



Article

Collective Efficacy as the Conditional Effect of the Relationship between Religiocentrism and Support for Interreligious Violence

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Abstract: When a person identifies with a particular religion, they identify not only with the ingroup's religious values but also with the ingroup's evaluations towards the relevant religious outgroup. Using a theoretical notion of ethnocentrism, this study offers religiocentrism to explain how one favourably perceives their religious affiliation and unfavourably evaluates the religious outgroup. Specifically, this study is focused on the recent interreligious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. In carrying out the study, we employ relevant constructs to test our hypothesis that religiocentrism is indirectly related to support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice and that this relation is stronger for individuals with high collective efficacy. We perform a confirmatory factor analysis to test all the measures' validity. In testing the hypothesis, we conduct a moderated mediation analysis to test the indirect relations between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice and to test the conditional effect of collective efficacy on the relationship. The results show that collective efficacy significantly moderates the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence. The finding contributes to the discussion of the various roles of collective efficacy in interreligious conflicts, dependent on the nature of the conflicts.

Keywords: interreligious violence; religious conflict; social identity theory; perceived injustice; collective efficacy



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1. Introduction

Religious identity has been used to explain interreligious conflicts worldwide (Ysseldyk et al. 2010; Abanes et al. 2014). Rooted in social identity theory, the main proposition states that every individual has the innate drive to identify themselves with a particular identity, in this case religious identity (Tajfel 1974, 1981). By this, individuals distinguish themselves from “us” and “them”, in which they generally perceive their religious ingroup favourably and the relevant outgroups unfavourably. Previous studies have shown that this condition alone is sufficient (and also necessary) to create ingroup favouritism and exclusionary outcomes against the outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Brewer 1999). According to Phinney and Ong (2007), individuals' tendency to constantly compare their religious ingroup social position vis-à-vis the relevant religious outgroup has two functions; one is to maintain or achieve superiority, and the other is to maintain their distinctiveness.

As a social identity that provides unfalsifiable life-guiding beliefs to its adherents, religious identity is evidently an important identity to many individuals (Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Unlike its counterparts, such as ethnic identity, people are able to convert to another religious affiliation, yet it is considered a difficult task to do—sometimes with severe social consequences accompanying the decision (French et al. 2008). This claim is even more

evident in countries such as Indonesia, where religion has resurfaced as one of the most important determinants in making important public-life decisions, i.e., electing a political leader and implementing Sharia law (Mulia 2011; Hadiz 2017).

The resurgence of religious identity in Indonesia has also fuelled interreligious conflicts in the country, which have become constant threats following the watershed event of the fall of Suharto's 32-year authoritarian regime (Van Bruinessen 2018). This claim is particularly true between Muslims and Christians (Protestants and Catholics combined). According to the religious freedom reports in 2015 alone, there were more than 150 cases of interreligious conflict between the two religious groups across Indonesia (Perkasa 2016). In 2021, both religious communities were still constantly found going against each other, where they were recorded to experience the highest number of religious freedom violations (SETARA Institute 2022). As of 2022, there still exist several prohibitions on the establishment of Christian religious houses of worship in areas where the population is predominantly Muslim (Kompas TV 2022). Thus, it is relevant to employ the notion of religious identity to explain individuals' support for interreligious conflicts in Indonesia.

As mentioned earlier, religious identity provides life-guiding beliefs that are to be taken wholeheartedly by their religious adherents, thus shaping the way people perceive their group and their surroundings (Stark and Glock 1968; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Religious adherents are likely to perceive their religious beliefs positively while perceiving their religious outgroup's beliefs negatively. This tendency is a classic phenomenon of ethnocentrism, in which individuals tend to show high respect for the norms and values of their social ingroup while rejecting those of the social outgroup (Levine and Campbell 1972). This is thought to be a result of stereotypical perceptions of the characteristics of the outgroup. This notion suggests that ethnocentrism consists of two components: positive ingroup attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes (Billiet et al. 1996).

In line with this, we argue that religious identity induces in its religious adherents an ethnocentric way of thinking. Here, the term is transformed into religiocentrism. The notion consists of the same two stereotypical perceptions as ethnocentrism does, but we focus on individuals' positive perceptions towards their religious ingroup as well as their negative perceptions towards their religious outgroup (Sterkens and Anthony 2008). A two-factor religiocentrism has been shown to exist in many religious affiliations, e.g., Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity. This confirms the claim that by identifying with a particular religious affiliation, individuals naturally compare their religious ingroup with relevant religious outgroups. Most importantly, previous studies have shown that religiocentrism predisposes people to show exclusionary measures against the relevant religious outgroups (Scheepers and Eisinga 2015). In fact, it has been demonstrated to be the strongest predictor among Muslims and Christians in Indonesia in determining their level of support for interreligious violence against each other (Setiawan et al. 2020a).

In the extant literature, religiocentrism has also been shown to indirectly relate to exclusionary measures against a religious outgroup through perceived injustice (van Zomeren et al. 2008). As a reflection of religious identity, religiocentrism activates religious ingroup experiences compared with the religious outgroup. Given the context of interreligious relationships between the two religious communities in Indonesia, the Muslim communities often hold a narrative of a long marginalisation experience inflicted by the Suharto regime, which was suspected of collaborating with Christian communities (Hadiz 2017; Van Bruinessen 2018). As the religious majority group, Muslim communities still feel they are treated unjustly even after the change of regime, as the post-Suharto governments allow too much space for the Christian identity to rise as well, e.g., 13 legislative seats in the national election in 2004 (Setiawan 2020), and a growing popularity of Pentecostalism even in Muslim-populated areas (Hoon 2013; Suhadi 2014). On the other hand, the Christian communities perceive that they are treated unfairly because, among many others, the Ministerial Decree of 2006 on Regulation of Places of Worship complicates the building of churches (Human Rights Watch 2013).

Perceptions towards unjust experiences among ingroup members can then be translated into collective action (De Weerd and Klandermans 1999; van Zomeren et al. 2008). This mediational relation proclaims that religiocentrism paves the way for perceptions of injustice to emerge, and in turn, religious ingroup members may turn to collective action to ameliorate their unjust experiences. In this relation, the feelings of injustice or deprivation become the key component. According to Mummendey et al. (1999), the experience of deprivation can be linked to either group or personal experiences. What is most important is whether ingroup members perceive a discrepancy between their group and their relevant outgroup, thus allowing a sense of injustice to emerge.

However, there have been studies demonstrating that highly identified religious adherents who perceive injustice towards their religious group refuse to participate in their group's collective action, especially in interreligious violence (see Beller and Kröger (2017)). According to the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), in order for ingroup members to carry out collective action as an attempt to improve their deprived experiences, a shared belief among ingroup members that they are, in fact, able to carry out such action is required (van Zomeren et al. 2008; Stewart et al. 2016). This group-based belief is known as collective efficacy, which refers to one's belief that their group has the capacity to carry out necessary actions to achieve their group's goal (Bandura 2002; Goncalo et al. 2010). In Mummendey et al.'s (1999) study, collective efficacy was placed as a mediator between group identification and collective action. They found that the group was more likely to perform the actual behaviour and think about the actual strategies to carry out the action when they perceived group resentment and believed that they could ameliorate their group's condition.

In the initial phase, collective efficacy is inevitably essential to driving the ingroup's support for interreligious violence. It may even increase as one's religious ingroup achieves a certain level of success (Bandura 1977), such as succeeding in preventing people of other religions from becoming regional leaders in the local election (Van Bruinessen 2018). In other words, the success of the ingroup's collective action affects one's collective efficacy, in turn increasing the likelihood of future collective action. In light of this premise, collective efficacy may become a moderator in a later stage of interreligious conflicts because the belief that one's group has the capacity to carry out a necessary action already exists. Thus, it is a matter of to what extent ingroup members believe in their group ability to carry out the action, rather than the presence or absence of such a belief. This is especially relevant in the context of prolonged interreligious conflicts, in which religious ingroup members who perceive the same unjust experiences no longer share the same level of belief that violent behaviours against the outgroup(s) can ameliorate their religious group's condition (Al Qurtuby 2013; Muluk et al. 2013). In this paper, we argue that the indirect relation between religious identification, here represented by religiocentrism, and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice can vary depending on the level of collective efficacy.

Based on all this, this study aims to investigate the moderating role of collective efficacy in the indirect relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice. While numerous studies have focused on the mediating role of collective efficacy, almost no studies have scrutinised the moderating role of collective efficacy in the relation between religious identification and support for interreligious violence. We believe that collective efficacy may shift from a mediating role to a moderating role after many years of conflict. This claim has been supported by evidence of flourishing numbers of interreligious movements that promote interreligious peace (Al Qurtuby 2013). Therefore, this raises the question whether the established relation of interest varies depending on the level of collective efficacy among religious ingroup members. To pursue this aim, this study involves six hotspot areas in Indonesia where interreligious conflicts have occurred. The study uses a data set involving a random selection of the general population living in those areas. By this, not only can we validate the measures among the general population, but we can also generalise the study, to a large extent, to similar areas in Indonesia.

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

In this section, we will delineate relevant theories employed in the study to explain how religious identity is related to exclusionary measures against the relevant outgroup, specifically support for interreligious violence. We start by first explaining religious identity, which encompasses religiocentrism. Then, we continue by providing a theoretical explanation of SIMCA, emphasising the notions of perceived injustice and collective efficacy.

2.1. Religious Identity and Religiocentrism

Social identity theory posits that individuals naturally define themselves as belonging to particular groups and, consequently, differentiate themselves from other individuals who are not part of their selected groups, such as football clubs, ethnic groups, and religious affiliations (Tajfel 1974). Social identification is thought to be necessary because it positively impacts individuals' self-esteem and wellbeing (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Branscombe et al. 1999). Similar to other social identities, the process of identifying with a certain religious identity is performed through social categorisation, in which individuals define and classify it on the basis of their subjective meanings that can provide them with a positive social identity.

Following the notions of social identity theory, Cameron (2004) proposed a three-factor social identity model that explains the extent to which individuals identify with a particular social identity. The model explains that any given individual's social identity is reflected in the degree of salience of a certain social category (cognitive centrality), the emotional valence towards the identity (ingroup affect), and the social ties between the group and the individual (ingroup ties). According to this, religious identity can be defined as an individual's identification or affiliation with a particular religious group, which is manifested in their perception of the influence that religion has on a daily basis (cognitive centrality), participation in religious services (ingroup ties), and the extent to which they accept its life-guiding beliefs (ingroup affect). Religious influence on individuals' daily life has been shown to negatively associate with support for interreligious conflicts (Setiawan et al. 2020a). However, participation in religious services has long been shown to negatively affect outgroup attitudes towards the religious outgroups (Allport and Ross 1967; Scheepers and Eisinga 2015). This claim, to a certain degree, has been shown to be true in the modern world of religious extremism (Ginges et al. 2009; Beller and Kröger 2017). However, religious beliefs are shown to have mixed findings (Sterkens and Anthony 2008; Jetten and Sterkens 2015).

It is worth reiterating why religious identity holds significant relevance in interreligious conflicts. First, religious identity provides beliefs that consist of life-governing values and norms for individuals (Abu-Nimer 2001; Hunsberger and Jackson 2005). This claim is supported by previous findings, which have shown that individuals with a stronger religious identification tend to show higher obedience to the authority and social norms (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004). However, this influence has also been shown to affect individuals in less-benign situations, in which religious beliefs in war-justifying scenarios can encourage individuals to take part in interreligious conflicts (Abu-Nimer 2001; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Second, religious beliefs pave the way for a sense of moral superiority because in order for individuals to accept the beliefs wholeheartedly, they should regard their religious group better than the outgroups (Brewer 1999; Muldoon et al. 2007). In other words, they are likely to perceive their religious ingroup favourably—"ingroup glorification"—and the relevant outgroup unfavourably (Ysseldyk et al. 2010, p. 62). This outcome is what we know as religiocentrism.

In times of intense interreligious competition, the bi-factor religiocentrism is expected to increase among religious ingroup members. According to the notions of social identity theory, this condition is more than sufficient to create exclusionary measures against the religious outgroup as an attempt to maintain the ingroup's psychological distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Therefore, *we expect that the level of religiocentrism is positively related to support for interreligious violence.*

2.2. Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)

Using psychological and sociological constructs, the SIMCA explains how an individual decides to take part in their group's collective action. By following relative deprivation theory (RDT), the SIMCA suggests that when people identify themselves with a disadvantaged group, they tend to experience resentment towards their group's deprivation, which leads them to perceive injustice. According to RDT, perception of injustice alone may not be sufficient to generate collective action, especially when ingroup members do not share the same belief that they are able to perform such action (Runciman 1966; Halevy et al. 2010). In other words, there should be a shared belief that they are able to ameliorate their deprived group position by carrying out a certain action. This collective efficacy is based on the concept of self-efficacy, that is, one's belief that they have the capacity to carry out necessary actions to attain their goal (Bandura 2002; Goncalo et al. 2010). When a group of individuals share the belief that through concerted efforts, they can overcome challenges and produce the desired outcomes, the group becomes more effective. This pattern of behaviour is referred to as "collective efficacy" (Bandura 1997).

We believe that the SIMCA is useful in explaining why Muslims and Christians support interreligious violence in Indonesia. By identifying as a Muslim or Christian, people evaluate their religious group experience vis-à-vis the religious outgroup; in the Indonesian context, both of them are found to perceive unjust experiences (Human Rights Watch 2013; Hadiz 2017; Van Bruinessen 2018). Additionally, through religious identification, which should be manifested in religiocentrism, people are expected to develop collective efficacy on the basis of their religious ingroup's past experiences. These two mechanisms are claimed to be able to generate collective action or, at least, support for collective action (van Zomeren et al. 2008, 2012; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013).

2.3. A Potential Moderating Role of Collective Efficacy

Depending on the stages of interreligious conflicts, we argue that the relations between collective efficacy, religiocentrism, and support for interreligious violence are dynamic. Collective efficacy can act as a conditioning variable rather than a mediator when interreligious conflicts are prolonged. Treating a mediator as a moderator is possible and has been demonstrated by Karazsia and Berlin (2018). As suggested by their study, a mediator can shift to moderate a particular theoretical relation over time. In our case, the shared belief among Muslims and Christians that they can carry out a certain action to ameliorate their group's condition has evolved over the years. Historically, both groups had believed that violence against the religious outgroup was the "appropriate" way to overcome their group's difficulty, e.g., violent clashes in Ambon (Braithwaite et al. 2010) and in Poso (Mcrae 2013). However, after a long period of physical clashes, both groups have finally come to realise that the collective action that they had once believed in had taken its toll on their personal lives and, for many, on their extended family. Therefore, instead of employing collective efficacy as an additional mediator, we argue that this indirect relation depends on the level of shared belief among ingroup members. For this, we hypothesise that *the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice is positively moderated by the level of collective efficacy; higher scores of collective efficacy show a stronger relation* (H1).

3. Method

This study uses a data set of six conflict regions in Indonesia from 2017. The documentation of the data set has been made publicly available by the authors (Setiawan et al. 2018). In short, we purposively selected research areas on the basis of three criteria: first, the areas should have a diverse population, at least in terms of religion; second, there has been salient interreligious competition in the past years over resources in the economic, political, and sociocultural domains; third, there has been interreligious violence in the form of damaging a house of worship and/or physical assaults in the past 10 years (starting

from 2016, when the survey was carried out). The following paragraphs describe how the survey gathered respondents in each selected area.

3.1. Respondents and Sampling Procedures

The data were gathered from May until August 2017 in Indonesia. The aim was to gather respondents aged 17–65 years old, randomly selected in hotspot locations where interreligious violence has occurred: Aceh Singkil, South Lampung, Bekasi, Poso, Kupang, and Sampang. The selection of locations thus covers a wide area of Indonesia. In total, the survey collected 2356 respondents from various religious affiliations. For our purpose, we selected only those who were Muslims or Christians. This resulted in a final number of 2237 respondents (1626 Muslims, and 611 Christians).

Two random sampling procedures were employed in the data collection. One procedure relied on the available regional population registry, and the other relied on a random walk. The former procedure was initiated by throwing dice to obtain a starting point and interval to randomly select a resident listed in the registration list. The latter procedure was conducted by selecting a starting point or a house, usually near the local subdistrict office, in a neighbourhood or a village. This starting point would be the first house to be approached. Next, from that house, the enumerators skipped two houses to approach the second respondent. The procedure was repeated until the survey obtained the target number of respondents in that neighbourhood or village. Although these two random selection procedures do not provide us with the degree of sampling representativeness, they provide the best approximation of a representation of the general population (aged 17–65) in the research areas (Babbie 1989).

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Support for Interreligious Violence

Our dependent variable is support for interreligious violence, which is measured by the extent to which respondents agree to take an exclusionary measure against the religious outgroup. The scale was adopted from a study by Subagya (2015) on support for ethnoreligious violence in Indonesia. Specifically, the scale consists of six items measuring to what extent individuals would support physical harm towards the religious outgroup members and their property. Examples of items are as follows: “I would support the damaging of property of other religions” and “I would support harm to persons of other religions to obtain more jobs”. Respondents were asked to rate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale; higher scores indicate higher support for interreligious violence.

We conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the scale’s validity. The results showed a good model fit, with $\chi^2(8, N = 2234) = 119.33, p < 0.000$, a comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.98, and a standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.02. The fit indices demonstrated that the model fits the data well (Hooper et al. 2008). As for the factor loadings, they ranged from 0.68 to 0.84, which indicates a medium to high range of representation of the factor. Finally, the scale also showed relatively high reliability among the respondents ($\alpha = 0.92$).

3.2.2. Religiocentrism

We employed a 5-item religiocentrism scale to assess to what extent individuals show positive attitudes towards their religious ingroup and, in the meantime, to what extent they show negative attitudes towards the religious outgroup (Sterkens and Anthony 2008). Statements such as “Thanks to our religion, most of us are good people” refer to positive attitudes, whereas statements such as “Other religions are often the cause of religious conflict” refer to negative attitudes.

Through CFA, we found that the model fits the data well: $\chi^2(4, N = 2218) = 28.68, p < 0.000$, CFI = 0.98, and SRMR = 0.02. In terms of the factor loadings, they were at a medium to high level, ranging from 0.42 to 0.81. Finally, the scale showed relatively high reliability among the respondents ($\alpha = 0.90$).

3.2.3. Mediator Variable: Perceived Injustice

Our mediator was operationalised as subjective perceptions and feelings of unjust experiences for one's own group (van Zomeren et al. 2008; Setiawan et al. 2020b). The three-item scale asks the respondents to what extent they agree or disagree that their religious group experiences unfair treatment. Respondents were asked to rate themselves on the following statements: (1) "My religious group experiences undeserving disadvantage"; (2) "My religious group is treated differently"; and (3) "My religious group experiences many unfair treatments". We calculated the total score of the scale, based on a 5-point Likert scale.

CFA revealed a good model fit: $\chi^2(1, N = 2233) = 44.77, p < 0.000$, CFI = 0.98, and SRMR = 0.05. Similarly, the factor loadings were within a high range, varying from 0.81 to 0.89. The scale was also shown to be highly reliable among the respondents ($\alpha = 0.88$).

3.2.4. Moderator Variable: Collective Efficacy

Collective efficacy measures to what extent respondents believe that their religious group has the capacity to carry out an action that can improve the group's conditions (Riggs and Knight 1994; van Zomeren et al. 2008). The scale consists of the following four items: (1) "My religious group can create political power to increase our influence"; (2) "My religious group has the ability to fight back any other religious power"; (3) "Demonstrations by our religious group can change unfair conditions"; and (4) "My religious group has the ability to do harm to other religions". Respondents were asked to rate their answer on a 5-point Likert scale, higher scores indicating higher collective efficacy.

CFA demonstrated a good model fit: $\chi^2(2, N = 2230) = 44.60, p < 0.000$, CFI = 0.98, and SRMR = 0.02. The factor loadings of all items were in the medium to high range, varying from 0.64 to 0.88. Finally, the scale was also highly reliable ($\alpha = 0.88$).

3.2.5. Demographic information

We also included demographic data to ensure that they do not influence the significant relations found in the statistical models. For this, we asked straightforward questions regarding respondents' age and gender. Further, we also asked respondents about their highest educational level and their individual income.

Prior to running the main analyses, we conducted preliminary analyses to make sure that our data meet the statistical assumptions. First, we checked the values of skewness and kurtosis of our dependent variable. The result showed that the values of skewness and kurtosis were less than 2 and 7, respectively, suggesting no substantial deviation from normality (Kim 2013). Second, we checked whether all predictors involved were linearly related to the dependent variable. The result confirmed that they were all linearly distributed. Third, we checked for the possible multicollinearity among the predictors. The results showed that the scores of variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics of the predictors are within the normal range (<10 and >0.2 , respectively). This suggests that there is no overly high-shared variance among the predictors (Field 2009).

4. Results

We first ran descriptive analyses to take a first look at the variables of interest. Table 1 provides a detailed account of the analyses. As we can see from the table, there is a significant difference between Muslims and Christians in terms of supporting interreligious violence. On average, Muslims ($M = 2.28, SD = 0.83$) are more supportive of interreligious violence than Christians are ($M = 1.86, SD = 0.64$), $t(2235) = 12.63, p < 0.001$. Similarly, on average, Muslim communities ($M = 3.18, SD = 0.66$; $M = 2.40, SD = 0.83$) are found to have higher scores in religiocentrism and collective efficacy than Christian communities have ($M = 2.77, SD = 0.76$; $M = 2.49, SD = 1.07$), $t(2227) = 11.80, p < 0.001$ and $t(2228) = 16.26$, and $p < 0.001$, respectively. Only in perceived injustice do we find no significant differences across religious groups.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and mean differences.

Variables	Range	Muslims		Christians		t-Test
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Interreligious violence	1–5	2.28	0.83	1.86	0.64	12.63
Religiocentrism	1–5	3.18	0.66	2.77	0.76	11.80
Perceived injustice	1–5	2.40	0.83	2.49	1.07	1.77
Collective efficacy	1–5	3.26	0.80	2.67	0.74	16.26
Individual characteristics						
Age	17–65	32.29	12.11	32.31	11.95	−0.03
Sex	0/1	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	-
Education	1–6	3.47	1.08	3.96	0.96	−10.26
Income	1–8	3.48	2.02	4.12	1.97	−6.66

Note: Bold indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ via a two-tailed test.

Next, we ran a second-stage moderated mediation to test the main hypothesis. Table 2 summarises the results of the analyses. We performed the analysis by using SPSS 27, with the help of Hayes’s PROCESS macro syntax (version 4). To properly run a second-stage moderated mediation analysis, we opted to use model 14 from the various models provided by PROCESS.

Table 2. Second-stage moderated mediation on religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived threat at the levels of collective efficacy (N = 2106, standard error in parentheses).

Variables	Model 1 IV → M (Path a)	Model 2 Moderated Mediation IV → Med and Mod → DV
Constant	1.37 (0.11)	1.92 (0.18)
Religiocentrism	0.33 (0.03)	0.11 (0.02)
Perceived injustice	-	−0.20 (0.06)
Collective efficacy	-	0.00 (0.04)
Interaction (perceived injustice X collective efficacy)	-	0.10 (0.02)
Age	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01 (0.00)
Sex (female as reference)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)
Religious affiliation(Christian and Catholic as reference)	−0.19 (0.04)	0.17 (0.03)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.01)
Income	0.02 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.00)
Adjusted R ²	0.07	0.21

Note: Bold indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ via a two-tailed test.

Here, we lay out the steps taken to reach the final results. First, the model runs multiple regression analysis, with the inclusion of demographic information as covariates,

to show that there is a relation between the independent variable (religiocentrism) and the mediator (perceived injustice). Here, we find that there is a significant relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence ($b = 0.33, p < 0.001$). From this, we learn that the first step (path a) towards a mediational relation has been established.

Second, the model automatically continues to run the moderated mediation by including the interaction between perceived injustice and collective efficacy as well as the demographic information. Here, we find that collective efficacy significantly moderates the relation between perceived injustice and support for interreligious violence ($b = 0.10, p < 0.001$). Surprisingly, a lower level of perceived injustice is found to associate with higher support for interreligious violence ($b = -0.20, p < 0.001$). We also find that there is a significant direct relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence ($b = 0.11, p < 0.001$).

Table 3 displays an index of moderated mediation = 0.03 (95%CI = 0.01; 0.05). Since there is no zero between the upper and lower limits, we can safely conclude that collective efficacy is a significant moderator of religiocentrism in support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice (see Hayes 2015 for moderated mediation). Specifically, the conditional indirect effect is strongest for those individuals with a high level of collective efficacy (>3.10 , effect = 0.06, 95% CI = 0.03; 0.08) and weakest for those with a low level of collective efficacy (<3.10 , effect = 0.00, 95% CI = -0.01 ; 0.02). From all this, we can confirm that our hypothesis that the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice is moderated by the level of collective efficacy is fully confirmed.

Table 3. Conditional effects of religiocentrism on support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice at the levels of collective efficacy.

Indirect Effect Religiocentrism → Perceived Injustice → Support for Interreligious Violence			
Level of Collective Efficacy	Effect	Lower Limit	Upper Limit
Low level (<3.10)	0.00	-0.01	0.02
Medium level (mean = 3.10)	0.03	0.01	0.05
High level (>3.10)	0.06	0.03	0.08
Index of moderated mediation 0.03		Lower limit 0.01	Upper limit 0.05

Note: Bold indicates a significant relation (values of the lower and upper limits do not cross zero).

Finally, Model 2 adds demographic information. It is shown that higher age ($b = -0.01, p < 0.001$), higher educational level ($b = -0.05, p < 0.001$), and higher income ($b = -0.03, p < 0.001$) are associated with lower support for interreligious violence. Consistent with the t -test above, on average, Muslim communities are found to show higher support for interreligious violence ($b = 0.17, p < 0.001$). In addition, women are associated with lower support for interreligious violence ($b = 0.07, p < 0.001$).

5. Discussion and Conclusions

This study set out to scrutinise the alternative role of collective efficacy in the relation between religious identification and support for interreligious violence among adults living in six hotspot regions in Indonesia. We argued that after prolonged interreligious conflicts, the mediating role of collective efficacy may shift to a moderator in the relation of interest. Therefore, we set out to answer whether the level of collective efficacy positively moderates the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice, higher scores of collective efficacy indicating a stronger relation. Our statistical model confirmed that a higher level of collective efficacy significantly moderates

the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice.

Our main finding revealed a plausible alternative role of collective efficacy in predicting a collective action. As shown by [van Zomeren et al. \(2008\)](#), collective efficacy is a relevant mediator, along with perceived injustice, in explaining to what extent individuals participate in a collective action. In a similar context, [Setiawan et al. \(2020b\)](#) also found that collective efficacy is a strong predictor of individuals' attitudes towards violent protests against the religious outgroup. The findings of previous studies definitely shed light on interreligious conflicts that occur worldwide. However, we should also consider the time involved in interreligious conflicts.

In prolonged interreligious conflicts between Muslims and Christians, such as in Indonesia, collective efficacy is no longer needed to tie the link between religious identification and exclusionary measures against the outgroup. Along with reinforcement from religious leaders, collective efficacy is inevitably instilled by religious ingroup members' perception towards various successes of the group in achieving its goals, in both Muslim and Christian groups, such as by collectively helping their selected political candidate win the regional elections, restricting other groups' worship activities, and influencing formal public regulations at the district, provincial, and national levels ([Human Rights Watch 2013](#); [Hadiz 2017](#)). All these experiences allow one's group-shared belief of one's religious capacity to carry out necessary collective actions to become part and parcel of their religious identity (see [Tajfel \(1982\)](#) and [Bar-Tal \(2007\)](#) for further explanation of the collective belief of one's identity). According to this, collective efficacy should no longer be seen as a necessary condition to promote support for interreligious violence. Instead, it is already present in the relation between religious identity and support for interreligious violence and should be seen in the sense of the extent to which it interacts with individuals' level of religiocentrism. Our finding corroborated previous studies that have demonstrated the conditional effect of collective efficacy in predicting intergroup behaviours ([Tasa et al. 2011](#)).

Our finding was also supported by mounting evidence of movements that advocate interreligious harmony and peacebuilding in different hotspot regions in Indonesia ([Al Qurtuby 2013](#)). This was partly due to the experience of certain religious group factions, from both Muslim and Christian communities, who also have successful experiences in fostering interreligious harmony and preventing the use of violence in resolving conflicts. Although previous studies have been concerned mostly with the role of successful violent attacks in collective efficacy, it is reasonable to suspect that success in pursuing religious harmony and in preventing violence is also a significant factor that shapes collective efficacy. Further, by knowing that, indeed, there are different factions within each religious group under study, this strengthens the argument that collective efficacy is part of individuals' religious identity and interacts with their religious identity manifestation in predicting their level of support for interreligious violence, instead of being a necessary condition to predict the support ([van Zomeren et al. 2012](#); [van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013](#)).

Although we did not explicitly test the role of time in this study, we argue that the time dimension of interreligious conflicts plays a significant role in determining the moderating role of collective efficacy (see [Karazsia and Berlin \(2018\)](#) for an explanation of the switch from a mediator to a moderator). As mentioned above, after a certain period of interreligious conflicts, when physical clashes subside, the religious groups involved would only need to perceive and feel unjust experiences to trigger their attitudes towards violence against the outgroup ([Mummendey et al. 1999](#); [van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013](#)). Hence, collective efficacy is no longer needed, because the levels of ingroup love and outgroup hate, while supported by experiences of injustice, are already sufficient to predispose individuals to show support for interreligious violence. In this case, collective efficacy will act as a moderator to predict the strength of the mediational relation. This, of course, should be further investigated with longitudinal data, taking into account the existence of different factions in each religious group in Indonesia.

Regarding the limitations, we acknowledge that this study had a few boundaries worth mentioning. First, the data set contained an overrepresentation of Muslim respondents. This condition, therefore, limited our generalisation to a wider area of the archipelago where Christians are the majority. Second, we focused solely on the interreligious conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities. This, of course, was relevant given the long history of interreligious conflicts between the two religious communities. However, we have also seen other conflicts involving Hindu and Buddhist communities, or Hindus and Muslims, such as in South Lampung (Humaedi 2014). Therefore, we encourage future studies to aim for wider coverage of interreligious conflicts in Indonesia.

In conclusion, we confirmed that collective efficacy significantly moderates the relation between religiocentrism and support for interreligious violence via perceived injustice. This finding confirmed our expectation that a higher level of shared belief among religious ingroup members would suggest a stronger relation between positive ingroup attitude and negative outgroup attitude, on one hand, and support for interreligious violence, on the other, via perceived injustice. Based on this, this study suggested that individuals, local agents, and government agencies should constantly promote positive interreligious contacts among religious groups to decrease stereotypical perceptions of religious outgroups, which in turn may reduce the level of religiocentrism (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Positive intergroup contacts may also promote peaceful resolution over interreligious conflicts, consequently promoting collective efficacy for peaceful resolution in times of conflict. In short, this study shed light on the current interreligious relations in Indonesia and paved the way for further discussion in preventing future interreligious conflicts.

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