Game Theory in Economics: Recent Advances in Spatial Competition

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 1 August 2024 | Viewed by 1108

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Stefano Colombo
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Finance, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 20123 Milano, Italy
Interests: antitrust; industrial organization; economics of business and marketing; regional science; spatial economics; game theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The term “spatial competition models” is commonly used to indicate the class of models in which space plays a central role in determining the result of the interaction between economic agents. Starting from the seminal contribution of Hotelling (1929), spatial competition has become a central theme for economists and regional scientists, dealing with issues such as agglomeration, dispersion, and so on. Nowadays, game theory is commonly adopted in spatial competition models, and it is not an exaggeration to say that game-theoretic concepts and tools have improved our understanding of spatial competition by creating new models and extending existing ones.

This Special Issue aims to collect original, high-quality applications of game-theoretic methods to spatial competition models (e.g., Hotelling, Salop, other spatial models). A non-exhaustive list of these methods includes, but is not limited to, static games, repeated games, Stackelberg games, entry games, and cooperative games. Applications include, but are not limited to, firms’ location, urban agglomeration/dispersion, horizontal and vertical differentiation, competition between private and public firms, and R&D competition.

Dr. Stefano Colombo
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • spatial competition
  • Hotelling
  • Salop
  • horizontal differentiation
  • vertical differentiation

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

20 pages, 998 KiB  
Article
Location of Firms and Outsourcing
Games 2023, 14(6), 70; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14060070 - 31 Oct 2023
Viewed by 895
Abstract
We analyze the location of final goods producers under spatial competition with strategic input price determination by firm-specific input suppliers when the final goods producers undertake complete outsourcing or bi-sourcing. Under complete outsourcing, the final goods producers locate closer as the distance between [...] Read more.
We analyze the location of final goods producers under spatial competition with strategic input price determination by firm-specific input suppliers when the final goods producers undertake complete outsourcing or bi-sourcing. Under complete outsourcing, the final goods producers locate closer as the distance between the input suppliers decreases, but the distance between the final goods producers may increase or decrease with the transportation costs of the consumers and the transportation costs between the input suppliers and the final goods producers depending on the distance between the input suppliers. The possibility of bi-sourcing reduces the benefit from saving the transportation costs between the input suppliers and the final goods producers, and creates effects which are opposite to those under complete outsourcing. Thus, our results differ significantly from the extant literature considering either no strategic input price determination or strategic input price determination under competition in the input market. We also discuss the implications on the profits, consumer surplus and welfare, and the implications of endogenous location choice of the input suppliers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Economics: Recent Advances in Spatial Competition)
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