to formidable challenges due to enormous vulnerabilities [
2,
3]. Moreover, the streamlining of renewable energy sources, incorporation of advanced metering, dynamic pricing, etc., are some of the other problems that plague the traditional power grids. These versatile challenges have necessitated the upgradation of the traditional power grid into the smart grid (SG) [
4]. The SG is further revolutionized by incorporating the burgeoning cyber physical system (CPS) technology [
5]. The smart grid from the cyber physical system perspective is referred to as a smart grid cyber physical system (SGCPS) [
6].
In the paradigm of CPS, the physical system of an SGCPS is the power grid electrical infrastructure, whereas the networking infrastructure to support data exchange and data interpretation is the cyber system of the SGCPS [
7]. Of the several applications of the SGCPS such as the advanced metering, dynamic pricing, demand–load balancing, grid optimization, smart management, etc. [
8,
9], the synchrophasor measurement system is an important application that provides real-time monitoring and control capabilities to the SGCPS [
10]. In the synchrophasor measurement system, several sensors known as phasor measurement units (PMUs) are installed on different electrical buses, which monitor the health of the grid. The data pertaining to the health of the grid measured by the PMU are known as synchrophasor data, which are primarily a time-synchronized measurement of voltage and current phasors [
11]. The synchrophasor data are communicated to the control center known as the phasor data concentrator (PDC) for providing monitoring and controlling capabilities to the SGCPS [
12]. The edifice of the synchrophasor applications is the communication network, which is used to for communication of data between the PMUs and the PDC. Such a communication network is referred to as a synchrophasor communication network (SCN) [
13]. Synchrophasor measurements have a wide range of applications such as grid monitoring, power quality monitoring, stability maintenance of the smart grid, control of the smart grid, load balancing, protection of the smart grid, minimizing grid outage probability for the distributed grid, etc., [
14]. These applications can be achieved using the SCNs by the reliable exchange of synchrophasor data.
The SCN is a complex interconnected network, which is susceptible to many challenges which hinder the effective monitoring and control operations of the SGCPS [
15]. Many testbeds have been proposed in the literature to evaluate the SG’s performance from various aspects. From the architectural perspective, a contemporary survey related to the challenges and their solutions in the SGCPS paradigm was presented by Smadi et al. [
16]. Further, Cintuglu et al. in [
17], presented an elaborative survey on the SGCPS testbeds. Moreover, some of the other key simulation-oriented software across various domains of the SGCPS are
Sandia Lab [
18] for wide area situational awareness and cyber security;
Virtual Power System testbed [
19] for cyber security; Queensland University’s test bed [
20] for network communication Kanas State University’s testbed [
21] for wide area situational awareness and network communication;
PowerCyber Testbed [
22] for wide area situational awareness and cyber security;
Cybersecurity Testbed for IEC61850 [
23], etc. However, a testbed or an assessment framework is needed to evaluate the risk associated with the SCNs in an SGCPS.
In [
24], authors reported a risk assessment framework from a security perspective for smart metering applications of the SG. Clements et al. investigated the plausibility of threats due to mass load fluctuations in an SG, using a risk-based approach [
25]. A unified risk assessment methodology using vulnerabilities and threats was proposed by Datta R. P. et al. in [
26] for the SG. An exemplary attempt to provide a risk assessment framework for the SCN in an SGCPS has been reported in [
27], where authors have also considered some other applications such as advanced metering, vehicular network, etc. In [
28], Smith et al. considered the cyber aspects of the smart grid for evaluating the risk. In particular, authors proposed a multimode bandit approach formulated using the multi-armed bandit problem. Appasani et al. in [
29], proposed a pragmatic framework for improving situational awareness in SCNs with the objective of enhancing the observability of the SG. In spite of a plethora of research work sprawled across various domains of the SG in the risk management paradigm, the risk assessment of an SCN in an SGCPS is very scarce to the best of authors knowledge, based on an extensive literature survey. This paper envisages providing a direction for evaluating the risk associated with the SCN in an SGCPS.
To summarize the work carried out in this article, the major contributions of the paper are outlined as follows:
An overview of the different topologies for synchrophasor communication, such as dedicated SCN, shared SCN and hybrid SCN, is provided.
A simplified state-of-art methodology has been proposed to evaluate hardware reliability and data reliability of these three topologies.
A comprehensive risk assessment framework for these topologies has been proposed. The risk assessment framework is based on both hardware reliability as well as data reliability.
Specifically, risk with data reliability is evaluated by simulating these networks for a practical power grid of India using the QualNet simulator, which are further analyzed with respect to the risk associated with the hardware reliability.
The reminder of the paper is organized in different sections. After a brief introduction presented in
Section 1, an overview of different topologies of the SCNs such as dedicated SCN, shared SCN, and hybrid SCN is presented in
Section 2. A comprehensive risk assessment framework of SCN in an SGCPS is proposed, including contemporary reliability assessment methodology in
Section 3. Using the proposed framework, the risk associated with different SCN topologies (namely: dedicated SCN, shared SCN and hybrid SCN) is evaluated in
Section 4. The proposed comprehensive risk assessment framework is obtained using the QualNet-based simulation in
Section 5. Lastly, the conclusion of the paper is presented in
Section 6.
3. Risk Assessment Framework
Now, a novel and comprehensive risk assessment framework for the SCN in an SGCPS is proposed. To help understand the study, the preliminaries are discussed.
3.1. Preliminaries
We consider an SCN that connects
η number of PMUs and
ϑ number of PDCs. These are installed on
κ electrical buses. Since the optimally installed PMUs are able to monitor more than one electrical bus simultaneously [
35], the number of PMUs will be less than the number of electrical buses.
Let us consider the PMUs and PDCs are represented by the sets denoted as A and X, respectively, so that and Further, a set representing the electrical buses in an SGCPS is denoted as Clearly, the cardinality of sets are , and Furthermore, we denote PMU in terms of its location corresponding to electrical bus as For, e.g., if a PMU numbered as third PMU is designated as is installed on bus number 2, i.e., , then such PMU will be represented as Likewise, represents the which is installed on bus number 2, i.e., .
It is worth recalling that a PMU can monitor the status of more than one electrical bus under optimally placed conditions since
. Thus, we define a PMU observable set as
, where the element of set
is defined using (1). Clearly, the set
defines the electrical buses
, which are monitored by a
Hence, if
is capable of monitoring
, then the PMU observable set is defined as
. Further, more than one PMU can communicate their synchrophasor data to a single PDC. Thus, the collection of such PMUs corresponding to each PDC is referred to as a PDC observable set which is defined as
. Nevertheless, the elements of set
are
. Hence, if
,
and
communicate their synchrophasor data to
, then the PDC observable set is defined as
. Moreover, the following inequality holds true:
3.2. Hardware Reliability Assessment Model
Let us represent the failure probability of a component
x as
px; its hardware reliability can be defined using (3).
Moreover, for a system comprising a number
Z of components in series and in parallel configuration, as shown in
Figure 4a,b, respectively, the overall reliability of such a system can be given using (4) and (5), respectively.
3.2.1. Hardware Reliability Assessment of Dedicated SCN
A dedicated SCN to evaluate reliability is as shown in
Figure 5. The dedicated SCN consists of several PMUs, PDCs, OTRs, repeaters, optical cable and an optical communication network (OCN), etc. Of this complex SCN, a pair of PMU and PDC is shown to evaluate its hardware reliability. W.L.O.G, a PMU–PDC pair consists of
, a
, an OTR at the PMU side, OTR at the PDC side, and several repeaters, which are interconnected using optical cable over the OCN. From Equations (4) and (5), an OTR at PMU, an OTR at PDC, and repeaters are used in parallel configuration which act as redundant components to enhance the reliability of the dedicated SCN.
In general, let
,
,
,
,
and
denote the failure probability of PMU, PDC, switch, OTR, optical fiber, and repeater, respectively, in the corresponding PMU–PDC pair. Thus, the hardware reliability of a
PMU1–
PDC1 pair with
repeaters shown in
Figure 5 can be given by (6), which is evaluated using (4) and (5).
3.2.2. Hardware Reliability Assessment of Shared SCN
With respect to the shared SCN depicted in
Figure 2, the shared SCN consists of several PMUs, PDCs, routers, end devices, etc., as key components which are interconnected over the IP network which acts as a backbone. Of these complex SCN, a pair of PMU and PDC is shown in
Figure 6 to evaluate its hardware reliability. W.L.O.G, a PMU–PDC pair consists of
, a
, a router at the PMU side, a router at the PDC side, which are interconnected using the IP network. From Equations (4) and (5), a router at PMU (PMU routers), and a router at PDC (PDC routers) are used in parallel configuration, which act as redundant components to enhance reliability of the shared SCN.
The hardware reliability of a
PMU1–
PDC1 pair in a shared SCN comprising of a PMU and a PDC which is shown in
Figure 6 can be given by (7), which is evaluated using (4) and (5). Where,
and
denotes failure probabilities of the router and IP network, respectively.
3.2.3. Hardware Reliability Assessment of Hybrid SCN
With respect to the hybrid SCN depicted in
Figure 3, it consists of several PMUs, PDCs, access points (APs) routers, end devices, etc., as key components which are interconnected over the IP network which acts as a backbone. Of these complex SCN, a pair of PMU and PDC is shown in
Figure 7 to evaluate its hardware reliability. W.L.O.G, a PMU–PDC pair consists of
, a
, APs, routers at the PMU side, the routers at PDC side, which are interconnected using the IP network. From Equations (4) and (5), an access point and a router at PMU, and a router at PDC are used in parallel configuration which act as redundant components to enhance the reliability of the hybrid SCN.
The hardware reliability of a
PMU1–
PDC1 pair in a hybrid SCN, which is shown in
Figure 7, can be given by (8), which is evaluated using (4) and (5). Here,
denotes the failure probability of an access point.
The failure probabilities of different key components of considered dedicated, shared and hybrid SCN is summarized in
Table 1.
3.3. Data Reliability Assessment Model
The synchrophasor communication network primarily carries synchrophasor data which correspond to the health of the electrical buses which are communicated by PMU to PDC for monitoring the SGCPS. The synchrophasor data are communicated among PMUs and PDCs in the form of packets. Based on SCN topologies, these data are prone to losses which is undesirable from the point of reliability. Thus, we can define the data reliability of an SCN in terms of packet delivery ratio (PDR).
Let
and
represent the number of packets sent by
and corresponding number of packets received by
up to time
. Then, the packet delivery ratio corresponding to
pair is given by (9), where
and
are the start and stop time during which packets are exchanged. Interestingly, simulations are preferred to record the PDR for different SCNs.
3.4. Risk Assessment Metric
In optimally placed conditions, a PMU installed on a particular bus is able to monitor the status of some additional other electrical buses. Thus, a failure of this particular PMU makes associated buses unobservable, which leads to un-observability of the SGCPS. This characteristic in a synchrophasor communication network can be opined in terms of severity index (S.I) which is defined in (10).
Let us consider a
, which is installed on
and capable of monitoring
buses. The PMU observable set (POS) is defined as
. Thus, the severity index of
can be defined using (11):
Consequently, if a
pair for any
and
does not exist, then
, and also
Further, the risk metric qualitatively analyzes the impact of severity associated with particular components on the SGCPS. In an SCN, if
denotes the severity index of
and
denotes its failure probability, then the pragmatic expression for risk (R) associated with
, in an SGCPS can be given using (12):
However, the risk associated with a
pair can be given using another pragmatic equation, as described in (13):
Moreover, (13) is a more generalized expression of risk assessment which can be used to evaluate the risk in terms of data reliability. Particularly, (13) can be restructured as given in (14) to evaluate risk of a
in terms of data reliability (i.e., PDR):
5. Simulation Results and Discussion
As a precursor to the simulations, we consider a case study for validating the proposed comprehensive framework for risk assessment with hardware and data reliability of the SCN in an SGCPS. The key architecture of the case study is briefly described as follows.
A practical power grid of West Bengal, an Indian state, is considered as a case study for validating the proposed framework for risk assessment. The power grid comprises 24 buses, 7 optimally placed PMUs and 1 PDC, as shown in
Figure 8. The geographical locations of PMUs and the PDC under this case study is reported from [
34] in
Table 2.
The location of these buses in the Indian state of West Bengal are mentioned in
Appendix A.
5.1. Risk Assessment of Dedicated SCN
From the case study, it has seven PMUs and one PDC which are optimally distributed over 24 electrical buses. Thus, the corresponding SCN parameters are
,
and
. Thus, the mean risk with hardware reliability associated with the dedicated SCN can be given using (16) as:
In dedicated SCN with
, (31) gives
Now, the minimum RwHR can be similarly evaluated using (17), which yields .
To obtain the risk associated with data reliability, the dedicated SCN shown in
Figure 1 is designed in QualNet, where locations of the PMUs and the PDC are in accordance with
Table 2 as per the case study. To recap, QualNet is a discrete event-based network simulator. From simulation, the number of packets communicated and received by each PMUs and PDC are recorded. Based on packets exchanged statistics, the PDR can be calculated for each of the PMUs using Equation (9). Further, the risk with data reliability can be assessed for the dedicated SCN using (18) and (19). In order to understand the impact of data rate on RwDR, the network is simulated under two conditions:
low data rate where PMU data rate is taken as 64 Kbps, and
high data rate where PMU data rate is taken as 300 Kbps. The simulation results of the dedicated SCN with low and high data rate is reported in
Table 3.
5.2. Risk Assessment of Shared SCN
Similar to the dedicated SCN, the mean risk with hardware reliability associated with the shared SCN for the case study can be given using (21) as:
In the shared SCN with , (33) gives . Now, the minimum RwHR can be similarly evaluated using (22) which yields .
The shared SCN shown in
Figure 2 is simulated using QualNet. Similar to the dedicated SCN, the PDR corresponding to each PMU can be obtained using (9) and associated RwDR can be calculated using (23) and (24).
Nevertheless, the communication resources are shared in the shared SCN, which necessitates the consideration of the background traffic (BT) in addition to the PMU data rate. Moreover, the significance of background traffic is appreciable on the performance of RwDR in the shared SCN, which mimics the characteristics of the practical shared communication network. Thus, the shared SCN is simulated with different background traffic of 70%, 80% and 95% under low and high data rate of PMU.
The simulation results are reported for low and high data rates in
Table 4 and
Table 5, respectively.
The background traffic on an SCN has significant impact on its performance. In order to have a comparative analysis on the performance of the shared SCN under varying background traffic conditions, a graph for RwDR under 70% BT, 80% BT and 95% BT is plotted, which is shown in
Figure 9. From the comparative results, it can be inferred that the risk associated with the shared SCN with a low data rate is very low under 70% BT since % risk is less than 1% with
and
. However, the risk is moderate under 80% background since 1 ≤ % risk ≤ 2 with
and
. Furthermore, the risk associated with the shared SCN is highest under 95% background traffic since 3 ≤ % Risk ≤ 5 with
and
. Nevertheless, if the data rate is increased from 64 Kbps to 300 Kbps, then the significant increment in the risk associated with the shared SCN under different BT conditions are observed. Specifically, the mean RwDR in the shared SCN with 300 Kbps increases by a factor of 5.22, 2.2045, and 1.95 under 70%, 80% and 95% BTs, respectively, as compared to that with a 64 Kbps data rate. The comparative analysis instigates the operation of the shared SCN below 95% BT to alleviate the associated risk.
5.3. Risk Assessment of Hybrid SCN
Similar to the shared SCN, mean risk with hardware reliability associated with the hybrid SCN for the case study can be given using (26) as , where . Further, the minimum RwHR can be similarly evaluated using (27) which yields .
From the perspective of validating risk with data reliability, the hybrid SCN shown in
Figure 3 is implemented in the QualNet network simulator for simulation. The distribution of the PMUs and PDCs are in accordance with
Table 2 of the case study. Similar to the shared SCN, the hybrid SCN is simulated with varying background traffic of 70%, 80% and 95% to mimic the characteristics of the practical communication network. The simulations are performed with low and high data rates under this background traffic. The simulation results are reported for low and high data rates in
Table 6 and
Table 7, respectively, including associated RwDR, which is evaluated using Equations (29) and (30).
Similar to shared SCN, a comparative study to analyze the performance of the hybrid SCN is presented in
Figure 10, where RwDR is analyzed for 70%, 80% and 95% BTs. Comparative analysis reveals that the risk associated with the hybrid SCN with low data rate is very low under 70% BT since % risk is less than 1% with
and
. However, the risk is moderate under 80% background since 1 ≤ % risk ≤ 4 with
and
. Furthermore, the risk associated with the hybrid SCN is highest under 95% background traffic since 4 ≤ % risk ≤ 9 with
and
. Nevertheless, if the data rate is increased from 64 Kbps to 300 Kbps, then the significant increment in the risk associated with the hybrid SCN under different BT conditions are observed. Specifically, the mean RwDR in the hybrid SCN with 300 Kbps increases by a factor of 1.8058, 1.2094, and 1.0172 under 70%, 80% and 95% BTs, respectively, as compared to that with a 64 Kbps data rate. The comparative analysis instigates the operation of the hybrid SCN below 95% BT to alleviate associated risk.
5.4. Comparative Performance Analysis
The three different topologies of SCNs (dedicated SCN, shared SCN and hybrid SCN) have been so far analyzed for risk hedging in SGCPS. However, it becomes pertinent to comprehensively compare their performance with respect to risk hedging. A comparative analysis of these three topologies is presented in
Figure 11.
The performance of each of these SCNs is compared in terms of mean RwHR, minimum RwHR, mean RwDR and minimum RwDR.
In the dedicated SCN, RwHR is found to be
and
, whereas RwDR is obtained as
and
with a 300 Kbps PMU data rate. However, RwHR obtained in the shared SCN is
and
, whereas RwDR is obtained as
and
with a 300 Kbps PMU data rate at 80% background traffic. Moreover, for the hybrid SCN, RwHR is obtained as
and
, whereas RwDR is obtained as
and
with a 300 Kbps PMU data rate, supporting 80% background traffic. Based on analysis, it can be inferred that the dedicated SCN has minimum risk, whereas the risk associated with hybrid SCN is maximum. Moreover, RwHR is almost same as that of RwDR in dedicated SCN. However, the mean RwDR increases in the shared SCN and hybrid SCN by a factor of 17.108 and 23.278, respectively, as compared to the corresponding mean RwHR, whereas minimum RwDR increases in shared and hybrid SCN by a factor of 16.005 and 17.717, respectively. To clearly visualize the mean and minimum RwHR in all three SCNs, the corresponding portion from
Figure 11a is magnified, which is shown in
Figure 11b.
Furthermore, the RwHR is high in the case of the shared SCN and hybrid SCN as compared to that of the dedicated SCN. However, the shared SCN and hybrid SCN are associated with same RwHR. Conclusively, the shared SCN has lower risk compared to the hybrid SCN; however, at the cost of flexibility and scalability. Moreover, the dedicated SCN provides better risk hedging comparative to its counterparts, i.e., the shared SCN and hybrid SCN. However, this is achieved at high implementation cost, inefficient resource utilization, less flexibility and less scalability.
6. Conclusions
A comprehensive risk assessment framework for SCNs in an SGCPS is proposed based on two vital availability metrics, namely, hardware reliability and data reliability. The simplified hardware reliability models for three different SCN topologies, namely, dedicated SCN, shared SCN and hybrid SCN are proposed. Further, a pragmatic metric known as PDR is used for data reliability in SCNs. The proposed comprehensive framework is meticulously validated using a case study in QualNet network simulator. To validate the proposed framework, different SCNs are implemented and simulated using QualNet corresponding to a case study. Specifically, a practical power grid of India (West Bengal State) has been considered as a case study. The simulation results reveal that RwDR is minimum for the dedicated SCN, moderate for the shared SCN, and highest for the hybrid SCN. In particular, %RwDR values, i.e., , and , are obtained, respectively for the dedicated SCN, shared SCN at 80% BT, and hybrid SCN at 80% BT at a 300 Kbps data rate. Further, RwHR is least in the dedicated SCN with , whereas the shared and hybrid SCN have the same RwHR with .
Moreover, the mean RwDR is comparatively more in all SCN topologies in comparison to the mean RwHR. In fact, the mean RwDR as compared to the mean RwHR increases in the shared SCN and hybrid SCN by a factor of 17.108 and 23.278, respectively. However, the minimum RwDR increases in the shared and hybrid SCN by a factor of 16.005 and 17.717, respectively, as compared to the corresponding minimum RwHR. These increments are a result of the architecture employed in the shared and hybrid SCN which are more prone to packet losses. Nevertheless, being cost-effective as compared to the dedicated SCN, the shared and hybrid SCNs are viable in SGCPS. Further, the total risk with data reliability less than 4% for up to 80% BT makes the shared SCN and hybrid SCN feasible for the SGCPS. Lastly, if the seamless integration of SGCPS components is of equal priority, then the hybrid SCN is a more preferable alternative to the dedicated and shared SCNs. Nevertheless, the shared SCN and hybrid SCN outperform the dedicated SCN in terms of scalability and flexibility. The risk hedging analysis of communication networks for some other applications of an SGCPS such as advanced metering, wide area measurements, situational awareness, is the future work which authors wish to carry out.