Cross-Server End-to-End Patient Key Agreement Protocol for DNA-Based U-Healthcare in the Internet of Living Things
1.1. Research Problems
- I introduce a DNA-based U-healthcare application constructed in CS-E2E communication environments. In the proposed model, multiple servers provide U-healthcare services based on real-time DNA sequencing data produced by smart tiny sequencers with TGS technology in the IoLT network. Patients are allowed to share healthcare data with each other directly.
- The protocol allows the patients to store single registered credentials on a smart card and enter the credentials once per session only. They are allowed to choose specific servers of a multi-server system from a list in the device to enjoy multiple registered services. I call this solution “smart-card-based single sign-on (SC-SSO)”. Furthermore, the proposed SC-SSO is designed without a centerless solution to alleviate communication cost and reduce the security risk of third-party authority compromise.
- The authentication protocol is designed using three factors, combining password, smart card and biometrics. It can guarantee higher security for communications compared to the single-factor or two-factor solutions. In the protocol, a perfect forward secrecy of shared E2E session keys is assured. Patient anonymity and untraceability are provided in the protocol. Patients can also update their passwords and biometrics to ensure higher security.
- The security proof of my proposed protocol is presented using formal verification tools, including the real-or-random (RoR) model and Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic. In addition, an informal analysis is provided to further discuss the resistance to various security attacks, e.g., replay attacks, impersonation attacks, etc.
1.3. Paper Structure
2. Related Works
3. Technical Preliminaries
3.1. Smart Card Technology
3.2. Biohash Function
3.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
3.4. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
3.5. Notations and Cryptographic Functions
4. Problem Statement
4.1. System Model
4.2. Adversarial Capabilities
- 𝒜 has control over the open internet. This means that 𝒜 can intercept, delete, insert or replay any transcript in each communication session.
- 𝒜 may steal the patients’ smart card and/or mobile device and then attempt to extract the secret credentials using power analysis .
- 𝒜 attempts to compromise the past messages communicated between patients once they have obtained secret values or even a session key of the current communication session.
- 𝒜 is a privileged insider of the system (e.g., admin) who may attempt to attack the patient’s registered information stored in ’s database.
- Legitimate patients or servers can behave as 𝒜 and trigger similar attacks on the system.
4.3. Formal Security Model
- Send(ℂ, ): 𝒜 is allowed to request to ℂ; ℂ replies to 𝒜 in accordance with the rules of the proposed protocol.
- Execute(): This passive attack allows 𝒜 to eavesdrop on the message communicated by and .
- Reveal(ℂ): In this attack, 𝒜 attempts to retrieve the session key generated by ℂ based on the rules of the protocol.
- Corrupt: In my proposed protocol, this query returns the password of the patient, the biometrics of the patient and the parameters stored on the smart card and the device to 𝒜 if , and , respectively.
- Test(ℂ): This query allows 𝒜 to request the session key from ℂ; ℂ replies to 𝒜 based on the probabilistic outcome of the coin tossed.
5. The Proposed Protocol
5.1. System Initialization Phase
5.2. Registration Phase
5.3. Login and Authentication Phase
5.4. Password and Biometrics Update Phase
6. Security Analysis
6.1. Formal Security Analysis Using RoR Model
- : Length of a hash value.
- : Length of a random number.
- : Length of a biometrics value.
- : Total number of hash oracle queries.
- : Total number of Send queries.
- : Total number of Execute queries.
- : List of hash oracle outputs.
- : List of random oracle results.
- : List of communicated messages between and .
- : Probability of biometrics false positive.
- : Zipf parameters.
6.2. Authentication Proof Using BAN Logic
- A |≡ X: A believes statement M.
- A ⊲ M: A sees statement M.
- #(M): Formula M is fresh.
- A |~ M: A once said statement M.
- (M, N): M or N is one part of formula (M, N).
- A ⟹ M: A has jurisdiction over statement M.
- : This represents M combined with formula N.
- : Value K is known only to A and B, and it is used for their communication.
- : Formula M is a secret known only by A and B. Only A and B can use M to authenticate each other.
- : Seeing rule (R1);
- : Interpretation rule (R2);
- : Freshness rule (R3);
- : Verification rule (R4);
- : Jurisdiction rule (R5);
- : Additional rule (R6).
- |≡ : Assumption 1 (A1);
- |≡ : Assumption 2 (A2);
- : Assumption 3 (A3);
- |≡ : Assumption 4 (A4);
- : Assumption 5 (A5);
- : Assumption 6 (A6).
- : According to Message 1, we have .
- : Based on R1 and A1, we obtain |≡ |~ .
- : Based on R2, we obtain |≡ |~ .
- : According to R3 and A2, we obtain |≡ #.
- : Based on R4, we obtain |≡ |≡ .
- : According to R5 and , we have |≡ .
- : Based on R6, we obtain |≡ , and |≡ .
- : According to A3 and , we obtain |≡ (G1 achieved).
- : According to Message 2, we have .
- : Based on R1 and A1, we obtain |≡ |~ .
- : Based on R2, we obtain .
- : Using R3, A4 and A5, we obtain .
- : Based on A6, and the rule of the protocol, we obtain |≡ (G2 achieved).
- : Using similar arguments of and for Message 3 and Message 4, we can obtain |≡ (G3 achieved) and |≡ (G4 achieved), respectively.
- : Based on A4, A5, A6, and , we obtain |≡ (G5 achieved).
- : Using similar arguments of , we can obtain |≡ (G6 achieved).
6.3. Informal Security Analysis
7. Performance Evaluation
7.2. Communication Cost
7.3. Computation Cost
- : Time of running fuzzy extraction function.
- : Time of running a Chebyshev chaotic polynomial mapping.
- : Time of operating an EC point multiplication.
- : Time of operating an EC point addition.
- : Time of running a symmetric encryption or symmetric decryption.
- : Time of calculating a modular squaring.
- : Time of calculating a square root module 𝑁.
- : Time of running a hash function.
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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|Private key, public key of|
|Signature of ’s message signed by|
|Basic point on the curve|
|⊕||Exclusive-or (XOR) operation|
|One-way hash function, biohash function|
|Symmetric encryption, decryption algorithms using key k|
|Storage parameters in ’s smart card|
|Storage parameters in ’s mobile device|
|The Hash query is simulated as follows, where is a message.|
If the record (, ) is found in the list , return ;
otherwise, choose a and add (, ) into ;
in this way, a similar procedure is performed to create .
Simulation of the Reveal(ℂ) query is simply performed as follows. |
Once ℂ is in an accepted state, the session key formed by ℂ is returned.
Simulation of the Test(ℂ) query is performed as follows. |
ℂtosses the coin . If , the query returns an available ; otherwise, the query returns a random number.
The query Corrupt() is simulated as follows. |
If , the query outputs .
If , the query outputs .
If , the query outputs the parameters stored in or .
Simulation of the Execute(, ) query occurs in succession to simulation of the Send(ℂ, ) query, which is described as follows.|
sends to , and sends to . We have: <> ← Send(, start), <> ← Send(, <>)
Finally, and are returned.
Following the rules of the proposed protocol, the Send query is executed below.
|Provision of IoLT-based U-healthcare application||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||√|
|Provision of E2E communication||√||√||√||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||√|
|Provision of cross-server communication||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||×||√|
|Provision of three-factor authentication||×||×||×||×||√||×||√||√||×||×||×||√|
|Provision of centerless authentication||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Provision of SC-SSO solution||×||×||×||×||√||×||√||×||√||×||×||√|
|Provision of user anonymity||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Provision of user untraceability||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||×||×||√||√|
|Provision of message unlinkability||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||×||×||√||√|
|Provision of robust mutual authentication||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Provision of perfect forward secrecy||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Provision of user password update||–||–||√||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Provision of user biometrics update||–||–||–||–||×||–||×||√||–||–||–||√|
|Provision of mathematical security proof||×||×||×||×||√||×||√||√||×||×||√||√|
|Resistance to DoS attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||×||√||√||√|
|Resistance to MITM attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Resistance to replay attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Resistance to online password guessing attacks||–||–||√||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Resistance to offline password guessing attacks||–||–||√||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Resistance to stolen smart card attacks||–||–||√||√||√||√||√||√||×||√||√||√|
|Resistance to impersonation attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√|
|Resistance to insider attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||–||√||√||√|
|Resistance to desynchronization attacks||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||√||×||√||√|
|Protocols||Total Communication Rounds|
|Le et al. ||2||512|
|Xu et al. ||3||1344|
|Lin et al. ||3||5736|
|Meshram et al. ||2||3072|
|Shohaimay and Ismail ||3||1376|
|Le et al. ||+ + 9||≈0.00744||+ 2 + 8||≈1.17560||≈1.18304|
|Xu et al. ||+ 4 + 9||≈2.54621||3 + 5||≈1.52745||≈4.07366|
|Lin et al. ||≈0.06353||≈0.06215||≈0.12568|
|Meshram et al. ||2 + 11||≈0.06521||2 + 9||≈0.06383||≈0.12904|
|Shohaimay and Ismail ||4 + 2 + 7||≈2.05063||4 + + 5||≈2.04235||≈4.09298|
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Le, T.-V. Cross-Server End-to-End Patient Key Agreement Protocol for DNA-Based U-Healthcare in the Internet of Living Things. Mathematics 2023, 11, 1638. https://doi.org/10.3390/math11071638
Le T-V. Cross-Server End-to-End Patient Key Agreement Protocol for DNA-Based U-Healthcare in the Internet of Living Things. Mathematics. 2023; 11(7):1638. https://doi.org/10.3390/math11071638Chicago/Turabian Style
Le, Tuan-Vinh. 2023. "Cross-Server End-to-End Patient Key Agreement Protocol for DNA-Based U-Healthcare in the Internet of Living Things" Mathematics 11, no. 7: 1638. https://doi.org/10.3390/math11071638