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Games, Volume 5, Issue 4 (December 2014) – 3 articles , Pages 191-256

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318 KiB  
Article
Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games
by Edward J. Cartwright and Denise Lovett
Games 2014, 5(4), 234-256; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040234 - 14 Nov 2014
Cited by 11 | Viewed by 8252
Abstract
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in [...] Read more.
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game. Full article
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288 KiB  
Article
Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences
by Richard F. Potthoff
Games 2014, 5(4), 204-233; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040204 - 30 Oct 2014
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5900
Abstract
This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more mathematical. The setting is one where an election is to choose a single winner from m (> 2) candidates, it is postulated that voters have [...] Read more.
This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more mathematical. The setting is one where an election is to choose a single winner from m (> 2) candidates, it is postulated that voters have knowledge of the preference profile of the electorate, and preference cycles are limited. Both papers devise voting systems whose two key goals are to select a Condorcet winner (if one exists) and to resist manipulation. These systems entail equilibrium strategies where everyone votes sincerely, no group of voters sharing the same preference ordering can gain by deviating given that no one else deviates, and the Condorcet candidate wins. The present paper uses two unusual ballot types. One asks voters to rank the candidates with respect both to their own preferences and to their discerned order of preference of the entire electorate. The other just asks voters for their own preference ranks plus approval votes. Novel mathematical elements distinguish this paper. Its Condorcet completion methods examine all candidate triples, sometimes analyze loop(s) of some of those triples, and order candidates in a set by first determining the last-place candidate. Its non-manipulability proofs involve mathematical induction on m. Full article
244 KiB  
Article
A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities
by Heinrich H. Nax
Games 2014, 5(4), 191-203; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040191 - 21 Oct 2014
Cited by 9 | Viewed by 5341
Abstract
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The [...] Read more.
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed. Full article
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