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Games, Volume 5, Issue 2 (June 2014) – 4 articles , Pages 92-139

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230 KiB  
Article
The Seawall Bargaining Game
by Rémy Delille and Jean-Christophe Pereau
Games 2014, 5(2), 127-139; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5020127 - 24 Jun 2014
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 5192
Abstract
Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for [...] Read more.
Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
204 KiB  
Article
Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony
by João Ricardo Faria, Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., Steven B. Caudill and Samantha J. Wineke
Games 2014, 5(2), 116-126; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5020116 - 20 May 2014
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 6166
Abstract
Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each [...] Read more.
Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each other and positively influence the payoff of the contest. We assume that legal effort affects the prize value, increasing the winner’s prospective rents, and research effort impacts the probability of winning the contest. The results of the model break new ground in showing that research effort is a function of legal effort, wherein research effort increases with rent-seeking effort. The model also shows the existence of a strategic equivalence between rent seeking and patent races. Full article
239 KiB  
Article
Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities
by Anat Lerner and Rica Gonen
Games 2014, 5(2), 97-115; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5020097 - 30 Apr 2014
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 5255
Abstract
We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one [...] Read more.
We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation: one of the players is subject to a publicly known budget constraint. We show that if it is publicly known that the valuation for the largest bundle is less than the budget for at least one of the players, then Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) uniquely fulfills the basic properties of being deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal. Our characterization of the efficient space for deterministic budget constrained combinatorial auctions is similar in spirit to that of Maskin 2000 for Bayesian single-item constrained efficiency auctions and comparable with Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 for non-constrained combinatorial auctions. Full article
226 KiB  
Short Note
Sequential Rationality in Continuous No-Limit Poker
by Thomas W. L. Norman
Games 2014, 5(2), 92-96; https://doi.org/10.3390/g5020092 - 14 Apr 2014
Viewed by 4648
Abstract
Newman’s (1959, Operations Research, 7, 557–560) solution for a variant of poker with continuous hand spaces and an unlimited bet size is modified to incorporate sequential rationality. Full article
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