In Pursuit of the Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Learning and Evolution in Games".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 June 2024 | Viewed by 1880

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Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330, Thailand
Interests: bioeconomics; environmental and resource economics; socio-ecological systems; sustainability; complex systems
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Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Due to your involvement and your expertise in the field, we cordially invite you to contribute a paper to the Special Issue of Games entitled "In Pursuit of the Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics”.

There are various mathematical descriptions of the evolutionary dynamics based on three fundamental principles which are reproduction, mutation and selection. Finding out the general laws governing evolutionary dynamics across all frames of reference is one of the major challenges in science. This Special Issue aims at getting together in one place the current academic works that create bridges between the different formulations of the dynamics of evolution. Analyzing the interconnections between evolutionary differential equations is utile, for the problems and results can be scrutinized from different angles; they can be more easily expressed in a specific framework, which in turn can provide a different perspective hard to unveil from the original system. Without being exclusive, what interests us notably are the consequences of such linking on cooperation and its stability from a game-theoretic point of view. We welcome both theoretical papers and real-world applications not to mention review papers. They can be related to any topic issued from mathematical biology, economics or social sciences.

Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, open access journal, which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making.

We thank you for your attention and look forward to hearing from you. Please spread the word around you.

Prof. Dr. Arnaud Z. Dragicevic
Prof. Dr. Ştefan Cristian Gherghina
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • quasispecies dynamics
  • Lotka–Volterra dynamics
  • replicator dynamics
  • replicator-mutator dynamics
  • price equation
  • adaptive dynamics
  • population dynamics
  • structured population
  • finite populations
  • reproduction
  • fitness
  • mutation selection
  • differential equations
  • evolutionary games
  • evolutionary game theory
  • dynamic games
  • games on graphs
  • spatial games

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

14 pages, 994 KiB  
Article
Invasion of Optimal Social Contracts
by Alessandra F. Lütz, Marco Antonio Amaral, Ian Braga and Lucas Wardil
Games 2023, 14(3), 42; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030042 - 15 May 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1274
Abstract
The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members. Thus, how does a population shift from [...] Read more.
The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members. Thus, how does a population shift from the current social contract to a better one? In other words, how can a social system leave a locally optimum configuration to achieve a globally optimum state? Here, we investigate the effect of promoting diversity on the evolution of social contracts. We consider group-structured populations where individuals play the stag-hunt game in all groups. We model the diversity incentive as a snowdrift game played in a single focus group where the individual is more prone to adopting a deviant norm. We show that a moderate diversity incentive is sufficient to change the system dynamics, driving the population over the stag-hunt invasion barrier that prevents the global optimum being reached. Thus, an initial fraction of adopters of the new, better norm can drive the system toward the optimum social contract. If the diversity incentive is not too large, the better social contract is the new equilibrium and remains stable even if the incentive is turned off. However, if the incentive is large, the population is trapped in a mixed equilibrium and the better social norm can only be reached if the incentive is turned off after the equilibrium is reached. The results are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations and analytical approximation methods. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue In Pursuit of the Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics)
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