Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Non-Cooperative Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 December 2023) | Viewed by 3940

Special Issue Editors

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
Interests: game theory; social dilemmas; bargaining games; theoretical and experimental research on competition; cooperation and fairness; theoretical physics; relativity theories; cosmology; astrophysics; coherent optics; GPS precision methods
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals
Department of Management and Organizations, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA
Interests: common pool resource dilemmas; dynamic pricing; fair cost-sharing allocation; route choice in traffic networks; sequential search by committees
Prof. Dr. Vernon Smith
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA
Interests: experimental economics; ethics & society; Adam Smith; industrial organization; real estate; economics and law
Prof. Dr. Guillermina Jasso
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Sociology, New York University, New York, NY 10012-9605, USA
Interests: inequality; justice and fairness; other sociobehavioral processes such as status and power; international migration; language; basic theory; probability distributions in theoretical analysis; factorial survey methods in empirical analysis

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Most experimental and theoretical studies of non-cooperative games have focused on the possibility of cooperation, with significantly less attention devoted to the norms of fairness and distributive justice. This seems inadequate given the immense importance of fairness in major real-life contexts. Perceived fairness of pay is very important in human resource decisions and processes, particularly with regard to salaries and other compensation decisions. Research suggests that perceived compensation fairness, the procedures used to make compensation-related decisions, and the manner in which compensation-related information is communicated play significant roles in shaping reactions to critical elements of the compensation system.

In this Special Issue, we aim to direct ther reader’s attention toward fairness in non-cooperative human interactions; moreover, we intend to present a comprehensive review of current models and experimental studies on fairness in strategic interactions alongside new, unpublished models and results. We welcome original and review papers pertaining to the following:

  1. Are humans fair by their nature, or is fairness an emergent trait cultivated by education, social norms, and religious ethics?
  2. To what extent are fairness and cooperative perceptions and behaviors correlated?
  3. Theoretical and simulation models pertaining to the possibility of the evolution of fair behavior in small and large groups.
  4. Individual and societal differences in fairness perceptions and behaviors.
  5. The neurophysiological correlates of fair perception and behavior.

Prof. Dr. Ramzi Suleiman
Prof. Dr. Amnon Rapoport
Prof. Dr. Vernon Smith
Prof. Dr. Guillermina Jasso
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

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Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • non-cooperative games
  • fairness
  • cooperation
  • social norms
  • evolution of norms
  • neuro-correlates of fairness
  • religious ethics

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

15 pages, 295 KiB  
Article
When Efficiency Requires Arbitrary Discrimination: Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Equilibrium Selection
Games 2023, 14(5), 65; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050065 - 30 Sep 2023
Viewed by 967
Abstract
Institutions may rely on fundamental principles, e.g., of legal philosophy, but may also have evolved according to institutional fitness, as gauged by a society’s well-being. In our stylized framework where two fundamental principles, equality and efficiency, conflict with each other, one of the [...] Read more.
Institutions may rely on fundamental principles, e.g., of legal philosophy, but may also have evolved according to institutional fitness, as gauged by a society’s well-being. In our stylized framework where two fundamental principles, equality and efficiency, conflict with each other, one of the three players is the third party who faces two symmetric co-players as culprits and determines whether to sanction the two culprits discriminatorily or treat them with parity. Relying on the theory of equilibrium selection, we derived equilibrium solutions and experimentally tested our behavioral hypotheses. We found that asymmetry in wealth between the two culprits let the sanctioning agent hold the richer culprit more responsible. Furthermore, our results demonstrated that when the sanctioning agent’s decision was observable, sanctioning the two culprits discriminatorily induced them to coordinate on an efficient outcome. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)
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10 pages, 261 KiB  
Article
Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts
Games 2023, 14(4), 55; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040055 - 28 Jul 2023
Viewed by 868
Abstract
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and [...] Read more.
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff’s probability of winning the contest. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)
15 pages, 909 KiB  
Article
A Representation for Many Player Generalized Divide the Dollar Games
Games 2023, 14(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020019 - 23 Feb 2023
Viewed by 1365
Abstract
Divide the dollar is a simplified version of a two player bargaining problem game devised by John Nash. The generalized divide the dollar game has n>2 players. Evolutionary algorithms can be used to evolve individual players for this generalized game but [...] Read more.
Divide the dollar is a simplified version of a two player bargaining problem game devised by John Nash. The generalized divide the dollar game has n>2 players. Evolutionary algorithms can be used to evolve individual players for this generalized game but representation—i.e., a genome plus a move or search operator(s)—must be carefully chosen since it affects the search process. This paper proposes an entirely new representation called a demand matrix. Each individual in the evolving population now represents a collection of n players rather than just an individual player. Players use previous outcomes to decide their choices (bids) in the current round. The representation scales linearly with the number of players and the move operator is a variant of an evolution strategy. The results indicate that this proposed representation for the generalized divide the dollar game permits the efficient evolution of large player populations with high payoffs and fair demand sets. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)
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