Dear Colleagues,

The overall aim of this Special Issue is to take stock and reflect on our current understanding of negotiations and to explore ways to improve that understanding. How authors propose to address this overall aim is left open to them. For example, articles that are critical reviews of literature or explorations via (interesting) examples are welcomed. To use a cliché, “out-of-the-box” thinking is encouraged. We are after creative ideas and suggestions, which, in turn, may inspire others to then follow up with further work. We also encourage authors to bring ideas from other disciplines into the debate or into the standard (economic) framework. An exploration into the interaction of emotions (or perhaps certain personality traits) and strategic (game-theoretic) behaviour on the outcome of negotiations would be interesting. The overall context of this Special Issue is motivated by the following considerations.

As we know, there is a huge amount of literature on the subject of negotiations in economics—theoretical and applied (in many subfields of economics). Much of it is built on or inspired by the classic papers by John Nash (Nash 1950 and 1953) and Ariel Rubinstein (Rubinstein 1982). We have learnt a lot from this huge scholarship over the past several decades on what determines bargaining power (the “distribution” question of who gets what) and when deals are struck and when they are not (the “efficiency” question of reaching agreement).

However, I think we are somewhat stuck now, and we need some fresh ideas, new perspectives and new tools too. Right across the globe, and in the different arenas of social, political and economic interaction, we see failures to reach agreement, some with serious consequences such as in various political conflicts. Compromise seems harder to reach. The Brexit impasse in the UK is a prime example. There are many other examples across the globe. Similar remarks apply to social “bargaining” situations and conflicts. In addition to the “efficiency” question of not reaching agreement, we need a better understanding of what drives bargaining power—and in turn how one can influence it; this question is ultimately and fundamentally the source of economic power and of the distribution of income and wealth.

In sum, for this Special Issue, we are looking for interesting and novel articles on the subject of negotiations, which can inspire others and shed some light on how we can progress our understanding. Length of Submissions (including Appendices): No more than 25 A4 pages.

Prof. Dr. Abhinay Muthoo
Guest Editor

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• Negotiations
• Bargaining
• Failure to Reach Agreement
• Bargaining Power