Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation: Theory and Evidence

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 May 2024 | Viewed by 3307

Special Issue Editors

School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Interests: information economics; behavioral economics; industrial economics; contest theory; matching theory
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

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Guest Editor
Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, China
Interests: institutional economics; language economics; theory of cooperation; theory of competition

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Competition, coordination, and cooperation are three fundamental types of relations for strategic interactions among individuals, firms, and countries. Our understanding of these relations has advanced thanks to the development of game theory in recent decades, and many existing theories have been examined via evidence in the field or the laboratory in recent years by empirical and experimental studies.

This Special Issue (short for CCC: T&E) aims to promote research that studies either one of the abovementioned strategic interactions among players, adopting the approach of either theory, empirics, or experiment. We encourage the submission of papers that either deliver new insights into these relations or provide new evidence that confirms the existing theory, or both. The topics of interest include but are not limited to: online and offline competition; competition with incomplete information; dynamic contests; group contests; coalition formation; conflict networks; coordination success and failure; mechanism design for cooperation; prisoner dilemma; public goods game; battle of the sexes; matching pennies; rock–paper–scissors game; Blotto games; externalities and free riding; rent seeking and inequality; social comparison and peer effect; information sharing and information disclosure; and gender difference in the relevant behavior.

Dr. Jie Zheng
Prof. Dr. Shaoan Huang
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

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Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • competition
  • coordination
  • cooperation
  • contests
  • conflict of interest
  • asymmetry of information
  • behavioral economics
  • experimental economics

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Research

13 pages, 1782 KiB  
Article
Cooperation and Coordination in Threshold Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players
by Xinmiao An, Yali Dong, Xiaomin Wang and Boyu Zhang
Games 2023, 14(6), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14060076 - 17 Dec 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1270
Abstract
In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments ei, productivities pi, and rewards ri. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium [...] Read more.
In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments ei, productivities pi, and rewards ri. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes, and multiple cooperative NEs, in which the group’s collective contribution equals the threshold. We then study how multiple dimensions of inequality influence people’s cooperation and coordination. We show that heterogeneity in eipi can promote cooperation in the sense that the existence condition of the defective NE becomes stricter. Furthermore, players with higher eipi are likely to contribute more at a cooperative NE in terms of collective contribution (i.e., absolute contribution multiplied by productivity). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation: Theory and Evidence)
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31 pages, 1917 KiB  
Article
Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment
by Manela Karunadasa, Katri K. Sieberg and Toni Tapani Kristian Jantunen
Games 2023, 14(3), 46; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046 - 31 May 2023
Viewed by 1415
Abstract
This experiment examines the relationship between payment systems and the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. By using a real-effort task to stimulate the decision making of service providers, the study finds that payment systems do indeed have an [...] Read more.
This experiment examines the relationship between payment systems and the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. By using a real-effort task to stimulate the decision making of service providers, the study finds that payment systems do indeed have an impact on service provision. Specifically, providers in fee-for-service systems over-provide, while those in salary systems under-provide services. Additionally, there is a lack of alignment between the services provided under fee-for-service and the actual needs of customers, resulting in a substantial loss of customer benefits under fee-for-service in comparison to under salary. The study also finds that providers in fee-for-service systems perform more faulty tasks than those in salary, indicating that they may prioritize quantity over quality in their services. As for insurance, the results of this study show no significant effect of insurance on the number of services provided; however, customers without insurance received significantly more faulty tasks. Based on these results, the study concludes that payment systems play an important role in determining the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. Overall, this study highlights the need for a better alignment between customer needs and services provided under fee-for-service systems. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation: Theory and Evidence)
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