A Social Network-Based Examination on Bid Riggers’ Relationships in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Theory of Collusive Bidding
2.2. Theory of Social Networks
2.3. Social Networks in Collusive Bidding
3. Research Design
3.1. Data Collection
3.2. Steps for Data Analysis
3.3. Collusive Network Indexes
4. Results
4.1. Collusive Bidding Network Indexes
4.1.1. Overall Network Analysis
4.1.2. Network Centrality Analysis
4.1.3. Condensation Analysis
4.2. Clustering Analysis
4.2.1. Basic Principle
4.2.2. K-Means Clustering Analysis
5. Findings and Discussion
5.1. Collusive Network Structure
5.2. Collusive Bidding Types
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Index | Number of Samples | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Skewness | Kurtosis |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Scale of collusive groups | 216 | 7.41 | 6.424 | 2 | 45 | 2.627 | 8.843 |
Number of individual participants | 216 | 12.07 | 9.312 | 3 | 60 | 2.199 | 5.972 |
Indicators | Expression | Collusion Connotation |
---|---|---|
Overall network density | The degree of contact and mutual influence between members of collusive bidding groups. | |
Average path length | The mean value of the number of intermediaries required for any two members to interact in the collusive network. | |
Degree centrality | The degree of concentration of power control distribution in the collusive network. | |
Between centrality | The degree of concentration of members of the collusive network at the location of the information and resource control intermediary. | |
Closeness centrality | The degree to which the collusive network is not controlled by power and the difficulty of member interaction. | |
Condensation coefficient | The cohesion and anti-attack ability of the collusive network. |
Cluster Center | Cluster 1 | Cluster 2 | Cluster 3 |
---|---|---|---|
Overall network density | 0.533 | 0.333 | 0.132 |
Average path length | 3.022 | 2.889 | 1.567 |
Condensation coefficient | 0.806 | 0.460 | 0.002 |
Degree central potential index | 0.493 | 0.324 | 0.705 |
Intermediate central potential index | 0.268 | 0.566 | 0.918 |
Near central potential index | 0.615 | 0.451 | 0.896 |
Number of cluster members | 70 | 90 | 56 |
First Type | Second Type | Third Type |
---|---|---|
Strong accessibility | Strong accessibility | Weak accessibility |
Weak centrality | Strong centrality | Strong centrality |
High stability | High stability | Low stability |
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Xiao, L.; Ye, K.; Zhou, J.; Ye, X.; Tekka, R.S. A Social Network-Based Examination on Bid Riggers’ Relationships in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of China. Buildings 2021, 11, 363. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings11080363
Xiao L, Ye K, Zhou J, Ye X, Tekka RS. A Social Network-Based Examination on Bid Riggers’ Relationships in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of China. Buildings. 2021; 11(8):363. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings11080363
Chicago/Turabian StyleXiao, Liang, Kunhui Ye, Junhong Zhou, Xiaoting Ye, and Ramadhani Said Tekka. 2021. "A Social Network-Based Examination on Bid Riggers’ Relationships in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of China" Buildings 11, no. 8: 363. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings11080363