Historic Ontology and Epistemology

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (20 October 2023) | Viewed by 8121

Special Issue Editor


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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA 16801, USA
Interests: American philosophy; semiotics; Peirce

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

We are inviting scholars to submit essays for a Special Issue devoted to historical ontology and epistemology or, perhaps more accurately, methodology. Though ontologies designed to do justice to time and history have been belated (the dominant tradition being one in which becoming has been slighted), philosophers and other theorists have dramatically shifted the focus of attention, especially since the 19th century. Even so, much remains to be explored. For the sake of encouraging this exploration, we are focusing on the ontological status of historical processes. While we adopt an inclusive approach, specifically one open to considering submissions in which their authors explore the possibility of our knowledge of historical phenomena and thus transient affairs, our hope is to receive essays concerned with how our knowledge of such phenomena and affairs, in specific domains. Insofar as epistemology is a discipline preoccupied with the question of skepticism, our interest is more methodological than epistemological (though we are, to repeat, open to epistemologically oriented work).

Historical relativity is at once an incontestable fact and an endlessly disputed topic. The dread of lapsing into some self-defeating form of relativism often seems to seduce theorists into denying the obvious; our locus in an open-ended history is a defining condition of all human pursuits. Facile appeals to a transcendent perspective war with unqualified affirmations of temporal location, precluding any possibility of avoiding presentism (i.e., of transcending our “moment” in history). Of course, essays drawing upon historical figures such as Darwin, Nietzsche, James, Bergson, and Whitehead are welcome, but we are not looking for purely exegetical submissions. 

We welcome submissions focused on the history of a single practice or extended family of shared practices, such as the history of the natural sciences or of historical disciplines themselves, insofar as they are concerned with the ontology of their objects, as well as submissions in which histories of different practices are explored for the sake of illuminating these diverse practices (e.g., an examination of the history of the arts vis-à-vis that of the sciences).

To what extent, if any, are historical processes teleological? To what extent does the history of historiographical practices and historical consciousness itself need to be incorporated in the work of historians and simply the self-understanding of human agents implicated in an ongoing process? Do mathematical truths imply what certain champions of what is often identified as “Platonism” claim they are, truths removed from the flux of time? Is historical relativism the self-defeating position so many thinkers even today still judge it to be? These are simply examples of questions falling within the scope of our topic.

Prof. Dr. Vincent Colapietro
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • abduction
  • becoming
  • foundationalism and anti-foundationalism
  • historicity
  • invariance
  • mutability
  • relativism
  • skepticism and anti-skepticism
  • transcendence
  • transience

Published Papers (5 papers)

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Research

15 pages, 293 KiB  
Article
John Dewey’s Radical Temporalism
by Vincent Colapietro
Philosophies 2023, 8(3), 45; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8030045 - 24 May 2023
Viewed by 1263
Abstract
The author presents John Dewey’s mature account of temporal continuity, showing how Dewey’s position can be identified as a form of radical temporalism. Even at the most elemental level (that of subatomic particles), natural existence is for such a temporalist an irreducibly temporal [...] Read more.
The author presents John Dewey’s mature account of temporal continuity, showing how Dewey’s position can be identified as a form of radical temporalism. Even at the most elemental level (that of subatomic particles), natural existence is for such a temporalist an irreducibly temporal affair. While he focuses primarily on Dewey’s “Time and Individuality” (1940), the author supplements his account by drawing upon Experience and Nature (1925), “Events and the Future” (1926), and to a lesser extent, other texts. In his magnum opus, Dewey draws a crucial distinction between temporal quality and temporal seriality. In an essay published the following year, he insists, contra C. D. Broad, on qualitative heterogeneity being an intrinsic trait of even the thinnest slice of the tem-poral continuum. The most elemental units of the temporal flux are neither “eternal and immu-table”, nor qualitatively homogenous. They also exhibit a from-to-through structure, with the dimensions of time being defined by these terms (pastness as from which, futurity as toward which, and presentness as through which). By relating the distinction between temporal quality and temporal seriality as well as the central claims made in “Events and the Future” to “Time and Individuality”, the author brings into clear focus the contours of Dewey’s radical temporalism. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Historic Ontology and Epistemology)
13 pages, 264 KiB  
Article
Habit, Gesture and the History of Ideas
by Giovanni Maddalena and Simone Bernardi della Rosa
Philosophies 2023, 8(2), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020040 - 18 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1290
Abstract
This paper explores the intertwinement of ontology and history that happened after the idealist turn of Kantian transcendentalism, particularly in classic German idealism and later in American pragmatism. The paper focuses on the less remarked-upon consequence of this intertwinement, namely the possibility of [...] Read more.
This paper explores the intertwinement of ontology and history that happened after the idealist turn of Kantian transcendentalism, particularly in classic German idealism and later in American pragmatism. The paper focuses on the less remarked-upon consequence of this intertwinement, namely the possibility of a new reading of history based on changes in concepts and habitual mentality. The paper proposes a new take on historiography that vindicates Hegel’s insight but changes his approach to a pragmatist one, more apt to face historical changes in a technical way and less easily twistable into ideological frameworks. The paper argues that the notion of habit, as phenomenologically and semiotically described by Peirce, is the fundamental cellule of the pragmatist take on the entanglement of history and ontology. The paper elaborates on the notion of habit, singling out a special form of it called “gesture” that can be a useful tool for reading the history of the human spirit without incorporating Hegel’s dialectic and Absolute. The paper compares the notion of gesture as it originated in the pragmatist tradition with the parallel use of the term in the early studies of Michel Foucault and argues that the notion of gesture is better equipped to tackle a theoretical reading of history. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Historic Ontology and Epistemology)
28 pages, 621 KiB  
Article
History and the Manifestation of the Good in Plato’s Republic
by Marco Stango
Philosophies 2023, 8(2), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020037 - 14 Apr 2023
Viewed by 2294
Abstract
This paper suggests that history, both personal and political, plays a crucial role in the manifestation (or concealment) of the Good in Plato’s Republic. After an introduction on how to read Plato’s dialogues vis-a-vis the problem of history, this article offers a [...] Read more.
This paper suggests that history, both personal and political, plays a crucial role in the manifestation (or concealment) of the Good in Plato’s Republic. After an introduction on how to read Plato’s dialogues vis-a-vis the problem of history, this article offers a close reading of Books I and VIII of the Republic. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Historic Ontology and Epistemology)
12 pages, 285 KiB  
Article
An Apology for a Dynamic Ontology: Peirce’s Analysis of Futurity in a Nietzschean Perspective
by Fabbrichesi Rossella
Philosophies 2023, 8(2), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020035 - 03 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1213
Abstract
Ontology is a part of metaphysics; it concerns what there is. Is it possible to consider being and reality not in a traditional metaphysical way—that is, not as a ground, an origin, a cause, but as a movement, a flux, a dynamogenic principle? [...] Read more.
Ontology is a part of metaphysics; it concerns what there is. Is it possible to consider being and reality not in a traditional metaphysical way—that is, not as a ground, an origin, a cause, but as a movement, a flux, a dynamogenic principle? I will set out from a seminal aphorism by Nietzsche, occurring in Human, all too Human (§2): “A lack of the historical sense is the hereditary fault of all philosophers. But everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, as there are likewise no absolute truths. Therefore, historical philosophising is henceforth necessary, and with it the virtue of diffidence”. I will then move on to explore Peirce’s late thought, starting from a passage in a letter to W. James, where the author supports a “futurist” interpretation of reality—as he had in the juvenile writings—and speaks of “the reality of the public world of the indefinite future as against our past opinions of what it was to be.” This can be defined as a process of “mellonization,” that operation of logic by which what “is conceived as having been is conceived as extended indefinitely into what always will be”. Similarly, in the Preface to Human, all too Human Nietzsche writes: “Our destiny rules over us, even when we are not yet aware of it; it is the future that makes laws for our today”. I will try to read some Peirce’s statements in a Nietzschean perspective within the context of the plan to develop a dynamic and historical ontology; and I will try to read the “enigma” of Nietzsche’s Eternal recurrence from a Peircean perspective. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Historic Ontology and Epistemology)
13 pages, 294 KiB  
Article
Taking Natural History Seriously: Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty’s Ontological Approach
by Maria Regina Brioschi
Philosophies 2023, 8(2), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020031 - 24 Mar 2023
Viewed by 1218
Abstract
This paper investigates Alfred North Whitehead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to develop a historical, dynamic ontology (a “process ontology”, according to the former, and an “ontology of the flesh” for the latter). The claim of the paper is that their originality lies in [...] Read more.
This paper investigates Alfred North Whitehead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to develop a historical, dynamic ontology (a “process ontology”, according to the former, and an “ontology of the flesh” for the latter). The claim of the paper is that their originality lies in the methods adopted to reach such ontologies, which show strong similarities. Both authors based their research on nature, conceived of as “the leaf of Being”, and on perceptual experience, understood not as a chaos of bare, punctual, sense data, but as the complex, original source of meaning that constitutes the primary field of philosophical investigation—the only source from which one can gain new understanding of both nature and logos (things, happenings, values, subjectivity, laws, etc.). After some introductory remarks on the connections between Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part clarifies why and how, according to the philosophers, ontology should start from a new scrutiny of nature. The second part specifies what this new conception of nature, based on perceptual experience, is. The third part focuses on how their ontologies must be construed as historic, insofar as behaviors, actions, and practices lie at the core of their concept of being. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Historic Ontology and Epistemology)
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